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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that presence in the performing arts can be reconceived, via the 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, as an encounter with difference or ‘differential presence’ 
which is variously defined as immanence, destratification, affect/becoming, and 
duration. These definitions are developed through a series of four analyses of exemplary 
performance practices:  1) The Living Theatre; 2) Antonin Artaud; 3) Allan Kaprow and 
4) Goat Island.  
 
Chapter One rehabilitates the Living Theatre from a dominant narrative of ‘failure’, 
aided by the Deleuzian concepts of ontological participation, immanence, 
production/creation and ‘the people to come’. Reframing the company as pioneers of 
methods such as audience participation and collective creation, the chapter argues that 
their theatrical ambition is irreducible to some simple pursuit of undifferentiated 
presence (as authenticity or communion).   
 
Chapter Two provides an exposition of three key concepts emerging in the encounter 
between Artaud and Deleuze: the body without organs, the theatre without organs, and 
the destratified voice. The chapter proposes that To have done with the judgment of god 
constitutes an instance of a theatre without organs that uses the destratified voice in a 
pursuit of differential presence – as a nonrepresentative encounter with difference that 
forces new thoughts upon us.  
 
Chapter Three defines differential presence in relation to Deleuze’s concepts of affect 
and becoming-imperceptible and Kaprow’s concepts of ‘experienced insight’, nonart, 
‘becoming “the whole”’, and attention. The chapter argues that Kaprow and Deleuze 
share a concern to theorize the practice of participating in actuality beyond the 
subject/object distinction, in a manner that promotes an ethico-political sense of taking 
part in “the whole”. 
 
Finally, Chapter Four focuses on the temporal aspect of differential presence, arguing 
that through slowness, waiting, repetition and imitation, Goat Island’s performance 
work acknowledges and responds to ‘the need to open ourselves affectively to the 
actuality of others’ (Mullarkey 2003: 488).  
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Introduction 
 
 
This thesis seeks to develop the concept of ‘differential presence’ in 
performance, by setting up encounters between the work of French philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze (1925-1995) and that of four different performance practitioners, chosen on 
account of their capacity to exemplify the value of bringing Deleuze to the study of 
presence: the Living Theatre, Antonin Artaud, Allan Kaprow and Goat Island. As a 
whole, the thesis is motivated by a series of core questions: What are the implications of 
Deleuze’s thought for the theorisation of these practices with regard to presence? How 
can his philosophy be employed to generate a new understanding of presence in 
performance that differs from the deconstructive argument, but nevertheless, does not 
involve some kind of return to essentialism or traditional metaphysics? Given 
Performance Studies’ proven commitment to the concept and experience of presence, 
can Deleuze help us to think in terms of differential presence, rather than in terms of 
difference as that which renders presence impossible? Can one be ‘present to’ (‘with’, 
‘in’ or ‘among’) difference as becoming rather than being; and in what sense can 
performance be said to offer such encounters with difference to the artist and audience? 
In other words, the thesis’ central question is: what is differential presence, and how 
does it work in performance? In turn, its core proposition is that differential presence 
does happen in performance, and that this encounter deserves the attention of 
performance theory and practice, audiences and artists.  
 
Organized conceptually, rather than chronologically, the narrative arc of the 
thesis begins with the Living Theatre whose practice will be framed as both pioneering 
and problematic in relation to the pursuit of differential presence, and ends with Goat 
Island who seem to solve not only the practical problems associated with performing 
differential presence but also the philosophical problems that have recently been 
assigned to the more Virtualist aspects of Deleuze’s thought. In other words, we start at 
a conceptual point where it seems as if performance needs to become adequate to 
Deleuze’s philosophy of difference; but we finish in a situation in which practice has 
become an exemplary mode of participatory and performative philosophy. Although it 
happens that Goat Island’s performances are the most contemporary of the examples we 
will address, this is not a narrative of temporal progress. Rather, the thesis begins with 
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the Living Theatre’s work as a practice that generates a set of questions regarding the 
nature of differential presence and the problems raised by its pursuit as an aesthetic, 
philosophical and ethico-political goal. As the chapters unfold, I will suggest that the 
practices that follow provide multiple ‘solutions’ to these problems – where a ‘solution’ 
is understood in Deleuze’s own sense, as one creative response amongst others.  
 
A contemporary of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, Deleuze has, over the 
last fifteen years, proved to be an extremely fruitful thinker for scholars across the 
disciplines, leading to the recent genesis of the interdisciplinary field known as Deleuze 
Studies. Despite the vibrancy of this field as a whole, relatively few Theatre and 
Performance Studies scholars have chosen to engage with Deleuze’s work and fewer 
still have addressed his philosophy from the point of view of presence in performance. I 
first encountered Deleuze’s philosophy during my Masters study at Goldsmiths College 
in London from 2002-4. At Goldsmiths, a Deleuzian vocabulary had already infiltrated 
a range of disciplines including cultural studies, sociology and fine art and a series of 
research events took place, which framed their interests in Deleuzian terms1. Since 
Deleuze, and other process philosophers such as Bergson and Whitehead, provided the 
dominant theoretical framework for much of the research activity being undertaken at 
the college, I was surprised by his relative absence from theoretical discussion in 
Performance Studies as I embarked on my PhD.  
 
Likewise, Deleuze Studies has, hitherto, paid insufficient attention to Deleuze’s 
engagement with theatre and performance. One aim of this thesis, then, is to make good 
this lack by questioning the implications of Deleuze’s thought for the theorisation of 
presence in much the same way as other scholars have already mined the resources of, 
for example, deconstruction, phenomenology and psychoanalysis. As this introduction 
will discuss, Deleuze’s thought has much in common with Derrida’s, sharing his 
concern to retrieve the notion of ‘difference’ from its lowly position in the Western 
philosophical tradition, which has tended to conceive it derivatively as opposition and 
negation in relation to a primary identity or sameness. But, as I will also emphasise, 
Deleuze has a different concept of difference from Derrida, and is less concerned with 
undermining presence by introducing absence, than with multiplying presence by 
incorporating difference directly within it (Lampert 2006: 28).  
                                                 
1 One example of such a research event would be the one day conference, Mapping Intensities held in 
June 2004, which I was involved in organising. The conference addressed art and architecture from a 
Deleuzian perspective, with speakers including Stefano Boeri, Mark Tribe and Sarah Cook.  
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This introduction is comprised of five sections. In the first section, there will be 
a general introduction to the concept of presence, exploring both its etymological roots 
and aspects of its history of usage in Performance Studies. The second section will 
provide an account of Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence, the subsequent 
take-up of this critique in Performance Studies, and finally the critique of this critique, 
or what we might describe as the recuperation of presence by contemporary 
performance theory. This trio of discourses, I will argue, forms a significant part of the 
theoretical context for this research project. In the third section, the similarities and 
differences between Derrida and Deleuze’s projects with regard to presence will be 
outlined, after which there will be a theoretical introduction to Deleuze’s philosophy 
based on an exposition of the concepts of ‘difference’, ‘becoming’, ‘affect’, ‘the 
event’/the ‘virtual/actual’ distinction, and ‘duration’. I will then go on to explore why 
this particular project on Deleuze and presence is a valuable addition and original 
contribution to the current context. On the one hand, this context includes the existing 
literature on our four chosen practitioners and their relation to presence. On the other, it 
includes the contributions provided by what little literature there is on Deleuze and 
presence in Performance Studies. In the fourth part of the introduction, we move onto 
the question of this project’s methodology. Initially, this will be addressed by 
examining the difficulties involved in thinking that there is such a thing as a Deleuzian 
methodology, before we go on to look at Deleuze’s idea of ‘transcendental empiricism’ 
as a methodological concept. Finally, the fifth section returns to the analysis of the key 
research questions motivating the thesis, and accounts both for the choices of examples 
of practices and for the necessary omissions that occur in this, as in any, bounded and 
finite project. This section then closes with an introduction to the chapters that follow 
based on an explanation of the conceptual, rather than chronological, logic that 
determines their order. 
 
 
1.  Introducing presence 
 
 As Gabriella Giannachi has discussed, the etymology of the word ‘presence’ 
comes from ‘prae (before) sens (sum: I am), ie., ‘before I am – in front of me – in view 
of me’. But as Giannachi notes, sens is also ‘the present participle of esse (to be),’ and, 
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as such, establishes a link between the notion of presence and the idea of a proximity to 
being, in its metaphysical sense. From this, Giannachi concludes that  
 
presence indicates that which is corollary to, around and before being, 
where the emphasis is on being. This suggests that presence indicates 
something other than the self which is witnessed in its occurrence. 
This also suggests that being is indeed separate but indispensable to a 
reading and understanding of presence (Giannachi 2006: n.p.). 
 
This, of course, is in contrast to the notion of ‘ab-sens’ where ‘ab’ indicates a position 
of being far off or away from being. These ideas: of presence as an encounter between a 
self and an other (or between an identity and difference), and of presence as involving a 
relationship with metaphysical being will be crucial for this thesis. However, one key 
objective of the project is to suggest that Deleuze’s thought allows us to conceive of 
presence beyond the subject/object distinction that defines the paradigm of 
representation. Presence, as ‘the state of being before, in front of, or in the same place 
with a person or thing’ (OED), is redefined as being among the other, ‘within it, 
together in a zone of proximity’ (Lawlor 2008: n.p.). But this participation is a presence 
among or within difference-in-itself, not an event of recognition; I am not before some 
‘thing’ I recognize, but swept up within a multiplicity that I cannot fully know or 
understand. In turn, the thesis will draw from Deleuze to argue that presence as 
differential presence, is not so much a state to be occupied, but a creative process in 
which one might take part; differential presence never arrives or ends, but is always 
complete in and as the process of becoming. I will expand on Deleuze’s concept of 
becoming in Part Two of this introduction, but first I want to look at some of the ways 
in which the notion of presence has been defined, beyond its etymological origins, in 
performance theory. 
 
The concept of presence in performance has been given a vast array of 
definitions and been evoked, both as a positive and negative value, for a multitude of 
rhetorical purposes. Of these myriad concepts, perhaps the most familiar or most widely 
used is what Jane Goodall (2008) calls ‘stage presence,’ what Cormac Power refers to 
as ‘the auratic mode of presence’ (Power 2008: 47), and Joseph Roach (2007) simply 
calls ‘It’: the concept of presence as the charismatic magnetism of a performer. ‘In 
theatrical parlance,’ Philip Auslander explains  
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presence usually refers to the relationship between actor and audience 
– the actor as manifestation before the audience – or more specifically 
to the actor’s psychophysical attractiveness to the audience, a concept 
related to that of charisma (Auslander 1997: 62 – original emphasis). 
 
Or, as Patrice Pavis puts it, ‘to have presence… is to know how to capture the attention 
of the public and make an impression’. But more than this, he suggests, ‘it is also to be 
endowed with a je ne sais quoi which triggers an immediate feeling of identification in 
the spectator, communicating a sense of living elsewhere and in an eternal present’ 
(Pavis 1998: 285). Here, Pavis’ definition introduces a number of important concepts 
that continue to be associated with presence in both its philosophical and theatrical 
context, including: power, mystery, immediacy, feeling, identification, communication 
and spatio-temporal transcendence.  
 
But there are many other definitions beyond the association of presence with 
charisma. Suzanne M. Jaeger, for instance, describes how contemporary performers 
might use the term when they ‘talk about “being in the moment” or having an “on 
performance,” in the sense of being really on top of it, or in good form’ (Jaeger 2006: 
123). In these instances, presence might be used to name ‘a feeling of being fully alive 
to the audience and other performers, a feeling of supreme control and power, but also 
paradoxically an openness to the contingencies of a live performance’ (ibid.). It is less 
about the performers’ possession of charisma, then, and more about having ‘a special 
capacity for spontaneity’ (ibid.). Likewise, Pavis himself extends his definition of 
presence to include the audience who might use the concept of presence to refer to an 
intense experience of ‘being there’ – akin to what Power refers to as ‘the fictional mode 
of presence’ (Power 2008: 15) – in which any distinction between fiction and reality 
collapses (Pavis 1998: 286).  
 
‘Being there,’ in this instance, is not conceived in terms of having a heightened 
awareness of the present, so much as a sense of the presence or presentness of a 
fictional world. In contrast, in 1967, the modernist art theorist Michael Fried would 
critique minimalist sculpture and theatricality in general, precisely on the basis that it 
was structured in order to foreground an awareness of the temporal process of viewing 
the work of art – akin to what Power calls ‘the literal mode of presence’ (Power 2008: 
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87). For Fried, that is, the idea that presence was the ‘sine qua non of theatre’ 
functioned as the devalued opposite in relation to the eternal or timeless nature of the 
modernist painting. Whereas theatre was derided for its preoccupation with the 
durational nature of aesthetic experience and intolerable dependence on an audience to 
complete it, the modernist work of art was valued for its autonomy through the 
transcendence of temporality (which Fried describes as its ‘presentness’) (Fried 1998: 
167). For Fried then, the notion of ‘modernist theatre’ would be an oxymoron; 
theatricality could never strip away all extraneous or differentiating elements, because it 
could not exist or could not be made without consideration for an audience. In contrast, 
those who are now described as the modernism’s theatrical visionaries – like Artaud and 
Grotowski – perceived non-representational presence as the specific power of the 
theatrical medium.  
 
But it was Jacques Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence, and his 
critique of Artaud’s aim, that would ultimately have the most significant impact on the 
status of the concept of presence in performance, as the second part of this introduction 
will now discuss. Until relatively recently and largely on account of this critique, 
‘presence’ has been something of an excluded term in Performance Studies insofar as it 
came to be associated with the aim to establish direct, unmediated contact or 
‘communion’ between audience and performance. In this next section, we explore this 
deconstructive critique in both its philosophical and performative contexts, before 
addressing the subsequent critiques of this critique and introducing the key studies that 
constitute the current revival of presence as a central concept for performance.  
 
 
2.  “After Derrida”: The thesis in the context of the critique of presence 
 
2.1 The critique of the metaphysics of presence 
 
As we’ve seen, the term ‘presence’ carries with it a particular set of connotations 
when used in the context of performance. But, of course, it also has a precise history as 
a philosophical concept: a context that has, in some cases, strongly informed the 
theorisation of presence in performance and continues to provide new ways for us to 
think our experiences of performance: whether as artists or audience. That is, both 
Western performance and Western philosophy have rich traditions of thinking presence 
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that intersect with one another in the work of theatrically minded philosophers – like 
Deleuze – and philosophically minded artists like Artaud. As such, rather than attempt 
the impossible task of summarising the plethora of ways in which both fields have 
separately defined presence, I will position this thesis as part of a tradition of discourse 
concerned with the implications of philosophical presence for performance and vice 
versa, of the performance of presence for philosophy.  
 
One primary area of intersection that forms the context for this thesis is the critique 
of the metaphysics of presence by Derrida (taking his lead from Nietzsche and 
Heidegger), and the impact of that critique in Theatre and Performance Studies. 
Metaphysics is perhaps most easily defined as an area of philosophical enquiry 
motivated by the question: ‘“what is being?” or “what is being as a whole?”’ (Bell 
2006: 27) and is associated particularly with figures such as Plato and Hegel. In Of 
Grammatology (1967), Derrida repeats Heidegger’s call to overturn this metaphysical 
tradition as that which ‘thinks in terms of... truth as correctness’ (Heidegger in Bell 
2006: 28), of the coincidence of thought and the world, and therefore, of the possibility 
of ‘the presence of truth as self-evidence’ or givenness (Bell 2006: 28 – emphasis 
original). The totalising claims of metaphysics are always unquestioningly based upon 
an assumed presence of being, or the self-identity of an ultimate, underlying reality, as 
their condition of possibility. This founding presence or self-sameness, makes truth or 
the knowledge of reality, possible. Building upon Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics, 
Derrida suggests that each of the categories that philosophers have used to try to ground 
philosophy – such as consciousness, or being – are always synonyms for the Now, or 
the present (consciousness of the self now, being that is present to hand now). What 
they forget is that the Now is always deferred and, as such, that self-presence is 
impossible in the flux of temporality.  
 
But Derrida also argues that the very idea of self-presence is based on an act of 
exclusion or differentiation; presence relies upon and yet denies a notion of the 
fundamentally different or ‘other’ in order to define itself. One example of this to which 
Derrida returns, is a sense of time or temporal difference; when, for instance, we posit 
speech as immediacy and self-presence, we imply and yet forget what is for Derrida the 
irreducible delay between thinking, speaking and hearing. As is well known, Derrida 
coins the term ‘différance’ to refer to this ‘movement of both temporal deferring and 
spatial differing’, a pure difference which he goes on to argue is ‘the transcendental 
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condition for the possibility of differentiation’ (ibid., 59). Différance both makes 
possible and forever defers the idea of ‘a self coming into presence with itself’ such as 
‘the plenitude of hearing oneself speak and of having a substantiality intimately tied to 
the vocalized expression of our ideas’ (ibid., 29).  
 
In particular, Derrida was concerned with the relationship between language and 
meaning, in the context of which différance suggested that meaning could never be fully 
present in language, but would always be ‘at once “differential” and “deferred”, the 
product of a restless play within language that cannot be fixed or pinned down for the 
purposes of conceptual definition’ (Norris 1987: 15). Neither in the form of speech nor 
writing can language be understood to have a stable meaning or “transcendental 
signified”. The work of ‘deconstruction’, in turn, as the philosophical methodology 
derived from the concept of différance, is to locate instances of this double 
presupposition and denial at work in other philosophical texts: the notions of impurity 
that are inseparable from concepts of the pure, the false from the true, the copy from the 
original and so forth. Texts are constantly trying to keep différance at bay as that which 
threatens their self-present meaning, but Derrida’s deconstructions repeatedly use close 
reading as a technique to reveal the constitutive role of the excluded ‘other’ and the 
underlying play of meanings operating beneath the philosophers’ intention to express 
simple, self-evident truths. To give an example, Derrida suggests that Husserl’s 
attempts to argue for the self-presence and immediacy of the voice are undercut within 
his own text and on account of the unstable meanings of the language he employs. It is 
this, in turn, that allows Derrida to argue that the voice is never immediate, but always 
mediated by signs and the ‘flux’ of temporality.  
 
 
2.2 Presence in performance becomes a ‘powerful illusion’ 
  
Derrida’s thought undoubtedly had a significant impact on performance, particularly 
as a result of his critique of Artaud (which we will examine in Chapter Two) and of 
those practitioners who conceived themselves as Artaud’s faithful followers. After 
Derrida, Marvin Carlson suggests, ‘theorists and performers could no longer 
comfortably embrace the goal of pure presence so attractive to modernism’ (Carlson 
1996: 135-6); it was now understood to be naïve to express a desire for performance to 
construct an unmediated, direct presence with its audience. To a great extent, this shift 
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was based on the generalised acceptance of the idea that presence was ‘always already’ 
mediated or differentiated by representation, the argument that Derrida put forward in 
order to deconstruct what he perceived to be Artaud’s aspirations for the Theatre of 
Cruelty. Rather than as the basis of performance, presence was now understood as an 
effect of performance. 
 
An early proponent of this perspective was Herbert Blau, who, as early as 1983, 
argued that  
 
There is nothing more illusory in performance than the illusion of the 
unmediated. It is a very powerful illusion in the theatre, but it is theatre, 
and it is theatre, the truth of illusion which haunts all performance, 
whether or not it occurs in a theatre (Blau 1983: 143).  
 
Likewise, it is largely this argument that we see at work in Philip Auslander’s essay, 
‘“Just be your self”: Logocentrism and difference in performance theory’ (1986/1997), 
which attempts to deconstruct the acting theories of Stanislavski, Grotowski and Brecht 
for their presumption that acting could serve as a transparent medium for the revelation 
of the actor’s self. For each one, Auslander claims, there is some kind of pre-
representational and fully present self that acts as the independent ground for the 
process of performance (just as logocentrism presumes that there is some autonomous 
order of truth and meaning that serves as the foundation for philosophizing). Regardless 
of the apparent differences between how each of these three figures construe the process 
of acting, the actor’s self (understood by Stanislavski, for example, as the actor’s 
subconscious experience) functions as an unquestioned source of truth.  
 
In turn, Auslander argues, the capacity to expose this real self has been purported to 
provide theatre’s audiences with privileged access to universal human truths beyond 
cultural differences (Auslander 1997: 30). For Auslander, in contrast, this self-presence 
is not simply ‘there’ to be discovered in the process of actor training or performance, 
rather ‘the self which is supposedly exposed through the medium of acting is in fact 
produced by the mediation of psychotechnique between the conscious and the 
unconscious levels of the actor’s psyche’ (Auslander 1997: 32 – emphasis added). 
Auslander argues that to follow Derrida, acting theory must appreciate that this self is 
not a pure presence, but a presence that can only be recognised as such, by actor and 
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audience, insofar as it is a function of theatrical language and ‘inseparable from the 
language by which it expresses itself’ (ibid. 34). Even the physical body, to which 
Grotowski turns (Auslander argues), cannot give access to transparent, undifferentiated 
presence since it too ‘becomes absent from itself, passing itself off as, and taking itself 
for, the mind’ (Derrida 1978: 186).  
 
Given the dominance of such arguments, figures like Artaud and the Living Theatre, 
who had been so strongly associated with the pursuit of presence, began to fall out of 
favour. Indeed, as Power has discussed, Elinor Fuchs’ article, ‘Presence and the 
Revenge of Writing: Re-thinking Theatre After Derrida’ (1985) very much suggests 
that, since the eighties, practitioners sought to reform the theatre for the poststructuralist 
era, by performing their self-reflexive awareness of ‘the stage as a site of representation 
and citation rather than “Presence” and “immediacy”’ (Power 2008: 118). In particular, 
Fuchs suggests that theatre needed to move on from the absolute value she perceives to 
be accorded to presence by figures like Julian Beck and Michael Goldman, under the 
influence of Artaud and Grotowski. For them, she argues, theatre was uniquely 
equipped to fulfil the longing to possess the present and to possess the self in the present 
that characterised the contemporary condition, such that ‘the exalted goal served by the 
actor was nothing less than the recuperation of full Reality’ (Fuchs 1985: 164). For 
Fuchs, The Living Theatre, amongst others, are positioned as ripe for deconstruction 
because she sees them as trusting speech over script, and the body over language, as the 
means to locate an inner self. 
 
In turn, Fuchs argues that the avant-garde Theatre of Presence that was seen to have 
dominated the 1960s and 70s had now been surpassed by a post-Derridean Theatre of 
Absence that ‘displaces the Subject’ and ‘destabilizes meaning’ (ibid., 165). ‘In a 
motion that parallels Derrida’s deconstruction of speech and writing’, Fuchs claims, 
‘theatre practitioners have begun to expose the normally “occulted” textuality behind 
the phonocentric fabric of performance’ (Fuchs 1985: 166). While actors once feigned 
spontaneity in their speech, gesture and behaviour, the new theatre – including 
practitioners such as The Wooster Group and Richard Foreman – now has ‘writing – as 
subject, activity and artifact’ at its centre (ibid. 163). While writing once ‘retired behind 
the apparent presence of performance’, it now takes centre stage. In this way, as Jon 
Erickson pointed out in 1995, Fuchs’ account seems to take Derrida’s concept of 
‘writing’ literally, rather than in the expanded sense in which it was arguably intended. 
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Writing, for Derrida, is not just literally written discourse (as in the script), but ‘the 
trace of differentiation per se, as both the predication and the erasure of Being’ 
(Erickson 1995: n.p.). 
 
 In each of these cases of deconstructive performance theory we can see that 
presence is associated with the undifferentiated and with immediate contact, whether in 
the context of the actor’s self-relation or the relation between the actor and audience. 
But, were pre-Derrida concepts of presence in performance really as simple or naïve as 
these theories suggest? In response, let us now end this section by contrasting 
Auslander’s conclusions with those of another deconstructionist who interprets the 
implications of Derrida for performance in a different way: the French theorist, Josette 
Féral and her article, ‘Performance and Theatricality: The Subject Demystified’ (1982), 
which pre-dates all the other Derridean performance theory we have looked at thus far.  
 
With Auslander, as we’ve seen, presence is associated with performance 
understood as the transparent communication of truth and with the concept of a natural, 
pre-representational self as the foundation of acting. Indeed, for him, imagining the 
performance of différance is an ‘impossible task’ since ‘différance is itself a manifest 
term for something which properly has no name and does not exist’ (Auslander 1997: 
38). One cannot perform différance because différance does not exist. Better, Auslander 
suggests, to devise ‘performance equivalents for Derrida’s practice of writing “under 
erasure”, using language bound up in the metaphysics of presence and crossing it out’ 
(ibid.). In contrast, Féral argues that performance – and specifically, the differential 
repetition of gesture in Vito Acconci’s piece Red Tapes (1976) – can operate as 
‘Derrida’s différance made perceptible’ (Féral in Murray 1997: 292), an operation she 
associates with the presence of performance or non-representational theatre as distinct 
from representational theatre. Using Derrida’s vocabulary at the same time as implicitly 
challenging Derrida’s own reading of Artaud, Féral proposes that the performance 
practices of the previous two decades provide us with actual examples (and hence the 
proof of the possibility) of the very non-representational theatre that Artaud had sought 
to construct (ibid., 289). With Acconci, but also in the case of Kaprow and the Living 
Theatre, Féral argues, performance is ‘a theatre of cruelty and violence, of the body and 
its drives, of displacement and “disruption”, a non-narrative and non-representational 
theatre’ (ibid.). Performance, she says, ‘is the death of the subject’ because 
‘performance means nothing and aims for no single, specific meaning, but attempts 
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instead to reveal places of passage’ (ibid., 293); likewise, performing is not about 
representing either a character or oneself, but about becoming ‘a source of production’ 
and ‘the point of passage for energy flows’. Though she does not refer to Deleuze and 
Guattari, Féral seems to see the performer as what they call a ‘desiring-machine’ when 
she argues that ‘The gestures that he carries out lead to nothing if not to the flow of the 
desire that sets them in motion’ (ibid.).  
 
Significantly, Auslander has a critique of Féral’s essay that chooses to neglect 
much of this detail in favour of arguing that her position has much in common with 
Fried’s in terms of its emphasis on ‘presentness’. ‘Whereas Fried posits presentness as a 
defining characteristic of modernist art,’ he argues, ‘Féral… posit[s] it as a defining 
characteristic of postmodern performance’ (Auslander 1997: 56). Auslander neglects to 
discuss Féral’s allusions to the presence of difference (or differential presence), in 
favour of unfairly criticising what he perceives as her (modernist) attachment to notions 
of medium specificity. Indeed, he describes her essay as dressing up ‘Greenbergian 
aesthetics in poststructuralist clothing’ (ibid.). In contrast, we are arguing that Féral 
moves between referring to the presence of difference in ‘performance’, ‘non-
representational theatre’ and ‘theatricality’, rather than constructing a rigid opposition 
between the media of performance and theatre. And, indeed, we are proposing that her 
essay provides an important precedent for thinking presence as difference, rather than as 
the denial of difference. That is, although Féral’s references to the actor’s body as a 
‘point of passage’ and performance as the revelation of ‘places of passage’ could seem 
to reiterate a standard metaphysics of presence (in which ‘passage’ is derived from 
‘point’ and ‘place’), from a Deleuzian perspective one could read her text as an effort to 
think towards the passage of places and points. 
 
 
2.3 Critiques of the critique of presence, or, the revival of presence 
 
There have already been a number of critiques of the deconstructive period in 
performance theory. As early as 1990, for example, Roger Copeland argued against 
Fuchs’ reduction of theatrical presence to phonocentrism, proposing that  
 
presence in the theatre has less to do with the distinction between 
speaking and writing than with the way in which the architectural and 
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technological components of the performance space promote or 
inhibit a sense of ‘reciprocity’ between actors and spectators 
(Copeland in Auslander 2003: 308). 
 
Likewise, at the first Performance Studies International conference in NYU in March 
1995, Jon Erickson presented a paper “A Critique of the Critique of Presence”2 in which 
he criticised  
 
certain theories being put forward at that time about avant-garde 
performance and the necessity of such performance to undermine 
any sense or illusion of presence for the spectator as an 
intrinsically political action (Erickson 2006: 144). 
 
Thinking precisely of scholars like Fuchs and Auslander, but also of Michael 
Vanden Heuvel’s Performing Drama/Dramatizing Performance (1991), Erickson 
argued that the concept of presence had mistakenly come to be associated primarily 
with the troubling authority of theatre’s illusions, and with mindless absorption in 
contrast to an alienating, or absenting, theatricality. For him, this has very little to do 
with deconstruction; or rather, it constitutes an attempt to ‘wed a certain reading of 
Derrida with a Brechtian tradition’ (Erickson 1995: n.p.). Presence, here, comes to be 
associated with the masquerading of ideology as naturalism and the playwright’s desire 
for mastery over theatrical meaning (Vanden Heuvel 1991: 4). In contrast, Erickson 
reiterates that Derridean presence is about the longing for the transcendental signified, 
and the desire to possess the present, both of which are construed as effects of, and 
rendered impossible by, différance. If presence is something we want but can’t have, 
Erickson goes on to suggest, it makes no sense to say that it needs to be undermined. 
Theatre never gave us the experience of self-presence in the first place (ibid). As a 
result, Erickson suggests, the critique of presence is not as political as it thinks it is; 
rather, it is merely a ‘radicalized formalism’ (ibid.) that tries to attribute some kind of 
‘moral imperative’ to breaking presence understood as ‘the fundamental hypnotic hold 
of dramatic absorption’ (Erickson 2006: 144). 
 
Aspects of Erickson’s argument have since been reiterated and expanded upon 
by Cormac Power, who points out that  
                                                 
2 Thanks to Jon Erickson for providing access to a copy of this important, yet unpublished paper.  
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Far from wishing to replace the notion of presence with ‘absence’ or 
‘textuality’, Derrida, in his key work Of Grammatology, declares a 
quite different ‘intention’: ‘To make enigmatic what one thinks one 
understands by the words “proximity,” “immediacy” and “presence”’ 
(Derrida in Power 2008: 10). 
 
Likewise, Power argues that the deconstructive theatre theorists ‘have tended to look at 
(P)resence [sic] as a singular, monolithic entity’ rather than exploring the complexity 
and multiplicity of notions of presence that theatre has generated (Power 2008: 118). 
For Power, theatre ‘has the capacity to explore and “play” with notions of presence’ 
(ibid.), to ‘make presence “strange’ or to ‘defamiliarise the present’ (ibid., 135). 
 
Such critiques belong to a broader revival of presence that can be seen to have 
taken place in performance scholarship over the last five years. Of course, the 
Performing Presence project itself (of which this thesis constitutes a part) demonstrates 
this changing climate. Performing Presence: From the Live to the Simulated was a 
major AHRC-funded research project managed by Nick Kaye and Gabriella Giannachi 
at Exeter University, Mel Slater at University College London and Michael Shanks at 
Stanford University. Running from October 2005 to June 2009, Performing Presence 
aimed ‘to combine expertise from performance and drama theory and practice, 
anthropological archaeology, and computer science to investigate means by which 
“presence” is achieved in live and mediated performance and simulated environments’ 
(Kaye 2008: n.p.). As one of two doctoral research students funded by the project3, my 
specific role has been to examine the nature of presence in live performance, as well as 
contributing to collective strands of research activity such as the production of a web-
based project bibliography4.  
                                                 
3 The other doctoral research student funded by the Performing Presence project was Stefanie Kuhn who 
has been researching the nature of presence in simulated or mediatised performance. While Philip 
Auslander has clearly problematised any fixed distinction between ‘the live’ and ‘the mediated’ in the 
context of performance, it has not been the specific concern of this thesis to address the relationship 
between these categories (Auslander 1999). However, Chapter Four on Goat Island does use Deleuze to 
insist that we rethink the association of presence with some simple ‘here and now’ in favour of a notion 
of multiple presents. Liveness, from this perspective, would not be conceived as an identitarian quality, 
which will be distorted by the mediation of reproductive technologies. Rather the live is already 
differential and multiple, in itself. 
4 This project bibliography can be found online at: http://presence.stanford.edu:3455/Collaboratory/1083 
The Presence Project Collaboratory is a state-of-the-art web facility constructed and hosted by the 
Metamedia Lab (Stanford Humanities Lab) at Stanford University. On this site, you can find a more 
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However, this revival of interest in presence is also evidenced by a wealth of 
recent publications, including: Andre Lepecki’s Of the Presence of the Body: Essays on 
Dance and Performance Theory (2004); Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s Production of 
Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey (2004); Hans Thies Lehmann’s Postdramatic 
Theatre (2006); Joseph Roach’s It (2007); Phillip B. Zarrilli’s Psychophysical Acting: 
An Intercultural Approach After Stanislavski (2008); Jane Goodall’s Stage Presence 
(2008); James Thompson’s Performance Affects: Applied Theatre and the end of effect 
(2009) as well as Erickson’s essay ‘Presence’ in the collection Staging Philosophy: 
Intersections of Theater, Performance, and Philosophy (2006) and Power’s Presence in 
Play: A Critique of Theories of Presence in the Theatre (2008), to which I have already 
referred.  
 
All these texts largely affirm the concept of presence, despite its poststructuralist 
critique. In some cases, such as in Erickson’s writing, the recuperation of presence 
constitutes a challenge to the relevance of poststructuralism; there is a gap, for him, 
between ‘a philosophically logical position and experience’ (Erickson 2006: 151). For 
Erickson, that is, ‘the micrological view of ontology,’ exemplified by Derrida and 
Deleuze, ‘is largely irrelevant to most people’s practical experience of the world’. 
Likewise, he argues that ‘the political operates in the real world at the level of conscious 
strategy and argument’, such that the ‘micropolitical’ is merely theoretical posturing 
rather than an active intervention into the practical field of politics (ibid.). Differential 
presence as the ‘experience of pure temporality’ or pure difference is merely mystical 
for Erickson and, for him, ‘mysticism is no basis for political decision-making’ (ibid., 
154). In this way, though Erickson’s 1995 paper makes some remarks about John 
Cage’s notion of presence as ‘accession to Becoming’ that are highly relevant to this 
thesis, his later work seems to have become less sympathetic to process perspectives in 
favour of pursuing what he calls the ‘material psycho-physiological truth about personal 
presence that compels attention’ (ibid., 146). In other words, Erickson now seems to 
want to ground his thought in subjective experience (albeit one grounded in a 
naturalised notion of the mind). 
 
                                                 
detailed outline of the Presence Project’s activities and research questions, as well as documentation of 
practitioner workshops and interviews.  
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In contrast, this thesis will propose that, for Deleuze, neither ‘experience’ nor 
‘politics’ can be taken as given or fixed, and nor should their theorisation be based on 
so-called ‘common sense’. Rather, as we will see in the methodological section of this 
introduction (and indeed, throughout this dissertation), Deleuze’s philosophy constructs 
ways of encountering the real as difference prior to its organization into conventional 
forms and recognizable ideas. In turn, Deleuze suggests that socio-political institutions 
are forms of sedimentation shot through with the revolutionary force of unconscious 
desire. ‘Real politics’ (as real change) happens for Deleuze, when this non-
representative force splits apart the social fabric altering the status quo in unpredictable 
ways, such as in the events of May ’68: a real world event but also an irruption of the 
new that we simply cannot understand if we continue to position politics as only going 
on ‘at the level of conscious strategy and argument’.  
 
In other cases, such as Power and Gumbrecht, the retrieval of presence is very 
much undertaken with the insights of poststructuralism in mind; they are post-Derridean 
insofar as they largely agree with Derrida (if not with his interpreters), whilst at the 
same time wanting to preserve the notion of presence as a value for performance. In 
Power’s case, for instance, there is the specific goal to ‘reconcile the Derridean critique 
of presence with the experience of theatre’s “presence”’ (Power 2008: 135). In part, he 
works towards this goal by re-reading Derrida’s essay on Artaud, arguing that although 
Derrida is ‘deeply sceptical towards the notion of unmediated presence in theatre’, it is 
not that he merely dismisses the Theatre of Cruelty ‘as naïvely implausible’ (ibid., 138). 
Rather, the opening two-thirds of Derrida’s text seems to perform Artaud, or to speak 
from Artaud’s position, in a manner that portrays some degree of admiration for 
Artaud’s ‘ambitious and impossible’ project (ibid). In turn, Power argues that Derrida 
does not ‘exclude or “close” the notion of theatrical presence’ in favour of absence, as 
his interpreters might suggest (ibid., 139). Indeed, Power even touches on the idea that 
Derrida might see the stage as a privileged site of the repetition of difference (ibid.)5.  
 
Ultimately though, Power understands the differentiating power of theatre 
primarily in terms of the play between the real and the sign, in a way that equates the 
                                                 
5 This idea emerges in Power’s close reading of Derrida on Artaud, in which he notes that although 
Derrida says that ‘the menace of repetition’ is particularly well organised in the theatre, he also says that 
it is in the theatre, above all, where one is brought ‘so close to the origin of repetition’ (Derrida in Power 
2008: 139). Power then goes on to suggest that ‘It is almost as if Derrida is qualifying the assertion that 
theatre is more about repetition and absence than presence by attaching the additional clause that theatre, 
like “nowhere else” brings one “close to the origin of repetition,”’ (Power 2008: 139) or différence. 
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real with simple presence. A chair, for instance, needs the theatre in order to differ from 
itself (or to make it’s presence “strange”) in Power’s schema (ibid., 143). In contrast, as 
we shall see, Deleuze’s thought locates difference and transformation in matter itself, 
deflating the privileged role assigned to representation by Derrideans. In the third part 
of this introduction, we will attempt to expand on this question of Deleuze’s 
relationship to Derrida, before going on to introduce a series of Deleuze’s key concepts 
and exploring how they might contribute to a new understanding of presence as 
differential.  
 
 
3.  An introduction to Deleuze 
 
3.1 Differentiating Deleuze and Derrida  
 
So what does Deleuze have to offer this debate? Why choose to engage with his 
philosophy in order to theorise presence in performance? As a philosopher of 
difference, and a contemporary of Derrida’s, does Deleuze’s thought really offer 
anything new to this discourse? No doubt, Deleuze and Derrida have much in common. 
Indeed, on the occasion of Deleuze’s death, Derrida described Deleuze as ‘the one to 
whom I have always considered myself closest among all of this “generation”’. He then 
goes on to say: ‘I never felt the slightest “objection” arise in me, not even a virtual one, 
against any of his discourse’ (Derrida 1995: n.p.). However, there are a number of key 
differences between their philosophical projects, such that the theorisation of 
differential presence (inspired by Deleuze) is a distinct undertaking from the 
deconstruction of presence (inspired by Derrida) that has already been undertaken by 
Power, Fuchs, Auslander and so forth.  
 
In the first instance, they differ in their attitudes to metaphysics. As we’ve seen, 
for Derrida, ‘metaphysics is defined in terms of presence’ and the concept of différance 
is both ‘that which marks “the disappearance of any originary presence”’ and ‘that 
which thereby exceeds or transcends metaphysics, and thereby, at the same time, 
constantly disrupts and “destabilizes” metaphysics’ (Smith in Patton and Protevi 2003: 
49). That said, it is not that Derrida thinks that he has escaped metaphysics (since, for 
him, this is impossible) with the concept of différance, so much that he proposes that we 
move to a different project altogether, in which philosophy is conceived as a species of 
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literature. In contrast, as Daniel W. Smith recounts, Deleuze described himself as a 
“pure metaphysician” and refrained from critiquing metaphysics per se as necessarily 
logocentric or based on presence (ibid., 50).  
 
Secondly, Deleuze and Derrida differ in how they practice philosophy. Coming 
from the hermeneutical tradition, Derrida sees philosophy as ‘an essentially linguistic 
activity’ and as ‘a form of textual exegesis and commentary’ that provides ‘a critique of 
metaphysical oppositions embedded in language’ (Bogue 1989: 158-9, 78). Deleuze, 
however, engages in little ‘close reading’ and defines philosophy as the creation of 
concepts, arguing that such creative thought begins with the shock encounter with an 
unidentifiable outside force rather than being determined by language. Given this 
approach, it has been argued that ‘Deleuze does not question the status of his own 
discourse, and hence does not confront the inescapable problem of language’ (ibid.)6.  
 
We will return to this objection in the next section on methodology. For now, let 
us focus on what is, perhaps, the most important distinction between Derrida and 
Deleuze for this project: the fact that Deleuze asserts that ‘difference manifests itself in 
sub-representative experience… and that non-discursive bodies/forces coexist and 
interact with the incorporeal surface of difference’ (ibid.). That is, even if most now 
agree that it was mistaken to read Derrida’s infamous statement ‘There is nothing 
outside the text’ as an implication of ‘linguistic idealism’, all the same, Derrida does 
primarily address difference in a discursive context, whereas Deleuze’s extended 
analysis locates the operation of difference in the realm of materiality. Difference is at 
work when sugar dissolves in water and when an eye responds to light; it is at work in 
the unconscious productions of desire; it is at work when the carpenter responds to 
wood. Consequently, Deleuze’s work should not be seen as a critique of Derrida’s, but 
as an expansion of a shared concern with the process of differentiation. After all, for 
Derrida, the concept of ‘writing’ does not merely refer to written discourse, as Fuchs 
implied. What he calls ‘writing’ is a model for differentiation, just as the voice was a 
model for identity. When he says that ‘There is nothing outside the text’, he means that 
writing, or difference, can be found everywhere; everything that claims to be self-
identical is actually differing/deferred. And yet, Derrida spent the vast majority of his 
career analysing the difference in texts, whereas Deleuze went looking for this 
                                                 
6 This is the critique of Deleuze presented by Vincent B. Leitch in Deconstructive Criticism (1983). 
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difference (or ‘writing’) in other realms, such as thermodynamics and geometry 
(Welchman in Protevi 2005: 133-4).  
 
To be slightly more critical of Derrida, or perhaps more so of his ‘followers’ in 
performance theory, this focus on difference in the text has sometimes led to the 
construction of presence as a ‘straw-man’ or easy target for deconstruction in a manner 
that this thesis hopes to counteract. That is, the chapters that follow will attempt to 
rehabilitate categories that have been deconstructed by Derrideans as synonyms for 
presence, such as ‘the body’ (which is discussed in all four chapters), ‘voice’ (a focus of 
Chapter Two), ‘affect’ (a focus of Chapter Three) and ‘community’ (which we look at 
particularly in Chapters One and Four). But this will not be a rehabilitation of self-
presence; rather, we will argue that, for Deleuze, such categories were never self-
present in the first place. For example, if we object to the idea that the body is a 
function or construction of discourses, this need not be understood as equivalent to 
saying that it is self-present. Rather, Deleuze’s position suggests that bodies participate 
in other forms of differentiation that are irreducible to discourse. The presence of the 
body is not just differentiated or changed by (and at the speed of) human discourses, but 
has its own processes of difference – its presence is the presence of (its) difference.  
 
As such, when this notion of difference is transposed to the terrain of 
performance, the question of presence expands beyond concerns with the instability of 
meaning and the critique of claims to immediacy and self-presentation, that all too often 
seem to underestimate the complexity of the notions of presence being evoked. From a 
Deleuzian perspective, the thesis will suggest, presence and difference (or the presence 
of difference) are not incompatible; presence need not be construed as a self-presence 
that must pass through, and inevitably be distorted by, discursive representation in order 
to present itself. The unconscious produces in the real, Deleuze and Guattari argue; we 
need not think that our access to it is limited to the interpretation of representations. 
Difference, here, is not the ‘dangerous supplement’ that presence both needs and denies 
as its condition of appearance. Rather, presence can be reconceived with Deleuze as a 
nonrepresentational experience of difference in itself, as differential presence.  
 
In this way, we might propose that Deleuze’s position lies somewhere between 
what we might call the liquidity of cultural relativism (a perspective sometimes 
manifested by a more extreme branch of deconstructionism) and the petrified nature of 
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an essentialist perspective. That is, it is not the case for Deleuze that reality is 
constructed by discourse; that all discourses create equally valid realities; or, in other 
words that ‘anything goes’ when it comes to making claims about what is ‘real’ or 
‘true’. In this model, the differentiation of reality by discourse is understood to take 
place at an infinite speed:  as quickly as I can think or write it, I can change reality. This 
stands in stark contrast to the temporality of essentialism, which denies any ontological 
reality to change. From the essentialist perspective the world is ultimately composed of 
fixed essences, and any apparent change is construed as a mere appearance that does 
not, in fact, change the essence of the thing in itself.  
 
For Deleuze, however, ‘It is not that we are trapped within a world of 
representations, such that we are destined always to be separated from presence in 
itself’ (Colebrook 2002: 171-2); re-presentation does not belong to a different order of 
being from the real. But nor would he accept the position that the world is as it is, and 
remains unaltered by philosophy or the arts. In between pure relativism and pure 
essentialism is a multiplicity of speeds of change. The human productions 
conventionally described as representations: concepts, images, pictures, texts, 
performances and so forth, are reconceived, by Deleuze, as re-presentations, understood 
as a differential or ‘productive repetition’ without a self-present original. For Deleuze, 
representational thinking privileges ‘the thing itself’ which is understood as the origin 
or cause of the poor copy that it effects. In contrast, Deleuze develops the concept of the 
‘simulacra’, as that which has no original. As such, Colebrook argues that, for Deleuze,  
 
Life just is appearance: a plane of images or simulations. The 
supposed ‘real thing’ that lies behind the images is a fiction we 
impose on the flux of images. What we have is appearance or imaging 
itself: a world of simulacra without ground’ (Colebrook 2002: 162-3).  
 
That is, there are inhuman as well as human forms of imaging or re-presentation. 
Deleuze’s expansion of the notion of difference suggests that there are numerous other 
inhuman processes of differentiation going on, acting upon and as the real at various 
different speeds, beyond the intervention of discourse. One example of this might be the 
‘perception’ of the sun by a plant. For Deleuze, perception is direct; it ‘reaches the thing 
itself’ not a mental representation of the thing. For instance, ‘the plant “perceiving” the 
sun does not have a representation of the sun. Perception is the direct [or faster] relation 
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of the different beings of the world’ (ibid., 163). Finally, it is important to qualify this 
by noting that, for Deleuze, there is no difference between things and images; 
perception is imaging, or re-presentation.  
 
But we need to provide greater context for these remarks. In the rest of this 
section, I will do this by expanding upon Deleuze’s concept of difference, and providing 
a brief exposition of some other key concepts and conceptual pairings from his 
ontology: becoming, affect, the event and the virtual/actual distinction, and finally, 
duration. As we shall see, the definitions of these concepts certainly overlap, to the 
point that, at times, they seem to be simply different words for the ‘same’ thing: 
difference in itself. As other commentators have noted, this can be seen as part of 
Deleuze’s distinctive strategy of proliferating terminology – a strategy I have chosen to 
appropriate in the following chapters, rather than adopting a single conceptual 
vocabulary in the attempt to think the notion of differential presence. As Claire 
Colebrook says, Deleuze’s ceaseless production of new terms is part of his response to 
the problem of thinking difference in itself, since ‘any thought or image we might have 
of this profound difference will always grasp only a part or expression of difference’ 
(Colebrook 2002b: xlii). 
 
By addressing these key concepts, we will be able to address Deleuze’s relation 
to the metaphysics of presence as a philosophical tradition, and in turn, to develop an 
initial understanding of what differential presence might be for Deleuze, and how it 
might work in an aesthetic situation. Ontology and aesthetics are inseparable for 
Deleuze, since the latter is conceived as one form of creative process amongst the many 
other creative processes that make up the nature of reality, not as a separate realm of 
representation. To appreciate this aesthetics, including Deleuze’s all too brief analysis 
of the theatre, which will also be introduced here, we need to understand the ontology to 
which it belongs.   
 
 
3.2 Key concepts in Deleuze’s ontology 
 
Deleuze wrote twenty-five books during the forty years from 1953 to 1993 that 
constituted the core of his working life, most famously the two volumes of Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus (1972) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980), which were 
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written in collaboration with the psychoanalyst and political activist, Félix Guattari. As 
John Protevi suggests, Deleuze’s work can be broadly divided into three different 
periods, beginning with ‘an early phase of scholarly works that examine individual 
philosophers, including studies of Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson (Protevi 2005: 132) 
– none of whom would have been considered “proper philosophers” by his former 
teachers at the Sorbonne: an institution ‘steeped in the rationalist tradition’ of figures 
such as Hegel, Husserl and the early Heidegger (Bogue 1989: 2). Secondly, there is the 
period characterized by the publication of Difference and Repetition (1968) and The 
Logic of Sense (1969), which Protevi describes as the phase in which ‘Deleuze achieved 
a genuine independence of thought and no longer expressed himself vicariously through 
commentary’ (Protevi 2005: 132).  
 
And it is this period that has recently come to be validated as the most important 
of Deleuze’s career, at the expense of the more experimental collaborative texts (with 
Guattari) that define the third period in Protevi’s schema and, indeed, provide many of 
this thesis’ theoretical resources7. James Williams, for example, refers to Difference and 
Repetition as ‘Deleuze’s masterwork’ and ‘the keystone of Deleuze’s work as a whole’ 
(Williams 2003: 1-2). Likewise, Erickson is not alone in thinking that ‘Deleuze was 
better off without Guattari, who basically tried to make a political theory out of what 
wasn't really political in Deleuze's thinking’ (Erickson 2007: n.p.). In this regard, Alain 
Badiou’s critique of Deleuze in Deleuze: The Clamor of Being (1997) has been 
influential, since here Badiou suggests that we ought to ‘dismiss the works co-authored 
with Félix Guattari, beginning with the Anti-Oedipus’ (Alliez 2004: n.p.)8. But even if 
the second period works are the key texts for those who want to keep Deleuze as a 
philosophers’ philosopher, and away from the “diversions” of politics, the two volumes 
of Capitalism and Schizophrenia remain the primary texts for many interdisciplinary 
engagements with Deleuze, and for practitioners – not least because these experimental 
texts call out to be tested and tried out in practice. Though less accessible for certain 
kinds of readers (and therefore more valued by some), Difference and Repetition and 
The Logic of Sense still harbour the traces of transcendence in their disembodied 
conceptions of the virtual. Or, as Smith helpfully summarises, the transition between 
                                                 
7 Although Protevi cites the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia as the defining texts of this 
third period, we should also note the two other main texts that Deleuze and Guattari wrote together: 
Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature (1975) and What is Philosophy? (1991). 
8 This suggestion is then reiterated by Slavoj Žižek in his book Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and 
Consequences (2004).  
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The Logic of Sense and Anti-Oedipus is one from Deleuze’s thinking of ‘the event’ as 
an effect akin to something like the irruption of the Lacanian Real into material reality, 
towards thinking the event as (desiring-) production or becoming. For Badiou (and 
Žižek), this is a bad move that turns Deleuze into a thinker of ‘the One’ rather than of 
multiplicity, whereas, for us, this is a good move that, in fact, emphasizes the 
multiplicity of actuality (Smith 2004). We will return to this particular debate in both 
Chapters Three and Four, so let us move on now to provide a general introduction to 
some of the key concepts that run across Deleuze’s oeuvre, starting with the central 
notion of ‘difference’.  
 
Difference 
 
As has already been suggested, the key concept for Deleuze’s philosophy is the 
notion of difference-in-itself. Clearly though, as Vincent Pecora has noted, difference  
 
is itself a term appropriated and reshaped by Deleuze, not one 
invented out of nothing. It has its own history, beginning perhaps with 
Saussure's description of language as a system of differences without 
positive terms (Pecora 1986: 36). 
 
But the concept of difference (albeit a very different concept of difference from the ones 
that Deleuze and Derrida will respectively produce) goes back much further than this. 
Since Aristotle, Western philosophy has tended to create a distinction between the 
concepts of ‘difference’ and ‘alterity’, in which the former is conceived as a difference 
based on a primary similarity and the latter as pure heterogeneity (of which very little, 
or nothing, can be said). From this perspective, things can be said to be different ‘on the 
basis of something they have in common,’ such as ‘genus, or kind’ (de Beistegui in 
Protevi 2005: 152.). To be able to say that a cat is different from a dog, one must have 
first taken them to belong to the same category of animal. In contrast, a dog is not 
‘different’, but simply ‘other’ in relation to an altogether uncommon thing, like a book 
(unless, of course, one puts the two together into an even more abstract and 
encompassing category, such as material thing). In this schema, difference does not give 
us the essence of the things in question (that they are animals), it ‘merely indicates some 
quality of that thing’ (that a dog is an animal with a particular set of contingent qualities 
belonging to ‘animalness’ that differ from those of a cat). While identity, or self-
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presence, is construed as primary, differences are traditionally positioned as ‘qualitative, 
material, contingent, secondary and derivative’ (ibid.). 
 
In contrast, both Deleuze and Derrida want to liberate difference from its 
historical construction as a derivative of identity, and show ‘how it is in fact the 
movement of difference itself that produces the apparent stability of the world of fixed 
identities (of substances and essences)’ (ibid.,151). Deleuze and Derrida argue that the 
apparent presence of the concepts that the Aristotelian tradition took as its starting 
points is, in fact, a product of a primary difference or ‘multiplicity’. There is not a world 
of permanent presences underpinning the differences between substances or physical 
systems; what there is, is difference as a kind of chaos or ‘virtually existent pure 
duration’ that generates the appearance of permanence and presence (May 2003: 147). 
Deleuze argues for the ‘lived reality of a sub-representative domain’ and for a mode of 
thinking adequate to such a domain by going ‘beyond the form of identity, in relation to 
both the object seen and the seeing subject’ (Deleuze 1994: 82). Likewise, in A 
Thousand Plateaus, they posit a primary material flow, which is only subsequently 
organised by the provisional and temporary ‘strata’.  
 
But importantly, for our purposes, Deleuze does not think in terms of difference 
as that which deconstructs self-presence, so much as in terms of difference as a new 
kind of presence. In Difference and Repetition, for example, Deleuze argues that 
difference-in-itself is ‘the only moment of presence and precision’ (ibid., 36). In this 
way, although difference cannot, by definition, be ‘given to us in consciousness’ (since 
consciousness works with identities), it is, nevertheless, something we can encounter 
and ‘apprehend directly’ (ibid., 56). As Todd May insists, for Deleuze,  
 
difference and becoming are immanent to our reality. They do not lie 
elsewhere, but here… The difference that produces qualitative 
diversity – the different stable identities of conscious experience – lies 
within the sensible, within appearance, not outside of it (May 2003: 
147). 
 
 The rest of the concepts we will now introduce will all help us to consider what the 
nature of this encounter might be and tell us more about ‘difference’s mode of existing’ 
(ibid., 148). 
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Becoming 
 
Another way of talking about Deleuze’s concept of difference and its relation to 
presence, is through the notion of becoming, which has its philosophical basis in the 
writings of Heraclitus, Nietzsche and Bergson. In contrast to the unchanging or eternal 
nature of being, becoming can be defined as ‘that which is changing, what is contingent, 
in constant process and flux’ (Smith in Protevi 2005: 60). For Nietzsche, it is Plato who 
‘makes the unchanging and selfsame realm of being the object of true knowledge, and 
opposes it to our phenomenal world of flux, change and becoming’ (Bogue 1989: 28). 
Plato is devoted to presence and transcendence, in a manner that Nietzsche regards ‘as a 
veiled hatred of life, a means of finding our world guilty and deficient’ (ibid.). As such, 
Nietzsche proposes that the fundamental task of philosophy is the reversal of Platonism 
– a call that Deleuze repeats – ‘through an affirmation of becoming’ (ibid.). 
Correlatively, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze argues that ‘Neither multiplicity 
nor becoming are [mere] appearances or illusions’; that ‘there is no being beyond 
becoming’ (Deleuze 1983: 23); or, in other words, that ‘becoming is the final reality’ 
(May 2003: 143). Likewise, in The Logic of Sense, Deleuze proposes that becoming be 
reconceived as a zone of indistinction that precedes differentiation, not as a relation that 
must be preceded by the terms or presences related.  
 
But above all perhaps, the notion of becoming binds together the concepts of 
difference and temporality. Time, for Deleuze, is not a discrete ‘now’ that beings 
occupy or are contained by; rather, ‘we abstract the “now” as some sort of being or 
thing from the becoming or flow of time’ (Colebrook 2002: 41). Time is immanent to 
what lives and as such what lives is ceaselessly becoming or self-differentiating; or, as 
Todd May summarises, ‘Becoming is the unfolding of difference in time and as time’ 
(May 2003: 147). And for Deleuze, there is no essential being or self-presence that 
grounds these processes of change – only dogmatic ways of thinking and acting that 
attempt to block or control becoming and which his thought encourages us to abandon.  
 
Becomings, in the context of experience, concern the undoing of autonomous 
subjectivity and the immanence of an ‘other’ within oneself; becomings are an auto-
affective experience of differential presence rather than self-presence. Phrased 
differently, they are processes of genuine transformation or change in which we come to 
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perceive things differently – whether they involve becoming-woman, becoming-animal 
or becoming-imperceptible. Deleuze and Guattari are clear that becoming does not 
involve a process of bare imitation or repetition and yet, as Leonard Lawlor points out, 
in becoming one ‘finds oneself before another who ends up being in oneself’ (Lawlor 
2008: n.p. – emphasis added). But this is not a simple instance of trading places. The 
structure of becoming, as Lawlor insists, ‘is not reciprocal’. Rather, with ‘the other in 
me… I am not substituting myself for another; the structure of becoming is… a zigzag 
in which I become other so that the other may become something else’ (ibid.).  
 
As Lawlor points out, a becoming is only successful for Deleuze and Guattari ‘if 
a work (œuvre) is produced’. Becoming must have creation as its result, though this is 
not to say that the experience of becoming is oriented towards some endpoint, goal or 
final form; becoming-dog does not end when we become recognizable as a dog as a 
‘molar’ form. Rather, we might think in terms of writing as the creative product of a 
becoming, as Lawlor discusses in the context of a becoming-rat. Becoming-rat, then, 
does not involve starting to look like a rat, but by allowing the rat to become ‘a 
“feverish thought” in me, forcing me to think’, and to ‘start to write like a rat’. For 
Lawlor, 
 
To write like a rat is to write in the style of the rat’s agony, to fabulate 
a legend of rats – so that the work produced will call forth a new 
people. Writing like a rat, we might be able to call forth a people who 
themselves have the feverish thought of the rat in them, forcing them 
to think differently (ibid.). 
 
One reason for the necessity of creation is to aid future becomings; ‘by writing the 
becoming down one “conserves” the formulas that will allow others to become and 
cross thresholds’ (ibid). However, Lawlor perhaps over-emphasises writing (although 
he also mentions the production of ‘a diagram, a map, a score, a concept’), as if this 
were the only form of creation that might be produced by becoming (ibid.). In fact, 
Deleuze and Guattari are also interested in both embodied and visual forms of creation, 
such as the performance artist, Lolito’s becoming-dog (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 247) 
and Van-Gogh’s becoming-sunflower (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 175).  
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 Becomings are always political for Deleuze and Guattari, since they always 
involve both what they call ‘becoming-minor,’ and the calling forth of ‘a people’ or 
‘minor race’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 109). We will deal more with the notion of the 
minor soon, when we go on to introduce Deleuze’s key essay on the theatre: ‘One Less 
Manifesto’, and the notion of minor theatre it develops. For now, we can say that the 
concept of the minor and of minority has nothing to do with quantities for Deleuze and 
Guattari, rather it relates to the oppression of those who differ from an imposed 
standard: ‘Man’, and, as such, includes women and animals. In turn, in What is 
Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari note that minorities experience ‘unimaginable 
sufferings’ at the hands of the majority, but also have in common ‘their resistance to 
death, to servitude, to the intolerable, to shame, and to the present’ (ibid., 110).  
 
Secondly, the productions of becomings – as writing or performance – are said 
to call forth a people or to evoke some kind of collectivity from this minority basis. 
Writing like a rat, for instance, ‘aims to produce a rat-people’ through a process akin to 
contagion; the forcing of thought that the animal provokes in me spreads to those who 
come into contact with the product of my becoming-animal, who, in turn, develop a new 
relation to animals as a result (Lawlor 2008: n.p.). Alternatively, Deleuze and Guattari 
claim that Artaud – who is the subject of Chapter Two – argued that the aim of art and 
philosophy should be ‘to write for the illiterate – to speak for the aphasic, to think for 
the acephalous’ or headless (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 109). But as Deleuze and 
Guattari make clear, the preposition “for” here does not mean ‘“for their benefit,” or yet 
“in their place”’ (ibid). Rather, to think or write or perform for the minor ‘is a question 
of becoming’, which, as we’ve seen, is not representational. Becoming-animal, for 
instance, is ‘for’ the animal in the sense that it allows the animal to become something 
else. There will be further analysis of this concept of a people to come in Chapter One 
on the Living Theatre, so for now, let us move on from becoming to the related concept 
of ‘affect’. 
 
Affect 
 
Becomings, for Deleuze and Guattari, involve affects; indeed, they sometimes 
say that ‘affects are becomings’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 256). But we might also 
say, as Lawlor does, that affect is ‘the motive or motor of becoming’ (Lawlor 2008: 
n.p.). And yet, at the same time, we must also note the extent to which the capacity to be 
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affected is laid open by the process of undoing molar subjectivity. If we are going to be 
motivated to become other, Lawlor argues, we must first pass through the process of 
desubjectification or ‘the clean break’ that he associates with aging in order to 
experience the externality of affect (ibid.). The crucial distinction here, as we will 
discuss further in Chapter Three, is between affect and feeling or emotion, which 
Deleuze construes as ‘a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an 
experience which is from that point onward defined as personal’ (Massumi 2002b: 28). 
Through the notion of affect, we are invited to reconceive love, pity or shame, for 
example, beyond the concept of emotion. Whereas emotion, for Deleuze and Guattari, is 
related to the formation of subjects, affect throws subjectivity into disequilibrium, 
cracking our sense of self. In the process of feeling the subject enfolds the threatening 
outside into its own internal world (as ‘introjection’), whereas affect acts upon it like an 
arrow (or ‘projectile’), forcing the subject to relate to the otherness of the outside, rather 
than suppressing its heterogeneity through identification. ‘Affects are projectiles just 
like weapons; feelings are introceptive like tools’, they suggest (Deleuze and Guattari 
1988: 400).  
 
Given this definition, the concept of affect also allows us to rehabilitate the 
concept of the body as differential rather than self-present. Following Spinoza, Deleuze 
defines a body ‘dynamically’ in terms of ‘the sum total of intensive affects it is capable 
of at a given power or degree of potential’, as well as by its speeds or in terms of its 
relations of movement and rest (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 206). Although Deleuze 
uses the word ‘essence’, this concept of the body should not be confused with the 
stable, self-identical body deconstructed by Derrideans. Rather, the essence of a body is 
constituted by its relation to other bodies: 
 
We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other 
words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into 
compositions with other affects, with the affects of another body, 
either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange 
actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more 
powerful body (ibid. 257).  
 
In particular, Deleuze speaks of the affects of joy and sadness, where the former 
is understood as that which increases our power of acting and the latter as that which 
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diminishes or separates us from it. And, as the quote above suggests, he is clear that the 
powers of a given body, or bodily assemblage, are not unlimited; rather, it is the limit of 
our potential to transform and be transformed in relationality that defines our essence. 
However, Deleuze also argues that  
 
The most beautiful thing is to live on the edges, at the limit of her/his 
own power of being affected… Everything which exceeds your power 
of being affected is ugly. Relatively ugly: what’s good for flies is not 
inevitably good for you (Deleuze 1978: n.p.). 
 
In this sense, Deleuze suggests, we can come into contact with an affect that is too much 
for us; this is the risk of desubjectification. While affects are always ‘beyond us’ in the 
sense that they originate outwith the subject, they can be evaluated – not once and for 
all – but relative to what they allow each different body to do. For example, as we will 
discuss further in Chapter Three, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the power of the 
artist’s body is greater than that of others since they are able to encounter ‘something in 
life that is too much for anyone’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 172-3). 
 
This leads us to a third aspect of the concept of affect: Deleuze and Guattari 
define the work of art as the creation of affects. Whereas philosophers create concepts, 
and scientists create functions, artists are defined as ‘presenters of affects’, who extract 
impersonal affects from subjectified ‘affections’, and then render affect perceptible to 
the audience via the materiality of the work of art. As What is Philosophy? makes clear, 
this presentation of affect is synonymous with the productions of becoming and their 
contagious impact on those who come into contact with them (ibid., 175).  
 
The ‘virtual/actual’ distinction and the Event 
 
For some commentators, like John Protevi and Brian Massumi, the distinction 
between the virtual and the actual seems to be the fundamental conceptual dyad of 
Deleuze’s philosophy. Like many of the concepts we have discussed so far, ‘the virtual’ 
has been multiply defined by Deleuze’s commentators: it is ‘change as such’ or ‘the 
mode of reality implicated in the emergence of new potentials’ (Massumi in Genosko 
2001: 1066); it is ‘difference’s mode of existing’ (May 2003: 148); and it is ‘the realm 
of affect’ (O’Sullivan 2006: 51). And crucially, for Deleuze, the virtual is never a 
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synonym for the artificial or the simulated, or as that which lacks reality (as in virtual 
reality). Borrowed primarily from Bergson’s Matter and Memory (1896), Deleuze’s 
notion of the virtual/actual distinction is used both as an alternative to the possible/real 
distinction and, Smith suggests, ‘as a way of reformulating the relationship between the 
empirical and the transcendental (the latter being the ‘ground’ or ‘condition’ of the 
former)’ (Smith in Protevi 2005: 7). The possible, Deleuze argues, prevents us from 
understanding life’s creation of differences because it is retrospectively constructed 
from the real ‘like a sterile double’ (Deleuze 1988: 98), despite the fact that we tend to 
think of things being possible before they become real over time. With the concept of 
the possible, the real is understood to be limited to reproducing the image of the 
possible that it realizes, and, at the same time, the possible ‘is simply traced off the 
empirical’ in a manner that does nothing with respect to the project to think the 
conditions or ground of reality (ibid.).  
 
The concept of the virtual is designed to remedy this problem. Unlike the possible 
and the real, the virtual and the actual do not resemble one another; the former is not a 
blueprint for the latter. And secondly, unlike the possible, the virtual does not lack 
existence prior to its passage into the actual in the temporal process Deleuze calls 
‘actualization’ or ‘differenciation’: a slowing-down of the chaos of the virtual, or a 
deceleration which allows consistent forms to emerge. Rather, the virtual is conceived 
as an already existing source of pure difference that can be called upon to explain the 
emergence of novelty in actuality; it is a ‘surface or plane [which] …allows new forms 
to arise’ (Welchman in Protevi 2005: 134) as it is actualized in processes of divergence 
and creativity. In short, Deleuze says, ‘The characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such 
a way that it is actualized by being differentiated’ (Deleuze 1988: 74). The virtual is 
dependent on the actual to exert its creative force and the actual (or empirical) on the 
virtual as its transcendental condition. Despite this association with the transcendental, 
Deleuze insists on the immanence of the virtual within the actual; the virtual is not 
outside or distinct from the actual, he argues, but inheres within identifiable forms as 
the motor of their becoming. Likewise, Smith emphasises the idea that, for Deleuze, the 
realm of the virtual is not fixed, but conditioned by changes in the actual (Smith in 
Protevi 2005: 8). 
 
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze uses the actual/virtual distinction to differentiate two 
kinds of time: ‘Chronos, or the actual time of the everyday, and Aion, or the time of the 
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virtual’ (Protevi 2005: 583). And it is in this virtual realm of time in which Deleuze 
positions what he calls ‘events’ which ‘lie in wait for bodies,’ in and through which 
they can happen (ibid.). But what happens? What is an event? For Derrida, Deleuze was 
‘above all, the thinker of the event’ (Derrida 1995: n.p.), and likewise Deleuze himself 
stated: ‘I’ve tried in all my books to discover the nature of events’. In the first instance, 
Deleuze suggests, the event is ‘a philosophical concept, the only one capable of ousting 
the verb “to be”’, and in this sense, allied to becoming (Deleuze 1995: 141). Secondly, 
whereas for Badiou, events are rare, historical moments that disrupt the status quo (such 
as The French Revolution), ‘events are numerous and natural, yet also imperceptible’ 
for Deleuze (Mullarkey 2009: 143). But thirdly, Deleuze seems to differentiate between 
events and ‘the Event’ (as he distinguishes between becomings and becoming) when he 
argues against the presence of the Event in The Logic of Sense, claiming that it is 
‘something which has just happened and something about to happen; never something 
which is happening’ (Deleuze 1990: 63). In this way, the Event is construed as a kind of 
atemporal realm that contains and conditions the actual time of the everyday. 
 
But do we need this concept of virtuality? Why does actuality need to look for 
something outside itself to explain the production of novelty? Does the virtual/actual 
distinction leave Deleuze himself vulnerable to deconstruction? What reason is there to 
assume that the dynamics of virtual and actual that Deleuze claims condition reality 
operate universally rather than simply appearing to function as such on the human 
scale? Again, it is Chapters Three and Four that will address these questions directly, 
looking at critiques of the virtual as a moment of anthropocentric omniscience in 
Deleuze, which positions the virtual as the universal (or ontological), invisible 
background to the actual, when, in fact, it may only appear as such from the perspective 
of human actuality. In contrast, we will suggest that there are a range of different affects 
and bodies of which ‘we’, humans, can only say that they are beyond our powers of 
representation. And yet, although we cannot know them, our bodies can affect and be 
affected by these other bodies; in constructing ourselves as affective bodies we can 
think and experiment in contact with inhuman forces. 
 
Duration 
 
Finally, let us look at the key concept of duration as it appears in Deleuze’s 
thought, and its relation to his reconsideration of presence. As Giannachi notes, the 
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concept of presence has an etymological connection to notions of time, since ‘the noun 
presence is linked to the adverb present’ meaning ‘the present time’, but equally ‘at this 
moment; also, in the next moment, straightway, at once’ (Giannachi 2006: n.p.). 
Traditionally, then, presence is associated with immediacy and the Now – both of 
which, as we have seen, have been targets for deconstruction. For Deleuze, likewise, 
there is no simple present, but nevertheless he concurs with Bergson’s argument that we 
can intuit the existence of durations other than our own, and have a direct experience of 
real time as difference in itself (as Chapter Four will discuss in detail).  
 
 In his early work, Bergson posits a clear distinction between duration and 
extensity, or memory and matter. But ultimately, it becomes clear that Bergsonian 
duration is a process of qualitative variation, which constitutes one way in which things 
differ from themselves; duration is, Deleuze suggests, ‘the variable essence of things’ 
(Deleuze 1988: 34). In this way, the concept of duration is closely linked to that of 
becoming and of the virtual. Indeed, in Bergsonism, Deleuze argues that becoming, as it 
appears in Bergson’s Time and Free Will and Creative Evolution, is ‘duration as 
psychological experience’ (ibid., 37); secondly, later, he argues that ‘duration, is the 
virtual’ (ibid., 42); and finally, thirdly, his 1978 lectures on affect imply that affect and 
duration are synonymous (Deleuze 1978: n.p.). However, Deleuze later insists that 
duration or becoming is not limited to consciousness or to human psychology; rather, 
duration is a process of alteration ‘belonging to things as much as to consciousness’ 
(ibid., 48). In its simplest form, Deleuze says, duration is ‘a lived passage or transition,’ 
but to say it is lived, he argues, ‘obviously doesn’t mean conscious’ (Deleuze 1978: 
n.p.). In turn, duration is presented as synonymous with Bergson’s particular concept of 
‘memory’, which, as Deleuze explains, he defines as “the conservation and preservation 
of the past in the present” (Bergson in Deleuze 1988: 52). As Deleuze argues,  
 
We have great difficulty in understanding a survival of the past in 
itself because we believe that the past is no longer, that it has ceased 
to be. We have thus confused Being with being-present. Nevertheless, 
the present is not; rather it is pure becoming, always outside itself 
(Deleuze 1988: 55).  
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3.3 Deleuze on performance 
 
 As Jonas Barish and Martin Puchner, amongst others, have discussed, there is a 
long tradition of anti-theatricality within philosophy, exemplified by figures such as St 
Augustine and Rousseau9. And indeed, aspects of Deleuze’s thought – such as Anti-
Oedipus – might seem to reproduce rather than challenge that tradition in ways that 
would appear problematic for a thesis such as this. Anti-Oedipus is perhaps Deleuze’s 
most explicitly anti-theatrical book, insofar as it is premised upon the sense that there is 
a ‘mysterious tie between psychoanalysis and the theatre’, with the former, of course, 
being the main target of the book’s ‘schizoanalytic’ criticism (Deleuze and Guattari 
1984: 305). But what is being critiqued here is not the actual theatre, so much as the 
psychoanalytic use of a theatrical model or metaphor to represent the unconscious: ‘The 
unconscious as a stage’ (ibid). According to Deleuze and Guattari, psychoanalysis 
reduces the productions of the unconscious to theatrical representations, which are 
understood as forms of absence or lack. Further, they allude to the theatrical example of 
the audience’s identification with a character (traditionally associated with presence), as 
one way in which the ‘mechanism of repression’ that is the Oedipal myth is continually 
reinforced. ‘We are all Archie Bunker at the theatre,’ they say, ‘shouting out before 
Oedipus: there’s my kind of guy! There’s my kind of guy!’ (ibid., 308)10.  
 
Yet, as Jean Khalfa notes, Anti-Oedipus is less an indictment against the theatre 
per se, and more a statement of support for those practitioners already working to 
challenge the notion of theatre as a representation. ‘If the unconscious is not a theatre of 
representation, theatre (dramatic art) must not be one either’ (Khalfa 2003: 79), Deleuze 
implies. Deleuze had already hinted at his interest in non-representational theatre in 
Difference and Repetition, but it would not be until 1978 that this interest would find its 
fullest expression as the essay ‘One Less Manifesto’ or ‘One Manifesto Less’ 
(depending on whose translation of the title you prefer), which was published as 
                                                 
9 The more obvious target for the accusation of anti-theatricality, of course, is Plato. However, Martin 
Puchner has convincingly argued that Plato’s relation to the theatre and theatricality is much more 
complex that this insofar as his philosophy is bound to the theatre as much as it struggles to resist its 
values. As Puchner suggests, ‘A more differentiated picture of Plato’s relation to the theatre emerges 
when one considers his relation to the two dominant dramatic genres: tragedy and comedy. Plato is said to 
have written tragedies at an early age, and so we can presume that his rejection of the theatre was based 
on a fundamental engagement with it. Indeed, rather than simply attacking tragedy and comedy, Plato 
revises them constructively, offering his own version of tragedy in the Apology and a new comedy in the 
Symposium’ (Puchner 2002: 522). 
10 ‘Archie Bunker’ is a reactionary, white working-class character from the 1970s sit-com All in the 
Family.  
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Deleuze’s contribution to Superpositions (1978), the collaborative text he produced with 
the Italian actor, director, playwright and filmmaker, Carmelo Bene (who contributed 
his script for a production entitled, Richard III: or, The Horrible Night of a Man of 
War). Bar his all too brief discussions of Artaud and Beckett in Essays Critical and 
Clinical and in the volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, this is Deleuze’s ‘only 
sustained discourse on theatre’ (Kowsar 2001: 30) and, as such, it is a vital text for 
anyone concerned with the relation between Deleuze and performance. In this essay, 
Deleuze argues that theatre is not representational, but presents opportunities for 
encounters with the nonrepresentative force of ‘perpetual variation’ or difference in 
itself. Here, already, is an initial definition of differential presence in performance: a 
moment of contact with the real understood as becoming rather than being, which 
Deleuze associates with what he calls ‘minor’, as opposed to ‘major’ theatre. Whereas 
the latter is complicit with authority and State power for Deleuze, the former is a kind of 
political theatre that ‘surge[s] forward as something representing nothing but what 
presents and creates a minority consciousness as a universal-becoming’ (Deleuze 1997: 
256). In this regard, ‘One Less Manifesto’ is also of central importance for introducing 
the politics of differential presence, insofar as it provides an elaboration of the 
conceptual dyad of ‘major’ and ‘minor’ that Deleuze and Guattari had already 
introduced in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975)11. 
 
Deleuze defines a minor theatre as one that places all the different elements of 
theatre – its language, gestures, costumes and props – in perpetual variation, through a 
process of ‘subtraction’ or ‘amputation’ (Deleuze 1997). Whereas in much conventional 
theatre, the tendency is to submit the speeds and slownesses of performance to the 
organizational forms of plot and dialogue and to emphasise characters over 
transformative becomings that sweep them away, a minor theatre seeks to affirm the 
                                                 
11 Deleuze and Guattari took the term ‘minor literature’ from a 1911 diary entry by Franz Kafka, in 
which he discusses the directly political role of Yiddish literature in Warsaw, as the site in which the 
collective concerns of an ethnic minority might be articulated (Bogue 1989: 116). Ronald Bogue has 
argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s book on Kafka fails to provide a clear delineation of ‘exactly how this 
revolutionary practice [of minor literature] works… for Deleuze and Guattari offer no satisfactory 
examples of the process of transformation which leads from deterritorialized sound to a dissolution and 
restructuring of content’ (Bogue 1989: 120). As such, Bogue contends that ‘One Less Manifesto’ might 
be seen as providing the specific, practical program that the collaborative work fails to offer. Further, 
Bogue goes as far as to suggest that, for Deleuze, the performance of a minor usage of language is the 
culmination of the project of minor literature; or in other words, ‘One Less Manifesto’ completes what 
Kafka begun. Performance as much as literature has an important role to play in the bid to make language 
stutter, or the endeavour to become a foreigner in one’s own tongue and the performance of language in 
Bene’s theatre provides Deleuze with the ‘fullest instance of a minor style’ (Bogue 2003: 141). 
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primacy of perpetual variation over the fixed representation of subjects, objects and a 
coherent fictional world.  
 
For Deleuze, there is no fundamental separation between art and life, or 
aesthetics and ontology. Lived experience is not more real than aesthetic experience, 
nor is theatre a mere illustration of the force of difference to which Deleuze accords 
ontological priority; rather, it is that differential force that presents itself to affect alone 
(Zepke 2005: 3-4). Indeed, we might even suggest that for Deleuze art can be more real 
than life, or at least bring us closer to the reality of difference. Whereas in everyday, 
conscious life we tend to experience affect as mediated through the subject/object 
relation, art can provide transformative, material encounters in which the viewer is 
carried away from herself as a fixed subject in order to enter into composition with the 
pure affects of a painterly, musical, literary or theatrical ‘body’. The work of art makes 
perceptible ‘the imperceptible forces that populate the world, affect us, and make us 
become’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 182).  
 
In this respect, ‘One Less Manifesto’ must be read in the light of Deleuze’s 
wider philosophical project, and the notion of the perpetual variations of minor theatre 
alongside the idea of life as constituted by becomings rather than beings, process rather 
than substance. However, given his onto-aesthetic position, it is also important to note 
that there are no essentially major or minor theatres for Deleuze, but rather different 
usages of theatre and its elements that we can call major and minor. In the first instance, 
Deleuze argues that Carmelo Bene’s practice constitutes a minor usage of theatre 
because he employs a tripartite, subtractive method that removes the ‘elements of 
Power’ from theatre – eliminating both representations of power and representation as 
power in order to set free the movement of difference. This process involves: ‘(1) 
deducting the stable elements, (2) placing everything in continuous variation, (3) then 
transposing everything in minor (this is the role of the company in responding to the 
notion of the “smallest” interval)’ (Deleuze 1997: 246). This subtraction (or 
amputation) constitutes what Deleuze also calls a process of ‘minorization’ – the 
undoing of the major in order to release the minor, which he defines as a revolutionary 
practice.  
 
‘One Less Manifesto’ particularly concentrates on the minorization of language 
in Bene’s creative appropriations of Shakespeare. Again, Deleuze emphasises that there 
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are not major or minor languages per se but major or minor usages of language, and 
hence what matters in Bene is not the fact that it is Shakespeare being spoken, but how 
Shakespeare’s words are being performed. The major Shakespeare, Deleuze claims, 
speaks “the king’s English”: homogenised and invariant’ (Deleuze in Fortier 1996: 5) 
whereas a minor theatre-maker must ‘amputate the text because the text is like the 
domination of language over speech and still attests to invariance or homogeneity’ 
(Deleuze 1997: 245). In contrast, Deleuze argues that minor usages of language allow 
us to apprehend ‘language’s most inherent, creative property’: a fundamental variability 
(Deleuze 1997: 245). Whereas the structuralist distinction between langue and parole 
suggests that there is an underlying set of rules or constants, in relation to which 
specific enunciations are understood to be deviations from a norm, Deleuze’s position 
implies that any given language ought to be understood as ‘a multiplicity of semantic 
worlds’ in which all possible differences of meaning are virtually present (Bogue 1989: 
147). Deleuze suggests that there are minor usages, which perform this difference 
within language in Bene’s Richard, such as Lady Anne’s differential repetition of the 
phrase “You disgust me!”. There is no fixed meaning to this enunciation, Deleuze 
argues;  
 
It is hardly the same…[enunciation] when uttered by a woman at war, 
a child facing a toad, or a young girl feeling a pity that is already 
consenting and loving… Lady Anne will have to move through all 
these variables. She will have to stand erect like a woman warrior, 
regress to a childlike state, and return as a young girl – as quickly as 
possible on a line of …[perpetual] variation (Deleuze 1997: 246). 
 
In this way, the actress playing Lady Anne transmits an enunciation through ‘all the 
variables that could affect it in the shortest amount of time’ (ibid., 245), allowing the 
phrase to actualize its immanent difference. 
 
Deleuze goes on to argue that Bene’s minor theatre deviates from what he calls 
majority rule. Under this state of rule, groups such as ‘women, children, the South, the 
third world, etc.’ (ibid., 255) are, despite their numbers, constituted as subordinate 
minorities in relation to a standard measure: the supposedly universal model of Man, 
who in fact represents the specifically ‘white, Christian, average-male-adult-inhabitant 
of contemporary American or European cities’ (ibid., 253). A political theatre, for 
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Deleuze, would not be one that aims to represent these minorities, or to represent 
conflicts between men and women, or the first and third worlds. Rather, a revolutionary 
theatre reveals the perpetual variation underlying these representational oppositions. 
Conflicts, Deleuze states, ‘are already normalized, codified, institutionalized. They are 
“products”. They are already a representation that can be represented so much better on 
the stage’ (ibid., 252). ‘As a substitute for the representation of conflicts,’ Deleuze 
argues, ‘Bene proposes the presence of variation’ (ibid. – emphasis added): an example 
of how theatre can help us to enlist in the revolutionary process Deleuze calls 
becoming-minor. With his minor usage of language – as well as his minorization of 
character, props and costume – Deleuze finds in Bene a literary and performative 
methodology that allows theatre to ‘surge forward as something representing nothing 
but what presents and creates a minority consciousness as a universal-becoming’ (ibid., 
256). Bene’s theatre of non-representation, he claims, has the capacity ‘…to construct in 
some way, a figure of the minority consciousness as each one’s potential. To render a 
potentiality present and actual…’ (ibid., 254). And for Deleuze, the suppression of 
difference, or the failure to affirm presence as perpetual variation, is an ethical as well 
as an aesthetic problem. The affirmation of difference is Deleuze’s overarching value – 
be it in philosophy, literature, theatre, science or politics. 
 
However, Deleuze’s enthusiasm for Bene, along with a select group of other 
theatre practitioners such as Grotowski and the Living Theatre, must be put in the 
context of some less flattering remarks he makes about theatre as an art form. In 
L'Abécédaire for instance, as Charles Stivale has reported, Deleuze remarks that theatre 
tends not to provide opportunities for ‘encounters… with certain exceptions (like Bob 
Wilson, Carmelo Bene)’ (Stivale 2000: n.p.)12. Likewise, we might note that Deleuze 
himself uses the actual term ‘presence’ relatively infrequently. He does make passing 
reference to presence, not only in ‘One Less Manifesto’ as we have already seen, but 
also in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (1981) when he speaks of the ‘hysterical 
presence’ of Bacon’s painting, as that which ‘directly attempts to release the presences 
beneath representation, beyond representation’ (Deleuze 2004c: 52); and in Cinema 2 
(1985), when he suggests that cinema does not lack presence, but has its own ‘different 
mode of presence... which rivals that of theatre and may even outdo it with different 
                                                 
12 Deleuze justifies this remark, on the basis that ‘he has trouble remaining seated so long’. We might do 
well to take such comments with a pinch of salt, however, given that Deleuze seems to have had no 
problem sitting through such epics as Syberberg’s Hitler: A film from Germany. See ‘C for Culture’ 
(Stivale 2000: n.p.).  
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methods’ (Deleuze 2005: 194). However, these allusions to concepts of presence tend to 
be brief, and therefore ultimately of less importance for us than the key terms of 
Deleuze’s ontology, which we have already outlined and that allow the project to create 
its own concept of differential presence. 
 
 
3.4 Why Deleuze? The value of Deleuze for theorising presence in performance 
 
Rethinking reception 
 
We have already noted that Deleuze offers us a theoretical means to rehabilitate 
the category of ‘the body’ from its perpetual deconstruction without appealing to self-
presence. Now, though, we can expand on the point that the same must be said of the 
notion of affect, as well as emphasising the potential importance of this rehabilitation 
for Performance Studies. For instance, the Deleuzian concept of affect or becoming 
holds great promise for the analysis of how performance impacts on audience, offering 
an alternative to the over-emphasis on interpretation and the construction of meaning 
that derives from Performance Studies’ embrace of semiotics, critical theory and 
psychoanalysis. As Barbara Kennedy suggests, each of these discourses prioritised 
‘ideological and political foci to the detriment of affectivity and art’ (Kennedy in Cull 
2009: 183). ‘Where was the body and feeling in such debates?’ she asks. ‘Why did none 
of this theory explain the vital, visceral and electric pulsations of my ‘autonomic’ 
response to the arts?’ (ibid.).  
 
To affirm affect is not to reinstate some kind of dichotomy between feeling and 
thinking, or body and mind, but to suggest a different conception of the impact of 
performance beyond the notion of meaning received by the representational 
consciousness of a subject. For example, when Deleuze argues that the ‘essential aims 
of the arts should be the subordination of form to speed, to the variation of speed, and 
the subordination of the subject to intensity or to affect, to the intense variation of 
affects’ (Deleuze 1997: 249), this is by no means a call to embrace a theatre of emotion 
over a theatre of the mind, or to give ourselves over to the pleasures of the ‘merely’ 
formal properties of a work of art instead of wrestling with its conceptual dimensions. 
Rather, Deleuze’s ‘onto-aesthetics’ (Zepke 2005: 4) posits the corporeal transformations 
of (human and inhuman) bodies in connection with one another as a kind of thinking – 
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specifically a kind of asubjective thinking conceived as affect or sensation. Conceived 
in terms of their power to be affected, Deleuze suggests that bodies can think in ways 
from which consciousness would do well to learn; he argues that difference in itself is 
that which ‘can only be sensed’, since consciousness works with identities (Deleuze 
1994: 139). For Deleuze, incomprehensibility is precisely where genuine thought 
begins; not being able ‘to make any sense’ of an event is what makes us really think as 
audience members, rather than getting locked into thinking with a fixed set of ideas. As 
encounter, thought is involved in bringing something new into being, rather than simply 
reaffirming what has already been thought; thought is creation rather than 
representation.  
 
The concepts of affect and becoming are also important in order to challenge the 
dominant status that the discourse of representation has come to hold in the theorization 
of acting. In particular, perhaps, they offer us a new way to think about character and 
the actor’s relationship to the ‘other’ he performs, as Chapter Four, on Goat Island, will 
discuss. Becoming has nothing to do with representing the other, in the sense of acting 
as the representative for the other’s absent presence. As Lawlor argues, ‘In becoming I 
do not become the representative of what I am becoming; it is not a relation of one thing 
(me) standing in for another (the animal, for example)’ (Lawlor 2008: n.p.). Rather, as 
Chapter Three on Kaprow will also emphasise, Deleuze and Guattari allow us to 
mobilize our thinking beyond the rigid separation of subject and object, and towards the 
idea of the participation of perception in and among the processes of the world.  
 
Rethinking the politics of presence  
 
Deleuze’s thought is also important in terms of thinking the politics of presence. 
There has always been a political dimension to the deconstruction of presence in 
performance; undoing the concept of self-presence can be seen as a political act. For 
instance, Lawlor has shown how the Derridean deconstruction of the supposed self-
presence of auto-affection, might be employed as part of a critique of species-ism and 
the consequent domination of the inhuman by the human. As Lawlor argues, ‘humans 
believe they have the right to dominate the animals because humans believe that they 
possess a special kind of subjectivity’ – a belief that has its ‘conceptual origins’ in both 
the Cartesian cogito and the Kantian notion of autonomy. For Lawlor, 
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The Kantian idea of autonomy means of course that I am self-ruling; I 
give the moral law to myself (unlike the animals upon whom nature 
imposes its laws). But in order to give the law to myself, I must tell it 
to myself. Kantian autonomy therefore is based on auto-affection. 
What makes me, as a human, autonomous is my supposed ability to 
hear myself speak at the very moment I speak. Because the voice 
seems to be purely immediate and mine, I hear myself speak in pure 
presence. This pure self-presence gives humans a dignity that far 
surpasses that of animals. It justifies the human right to domination 
(ibid.). 
 
In contrast, both Derrida and Deleuze show how the idea of auto-affection is not about 
the self feeling itself as itself (self-presence), but about ‘a thing’s immediacy to its own 
variation’ (Massumi 2002b: 8). In Difference and Repetition, for example, Lawlor 
argues, Deleuze points out that ‘when Kant introduces receptivity into the self, this puts 
a crack in the self’ and, as such, that  
 
human auto-affection is really and always hetero-affection… In 
thought, in my interior monologue, when I hear myself speak, I also 
inseparably do not hear myself.  What do I hear if not my “self”? I 
hear the other voices of the animals (Lawlor 2008: n.p.). 
 
In this sense, the politics of differential presence manifests itself as a politics of the 
animal and the inhuman. As Protevi argues, ‘Deleuze’s most basic philosophical 
instinct is against anthropomorphism’ (Protevi 2005: 132), and against the 
subordination of the world to consciousness and common sense, in a manner that 
suggests that Deleuze’s thought might be well suited to offer theoretical support to the 
recent turn towards the animal and ecology in Performance Studies13. Differential 
presence, as we will emphasise particularly in Chapters Three and Four of this thesis, is 
                                                 
13 To some extent this work has already been done by scholars such as Alan Read in Theatre, Intimacy 
and Engagement (2008), particularly pp. 149-150 and 256; by Una Chaudhuri and Shonni Enelow in 
‘Animalizing Performance, Becoming-Theatre: Inside Zooesis with The Animal Project at NYU’ (2006), 
Theatre Topics, Volume 16, Number 1, March 2006, pp. 1-17; and Jennifer Parker-Starbuck in 
‘Becoming-Animate: On the Performed Limits of "Human"’, Theatre Journal, Volume 58, Number 4, 
December 2006, pp. 649-668. Baz Kershaw also touches on Deleuze’s, but also particularly Guattari’s 
thought, in Theatre Ecology: Environments and Performance Events (2007).  
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not just a category of human experience, but a way of conceiving the relation between 
human and inhuman bodies and their respective durations.  
 
The political side of Derridean deconstruction has also been addressed in its 
theatrical context. Philip Auslander, for instance, draws from the example of the 
Wooster Group’s production of LSD (… Just the High Points…) to argue that the 
company’s deconstruction of presence allows them to investigate the ways in which 
both racial and sexual difference is suppressed in theatrical representations, and 
specifically in their appropriated source, The Crucible (Auslander 1997: 64). The 
authority of Miller’s text as a representation founded by an originary presence is 
destabilised when the character of Tituba is not portrayed by an African American, but 
by a white actress in the grotesque, caricaturing mask that is ‘blackface’ – one of the 
most extreme examples of the way in which difference is judged from the perspective of 
a standard that takes itself for a universal norm. To make such a character come to life, 
to give it presence rather than block presence with visible artifice, is equated with 
authorising a racist fiction. But equally, for the performer to claim that she is being 
herself (not the character) onstage, implies that she occupies some kind of transcendent 
ground out-with the circulation of, and constitution of identity by, representational 
categories. If nineteenth century American blackface performance contributed to the 
justification of slavery, then Auslander suggests that the politics of the Wooster Group’s 
practice lies in their performance of ‘a critique of presence in which… charismatic 
performance is accompanied by its own deconstruction’ (ibid., 67) – for instance, in 
Ron Vawter’s presencing of the impassioned ideologue, whilst substituting ‘gibberish’ 
for a comprehensible speech.   
 
Deleuze’s ‘One Less Manifesto’, however, offers a different account of the 
politics of presence – where it is presence, as difference or variation, which is invested 
with the power to expose the oppressive nature of representation. In his deconstructive 
readings of ‘the experimental theatre and performance of the 1960s’, Auslander 
assumes that the political aspirations of groups like the Living Theatre were based on 
the liberatory power they attached to the idea of self-presence. The assumption, he says, 
 
was that because the presence of the actor as one living human being 
before others is psychologically liberating, pure presentation of 
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performer to audience is the best means available to the theatre to 
make a radical spiritual/political statement (Auslander 1997: 62). 
 
In turn, Auslander’s deconstructions of the immediate actor reconceive such groups as 
politically dubious, and correlatively situate his own scholarly practice as the politically 
valuable act. Drawing from Deleuze here allows us to reconceive the ‘pure presentation’ 
of the performer as the presentation of difference, in a maner that also permits us to 
rehabilitate a valid micropolitics in the Living Theatre’s work – as Chapter One will 
discuss in depth.   
 
 
3.5 The thesis in the context of existing literature on Deleuze, presence and 
performance 
 
 Although there are a good deal of recent studies of art and performance that make 
use of Deleuzian concepts, and studies of Deleuze that refer to examples of 
performance, there are few precedents for the Deleuzian analysis of presence. Such 
precedents as there are tend to make reference to Deleuze, or to discuss him somewhat 
briefly, whereas this study aims to generate a detailed and in-depth account of the 
Deleuzian concept of differential presence. For instance, Martin Puchner cites Deleuze 
as part of his broader discussion of the relation between presence and representation in 
performance, in the essay ‘The Theatre in Modernist Thought’ (2002). For Puchner, 
Deleuze is part of ‘the theatrical turn in philosophy’ (along with Nietzsche, Benjamin 
and Butler), but nonetheless Puchner remains cynical about the value or relevance of 
Deleuze’s ‘protheatrical theory’ for actual theatrical practice (Puchner 2002: 524). To 
Puchner’s mind, Deleuze’s concept of the genetic role of difference-in-itself and of 
repetition as the return of difference (rather than the same) ‘all sounds rather 
speculative’, and he complains that ‘it is difficult to picture what these two forces of 
difference and repetition really are’ (ibid.). In turn, while he notes that the theatre that 
Deleuze wants is one in which difference presents itself, he suggests that theatre itself 
remains more concerned with the attempt to ‘try to somehow represent a world’. In 
addition, Puchner argues that the ‘different performances of a single play imply 
precisely a model of difference that is anchored by an identity, namely, the identity of 
the play that is being rehearsed over and over again’ (ibid.).  And finally, he concludes 
that Deleuze’s commitment to differential presence means that he ‘must insist on the 
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theater as a performing art and repress the function of the theater as a (representational) 
medium’; he is anti-literary and anti-textual. 
 
 With such a reading of Deleuze in place, Puchner posits a sharp contrast 
between Derrida and Deleuze, which he claims is ‘the consequence of their respective 
reliance on the model of the text and of the theater,’ (specifically ‘the anti-textual 
theater of the avant-garde’). He argues that 
 
While Derrida’s insistence that any form of presence is forever 
interrupted and displaced in a chain of signifiers is derived from the 
fact that text displaces presence, Deleuze’s understanding of singular 
events is based on the precarious form of presence that characterizes 
live human bodies on a stage (ibid., 526). 
 
At first, this might sound compatible with our own argument that Derrida and Deleuze 
explore difference in different realms. However, Puchner later equates this unstable 
presence of bodies, upon which he claims that Deleuze’s interest in theatre is based, 
with the stability of ‘unmediated presence’ (ibid., 527). As such, he implies, the theatre 
Deleuze wants is ‘an imaginary theatre’ as open to deconstruction as Artaud’s Theatre 
of Cruelty. Deleuze’s call for a theatre without representation is misunderstood as a call 
for a theatre without difference.   
 
Another engagement with Deleuze’s relation to presence in performance is 
provided by Maaike Bleeker’s essay, ‘The A,B,C’s of Différance: Jan Ritsema and the 
Relationality of Theatrical Presence’ (2004). Though thoroughly poststructuralist, 
Bleeker’s analysis does not ‘set out to deny the longing for some kind of intense 
experience of ‘being there’ as an important drive behind the making of performances 
and the watching of them’ (Bleeker 2006: 139). Rather, Bleeker makes use of both 
Derrida and Deleuze to attempt to account for such experiences of ‘presence’, without 
needing ‘to ground these experiences in some kind of independently existing materiality 
or given’ awaiting discovery (ibid.). Bleeker’s essay introduces several valuable insights 
for how Deleuze’s philosophy, and particularly his ‘account of thinking in terms of 
movement’, might allow us to reconsider the experience of presence as ‘a thinking 
process, an ongoing flow of thought, that develops in and through interaction with what 
is seen on stage’ (ibid., 147). In turn, she identifies Deleuze’s book on Francis Bacon as 
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‘a useful starting point for a reconsideration of “presence” in the theatre’ as a 
presentation of affects that makes the audience think (ibid., 148). However, the vast 
majority of the essay takes the form of a deconstruction of an interview with 
contemporary dancer, Jan Ritsema, in a manner that could be seen to underestimate the 
already differential nature of the notion of presence at work in Ritsema’s theory and 
practice. Though an important precedent, the brevity of Bleeker’s treatment of Deleuze 
means that the essay does not reduce the necessity of this extended and in-depth study 
of Deleuze and presence.  
 
 
4. Deleuze and the notion of methodology 
 
 The next section of this introduction will address the question of methodology: 
elaborating the nature of the thesis’ own methodology and justifying its usage for the 
study of presence. As has already been indicated, this methodology is primarily 
influenced by Deleuze, and hence the first subsection of this discussion will provide an 
account of what has become known as ‘Deleuzianism’, though not before having 
recognised Deleuze’s problematic relation to the very notion of ‘methodology’. Having 
addressed its Deleuzian influences, the second subsection will then attempt to outline 
the other characteristics of this thesis’ method, particularly touching on its contentions 
regarding the relationship between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, or philosophy and 
performance.  
 
Deleuze himself has a complex relationship with the notion of ‘methodology’. 
Indeed Claire Colebrook suggests that  
 
There is a problem with talking about “method” in Deleuze, simply 
because his whole approach to life and thinking set itself against any 
idea that we should approach problems with ready-made schemas, 
questions or systems… Philosophy, especially, ought to be creative 
and responsive, forming its questions through what it encounters… If 
Deleuze has a method it is that we should never have a method, but 
should allow ourselves to become in relation to what we are seeking 
to understand (Colebrook 2002: 46).  
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Likewise, O’Sullivan expresses the opinion that ‘The desire to outline a Deleuzian 
methodology is… somewhat wrong-headed’, insofar as Deleuze’s own thought and the 
approach to thought he encourages is one that breaks with pre-existent methods. ‘One 
might be able to extract such a method or system,’ O’Sullivan concedes, ‘but this would 
be to render Deleuze’s thought inoperative, to freeze it in, and as a particular image of 
thought, to capture its movement, precisely to represent it’ (O’Sullivan 2006: 3).  
 
Nevertheless, Deleuze does address methodological questions and discuss 
existing methods, such as Bergson’s notion of ‘intuition’. Alone and with Guattari, he 
also introduces a series of synonyms for his approach, including ‘schizoanalysis’, 
‘rhizomatics’, ‘nomadology’ and ‘micropolitics’. Finally, Deleuze frequently addresses 
the question of how philosophy ought to be done, what it might involve and how it 
might relate to art in ways that offer valuable insights into methodological debates, even 
if they do not amount to a single, coherent method. In the first chapter, on the Living 
Theatre, for instance, we will address Deleuze’s argument that philosophy must become 
more ‘abstract’ – an argument that, as we shall see, is not in favour of philosophy 
becoming divorced from the world, but of thinking on the level of process and 
difference. In the case of each of these contributions, we can frame Deleuze’s comments 
on methodology as responses to the dominant methodologies of the philosophical 
context from which his work emerged; namely, structuralism (particularly in its 
psychoanalytic manifestation) and phenomenology. 
 
Of all these responses to the problem of methodology, the most important is 
arguably Deleuze’s idea of ‘transcendental empiricism’ and his definition of philosophy 
as concept creation. ‘Transcendental empiricism’ can be understood as a response to 
Kant’s theory of ‘transcendental idealism,’ which, in turn, might be construed to 
conceptualise the event of presence insofar as transcendental idealism concerns the 
recognition of an object by a subject. As Ronald Bogue explains, this event of 
recognition or presence is made possible by the harmonious functioning of the faculties 
(of sensibility, understanding, memory, imagination and so on); when they all perceive 
the same object as the same, in an agreement that ‘establishes the identity of the subject 
(as union of the faculties)’ (Bogue 1989: 57). In contrast, Deleuze is more interested in 
the differential powers of the faculties, for instance, in the idea that there are things that 
can only be sensed rather than understood. According to this account, as he describes it 
in Difference and Repetition:  
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Rather than all the faculties converging and contributing to a common 
project of recognising an object, we see divergent projects in which, 
with regard to what concerns it essentially, each faculty is in the 
presence of that which is its ‘own’ (Deleuze 1994: 141).  
 
Deleuze contends that ‘For each faculty there exists something that it alone can 
experience… and this something is revealed only in moments of disequilibrium, 
through contradictions and enigmas’ (Bogue 1989: 58). Or as Deleuze himself puts it  
 
Empiricism truly becomes transcendental ... only when we apprehend 
directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being 
of the sensible: difference, potential difference, and difference in 
intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity (Deleuze 1994: 56–
57).  
 
In this way, Deleuze also rejects Kant’s reduction of experience to that which 
we can represent to ourselves and thus, the exclusion of difference as nonrepresentative 
force. Kant’s project in The Critique of Pure Reason was to locate a universal set of 
conditions for the possibility of knowledge, whereas what transcendental empiricism 
seeks is an experimental method that aims to have real experience as its object and to go 
beyond the understanding of experience as grounded by any specifically human 
phenomenon such as subjectivity or language. It is not a question of developing a 
methodology that allows thought to access a transcendent realm, since ‘for Deleuze both 
difference and becoming are immanent to our reality’ (May 2002: 147). Nor is it a 
methodology for achieving self-same presence as the coincidence of subject and object. 
Rather, transcendental empiricism conceives thought and experience as differential 
presence – in which difference is never captured and understood once and for all, but 
continues to present us with encounters that challenge the supposed unity or identity of 
the subject.  
 
With regards to the nature of concepts, perhaps some of Deleuze’s clearest 
remarks on this theme are to be found in Negotiations in which he reiterates an 
argument that we will find throughout his work: ‘Philosophy is always a matter of 
creating concepts’ (Deleuze 1995: 136). It is this that makes philosophy ‘creative or 
 53 
even revolutionary’, for Deleuze, rather than ‘communicative … contemplative or 
reflective’ (ibid.). However, he stipulates that philosophy is not a matter of creating any 
kind of concept whatever. Instead, genuinely creative philosophers are subject to the 
constraint that their concepts must ‘have a necessity, as well as an unfamiliarity, and 
they have both to the extent that they’re a response to real problems. Concepts are what 
stops thought being a mere opinion’ (ibid.). In this way, one concept is not as good as 
another, for Deleuze; they are not arbitrary, subjective or detached from reality. Or as 
Khalfa puts it ‘philosophy for Deleuze only has meaning when provoked by life or by 
the world’ (Khalfa 2003: 24).  
 
But nor are concepts representations of the truth of the world. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze argues for ‘a thought which moves’ over a static image of thought 
based on determinate concepts by which any given thing can, or cannot, be identified. 
Deleuze’s concepts do not stay the same as themselves from one text to another, but are 
transformed by coming into contact with ‘the outside’, with the excess of experience. 
‘You have to construct intellectually mobile concepts’, Deleuze argues (Deleuze 1995: 
122); and it is the actualisation of this imperative that makes A Thousand Plateaus, in 
particular, so productive for an interdisciplinary study such as this. Indeed, the thesis 
follows this Deleuzian method insofar as it creates its own concept of differential 
presence, and synonyms such as the ‘theatre without organs’ (introduced in Chapter 
Two).  
 
 
5. The thesis: questions, parameters, examples and structure  
 
5.1 The research questions 
 
At the start of this introduction, we noted that one of the central questions 
motivating this thesis was, simply: what is differential presence, and how does it work 
in performance? However, we are now in a position to move from these very general 
questions towards an introduction to the more precise questions that the thesis asks 
regarding the relationship between key Deleuzian concepts and differential presence, 
and between differential presence and key concepts from performance theory. In 
Chapter One, for instance, we ask after the relationship between differential presence 
and Deleuze’s own concepts of ‘immanence’ and ‘production’, as well as the relation 
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between differential presence and the theatrical concepts of audience participation, 
improvisation and collective creation. Likewise, in Chapter Two, we consider the 
relevance of Deleuze’s concept of ‘the body without organs’ for the theorisation of 
differential presence, but we also address the connection between this presence and 
Artaud’s concepts of the ‘Theatre of Cruelty’, ‘Flesh’, ‘incantation’ and ‘vibration’.  
 
In this way, each chapter of the thesis questions what particular strategies or 
techniques their respective practitioners theorise and use – in rehearsal and in 
performance – to create a minor theatre of differential rather than self-presence, a 
‘theatre-without-organs’, or performance as an experience of becoming. How do they 
(re)approach the traditional theatrical elements of text, body, space and time? How do 
they (re)conceive of the role of the director or the artist and their relationship to the 
audience? In turn, these practical questions prompt us to address the multiple facets of 
differential presence and its relation to the key philosophical categories of language and 
meaning, self and ‘other’, time and matter. In Chapter Three, we examine how both 
Deleuze’s notions of ‘affect’ and ‘becoming-imperceptible,’ and Kaprow’s concepts of 
‘experienced insight’, ‘lived change’ and ‘becoming “the whole”’, contribute to our 
understanding of differential presence. And finally in Chapter Four, we conclude our 
theorisation of differential presence by placing the Deleuzo-Bergsonian notions of 
virtuality, duration and multiplicity, alongside a series of concepts created by Goat 
Island, including ‘slowness’, ‘waiting’ and ‘hybridity’.  
 
That said, if the thesis is concerned to generate responses to certain key 
questions, it also derives from the core proposition that one can be ‘present to’ (or 
‘with’ or ‘in’ or ‘among’) difference as becoming rather than being; one can encounter 
difference as affect and duration. In this sense, the thesis proposes that one of the 
implications of Deleuze’s thought is that performance theory and practice must affirm 
the presence of difference for not only aesthetic and philosophical, but ethico-political 
reasons. Such an affirmation is by no means easy or without risk. However, this 
proposition will gather its strength from the analysis of exemplary practices that aim to 
show this affirmation at work and convince the reader of the reality of differential 
presence as a mode of relation.  
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5.2 The parameters of the project 
  
How do you define the parameters of a project to articulate a Deleuzian concept 
of differential presence in performance? Where does the territory of such a project begin 
and end? How do you choose which practical examples of performance to discuss? 
Perhaps, firstly, it is worth noting that, while the Derridean deconstruction of presence 
forms a highly significant aspect of the context for this project, neither it, nor Deleuze’s 
relationship to Derrida, is the specific subject of this thesis. We will return to the 
difference between their perspectives, particularly in Chapter Two on Artaud, but there 
is still considerable work that might be done in another context to address this 
relationship with regards to presence.  
 
Secondly, since this is an interdisciplinary project concerned with the 
intersection of Deleuze, performance and presence, rather than a solely philosophical or 
solely theatrical project, we can neither be concerned with Deleuze’s entire oeuvre in all 
its extensive, technical, and complex manifestations, nor with the entire oeuvres of the 
prolific practitioners addressed in each chapter. Rather, the project focusses on those 
aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference that are of the greatest relevance to 
performance and to the theme of presence, though even these aspects must be treated 
selectively and as determined by the particular practice being discussed. With this in 
mind, while the thesis will draw from a wide variety of different texts by Deleuze (with 
and without Guattari), including a number of lesser known texts such as ‘One Less 
Manifesto’ and transcripts of Deleuze’s lectures on affect, we will not attempt to extract 
concepts from each one of his twenty-five key works. In particular, the project excludes 
many of those texts from the first period of Deleuze’s career (as outlined by Protevi) 
which provide highly technical and specific analyses of indvidual philosophers such as 
Kant and Hume, and, as such, are less immediately relevant to discussions of 
performance. Likewise, the project will focus on those aspects of the artists’ practice 
that we judge to be of the greatest relevance to Deleuze and to the concept of 
differential presence this project aims to develop. 
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5.3 Why these practices? 
 
The thesis will focus on the work of four practitioners who are all broadly 
sympathetic to Deleuze and, as such, all four practices both lend themselves to, and 
benefit from, a Deleuzian reading. This Deleuzian sympathy is particularly pronounced 
in the cases of Artaud and Goat Island, since the former has already been written about 
by Deleuze himself, whilst the latter are familiar with Deleuze’s work and explicitly 
theorise their own processes in Deleuzian terms. In the case of the Living Theatre, we 
have made it our explicit aim to seek out and foreground the Deleuzian aspects of the 
company’s working practices and the theorisations of that practice by Julian Beck and 
Judith Malina, emphasising – for instance – their commitment to an ontology of 
movement and change, to relations of immanence and creative connection, to ‘bottom-
up’ rather than ‘top-down’ processes of producing performance and so forth. Likewise, 
with Allan Kaprow, the chapter extracts the aspects of the artist’s thinking that resonate 
most strongly with Deleuze’s philosophy. For example, we will focus on Kaprow’s 
interest in the affective, rather than signifying, properties of works of art; on his 
conception of reality as ‘constant metamorphosis’ (Kaprow 1966: 169); and 
particularly, on his exploration of the artist’s capacity to undo both the bounds of his 
own distinct identity and that of the art work, which we suggest connects strongly with 
Deleuze’s concept of becoming-imperceptible.  
 
In each case, the conjunction with Deleuze allows us to frame these practices in 
ways that respond to existing affinities with Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, but 
also, oftentimes, re-reading the practitioners’ work against the grain of dominant 
interpretations in the secondary literature. This is particularly critical with respect to 
Chapters One, Two and Three, each of which will work to reposition their exemplary 
practice as affiliated with the values of immanence rather than transcendence, with 
multiplicity rather than ‘The One’, and, above all, with differential rather than self-
presence. In other words, it should become clear that the choice of examples for the 
thesis is not just based on the concern to connect Deleuze and performance, but also to 
introduce (or create) a new concept of presence. And in this regard, some of the choices 
of examples are somewhat strategic in relation to existing literature: Chapter Two 
addresses Artaud, for instance, as much because we want to rehabilitate his concept of 
presence, as because of the amount of attention given to him by Deleuze. A similar 
sense of the need for recuperation motivated the decision to address the Living Theatre 
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in Chapter One. Much derided in critiques by Christopher Innes (1981/1993) and Gerald 
Rabkin (1984), and often reductively represented in presence theory, this chapter asks if 
their work really is just an ‘affirmation of live, unmediated presence’ (Copeland 1990: 
28) or if there are more complex understandings of this concept at work in their creative 
processes and productions. 
 
That said, there are, of course, an unlimited number of examples of theatre and 
performance that we might have discussed here, for a range of reasons. In the first 
instance, the thesis might have chosen to adopt the logic that all the practices under 
discussion must figure in Deleuze’s own writing, however briefly. If this were the case, 
the current Chapter Two on Artaud would then, perhaps, have been accompanied by 
chapters on Carmelo Bene, Samuel Beckett, Robert Wilson and John Cage, each of 
whom Deleuze makes reference to in a number of works. However, a proven connection 
to Deleuze has not been the only principle underlying the choice of examples, partly 
because an objective of the thesis is to demonstrate the extent to which Deleuzian 
concepts are designed to function in new contexts, to be transplanted from philosophy 
and put to work in interdisciplinary studies. Secondly, the risk of this model is that the 
thesis would remain on the level of exposition, articulating Deleuze’s position rather 
than introducing new arguments, perspectives, and concepts on the practices in 
question.  
 
Nevertheless, these are not the only four exemplary practices that might have 
been discussed. Indeed, given the ontological claims that Deleuze makes for his 
philosophy, it must be the case that differential presence subsists in every example of 
performance – however representational or non-experimental it appears to be. In theory, 
I could have used the Naturalist theatre of Stanislavski as an example of differential 
presence. But again, the reason for choosing these four practices is the theme of 
presence with which all of them have previously been associated, albeit – I argue – in a 
limited fashion.  
  
 One might also observe both the masculinism and the predominantly Western 
nature of Deleuze’s theatrical canon. To follow his choice of examples is to end up 
focussing on the contributions of white Western men. No doubt, to some, this thesis will 
not present an adequately different picture. There are still chapters devoted to Artaud 
and Kaprow, rather than to Tatsumi Hijikata and Lygia Clark. In response, we might 
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first note the central roles played by Judith Malina in The Living Theatre, and by Lin 
Hixson and Karen Christopher in Goat Island. But secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, the definition of a political practice in this thesis is not so much based on 
who makes it, but how the work is made: does the practitioner seek to enter into a 
becoming-minor? For Deleuze, however controversially, the micropolitics of liberating 
difference-in-itself is ultimately more important than pursuing the macropolitical goals 
of feminism or Marxism or postcolonialism, which tend to pursue wholesale social 
change on behalf of an identity.  
 
Finally, the thesis is not only concerned with what Deleuze has to say about 
performance and the arts in general, but also with what performance might have to say 
back to Deleuze. As a result, it tends towards practitioners who not only make work 
which seems able to enter into a dialogue with Deleuze, but who also write about that 
work. Despite the controversial claim of What is Philosophy?: that philosophers are 
unique in their capacity to create concepts, Daniel W. Smith argues that Deleuze was 
actually interested in what artists had to say, conceptually, about their own work, at 
least in Bacon’s case.  
 
Deleuze himself insists that we do not listen closely enough to what 
painters have to say. “The texts of a painter act in a completely 
different manner than the paintings,” he notes. “In general, when 
artists speak of what they are doing, they have an extraordinary 
modesty, a severity toward themselves, and a great force. They are the 
first to suggest the nature of the concepts and affects that are 
disengaged in their work.” Deleuze thus uses the interviews not as 
definitive statements on Bacon’s part but rather as the starting point 
for his own conceptual inventions (Smith 2003: n.p.). 
 
Likewise in this thesis, I have chosen to study four artists or companies who have 
produced their own sizeable archives of commentary in the form of interviews and 
independent writings, but at the same time, I have attempted to stay alert to the powers 
of rhetoric to misrepresent practice, and to treat the artists’ writings as one resource 
amongst others, rather than as the dominant or determining source of evidence. 
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But it is not only because they write about what they do that these practices 
become amenable to philosophical investigation; it is also because performance itself is 
a kind of thinking. In part, this approach reflects my own background, since I trained as 
an artist and performer before choosing to focus on academic writing in my graduate 
studies. Likewise, having worked within the research project, PARIP (Practice as 
Research in Performance)14, I have developed a significant interest in the practices and 
discourses that have been generated in the emerging field of ‘practice-as-research’, 
which refuses the theory/practice binary in favour of exploring the nature of the 
knowledge and ideas that practice itself produces. Performance does not need 
philosophy to do its thinking on its behalf; rather, we need to establish forms of 
exchange in which the different kinds of ideas generated through the practices of 
performance and philosophy can come into contact with one another.  
 
Thus, this thesis’ opening contention is that these practices are, in themselves, 
profoundly philosophical; Kaprow’s Activities, for example, constitute a project to 
think differential presence or presence as affect and becoming-imperceptible. Thus, 
although the thesis will draw heavily from Deleuze in order to articulate some of the 
conceptual detail of this theorisation of presence, this will not be a one-way flow of 
ideas from Deleuze to practice. Rather, we will suggest that ‘activating the detail’ of 
examples of performance not only allows us to address the difficulties of putting 
differential presence into practice, but to show how performance acts as a kind of 
resistance and perpetual challenge to theorisation (Massumi 2002b: 17).  
 
 
5.4 A conceptual structure 
 
As we have already pointed out, this thesis is structured conceptually rather than 
chronologically. The chapters are in the order that they are, as a means to construct a 
specific narrative or sense of development across the dissertation as a whole. For 
example, we begin with the Living Theatre, partly because their notion of presence is 
not fully differential in relation to the other practitioners; they still hold onto notions of 
transcendence, whether with respect to the role of the director or the presence of the 
                                                 
14 I worked as Project Officer for PARIP from April-September 2005. PARIP — Practice as Research in 
Performance — was an AHRC-funded research project directed by Professor Baz Kershaw and the 
Department of Drama: Theatre, Film, Television at the University of Bristol, running from 2001-2006. 
For more information, see: http://www.bris.ac.uk/parip/  
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actor. Further, we will see how their macropolitical goals lead them to try and steer or 
control creative participation for specific anarcho-pacifist ends. Despite their attempts to 
dislocate the performance from the mechanisms of control they associate with the State 
and with theatre as an institution, they nevertheless end up attempting to impose a 
transcendent system of organization on the becomings released by their own events. 
More positively, we also begin with the Living Theatre because the vast scope and 
diversity of their theatrical experimentation provides us with an opportunity to outline 
the range of areas of performance to which the concept of differential presence might 
relate, including: the performance of language, meta-theatrical structures, 
improvisation, participation, acting, collective creation, and chance processes. Although 
we will pay particular attention to Paradise Now (1968) on account of its canonical 
position in presence theory, the chapter also addresses early work such as Many Loves 
(1959), and recent pieces like Utopia (1995).  
 
 In Chapter Two we move on to address the work of Antonin Artaud, who has 
none of the Living Theatre’s macropolitical goals for his own performances of language 
and recognizes far better the ‘crowned anarchy’ that reigns within our own body.  
Artaud pursues differential presence at the level of the voice and the body, constructing 
‘a theatre without organs’ and a ‘destratified voice’ in order produce performance as an 
encounter with differential presence. Of all the examples, Artaud might appear to be the 
most conventional ‘author’, choosing to work primarily alone and without inviting any 
active audience participation. And indeed, we will note his lingering tendency to think 
of presence conventionally, in terms of controllable meaning and the communication of 
ideas, as well as thinking it differentially, in terms of the forcing of thought. However, 
given the extremity of his own experiences of self-dispossession (whether we choose to 
categorize them as ‘schizophrenic’ or not), he is in a unique position, in the context of 
this thesis, to dispute the characterization of thought, voice, language and body as self-
presence.  
 
 Chapter Three is dedicated to an analysis of Allan Kaprow’s ‘Activities’, in which 
we see the undoing of the sovereign artist, art-work and audience member into a 
participatory whole (and so contra Artaud’s lingering auteurism). In this chapter, I 
suggest that Kaprow is working towards what Deleuze might call a ‘becoming-
imperceptible’ of artist, work and audience, not in order to escape ‘this world’ and 
politics, but in order to participate immanently in the whole as change. The world, for 
Kaprow and Deleuze, never was some singular thing to be escaped. Rather, the problem 
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is how to access the world’s differential presence. This chapter elaborates upon the 
Deleuzian concepts of affect and becoming that we have introduced here, questioning 
further how they might enrich our understanding of differential presence, alongside 
Kaprow’s key concepts of ‘nonart’ or ‘lifelike art’, the ‘experienced insight’, and ‘lived 
change’. Here, differential presence will come to be conceived as an undoing of the 
subject/object relation, which enables us to experience ourselves as ‘in the midst of 
things’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 280), or as ‘becoming “the whole”’ (Kaprow 2003: 
217). For Deleuze, as we will discuss, the experience of becoming-imperceptible marks 
a kind of limit point of becoming; it takes becoming and our relation to difference to an 
extreme. Yet, while Kaprow will be shown to take up this challenge, and perhaps to 
take the experiment of becoming further than the previous two examples, we will 
ultimately argue that, despite his best attempts, he failed to break away altogether from 
the art-world and its organizing forces. However, this chapter will also emphasise the 
need for practice to feed back to philosophy, which in this instance takes the form of a 
critique of Deleuze’s artistic elitism via Kaprow’s democratisation of aesthetic 
experience.  
 
 
With the final chapter of the thesis, we arrive at the example of Goat Island who 
bring together the best of each of the previous examples. Like the Living Theatre, they 
are committed to the process of collective creation or collaboration as a means to 
generate performance as differential presence; but, like Artaud, they improve on the 
Living Theatre from a Deleuzian perspective, because they address the question of 
presence at the micrological level of the body, movement, duration, voice and so forth. 
However, whereas Artaud maintained a faint concern with the notion of 
communication, Goat Island (like Kaprow) reject the very idea of making a 
performance function as an illustration of existing ideas. In turn, they share Kaprow’s 
interest in locating difference within the ordinary, through experiments with the 
multiple durations of different bodies. That said, Goat Island do not privilege active, 
audience participation in Kaprow’s sense; and nor do they consider it necessary to leave 
the context of ‘art’ or ‘theatre’ in order to construct performance as an experience of 
differential presence. In their a-disciplinary works – inspired as much by classical 
theatre as performance art and contemporary dance – Goat Island suggest that the 
contemporary theatrical, ‘black-box’ space is always already multiple rather than a 
mechanism of control which suppresses the appearance of difference. The theatre space 
is not just a space and a time in which other times and spaces can only be imitated; it is 
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always already a differential space and time in which ‘the past’, for example, is not 
construed as absent or virtual but as a different, co-existing duration. Differential 
presence, here, is understood as an attention to the multiplicity of the present – an 
experience that we can have without leaving the theatre, via performances that invite us 
to attend to ‘it’ differently. Ultimately, this argument leads us to make ethical claims for 
differential presence as an experience offered by Goat Island’s performances, and as a 
concept generated both in the company’s writing and in Deleuze’s thought.  
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Chapter One  
 
Beyond failure, toward differential presence in the Living Theatre 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This opening chapter of the thesis will outline the concept of differential 
presence through an encounter between Deleuze’s philosophy and the work of the 
Living Theatre – the American experimental theatre company founded in 1947 by 
Judith Malina and Julian Beck, which still continues to work today. The Living Theatre 
originally conceived itself as a challenging alternative to the mainstream Broadway 
theatres, at first on the basis of its choice of material by modern poets and playwrights 
whose work was ‘decidedly not part of the familiar repertoire of that era’ (Rabkin 1984: 
9)15. Aware of and engaged in the emergent innovations that were taking place in art, 
music and dance, the company also conceived itself as ‘bringing interest and stimulation 
to [theatre as] an art medium which tends to become repetitive in its form rather than 
creative’ (The Living Theatre in Mee 1962: 195). Thirdly, Julian Beck conceived the 
company as breaking away from the ‘critical attitude towards art’ which had come to 
dominate ‘after the war and in the early fifties’: the view that ‘you cannot mix art and 
politics; you cannot mix art and activist-social thought, they don’t go together; they 
degrade each other’. For Beck this attitude constituted ‘a form of censorship’ against 
which he and Malina, as ‘confirmed theoretical anarchists’, sought to rebel (Beck in 
Schechner et al 1969: 37).  
 
Although they received the greatest critical acclaim for earlier works such as 
The Connection (1959) and The Brig (1963), the company are best known for Paradise 
Now (1968) – a piece that Stephen J. Bottoms refers to as one of the ‘countercultural 
landmarks’ of the 1960s (Bottoms 2006: 238). Collectively created while the Living 
Theatre were in exile in Europe and subsequently toured around the US during the 
politically and socially volatile years of 1968-69, Paradise Now is frequently cited by 
scholars as exemplary of the concern with presence, and the rejection of 
representational theatre, understood to characterise the American avant-garde theatre (or 
‘alternative theatre’ or ‘Off-off Broadway’ theatre) of the 60s. For Bottoms, for 
                                                 
15 This unfamiliar repertoire included plays by Paul Goodman, Gertrude Stein and Federico Garcia Lorca.  
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instance, the Living Theatre should be seen as at the forefront of developments which, 
by 1968, saw ‘ensemble explorations of the theatrical “here and now” (as opposed to the 
“then and there” of representational drama)’ acquire  
 
a significant new twist. Concern with the immediate “presence of 
the actor” onstage, began to be complemented by a desire to 
highlight the presence of the audience – by inviting spectators to 
participate directly in the theatrical event’ (ibid., 237).  
 
Likewise Roger Copeland notes that Paradise Now (and particularly its ‘Rite of 
Universal Intercourse’) ‘is often regarded as a quintessential affirmation of live, 
unmediated presence’ (Copeland 1990: 28). There can be no more extreme example of 
the eradication of barriers between audience and performer, Copeland suggests, than the 
event of audience members taking up the invitation to join with the Living Theatre 
performers in the pile of ‘caressing…loving’ bodies on the floor. Quite simply, 
Copeland proposes that The Living Theatre wanted to ‘affirm presence by creating 
opportunities for physical interaction between audience and spectators’; the emphasis 
being on touch, rather than alienating vision, as the sense that leads directly to presence 
(ibid., 34). In stark opposition, Copeland argues, 1980s performance is characterised by 
the construction rather than dissolution of boundaries between performer and audience; 
a tendency that Copeland illustrates with reference to the work of Richard Foreman. In 
the 1960s, he goes on to suggest, Paradise Now would have been viewed, via Artaud, 
‘as an attempt to reunify the community in a neo- (or pseudo-) ritual, erasing any sense 
of theatrical rift’ (ibid., 28). And in the 1980s and 1990s, Foreman’s performance would 
perhaps most often be read via Brecht’s concept of the V-effect as a deliberate attempt 
to distance the performer from the event in order to encourage thinking rather than 
immersion, conscious reflection rather than presence.  
 
 However, as we noted in the general introduction, more deconstructively 
inclined performance theorists from the last two decades such as Herbert Blau and 
Philip Auslander have drawn from Derrida in order to translate the critique of the 
metaphysics of presence to the critique of presence in performance practice and 
discourse. Given their appeals to notions of “truth” and “authenticity”, the Living 
Theatre (as well as Artaud and Grotowski) have been a natural target for accusations of 
naivety. Looking back over the theatre of the sixties and seventies, a skeptical Blau 
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noted  
 
There has been a serious effort over the last generation to eliminate 
the as if, to return performance to unmediated experience, as with 
The Living Theatre, but with whatever measure of “truth” or 
“authenticity” it is at best only appearance. There is nothing more 
illusory in performance than the illusion of the unmediated (Blau in 
Schechner and Appel 1990: 253). 
 
In the attempt to eradicate fiction, Blau argues, practitioners like the Living Theatre 
merely revive what he conceives as the illusion of presence as the experience of truth. 
Arguing from a similar perspective, Martin Puchner contends that the theatre’s use of 
physical bodies as its medium is what fuels ‘the recurring fantasy that theatrical 
mimesis can be unmediated’ (Puchner 2002: 521). And here is where the discourse of 
failure – the failure of the Living Theatre, the failure of the sixties, the failure of 
presence – begins. The project of the Living Theatre fails for Blau because it is 
premised upon a fundamental, metaphysical error: that performance can itself be a full 
presence rather than a representation of that presence.  
 
But this chapter will suggest that we should be wary of allowing this 
deconstructive critique from preventing us from seeing the value in the non-
representational experiments of the Living Theatre. That is, we may wish to complicate 
the notion of presence that they were working with, but we need not add our voice to 
the chorus of those who insist on the outright impossibility of presence as non-
representational relation. Rather, this chapter proposes that we return to this call for 
presence with Deleuze who shares the Living Theatre’s concern with non-
representational processes (events, forces, sensations…), but who conceives the non-
representational as differential presence rather than self-presence. By drawing from 
Deleuze’s thought we aim to demonstrate that there is plenty worth rehabilitating from 
the company’s attempts to use performance as a place in which to think through how a 
theatre without representation might work – with regard to acting, directing and 
particularly, the audience – if not from the final strategies that the company actually 
used in performance.  
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This thesis begins with an encounter between Deleuze and the Living Theatre 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, because the structure of this project has been devised 
on the basis of a conceptual logic rather than a chronological one; this is not a history of 
differential presence in performance, but a theorisation of it, which will begin in a 
broad, exploratory fashion before going into greater depth and detail, both in relation to 
Deleuze’s philosophy and the examples of performance, in the following chapters. 
Arguably, the practice of those who become the focus of these later chapters constitute 
more complex and nuanced investigations of presence, and certainly their work makes 
for an easier ‘fit’ with Deleuze’s ontology than the Living Theatre’s – a practice all too 
often driven by concerns with truth, transcendence, identity, unity, and universality (in 
other words, with notions linked to traditional conceptions of ‘presence’) that are 
anathema to a Deleuzian philosophy of difference. And yet, if we take Deleuze’s 
ontological claims seriously, we must commit to the idea that differential presence is at 
work in all forms of performance, not just in those practitioners who articulate their 
ideas in Deleuzian terms (Goat Island) or have already been embraced by Deleuze 
himself (Artaud). But more than this, beneath some apparently naïve or romantic ideas 
about the means to arrive at a more harmonious condition in global politics16, the Living 
Theatre can be seen to have been pioneers in terms of their determination to undo 
representational relations - between author and work, director and cast, audience and 
performance - in order to make way for the immanent processes of participation, 
collective creation and the creation of community in a manner that has some interesting 
resonances with Deleuze’s ideas.  
 
The body of work of the Living Theatre – particularly in the period from 1947-
1978 – charts a line of evolution in a manner that has arguably rarely been equalled by 
other theatre companies at the time or since17. From ‘meticulously crafted’ works like 
The Brig to Paradise Now ‘which consciously denied traditional craft in its rage to drive 
theatre into the streets’ (Rabkin 1984: 13), from performing scripts to collective 
devising, the company ceaselessly remade itself. Because of the scope of this 
                                                 
16 See the critique of the Living Theatre by Christopher Innes: ‘Perhaps reflecting the naivety of 
American radicals in the 1960’s, their slogans were at best sophomoric statements of conviction, with 
little relevance to the actual situation [...] where “universal intercourse” was proposed (without any sense 
of irony) as a solution to the problems of the Middle East’ (Innes 1993: 182). 
17 This specific time period indicates the duration from the founding of the company to the end of the 
paratheatrical cycle The Legacy of Cain. Arguably, this was the company’s most consistently 
experimental period, before the return to the performance of scripts in the 1983 season at the Joyce 
Theatre and the reenactment of past performances – such as The Brig in 2007 - that has characterised 
much of their recent practice.  
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experimentation, this opening chapter will touch on many of the ideas related to the 
performance of differential presence that we will go on to develop and expand upon in 
subsequent chapters: the relationship between mind and body, conscious and 
unconscious, self and other, art and life, representation and creation, and so forth. In the 
first section of the chapter we will address some aspects of context, looking at the 
dominant tendency of secondary commentators to construe the Living Theatre’s overall 
project in terms of failure. However, this first part will also address issues of 
methodology specific to this chapter. Here, we will draw from aspects of Deleuze’s 
‘micropolitical’ and ‘abstract’ methodology in order to suggest ways in which the 
Living Theatre might be rehabilitated from such negative portrayals.  
 
In the following four sections, we will move beyond failure and toward the 
concept of differential presence, rather than self-presence, positing The Living Theatre 
as pioneering explorers (albeit flawed and conflicted ones) of some of the ways in 
which theatre might be reconfigured to unleash its ‘nonrepresentative force’, as Deleuze 
himself appreciated18. First, we will examine the relation between differential presence 
and participation, introducing a redefinition of the concept of participation as a creative 
presence rather than ‘absolute communion’, two routes to which might be the Living 
Theatre’s processes of audience participation and collective creation. Next, we will look 
at differential presence in the light of the important Deleuzian concept of immanence as 
a quality of relation the Living Theatre attempted to access by subtracting any 
transcendent elements – director, intending author, or spectating consciousness – from 
their processes of creation and performance. The following section will examine the 
company’s poetic uses of language and their experiments with the thinking body and 
improvisation as ways to access a nonrepresentative power of theatre, before we close 
the discussion with an examination of the Living Theatre’s relationship to concepts of 
community. Although the company themselves often spoke of their desire to generate an 
‘absolute communion’ or self-present community of performers and audience (Beck and 
Malina in Mantegna et al 1970: 24), we will address the mis-fit of this ambition with 
                                                 
18 We can be sure that the Living Theatre were known to both Deleuze and Guattari; for instance, in ‘One 
Less Manifesto’ Deleuze cites the company amongst an alliance of practitioners whom he perceives to be 
working with theatre as ‘nonrepresentative force’ (Deleuze 1997: 241). And six years later, in an 
interview with Charles Stivale, Felix Guattari would refer to the Living Theatre in order to argue that the 
notion of a ‘deterritorialized’ America is not just a utopian dream. Guattari says, it is not ‘that there isn't a 
potential America, an America of nomadism. Some people still exist . . . I was thinking of Julian Beck, of 
Judith Molina [sic], the former members of the Living Theater. Just because they've been completely 
marginalized is no reason to ignore their existence. They still exist nonetheless (Guattari 1985: n.p.). 
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their equal concern to make performances that cause ‘other escapes’, creativity or 
becoming (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 322).  
 
 
1. Contexts and methodologies:  
Process over content, production over representation, becomings over history 
 
Under this heading we are going to look at the narrative of failure that dominates the 
secondary literature on the Living Theatre and then at how, methodologically, one 
might rehabilitate the company from such a narrative. We will look at three interrelated 
ways in which this recuperation might happen, starting with an ‘abstract’ methodology 
that focuses on the ontological processes at work in the Living Theatre’s performances 
rather than on the specific, and sometimes flawed, contents of those processes. Next, we 
will argue in favour of approaching the theorisation of the Living Theatre as a creative 
production rather than a faithful representation of the company understood as a fixed 
and self-same object. And finally, we will argue in favour of a break with the 
methodological emphasis on socio-historical context, not only with regards to the 
Living Theatre but also in relation to the study of Deleuze and Guattari’s first 
collaborative work, Anti-Oedipus. 
 
So, first, the context of failure. As the introduction has already suggested, a 
great deal of the secondary academic literature and critical commentary on the Living 
Theatre tends to describes the company in terms of failure – a discursive context that the 
company arguably shares with the events of May ’68 in general. Erika Munk, for 
instance, describes Paradise Now as a work that ‘failed at a task seriously conceived’ 
(Munk in Harding & Rosenthal 2006: 50). For all their revolutionary rhetoric, it is 
argued, the Living Theatre failed to achieve their ambitions to produce a theatre that 
functioned as a genuinely transformative ritual. Arnold Aronson, for example, argues 
that the ambition to create secular modern rituals – common to the Performance Group 
and the Living Theatre – failed to appreciate that 1960s America was not a ‘community 
with shared beliefs, shared experiences, or, most important, shared rituals’ (Aronson 
2000: 101). What they created were merely faux-rituals or pseudo-rituals, Antony 
Graham-White concurs, which borrowed the ritual form but lacked its transformative 
force. Christopher Innes, in turn, dismisses the company’s political ambitions to affirm 
the real within performance as mere category error (Innes 1981: 191); he brands as 
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failure their “inability” ‘to distinguish between theatre and reality, sex and politics’ 
(ibid., 198). At the same time Innes argues that the company’s emphasis on process, and 
a correlative hostility to product, was necessarily ‘self-defeating’, and that the logical 
outcome of such an emphasis is the ‘crude acting, unsustained characterization and 
imperfect physical imagery’ that the company presented in Paradise Now (ibid., 192). 
 
This chapter will not argue that the impression of failure in the work of the 
Living Theatre is an illusion. Indeed, we might say that there is something of a harmony 
of failures in the Living Theatre’s Paradise Now and Deleuze and Guattari’s first 
collaboration: Anti-Oedipus (1972). In both cases perhaps there is an over-estimation of 
the revolutionary power of desire combined with an equal under-estimation or disregard 
of actual, social conditions and of both practical and ethical risks (to which Deleuze and 
Guattari pay much greater attention in a subsequent collaborative work, A Thousand 
Plateaus). Just as Julian Beck’s notion of ‘the world-prison’ has been dismissed by 
some as melodrama, there has also been a critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s over-
estimation or exaggeration of the impact of psychoanalysis and the Oedipal 
representation of desire on the lives of ordinary people. The encounter here between the 
Living Theatre and Deleuze and Guattari shows up a degree of naïvety in the 
philosophers’ early work too.  
 
 Throughout 1972-3, Deleuze and Guattari defended and clarified the position 
they had attempted to articulate in Anti-Oedipus. In the interview, Abecedaire, for 
instance, Deleuze identifies two key forms of misunderstanding in the reception of Anti-
Oedipus that emerged in the attempts to put the book’s philosophy of desire into 
practice: “spontaneity and la fête” (“Some people”, Deleuze says “thought that desire 
was a form of spontaneity, others thought it was an occasion for partying (la fête)”). 
However, Julian Bourg suggests that the problem was that ‘even if Anti-Oedipus did not 
make the claim for limitless liberated desire, it did not make a clear case against it’ 
(Bourg 2007: 120). As such, Bourg argues that ‘Despite their continual efforts to 
explain that they were not merely advocating a free-for-all celebration of unfettered 
desire, it was not merely by chance that their work was judged in that light’ (ibid., 121). 
Ultimately, he argues, Anti-Oedipus’ desire is ‘lawless’. And indeed, the book’s 
language of desiring and desiring-machines is all but abandoned by the works that 
followed; according to Deleuze, the notion of ‘desiring’ being dropped on account of its 
‘residual subjectivism’ (Deleuze 1995: 184). In this way, as John Mullarkey notes,  
 70 
 
The move from Anti-Oedipus to A Thousand Plateaus is 
simultaneously more physicalist and less psycho-sociological: 
ethology replaces ethnology (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 328); 
schizophrenia expresses nomadology only at the level of pathos 
and not universally (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 506); and ‘lines of 
flight’ and rhizomatics take over from schizophrenia (Mullarkey 
2006: 198 n21)19.  
 
 However, and this brings us to the first methodological point, the heuristic 
device of a process/content distinction allows us to see that there are different kinds of 
‘failure’ at work in the Living Theatre, and, as such, that they partly succeeded on 
another level. Sometimes the failure concerns a flawed or inconsistent attempt to fully 
engage in an otherwise ‘good’ process – from the Deleuzian perspective of this thesis – 
as we shall see in the following discussions of collective creation as an attempt to 
establish presence as an immanent relation between company and ‘work’. In turn, as 
many critics have foregrounded, the Living Theatre are often also guilty of what we 
might call failures at the level of ‘content’ - with their emphasis on ‘breaking the touch 
barrier’, for instance (or what that might mean for an all too deconstructable notion of 
presence), as a particular ‘content’ of the process of participation (Beck and Malina 
1971: 74). The idea of creating performance as a participatory process constitutes an 
important part of our project of conceiving presence as self-differing, but the attempt to 
instantiate that process through orgiastic touch and mere physical proximity has its 
obvious risks and limitations. At other times, as in the case of the company’s 
transcendent notion of ‘trance,’ it is the thinking process itself that fails, at least in terms 
of this thesis’ pursuit of differential presence. Or to give another example of this, whilst 
the company clearly critiqued the sedimentation of other oppositions in a segregating 
social structure (the separation of rich from poor, actor from spectator, body from mind, 
and so forth), other aspects of their discourse express an apparently deconstructable 
conception of the world as that which could be divided into examples of honesty and 
falsity, the alienated and the authentic. Finally, there is another kind of failure that can 
                                                 
19 As Bourg suggests, Deleuze defines ethology as “the study of the relations of speed and slowness, of 
the capacities for affecting and being affected that characterize each thing” (Deleuze in Bourg 2007: 155). 
In contrast, ethnology is conventionally defined as a branch of anthropology, and as such with 
specifically human forms of socio-cultural behaviour.  
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be rehabilitated from a Deleuzian position – such as the failure to commune with, or 
‘get through to’ the audience, insofar as this ambition itself can be shown to be ‘faulty’ 
qua representationalist. As we shall see in due course, the anecdotal accounts of these 
‘missed encounters’ between audience and a Living Theatre event can be re-read as a 
different kind of success. 
 
The heuristic device of a process/content distinction allows us to get beyond the 
predominantly negative perspective presented on the group’s work in the secondary 
literature. Contra this existing discourse on the Living Theatre, we can re-evaluate the 
content of the group’s performances, with a view to focusing upon the primary forms or 
processes from which these contents derive. From this processual perspective, what 
counts in the Living Theatre is not the fact that they tried to lead, half naked audiences 
out into the streets in sub-zero temperatures to start a revolution – a contextually 
specific act that critics like Innes evaluate as doomed to failure for all sorts of 
conceptual, artistic, practical and political reasons. What counts is participation as a 
form of refusal of fixed boundaries, whether between audience and performer or theatre 
and street. As Solomon has discussed, the company have been much criticized for 
leading spectators ‘out of the hall into the public square at the end of Paradise Now, 
urging them to free the prisoners from local jails’ (Solomon in Harding and Rosenthal 
2006: 65). However, ‘Beck and Malina asserted that they did not literally expect that the 
rush of spectators would, in fact, open the jails, but that they would experience the 
possibility – and the limitations – of their collective power’ (ibid.). What counts is the 
experience of collectivity and participation.  
 
 The Living Theatre’s individual works, and the details of these individual 
works, are the products of a more fundamental engagement with processes of movement 
across thresholds, with processes of connection unrestricted by conventional categories 
akin to what Deleuze and Guattari theorise as desire, becoming, or immanence. Another 
way to frame this approach is to see it as a response to Deleuze’s call for philosophy to 
become more ‘abstract’. By ‘abstract’ Deleuze does not mean that philosophy should 
become more unworldly, but that it should focus its attention on processes – on the 
molecular movements and becomings between things, rather than on the molar things 
that ‘do’ the moving and becoming. Thinking at the appropriate level of abstraction, for 
Deleuze, means thinking change as such, movement in itself, or relation per se rather 
than focussing on the object moved or the things related. Things or objects are re-
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evaluated as movements and becomings when they are seen more ‘abstractly’ as 
connected to each other, plugged in to each other, always and everywhere as related 
somehow. Process philosophy contends that, as humans, indeed as living beings, we are 
geared towards objectification; in order to survive we need to treat the world as a set of 
objects, whereas in reality what there is is movement, ceaseless change, or what 
Deleuze also calls perpetual variation. In terms of performance then, a Deleuzian 
approach involves reading performance at the level of processes. ‘Process’ in this sense 
does not mean the developmental processes a given company undergo in order to 
produce a performance, but the movements or becomings that are operative in theatrical 
events such as the dissolution of the transcendent spectator in the event of participation.    
 
 To give an example, in the context of ’68, the theatre as institution was 
understood to function as one more State apparatus which organized people as passive 
observers in relation to the performance as representing object. As much as the school, 
the hospital, and the factory, the theatre was seen to bind people to the strata of ‘the 
organism, signifiance and subjectification’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 159). As such, 
the movement from theatre to street involved a process of resistance to the strata, and 
yet one could imagine an alternative universe in which the necessary movement could 
be reversed, and the most radical, destratifying gesture would be to take people into a 
theatre rather than out of it. What matters is that through performance, the street can 
enter into a process of becoming that challenges existing conceptions of its identity. But 
there can be no eternal formula for revolution. As Hanon Reznikov has suggested20, the 
street only functions as a radical site for theatre as long as ‘you’re doing something that 
runs counter to the accepted or expected notion of what a sidewalk is for’ (Reznikov in 
Rosenthal 1998: 157-159). Likewise, the idea of resisting interdictions is still valuable, 
even if we are no longer particularly concerned about resisting laws around marijuana 
usage; and the company’s performance strategies – such as performing in the aisles - 
may well now have become clichéd, but that needn’t devalue their commitment at the 
level of process to participation rather than representation. In this way, both Anti-
Oedipus and the Living Theatre’s exile period works have aspects that transcend that 
specific context, on the level of process. And on this processual level, there is a definite 
‘fit’ between Deleuze and the Living Theatre, in terms of their shared concerns with 
desire, Life, creativity and transformation, community and participation.  
                                                 
20 After Julian Beck’s death in 1985, Hanon Reznikov took over as co-director of the Living Theatre with 
Malina.  
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 In the same way, we can look to the well-known example of Richard Schechner’s 
response as an audience member to ‘The Rite of Guerilla Theatre’ at the start of 
Paradise Now. In this ‘rite’, actors go from spectator to spectator, speaking phrases 
such as: ‘I am not allowed to travel without a passport’, in ‘a very quiet, urgent, but 
personal voice… With each repetition, his voice and body express greater urgency and 
frustration…He is obsessed with the meaning of the prohibition and by the 
ramifications of the prohibition…By the end of two minutes, all of the actors have 
reached a point close to hysteria’ (Beck and Malina 1971: 15). As Schechner describes, 
‘When Steve Ben Israel, I believe, came up to me and started shouting … - “I am not 
allowed to take off my clothes,” I felt it was time to take off my clothes’: an act that, at 
the time, Schechner conceived as a ‘put-down gesture’ (Schechner et al. 1969: 29). 
Later, however Schechner re-interprets his response, arguing:  
 
 I felt it was time to take off my clothes, because I didn't really 
understand what  he meant. I was directing Dionysus in 69 at the time, 
and a lot of nakedness was part of that show. But the point was not 
that you could or couldn't take off your clothes; the point was that you 
were not allowed to take off your clothes. The point was that an unjust 
law constrains those who obey. So my taking off my clothes, though it 
was theatrical and fun, was not the point of that scene. And I 
remember them later on explaining it to me; they would not let me off 
the hook. ‘No, you didn't understand what we were doing. It's not 
about whether you can  smoke marijuana or take off your clothes or 
smuggle yourself across a border without a passport; it's about the 
existence of unjust circumstances that put you  in a position of 
breaking the law to do good’ (Schechner in Smith 1986: 118 - 
emphasis added). 
 
Schechner’s first response puts content over process; the Living Theatre point him to a 
notion of law operating on at another level. Doing ‘good’ is not about taking drugs or 
being naked – these are merely the specific routes to creation and immanence that 
seemed relevant to the Living Theatre at the time they were working; they are some 
specific contents of the experimental processes they initiated.    
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 Despite these instances of flawed thinking we have noted above, we can locate a 
concern with the Deleuzian notion of difference as fundamental processuality, change 
and movement both in company’s practice and in Julian Beck’s writing. For example, in 
a text from 1969, he argues that ‘In order to perpetuate itself, that is, in order to stay 
alive, life has to change’ (Beck 1972: n.p.). And a year later, he reiterates that 
 
Nothing is more natural than change. That is what anarchism is 
about… The anarchist wants to create the conditions so that the 
process, this process of the universe, goes on with maximal effective 
extension of life and joy’ (ibid.). 
 
In fact, the Deleuzian equation of life and becoming is reflected in the very name of the 
theatre; it is the Living Theatre because it never ceases to change.  
 
 And this brings us to our second methodological point, that one can only approach 
the theorisation of the Living Theatre as a process of conceptual production in relation 
to other processes rather than a representational reproduction in relation to an object. As 
Jack Gelber once remarked, ‘It's very hard to talk about the Living Theatre as a static 
entity, because in fact the Living Theatre is different kinds of theatre depending on 
when you saw them’ (Gelber in Smith 1986: 109). In turn, one might add that what the 
Living Theatre ‘is’ or ‘was’ is irreducible to its own rhetoric, always eliding the 
company’s own attempts to represent themselves in texts, manifestos, interviews, 
photographs and films. As such, at times, the chapter will be generating creative 
readings of even Beck and Malina’s own interpretation of their practice in order to 
emphasise the formal connections between their work and the broad themes of 
Deleuze’s ontology: participation, immanence, production and community. In this 
sense, the chapter will not claim to faithfully represent what the Living Theatre really 
meant, so much as to construct the specifically Deleuzian aspects of the thinking that 
constitutes the ‘virtual’ line of variation running through their ‘actual’ practice. In this 
way, the emphasis on a methodology of production rather than representation (or 
representation as production) is not about imposing an arbitrary meaning on a static 
body of work but to approach that body of work as a varying product of differential 
processes and allowing the Living Theatre to transform our thinking. Foregrounding 
this ontological level also allows us to retrieve some lesser-studied details from the 
literature on and by the Living Theatre, but equally to introduce some primary concepts 
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in Deleuze’s thought that will provide the much-needed context for the more specific 
concepts of presence (as difference, as becoming-imperceptible) that will follow.  
 
But before we move on to these themes, let us finally address the 
methodological issue of socio-historical context. On a socio-historical level, there 
would seem to be a clear case for a productive encounter between the Living Theatre 
and Deleuze (particularly in his collaborations with Guattari21). Both were thoroughly 
involved in the revolutionary protests of May ’68 in Paris, critiques of the capitalist 
state, and the celebration of drugs, free sexuality and the ‘primitive’ as aspects of an 
alternative way of living and operating in the world beyond bourgeois conventions. 
Similarly, it is in the spirit of ‘68 that both the Living Theatre and Deleuze identify the 
“molar” formations of ‘the school, the family, the factory, the state’ as the targets of any 
“molecular” revolution of desire. From this perspective, Paradise Now and Anti-
Oedipus, which will be the focal examples of this chapter, may be seen as products of 
and responses to the revolutionary period of “the 68 years” and as such, as works that 
must be addressed in that context. Anti-Oedipus, the first collaborative work produced 
by Deleuze and the ‘anti-psychiatrist’ and political activist, Félix Guattari, was 
‘published in the afterglow of the events of May 1968’22 and as Eugene Holland 
suggests,  
 
…It may be that the events of 1968 brought these two otherwise 
quite unlikely  collaborators together in a way that would be 
unthinkable outside the context of that tumultuous and fertile 
moment, and that their thought-experiment was conducted in an 
effort to respond to it (Holland 1999: viii).  
 
In Anti-Oedipus, Bogue has argued: 
 
                                                 
21 Deleuze and Guattari’s collaboration can be mapped back to April 1969, when Guattari initiated a 
correspondence with Deleuze, which developed into a friendship and after two and a half years, the 
production of the Anti-Oedipus project. According to Bourg (2007), most of the book was ‘worked out 
between August 1969 and August 1971’, during which time The Living Theatre divided into various 
international ‘cells’, having returned to the States from their self-imposed period of European exile. 
22 What Lenora Champagne has called ‘the explosion of May 1968’ might be summarised as an eruption 
of protests, riots, strikes and occupations that sought to effect change in what the protesters saw as the 
repressive social relations that had come to dominate France under capitalism. However, while starting in 
France, the spirit of revolt soon spread around the world with comparable protests and occupations taking 
place in the US, Germany, Italy and Japan amongst others.  
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… many saw a philosophical expression of the spirit of the May 
1968 student revolt – some, because the book offered an exuberant 
and iconoclastic synthesis of Marxist and Freudian motifs within an 
anti-structural, Nietzschean thematics of liberation; others, because 
it seemed to enunciate an irresponsible and anarchistic politics of 
libidinal self-indulgence (Bogue 1989: 1). 
 
Likewise, The Living Theatre could easily be perceived as a theatrical expression of the 
’68 spirit: from their interest in drugs and meditation, to their fervent belief in a 
revolutionary overhaul of the capitalist State. Further, Julian Beck and Judith Malina 
were directly involved in the events of May – leading the occupation of the Odeon 
Theatre and drawing attention to the militants cause by withdrawing the planned 
performances of Paradise Now from the 1968 Avignon Festival.  
 
 And yet, to some extent, it is precisely these shared links to ’68 or some generic 
notion of “the sixties” that allow some to dismiss both the Living Theatre’s Paradise 
Now and Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus as outdated, and indeed as little more 
than documents of a now discredited brand of ‘hippy’ radicalism. That is, although a 
common socio-political context is perhaps the most obvious reason to study Deleuze 
and the Living Theatre alongside one another, it is also this context which ‘dates’ them, 
allowing subsequent generations to reject or criticise works such as Anti-Oedipus and 
Paradise Now as very much ‘of their time’, and of limited relevance to contemporary 
conditions. The risk is that if ’68 becomes the dominant contextual frame through which 
these works are read, then other aspects of their projects are missed. As Bogue 
describes, the association of Deleuze and Guattari with May ‘68 had some ‘unfortunate 
side effects. They became symbols of anti-psychiatry and the spirit of May, and as a 
result the broader concerns that informed Anti-Oedipus were often ignored’ (Bogue 
1989: 6). Bogue continues by  pointing out that Anti-Oedipus  
 
was neither a spontaneous effusion of May ’68 irrationalism nor an 
opportunistic  exploitation of the cult of Lacanism. Rather, it was 
the result of nearly twenty  years of investigation in philosophy, 
psychoanalysis and political theory on the part of its authors; hence, 
it was as much a response to intellectual currents spanning decades 
as a reaction to the May insurrection (ibid., 1). 
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Likewise, I want to suggest that the ‘datedness’ of some of the specific contents 
of the Living Theatre’s performances should not put us off attending to the ‘broader 
concerns’ or processes with which their work engages – concerns which come to the 
fore when we conceive works such as Paradise Now not simply in the context of ’68 
but as the result of twenty years of theatrical investigation on the part of Beck and 
Malina. For many, the Living Theatre are the quintessential sixties theatre group. And 
as such, Alisa Solomon argues  
 
It’s easy to blame the Living Theatre – and there’s a lot of will to 
assign blame in these reactionary times for the myriad alleged sins 
that have collectively come to epitomize “the sixties”… With a 
triumphalist post-Cold War crow of victory,  today’s conservatives 
pronounce the moral defeat of all that druggy lassitude, sexual 
abandon, pious rebellion, romanticizing of the poor and demonizing 
of the state with which they characterize the period (Solomon in 
Harding & Rosenthal 2006: 56).  
 
So, to mention the Living Theatre today is, as Solomon implies, to risk being accused of 
‘harking back to those hippy-dippy times, those naïve and destructive days of group-
groping, fuck-the-system free-for-all that we’re all supposed to have grown out of’ 
(ibid.). Paradise Now, in particular, has come to act as a ‘shorthand descriptor for the 
decade’s theatrical experimentation’ insofar as it is imaged as constituted by ‘nearly 
naked, long-haired men and women twined in a sweaty group embrace, groping at the 
audience, and leading them in [a] Pied Piper procession through the streets’ (ibid., 57). 
Problematically – both for an analysis of their past practice and for the company 
themselves who continue to operate today - this image has come to stand in for the 
Living Theatre’s entire legacy.  
 
 The remainder of this chapter is broken down into a series of four thematic or 
conceptual headings: participation, immanence, production and community – each of 
which will contribute something to a new understanding of the abstract notion of 
‘presence’. In some cases, the themes will be familiar from existing presence discourse. 
For instance, we have already seen how Copeland equated presence and audience 
participation in Paradise Now. However, this first section aims to reinvent the concept 
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of ‘participation’ via Deleuze and Guattari as a becoming or trans-categorical meeting 
of the different, rather than as an attempt to dissolve difference based on a belief in 
some underlying, universal sameness. And as the section on the theme of participation 
merges into that of immanence (there can be no fixed boundaries here), we will see how 
the notion of participation can be extended to discuss not just the relation between 
audience and performance but between performers and work, and art and life. That is, as 
one would expect from a discussion of a philosophy and a theatre of immanence, many 
of the themes of this chapter are overlapping: the Living Theatre’s interest in the 
process of improvisation, for instance, could equally have been discussed under the 
headings of immanence or production. But we have imposed these distinct headings in 
order to provide what is intended to be a broad, clear account of the multi-faceted 
process of differential presence which this thesis will continually work towards.  
 
 
2. Participation in creativity: activating audiences and actors  
 
 So, under this second heading we will look at the contribution that the concept 
of ‘participation’ might make to a theorisation of differential presence in the Living 
Theatre. In the course of this examination, we will address two senses of ‘participation’, 
starting with its most conventional theatrical definition as a more active mode of 
audience engagement with performance, in contrast to ‘spectatorship’, before 
attempting to extract a more ontological notion of participation from Deleuze, which 
concerns both the relation between ‘self’ and ‘other’, and ‘part’ and whole’.  This 
ontological participation, we will argue, is operative in the breakdown (rather than the 
successful enactment) of scripted audience involvement and in the collision of differing 
perspectives that occurs between the actors in the process of collective creation.   
 
To begin with the term ‘participation’ as it is conventionally understood in a 
theatrical context, we can say that participation, or the attempt to dissolve the boundary 
between actor and spectator, was one way that the Living Theatre attempted to break 
with representational theatre. At first, this was simply a spatial practice: of placing 
actors in what was conventionally the space of the audience – a practice that, although 
entirely institutionalized now, was innovative when the Living Theatre first used it in 
the late fifties with productions such as Many Loves (1959). Beck and Malina were also 
amongst the first in the American theatre world to read the translation of Artaud’s The 
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Theatre and Its Double in 1958, which famously includes the following passage 
encouraging theatre-makers to break out of the ‘two-worlds’ structure of the theatre 
space: 
 
In order to affect every facet of the spectator’s sensibility, we 
advocate a revolving show, which instead of making stage and 
auditorium into two closed worlds without any possible 
communication between them, will extend its visual and oral outbursts 
over the whole mass of spectators (Artaud 1977: 66). 
 
While conventional theatre architecture was seen as reinforcing the idea of the spectator 
as detached subject or disembodied mind before the object of performance, using the 
whole of the house was intended to force the spectator to experience him/her self as part 
of the performance.  
 
By the 1960s, the notion of audience participation had become very popular, 
with practitioners like The Performance Group as well as the Living Theatre exploring 
the idea of theatre as ritual. For advocates like Richard Schechner ‘the move from 
theatre to ritual happens when the audience as a separate entity is dissolved into the 
performance as “participants”’ (Schechner in Graham-White 1976: 323). Traditional 
theatre was associated with the segregation of the audience into a separate space such 
that they could not interfere with the pre-determined unfolding of the artist’s creation. 
By contrast, ritual seemed to provide a model for a desirable form of audience 
engagement and participation that the Becks, amongst others, associated with the 
origins of theatre. Julian Beck enthusiastically evoked an image of a new audience as ‘a 
congregation led by priests, a choral ecstasy of reading and response’ (Beck in Bigsby 
1985: 80). And according to Innes, the Living Theatre  
 
repeatedly termed their political aim ‘prophesying’, referred to the 
actor as ‘a priest’ or ‘shaman’, and pointed out their ‘concern with 
primitive and mystic rituals’; they described their theatre as 
‘performing a ceremony’ and its intended effect as ‘an absolute 
communion’ between audience and actors (Innes 1981: 187).  
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However, drawing from Deleuze and Guattari allows us to re-evaluate 
participation on a more abstract, processual level: not as ‘ritual’ but as a taking part in a 
differential whole, akin to what Anti-Oedipus calls ‘desiring-production’ or what the 
authors would later theorise as a process of becoming that dismantles ‘binary 
aggregates’ or ‘molar’ categories. Correlatively, we will re-evaluate the presence of 
participation not as ‘absolute communion’ but as the ‘intimate contact’ man can 
construct ‘with the profound life of all forms or all types of beings’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1984: 4), an immanent participation in difference as the ultimate reality. The 
notion of ‘absolute communion’ connotes a transcendent move beyond social 
differences towards a realm of being in which ritual participants might meet one 
another, premised upon a presumption of a universal humanity or ultimate sameness. In 
contrast, as we shall see, although the Deleuzian notion of participation also involves 
the dissolution of fixed distinctions between ‘self’ and ‘other’, the consequent presence 
involves the creative coupling and re-coupling of heterogeneous parts: the meeting of 
the different beyond differences.  
 
 Deleuze’s ideas on participation come primarily from Spinoza who, in his 
Political Treatise (Chapter 2, No. 6), argued that  
 
Men conceive of themselves as being in nature like a kingdom 
within a kingdom. For they hold that the human mind cannot be 
produced by any natural causes, but is created immediately by God, 
and is, therefore, independent of everything else to such an extent 
that it has an absolute power of determining  itself… (Spinoza in 
Leibniz 1989: 280). 
 
Spinoza broke with this ‘two-worlds’ view and insisted on the immanence of mind and 
matter; the participation of all things in nature. There is only one ‘kingdom’, in other 
words, in which all things participate. In the opening pages of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze 
and Guattari re-invent this Spinozist view using a machinic vocabulary. Drawing from 
Georg Büchner’s unfinished biographical narrative of the schizophrenic Jakob Lenz23, 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that ‘Lenz’s stroll’ outdoors provides a paradigmatic 
example of how man [sic] can experience himself, not as an independent kingdom but 
                                                 
23 Jakob Lenz was an 18th century author who moved in the same circles as Goethe, but suffered from 
recurring bouts of schizophrenia (Knapp 2003: n.p.) 
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as ‘one part among the others’:  
 
Lenz has projected himself back to a time before the man-nature 
dichotomy, before all the co-ordinates of this fundamental 
dichotomy have been laid down. He does not live nature as nature, 
but as a process of production. There is no such thing as either man 
or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other 
and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, desiring-
machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: 
the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any 
meaning whatsoever (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 2). 
 
What matters is that the schizophrenic experiences himself as a participant in ‘nature as 
a process of production’, in nature as what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘desire’. There is 
no separation, they argue, between producer and product; rather, both nature and 
industry belong to the same process of production that is ‘of man and by man’ – not in 
the sense that it belongs to him or is controlled by him, but in the sense that man 
‘ceaselessly plugs’ into nature as part of its creative process (ibid., 4-5).  
 
Deleuze also addresses the ontology of participation in his reconsideration of the 
relationship between ‘part’ and ‘Whole’ through the concept of multiplicity. Here 
Deleuze differentiates between ‘discrete’ and ‘continuous’ multiplicities defined as a 
distinction between that which does not and that which does change in kind when 
divided into parts (Deleuze 1988: 41). Correlatively, Deleuze takes on an emergentist 
perspective in works such as Cinema 1, such that the Whole is always more than the 
mere sum of its parts (Deleuze 1986: 23). As Smith has discussed, according to ‘the 
principle of difference’ that characterises Deleuze’s thought, the Whole is not a totality 
that unites the fragmented, but a variable and varying effect of the relations between its 
dissociated and disconnected parts (Smith in Deleuze 1998: xxiii – original emphasis).  
 
We will deal with these ideas further under the next category of immanence, but 
for now let us move on to explore the ways in which the Living Theatre attempted to 
generate this creative, participatory presence by their own means. In this expanded 
sense, we can see that ‘participation’ not only relates to the dissolution of the distinction 
between performers and audience, but between authors and performers, and more 
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broadly between art and life. In each of these three cases, participation refuses 
separation but not difference; it is not about homogenisation but about becoming part of 
a heterogeneous whole. Let’s begin with the most obvious case: audience participation. 
Certainly, there is no question of the Living Theatre merely jumping on the 
‘participation-bandwagon’ of the sixties, given that the origins of the company’s 
engagement with audience participation as a process can arguably be traced back to 
their earliest productions. For instance, in Many Loves, although they did not yet 
explicitly address the problem of how to transform the audience into performers, they 
were concerned with what Beck called ‘the problem of recognizing the presence of the 
audience’ (Beck in Schechner et al 1969: 37). First performed by the Living Theatre in 
January 1959, Williams’ Many Loves is set in a dress rehearsal and, as Mee notes, this 
meta-theatrical structure lets the company ‘throw lines to the audience and even have 
some of the actors sit with the audience, delivering their speeches from the auditorium’ 
(Mee 1962: 197). But even with respect to these tentative beginnings, the following 
quote suggests that Julian Beck was troubled by the political and aesthetic implications 
of allowing the audience to remain in a position safely ‘outside’ the work, and indeed 
the actors to remain comfortably detached from the audience. At the time, Beck 
believed that  
 
these play-within-the-play devices arose out of a crying need on the 
part of the authors, and of us, to reach the audience, to awaken them 
from their passive slumber, to provoke them into attention, shock 
them if necessary, and, this is also important, to involve the actors 
with what was happening in the audience…  The intention was to… 
bring everyone closed to life. Joining as opposed to separation (Beck 
in Aronson 2000: 55 – emphasis added). 
 
To be alive, Beck suggests, is to be open and connected to, rather than separated from, 
our surroundings, or even simply to attend to, rather than fail to notice, this primary 
relationality.    
 
 This ambition to construct connections, to plug the audience into the work and 
into the actors (and vice versa), became an increasingly dominant concern as the 
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company developed new pieces during their so-called ‘exile period’24. As Malina later 
emphasised, participation was not specifically about ‘trying to get the audience to get up 
and dance and sing in the aisle’ – which was of ‘no interest’ to the company – but about 
undoing the audience-performer distinction as that which stifled the creativity of both 
parties (Malina in Kattwinkel 2003: 25). Paradise Now, for example, was structured in 
such a way as to make room for the audience to generate creative responses to an 
invitation from the company. The performance consisted of a series of eight of what the 
company called ‘Rungs’, incorporating a ‘Vision’ performed by the actors, a ‘Rite’ 
which aimed to establish contact between audience and performers, and an ‘Action’ to 
be initiated and conducted by the audience.  
 
 If we take the Deleuzian account of participation to heart, then ideally these 
interventions would not merely be accommodated by the company, who are able to 
continue to perform the rest of the piece as planned. Rather, the audience sections must 
be allowed to connect to the work as a part that changes the whole. The audience’s 
relations to one another and to the performers must be allowed to constantly produce the 
whole as their varying effects. Arguably, this happened with Paradise Now, but only on 
those occasions when the performance ‘broke down’ rather than when it worked. For 
instance, in one performance on the American tour, the invitation to “free the theatre” 
did lead to the stage becoming crowded with naked spectators, however it also led to the 
play being ‘brought to an abrupt end by a public discussion on the political relevance of 
the Living Theatre itself’ (Innes 1993: 189). In contrast, what Malina calls the 
‘beautiful’ pre-rehearsed interventions of already sympathetic audience members could 
be seen to blend too easily into the work, doing little to couple ‘life’ with ‘art’ nor to 
ignite the creativity of the actors.  
 
In their favour, we must acknowledge that the Living Theatre did allow every 
kind of audience participation to happen; there was little policing of the audience except 
on the occasions when the company felt the need to ‘steer’ Paradise back on course. 
For example, during ‘Rung II’, the actors are instructed to give support to any kind of 
                                                 
24 As Saul Gottlieb describes, The Living Theatre went into ‘voluntary, self-imposed exile’ from the US 
and into Europe from September 1964, following ‘the seizure of the Fourteenth Street theatre by agents of 
the U.S. Internal Revenue Service’ in October 1963, and until their US tour in 1968-9. Despite Malina 
and Beck having to return to the US to serve prison sentences (of thirty and sixty days respectively during 
the winter of 1964-65), the company managed to tour a number of existing works to various cities across 
Europe during this time, and develop two new pieces: Mysteries and Smaller Pieces and Frankenstein 
(Gottlieb 1966: 137-8).  
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movement, dialogue or scene that members of the public might decide to enact. 
However, the instruction then continues: ‘If this digresses from the revolutionary theme 
or from the plateau to which we have been brought by the Rite and the Vision, the 
actors then try to guide the scene back to the meaning of the Rung’ (Beck and Malina 
1971: 45 – emphasis added). This quote is emblematic of a recurring problem for the 
Living Theatre: the incompatibility of the desire to generate an audience experience of 
creative, participatory presence and the ambition to communicate or transmit a single 
political message or final meaning. In contrast, and this is a point that will be developed 
towards the end of this chapter, we might argue that creative, participatory presence is 
itself political, insofar as it rejects the didactic relation to the audience prevalent in 
existing forms of so-called ‘political theatre’.  
 
 As Bottoms reports, Judson director Lawrence Kornfeld criticised what he saw 
as the disingenuous nature of the Living Theatre’s attempts to dissolve the actor-
spectator distinction in the process of audience participation:  
 
Those events that play amidst the people are playing a sleight-of-
hand trick: they are trying to convince us that they are not separate 
from us, [like] a grown-up coming into the midst of children and 
playing with them as if there were no differences in age between 
them and the kids (Kornfeld in Bottoms 2006: 242).  
 
But is Kornfeld being fair about the notion of the child in this analogy? In contrast, the 
Deleuzian position would argue that the molar category of ‘the child’ as defined by their 
age (what age? when do we stop/begin relating to the world like children?) covers over 
more fundamental relations of ‘childness’ that those categorised as ‘adults’ can 
implement in what Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘becoming-child’. This becoming has 
nothing to do with imitating a molar child - for instance, putting our hair in bunches - 
but by adopting new ‘childish’ relations to our bodies, to others, to the world. In turn, 
whereas for Kornfeld it is the fundamental distinction between ‘them’ (the actors) and 
‘us’ (the audience) that is real – a distinction institutionalised by the very architecture of 
proscenium arch theatres – the Living Theatre’s attempts to ‘play amidst the people’, 
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indeed even to become indistinguishable from the audience, affirms a more primary 
relationality or becoming that precedes those fixed identities25.  
 
 At the same time, participation was an important term for the May ‘68 
revolutionaries who wanted to encourage people to become active participants in, rather 
than merely passive consumers of, the social. From this perspective we might suggest 
that audience participation is but the first step along the way to a more thoroughgoing 
dissolution of the audience-performer divide, the ultimate stage of which could be the 
creation of community theatres or ‘people’s theatres’ in which those who were once the 
‘audience’ no longer need the ‘performers’ to invite them to participate. Or further still, 
to pre-empt the route that Grotowski was to explore in his paratheatrical experiments 
and Allan Kaprow in his Activities, participation can be taken to the limit such that 
there is no performance, only an experienced event, such that there is nothing to see and 
nothing made to be seen by anyone other than the community of creators who generate 
the event. In contrast, and despite the stated ambition for Paradise Now to function as a 
reciprocally participatory ‘voyage for the actors and the spectators’ (Beck and Malina 
1971: 5), much of the performance involves exercises undertaken by the actors – always 
in a 2:1 ratio, in which the audience participation is reserved to the final section of each 
‘Rung’. During much of the rest of the performance, the audience are re-positioned as 
spectators to the ‘Rites’ and ‘Visions’ enacted by the company.  
 
However, from a different perspective, we could say that literal audience 
involvement is only one way to access the creative, participatory presence that the 
Living Theatre sought, and equally, that one ought not to equate the creativity of the 
audience with physical interaction rather than spectatorship. As Gerald Rabkin’s 
critique of the group’s ‘continued reliance’ on confrontational strategies in the 1980s 
demonstrates, it is also a temporary method that relies on unfamiliarity or 
unrecognizability for its disturbing effects26. Novelty is effective and affective, or better 
effective as affective. In this regard, it seems important to note, as Rabkin does, that the 
Living Theatre were the first to present American audiences with new and unexpected 
uses of various theatrical elements; that they were the first to experiment with novel 
                                                 
25 In The Enormous Despair, Malina recalls how in a Yale performance of Mysteries and Smaller Pieces 
in September 1968 ‘the long wait in the dark’ was ‘filled with the sentimental preaching of a lady of 
religious bent’ whom a critic from Time Magazine mistakes for an actress with the company (Malina 
1972: 30). 
26 As Rabkin notes ‘There is, of course, no reason why an imaginative director cannot use the entire 
house, but it can no longer be assumed that that now familiar use is still provocative’ (Rabkin 1984: 17).  
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forms of production and dramaturgy that have since become commonplace. For 
instance, Rabkin notes that The Connection was the first play he had ever seen which 
began ‘with the house and stage lights on, with the performers gradually moving onto 
the scene’ (Rabkin 1984: 11). Likewise, he notes the way in which the ‘virtually 
plotless’ and repetitive nature of The Brig presented a challenge to most American 
audiences’ views of what constituted ‘a play’ at the time (‘this was not a play!’) (ibid. 
10). 
 
 Another of these ‘firsts’ was the company’s exploration of participation in their 
experiments with collective creation, their move from performing existing scripts to 
collaborative devising. In this way, we can suggest that differential presence concerns 
not only the relation between audience and event, but the relations between company 
members during the process of creating performance. Again, although clearly 
influenced by the wider context of ‘68 in many ways, the Living Theatre had already 
begun to creative collectively prior to the strikes and the emergence of collective 
creation in French companies such as the Théâtre du Soleil and Le Folidrome. Beck and 
Malina claim that the Living Theatre found themselves working on a collective creation 
almost by accident in 1964, in the development of Mysteries and Smaller Pieces, the 
first original production undertaken in their ‘exile’ period. According to Beck 
‘Mysteries had no director’  – a shift in the nature of the company’s creative process 
that he presents as accidental, as something that happened to the company without them 
knowing or planning it (Beck 1972: n.p.). However, though collective creation might 
have happened to the Living Theatre by accident, by 1969 Beck was arguing that ‘the 
real work of the director in the modern theatre is to eliminate himself’ (Beck in Shank 
2002: 36). 
 
 Whereas in previous productions the company had tended to use an authored 
script as the basis for performance, Mysteries was conceived as an opportunity for all 
company members to engage in the process of creative production, beyond the form of 
improvisation. Primarily, this participation took the form of lengthy, multiple 
discussions which the Living Theatre refer to as their ‘rehearsals’. In turn, published 
notes concerning Paradise Now document only the first five of one hundred general 
discussions in which all company members participated. According to Beck, 
discussions such as these became ‘an integral part’ of the company’s ‘working method, 
and were the source material out of which Mysteries, Frankenstein, Paradise Now, and 
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the mise-en-scene for Antigone were created’ (The Living Theatre 1969: 90). These 
notes also emphasise that these participatory discussions did not tend to lead to 
instances of ‘absolute communion’ between the actors, as much as disagreements and 
debates – demonstrating the difficulty involved in putting the idea of connecting 
heterogeneous parts into practice. For instance, there are the divergent opinions of 
company members around the question of how social change happens, the relation 
between social and individual repression, and the role that theatre might play in undoing 
these repressions27.  
 
 So, collective creation was often a lengthy and somewhat painful process for the 
Living Theatre given their diverse backgrounds and differing views, allowing Bradford 
D. Martin to suggest that  
 
the often frustrating tedium of collective creation parallels the New 
Left’s  experiences with consensus-based decision-making in trying 
to constitute a  process of working that reflected the egalitarian 
sentiments of participatory democracy (Martin 2004: 68). 
 
However, if what matters most is the participation of all company members in the 
process of creating a work, then there is no reason to position ‘agreement’ or 
‘consensus’ as the goal of that process. Company member Henry Howard once 
remarked that ‘“The whole company has thirty political ideologies and there has to 
come out of it one front – not one mind because the thirty of us are never going to 
agree”’ (ibid., 69). In turn we might suggest that the resulting ‘front’ is a differential 
creation rather than a self-identical presence that represents a single concept. Of course, 
in this sense, collaboration or collective creation is not opposed to working alone, but to 
any practice structured by a transcendent authority that is positioned ‘outside’ the 
creative process. In the famous opening sentence of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze 
recalls his and Guattari’s last collaboration: ‘The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. 
Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
                                                 
27 One of the company members, Gene Gordon, expresses doubts about the power of theatre in the face of 
the contemporary socio-political climate, saying – ‘I see the rise of fascism again. I find it difficult to 
work on a play about Paradise Now without working on the real problems of fascism – money war 
wages… To change the world we have to get rid of money and governments’ (The Living Theatre 1969: 
94-95). While another, Henry Howard, argues that Mysteries and Antigone have already dealt with these 
problems and that the ambition now should be to ‘create a play that will change… the outlook’ (ibid.).  
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1988: 3). Individual presence is always already differentiated, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
though not on account of the penetration of representation but because of what they 
conceive as the material, vital difference that runs through all bodies.   
 
 
3. Theatres of immanence: exit the transcendent author, director, spectator 
 
 We will continue to consider the Living Theatre’s collective creation at the start 
of this third section, but now from the perspective of thinking differential presence as 
constituted by specifically immanent rather than transcendent relations between creator 
and created. What does Deleuze’s concept of ‘immanence’ have to contribute to our 
understanding of differential presence? In order to address this question we need to 
begin with a theoretical introduction to the concept of immanence itself. After this we 
will attempt to evaluate the extent to which Beck and Malina were able to relinquish a 
transcendent, directorial position in favour of establishing differential presence as an 
immanent relation to others and to difference. Here, we shall examine three elements of 
the Living Theatre in turn: their creative process, their communal style of living and 
their relation to their audience in performance.  
 
Deleuze calls immanence ‘the very vertigo of philosophy’ and indeed, this 
highly elusive concept can be seen, as Christian Kerslake argues, as ‘the problem 
inspiring his work’ (Kerslake 2002: n.p. – emphasis added). Giorgio Agamben, in turn, 
suggests that, for Deleuze, immanence is both that which must and cannot be thought 
(Agamben in Khalfa 2003: 158). The plane of immanence is what Deleuze himself calls 
‘the not-external outside and the not-internal inside’ of thought (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 60). But perhaps the easiest place to begin in order to generate an opening 
definition of the concept is by looking at immanence as that which is opposed to 
‘transcendence’. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari propose their own 
thought as an alternative to the ‘illusion of transcendence’ perpetuated by much of the 
history of philosophy, whether in the form of a transcendent God or a transcendent 
subject who occupies a place outside the material world. As May explains, philosophies 
of transcendence are committed both to dualism – the idea of Being as composed of 
two, interactive types of substance such as ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ – and to the idea of the 
primacy of one of these ontological substances over the other (May 2005: 28-29). In 
contrast, philosophies of immanence like Spinoza’s as well as Deleuze’s, are based on 
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the notion of univocity – the idea that ‘“being” (or “Being”) is said in one and the same 
sense of everything of which it is said’, and the rejection of any hierarchical, ontological 
distinctions (ibid., 34). Although such a position seems to imply the eradication of 
differences, Deleuze is able to nuance the definition of univocal being in order to 
embrace the principle of immanence within his philosophy of difference. Without 
getting lost in the technicalities of Deleuze’s engagement with Spinoza, we can say that 
this nuancing involves a refusal of any distinction between worldly products and a 
transcendent producer, between agent and event, in favour of the notion of being as a 
processuality ‘immanent in whatever manifests it’ (Deleuze 1990: 16). Or again, ‘Being 
is said in a single and the same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which 
it is said differs: it is said of difference itself’ (Deleuze 1994: 36).  
  
 In a recent essay, Holland has helpfully demonstrated the pertinence of this 
articulation of the relation between immanence and transcendence for establishing 
differences between modes of creative practice, in his case between classical symphony 
performance and jazz. Holland argues that  
 
The classical symphony orchestra requires a transcendent instance of 
command in the figure of the conductor to guarantee coordination, 
whereas coordination arises more spontaneously and in a manner 
immanent to the group activity in jazz. Classical music entails a 
social division of labour whereby some merely execute what others 
(composers and conductors) conceive and command (Holland 2006: 
195). 
 
In the same way, the figures of both the author and the director might be said to 
function as transcendent authorities in the conventional theatre. In contrast, both in the 
process of collective creation, and in the company’s arrival at it as a way of working, 
the Living Theatre’s emphasis is on ‘emergence’. That is, they treat process – whether it 
is a company’s process or a production’s process - as a self-organising system that will 
generate its own unpredictable creations without need of a transcendent design or 
author. In collective creation, Beck suggests 
 
a group of people comes together. There is no author to rest on who 
wrests the creative impulse from you… We sit around for months 
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talking, absorbing, discarding, making an atmosphere in which we 
not only inspire each other but in which each one feels free to say 
whatever he or she wants to say… In the process a form presents 
itself (Beck 1972: n.p.). 
 
Beck also suggests that the final work will always be more than the sum of its parts and, 
as such, cannot be quantified in terms of individual contributions. Indeed, he suggests 
that contributions as such cannot be measured: ‘The person who talks least may be the 
one who inspires the one who talks most. At the end no one knows who was really 
responsible for what, the individual ego drifts into darkness… everyone has greater 
personal satisfaction than the satisfaction of the lonely ‘I’’(ibid.).  
 
 Equally, in collective creation, there is no longer an isolated director who stands 
outside of the work and manipulates the performers as the pliant material of his vision. 
In this sense, the processes of collective creation used to make work during ‘the exile 
period’ might be productively contextualised by the caricatured role assigned to the 
director in the company’s creation of The Brig. The Brig was a ‘play’ by the young ex-
Marine, Kenneth Brown, which presented itself as a document of a day in a US Marine 
prison in Japan in 1957. From a Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, The Brig presents a 
vision of one of the most extreme manifestations of top-down, State organisation. The 
world of The Brig is one that strives, as far as possible, to restrict life to processes of 
reproduction or the repetition of sameness. Any perceptible variation in the performance 
of a regulated movement or speech is suppressed through fear and punishment. 
Unpredictability, we are shown, is the privilege of the guards who interrupt the 
prisoners’ performances of orders, indulge in unexpected outbursts of violence and 
sometimes impose additional, arbitrary amendments to the regulations to express the 
relations of power between them and the inmates. When one prisoner, ‘twenty six’ (or 
‘James Turner’ as he reminds the guards he is actually called), acts similarly 
unpredictably he is promptly ejected from the brig world to face an uncertain, but no 
doubt unpleasant, future. For Beck and Malina, Pierre Biner suggests, ‘the brig was the 
image of the world as a whole and, by analogy, of such microcosms as the school, the 
family, the factory, the state’ (Biner 1972: 68), and, arguably, the institution of the 
theatre. Indeed, it was exactly because of this sense of theatre’s complicity with the 
State’s transcendent relation to its citizens that the student protesters occupied the 
Odeon Theatre during May ’68.   
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 Given this interest in collective creation, as a process that generates a self-
differing performance irreducible to the intentions of any one authorial subject, it seems 
strange that – as we have already noted – the company still sought to control the 
political ‘meaning’ of the various Rungs of Paradise Now. Furthermore, it would be 
inaccurate to describe the Living Theatre’s practices purely in terms of immanent 
presence, not least because of the perpetually central role that Beck and Malina played 
in the composition of works – albeit against their best intentions. That is, despite the 
Living Theatre’s attempts to create collectively, to genuinely collaborate in the absence 
of the judgment of a director, traces of transcendence remained. For example, although 
Beck describes Frankenstein (1965) as a collective creation in an interview with Biner, 
he also acknowledges that during ‘the last five or six weeks’ before its performance in 
Venice, he and Malina broke off from the rest of the company to work on the piece’s 
overall structure. ‘It was no longer possible to have twenty-five directors on stage. The 
pieces of the puzzle had to be assembled. Judith and I were holed up in the hotel room’ 
(Beck in Biner 1972:160). Beck goes on to say that the same situation occurred before 
Paradise Now, and many commentators have since argued that the company’s 
operations were less decentralised than they were claimed to be. Robert K.Sarlós, for 
example, argues that in the case of Paradise, Beck and Malina ‘ended up dominating 
and manipulating the anarchistic collective’ (Sarlós 1982: 167). Similarly, in relation to 
the 1970s  period when the Living Theatre split into four separate ‘cells’, Rabkin argues 
that ‘the disappearance of the non-Beckian cells after the 1970 declaration’ exactly 
confirms the unequal importance of the Beck and Malina in relation to the other 
company members (Rabkin 1984: 18). Even a sympathetic commentator like Paul 
Ryder Ryan made similar remarks in relation to the rehearsals for the play-cycle The 
Legacy of Cain, inviting us to consider the pragmatics of immanence as collective 
creation:  
 
While in theory Malina and Beck have tried to stay in the 
background and let the collective assume the directing leadership, in 
practice they find themselves  guiding the rehearsals a great deal, 
mainly because they have more experience than other members of 
the group (Ryan 1974: 18)28.  
                                                 
28 In interviews with Biner, Beck also acknowledges that he and Malina control the casting for every 
production (Biner 1972: 165). 
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 And yet, it is noteworthy that Deleuze’s own essay ‘One Less Manifesto’ forces 
us to question whether a top-down directorial approach is necessarily at odds with the 
project to liberate desire as creative production insofar as, here, Deleuze happily affirms 
Bene’s notably dictatorial, directorial methods. We might say then that collective 
creation can lead to relations of immanence, but that many things can be collective 
creation. What matters is not the presence or absence of a director, but how we approach 
directing or the nature of that director. He argues that: ‘It is of little consequence that 
the actor-author-director exerts influence and assumes an authoritarian manner, even a 
very authoritarian one’ (Deleuze 1997: 54). Because of the ‘minoritarian’ nature of the 
work that Bene is trying to make, Deleuze argues,  
 
This would be the authority of perpetual variation in contrast to the 
power or despotism of the invariant. This would be the authority, 
the autonomy of the stammerer who has acquired the right to 
stammer in contrast to the ‘well-spoken’ majority (ibid.).  
 
The political function of the minor theatre as Deleuze sets it up, is to awaken a 
“minority-consciousness” in its audience or to enlist the audience in a “becoming-
minority” by putting all the elements of theatrical representation – character, gesture, 
enunciation – into variation. If a dominant director is needed to construct such a theatre, 
then so be it, Deleuze seems to imply; whatever way works. 
 
 As we’ve seen, Holland’s article also emphasises the social nature of cultural 
activities, the way in which activities like jazz or theatre ‘induce a certain division of 
labour’ or style of social organisation that contributes to the wider organisation of the 
social field (Holland 2006: 195). In this sense, it is not just that theatre can function as a 
macrocosm of the social in the event of performance. Rather, theatre can be understood 
to have a socio-political dimension in terms of the style of organisation manifested in its 
creative process. From this perspective we might say that the Living Theatre’s processes 
of collective creation suggest a ‘social ideal’ of bottom-up rather than top-down 
organisation and the integration of difference into group production. Indeed, Rabkin 
suggests that this might be the best way to understand Paradise Now and the 
transformation of the Living Theatre as a company during ‘the exile period’.  
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It was no longer a theatre in the formal sense; it was a tribe, a 
commune. The new performers on stage… were not primarily artists 
sharing in a collective effort, but members of a family cultivating 
alternative modes of living. And… why not? The violent, polarized 
society we lived in then demanded new strategies (Rabkin 1984: 13). 
 
And the Living Theatre actively publicised this way of life – as a non-nuclear family or 
self-organized community. For instance, in The Living book of the Living Theatre, there 
are as many images of the group cooking together or looking after children, as there are 
of the productions themselves. In this way, while Rabkin retains a distinction between 
art and life, the company themselves could be seen as early proponents of the idea of art 
as the creation of ways of living, a concept that has since become of central importance 
for contemporary art practice29. That is, just as Beck and Malina worked hard to 
withdraw themselves from playing the role of director as transcendent producer through 
collective creation, they also resisted becoming leaders of the Living Theatre as a form 
of social organisation. Instead, they sought to establish their presence immanently, by 
merging into the community in their daily life as much as in their rehearsals.  
  
 The immanence/transcendence dyad can also help us to address the company’s 
ambivalent and perpetually shifting relation to their audiences. At times, The Living 
Theatre’s rhetoric appears to be premised upon an implicit God’s eye view on society; 
as if they feel able to position themselves outside the world-prison that they critique. As 
‘priest’ or ‘shaman’, the Living Theatre actor seems to be figured as a portal to 
transcendence; as the one who can lead the audience to a paradisial world elsewhere. 
And yet, at other times, Beck and Malina re-affirm their commitment to and 
participation in actuality. For example, in an interview with Biner, they say that the 
decision to perform Antigone (1967) in ‘ordinary work clothes’ rather than ‘“polite” 
bourgeois costume’ was conceived to emphasise their immanent relation to ‘the public’ 
and to the very system from which their work attempts to take flight. The performance 
does not constitute a critique of society ‘from the height of a pedestal or from outside,’ 
Beck argues. ‘We feel as responsible for the state of things as does the public. We are 
not doing enough to effect a change for the better’. The only way that theatre can effect 
                                                 
29 Examples of this can be found in a wide range of contemporary visual art practice, including the Dutch 
group Atelier Van Lieshout (http://www.ateliervanlieshout.com/), or the Croatian group Red Plan. 
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change, he continues, is if it is made ‘with the public…What we are saying to the public 
is, We are with you, among you…’ (Beck in Biner 1972: 159-160).  
 
 But both the philosophy and theatre of immanence has a long tradition of 
transcendent thinking to contend with. And indeed, theatre historian David Wiles has 
emphasized the extent to which philosophy and theatre impacted upon one another in 
this regard. For instance, Wiles calls the divide between active actor and passive 
spectator ‘the Cartesian theatrical dichotomy’ (Wiles 2003: 7) since it was Descartes 
who ‘cultivated the detached scientific gaze: reality viewed from a non-place 
somewhere on the margins’ (ibid., 4). Descartes’ philosophy conceived of the mind as 
somewhat like a ‘miniature theatre’ in which an ego or self ‘could contemplate reality 
and decide how to deal with it, before sending appropriate messages down… to the 
body’ (ibid.). Human thought was not understood as in the world, or as part of the 
world but as a separate representative system that produced and responded to its own 
images of reality.  
 
Likewise the theatre came to be conceived as a Cartesian space in which the 
passive spectator could view the on-stage reality at a remove, with their gaze directed 
by ‘the focalizing lens created by a proscenium arch’. In this way, the spectator’s gaze 
was ‘directed towards a stage and via the perspectival décor towards a Euclidian 
infinity’ (ibid., 8); or as Mike Pearson has argued, the proscenium arch theatre can be 
thought of as a ‘spatial machine’ that positioned the spectator as the transcendent 
observer of the performance as object (Pearson in Wiles 2003: 2). As such, Descartes 
can be seen as a ‘seminal figure in the history of western theatre’ particularly with 
regard to its spatial organization. Within this ‘ocular space’, Wiles explains 
 
The invisible ego not only views the action but also quells the actor 
with the controlling power of its gaze. It does not submit to any 
embodied immersion in space – space as apprehended through 
kinetics, smell, sonic vibrations or an osmosis running through 
packed shoulders (Wiles 2003: 7). 
 
Wiles’ characterization of immersive space here immediately suggests links to the 
Living Theatre’s work during the exile period – such as the activation of olfactory space 
through the use of incense in Mysteries. It also invokes the space of Paradise Now in 
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which there was often no single focal point to direct the audience’s gaze, and the crowd 
tended to arrange and rearrange itself in multiple, self-organized formations.  
 
 To return briefly to the process/content distinction that we introduced in the 
methodological section, one might object that the means that the company developed to 
instantiate differential presence as a relation of immanence between actors and audience 
now seem too literal, clichéd, or simply flawed. For instance, in Mysteries where the 
actors famously ‘died’ in the aisles, being literally among the audience spatially was 
hoped to affirm the reality of being among them ontologically. But while such an 
example may be fairly easily rehabilitated as a pioneering instance of what has since 
become a clichéd, and as such inoperative mode of crossing the audience-actor 
threshold, it is perhaps harder to locate the value for the theorisation of immanent 
presence of the company’s more confrontational modes of audience address. Famously, 
what starts as whispering in the opening of Paradise Now turns into the increasingly 
frustrated shouting of interdictions, by the actors at the audience: ‘I’m not allowed to 
travel without a passport’; ‘I’m not allowed to take my clothes off’; ‘I’m not allowed to 
smoke marijuana’. Having been among the audience, barely distinguishable from the 
audience, the company then seem to go to the opposite extreme: positioning themselves 
as external to individual audience members in a manner that recalls the relation between 
the officers and prisoners in The Brig. 
 
 And yet, even these outbursts can be re-evaluated as resistances to the law as the 
ultimate form of transcendent organisation. Moreover, we noted at the start the extent to 
which May ’68 and the associated themes of desire and liberation from oppression act 
as points of connection between The Living Theatre and Deleuze and Guattari. 
However, the methodological section of this chapter also gave a preliminary indication 
of the point we can expand upon now: the extent to which the reader must subtract the 
specifically ’68 contents of both Anti-Oedipus and Paradise Now in order to locate their 
lasting relevance. What concerns us long-term are not the specific ‘routes’ that the 
Living Theatre or Deleuze & Guattari may have temporarily recommended in the 
pursuit of differential presence, or what this chapter variously conceives as presence as 
participation, immanence, production and community. For example, both The Living 
Theatre and Deleuze and Guattari are interested in the perception altering capacity of 
drugs to destabilise the role of conscious thought as the transcendent ‘director’ of the 
actor’s experience. Again, in an interview with Biner, Beck argues that most 
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contemporary actor trainings remain on ‘the level of conscious interpretation’, the actor 
tends to draw only on his conscious experiences. As Biner reports, the Living Theatre 
reproaches the popularised and highly selective version of Stanislavski propounded by 
the “Method” in particular, ‘for its total reliance on rationality and psychology and 
upholds the premise that life unfolds on various, diverse levels that are intricately 
interconnected and also simultaneous’ (Biner 1972: 97); ‘The world of conscious 
experience is not enough’ (Beck 1972: n.p.).  
 
And the practical implications of this premise can be seen in the Living 
Theatre’s aspiration to access unconscious levels of perception, and their suggestion 
that one way to achieve this state is through the use of drugs.  
 
I believe that the bourgeois government have forbidden [drugs]… 
because they are afraid and want everybody to remain in the prison 
in which we live permanently. Perhaps what one learns with drugs is 
more real than what one learns with the drug of education, of 
politics, of language, of words (Beck in Biner 1972: 93). 
 
Likewise in another text, Beck ‘proposes the systematic use of psychedelic drugs to 
“enable one to begin to associate differently in the head, remember differently, learn 
time differently” (Beck in Innes 1981: 272). This idea of drugs as a way to access 
unconscious modes of perception, and to bring thought and experience into a more 
immanent relation with the movement of the world, is also addressed in A Thousand 
Plateaus. Here, Deleuze and Guattari report on the experiences of Artaud and the Beats 
that drugs can facilitate the leap from what they call ‘the plane of organization’ – 
characterized by the perception of discrete ‘things’ – to that of ‘consistency’ or 
‘immanence’ – characterised by the perception of a primary relationality prior to 
‘things’. For Deleuze and Guattari, drugs provide one means to perceive presence as 
movement and, as such, they can act as an agent of becoming. All drugs, they say, 
whether ‘hallucinatory or nonhallucinatory, hard or soft’, allow the imperceptible to be 
perceived, the direct investment of desire in perception and the perceived, and render 
perception molecular (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 282). In other words, ‘drugs 
eliminate forms and persons’: the molar entities that shape our perception as long as we 
occupy the transcendent plane of organization. In contrast, molecular perception 
perceives the world immanently, as ‘speeds and slownesses without form, without 
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subject, without a face’ which Deleuze and Guattari describe as ‘the moment when 
desire and perception meld’ and in which the ‘unconscious as such is given’ (ibid., 283).  
 
 And yet at the same time, A Thousand Plateaus takes care to warn us that drugs 
cannot be presumed to have fully predictable effects – ‘drugs do not guarantee 
immanence’ (ibid., 286) – any more than the elimination of the director might in 
relation to the production process. If the actor having a new experience of time is one 
possible outcome of drug-taking, then ‘the glassy body of the addict’ is another (ibid., 
285). As a more cautious Deleuze and Guattari remind us in A Thousand Plateaus, we 
must be careful not to reify hallucinogenic drugs for instance, as the only way to arrive 
at an immanent relation to the world, as transferable objects that will function in the 
same way despite the new contextual relationships composing them. Why not ‘succeed 
in getting drunk, but on pure water’ or ‘succeed in getting high, but by abstention,’ they 
suggest (ibid., 286)?  
 
 We will stay with this theme of unconscious reality as we move into the next 
section, which will begin by looking specifically at Anti-Oedipus in order to redraw a 
parallel between the unconscious and theatre, though as a site of production rather than 
the representation of the real.  
 
 
4. Theatres of production: contacting reality beyond representation and enactment   
 
 Within this fourth section, we will address how the Deleuzian concept of 
‘production’ contributes to our theorization of differential presence. First, we need to 
explore the notion of production by looking more closely at Anti-Oedipus, and its 
central argument that the unconscious is a site of production rather than representation, 
a factory not a theatre. Secondly, it will be argued that we can move from this 
apparently anti-theatrical notion of production towards a concept of a ‘theatre of 
production’ as that which manufactures differential presence. Specifically we will look 
at four different ways in which the Living Theatre sought to construct such a theatre: 
their affective use of language; their concept of the body as defined by the power to 
think the unthought; their interest in chance techniques; and their experiments with 
improvisation. Thirdly, we will conclude this section with an attempt to complicate the 
notion of presence that emerges from the Living Theatre’s opposition of ‘enactment’ 
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and ‘the act itself’ (Beck in Schechner et al 1969: 25). On this basis it will be proposed 
that Paradise Now constitutes what we might call the production of a ‘real fiction’ or a 
‘fictional reality’ rather than either a representation or a self-present act.  
 
How do you expose theatre and thought to the ‘outside’? How do you put them 
into contact with ‘a little real reality’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 334)? These are key 
questions for both the Living Theatre and Deleuze and Guattari, particularly in Anti-
Oedipus which they describe as ‘calling for the rights of a new functionalism’ versus a 
dominant, psychoanalytic representationalism in relation to their chosen field of study: 
unconscious desire (Deleuze 2004b: 243). Importantly for this study, Deleuze and 
Guattari contrast the functioning of the unconscious with that of the theatre as that 
which is expressed through representation. Indeed, Deleuze suggests that:  
 
Perhaps the most fundamental idea [of Anti-Oedipus] is that the 
unconscious ‘produces’. What this means is that we must stop 
treating the unconscious… like some kind of theatre where a 
privileged drama is represented, the drama of Oedipus. We believe 
the unconscious is not a theatre, but a factory… Saying the 
unconscious ‘produces’ means that it’s a kind of mechanism that 
produces other mechanisms. In other words, we believe the 
unconscious has nothing in common with theatrical representation, 
but with something called a ‘desiring-machine’ (ibid., 232).  
 
Contra the theatre, unconscious desire manufactures machinic connections rather than 
representations as its ‘units of production’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 24); Deleuze 
and Guattari critique psychoanalysis because it ‘fails to grasp that the unconscious is a 
factory and not a theatre’ (Deleuze 2004b: 219). In other words, Deleuze and Guattari 
want to reevaluate the productions of unconscious desire – such as, the desire to become 
a horse shown by Freud’s patient ‘Little Hans’ – not as representations of meanings but 
as acts of creation30. ‘The unconscious doesn’t mean anything’ Deleuze says (ibid., 
221); desire ‘is perfectly meaningless’ (ibid., 232). As such, we do not need to interpret 
the unconscious as psychoanalysis seeks to do; rather, they say, ‘The problem is 
                                                 
30 ‘Little Hans’ (whose real name was Herbert Graf) is the subject of Freud’s 1909 case study “The 
Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy”. Freud interpreted ‘Little Hans’’ sexual curiosity and 
‘phobia’ of horses according to an Oedipal model of desire in which the horse is understood to represent 
the father. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari argue that Little Hans was engaged in a ‘becoming-horse’ 
that has nothing to do with the familial context (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 259).  
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knowing how the unconscious works. It is knowing how “desiring-machines” work, and 
knowing how to use those machines’ (ibid.).   
 
 In interviews responding to the publication of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and 
Guattari emphasise their view that psychoanalysis has mis-read the “pure lived 
experience” of schizophrenics (but also children and ‘the primitive’) by insisting upon 
interpreting their acts as representational. In contrast, they argue that schizophrenic 
experience constitutes living in its purest form: as a particular, “intensive” form of 
feeling (ibid., 238), an ‘almost unbearable… intense feeling of transition, states of pure, 
naked intensity stripped of all shape and form’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 18). 
Schizophrenia, Deleuze argues, ‘is a shocking and very very acute experience, an 
involuntary experience, of intensity and the passing of intensities’, that is articulated, for 
example, when ‘a schizophrenic says: “I feel I’m becoming a woman”’ (Deleuze 2004b: 
238). These experiences tend to be described as either hallucinations or delirium, 
Deleuze and Guattari note; however, their own analysis conceives them as becomings: 
‘intense nervous states’ through which the subject passes, but which cannot be said to 
belong to that subject. As they will go on to emphasise in A Thousand Plateaus, 
becomings – such as Judge Schreber’s ‘becoming-woman’ – have nothing to do with 
imitation: ‘Nothing here is representative; rather, it is all life and lived experience: the 
actual, lived emotion of having breasts does not resemble breasts, it does not represent 
them’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 19). Deleuze and Guattari argue that such becomings 
bring ‘the schizo as close as possible to matter, to a burning, living centre of matter’, to 
‘that unbearable point where the mind touches matter and lives its every intensity’ 
(ibid.,19-20).  
 
 The apparently anti-theatrical remarks in Anti-Oedipus, and in the interviews 
Deleuze and Guattari gave about the book, must be read in the context of Deleuze’s 
affirmation elsewhere of the revolutionary power of theatre as nonrepresentative force; 
namely, in Difference & Repetition and ‘One Less Manifesto’, but also in other sections 
of Anti-Oedipus itself. We must be clear that it is not the theatre per se that Deleuze and 
Guattari reject, so much as a psychoanalytic model of the unconscious which conceives 
desire as producing ‘merely theatrical’ fantasies, rather than  producing the real. ‘If 
desire produces,’ they argue ‘its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be 
productive only in the real world and can produce only reality… The objective being of 
desire is the Real in and of itself…To desire is to produce, to produce within the realm 
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of the real’ (ibid., 26-27). In fact, they will go on to imply that actual theatres can 
manifest the liberation of desire insofar as they function as “theatres of production”: 
 
The movement of the theatre of cruelty; for it is the only theatre of 
production, there where the flows cross the threshold of 
deterritorialization and produce the new land – not at all a hope, but 
a simple ‘finding’, a ‘finished design,’ where the person who 
escapes causes other escapes, and marks out the land while 
deterritorializing himself (ibid., 322).  
 
This idea of causing others to ‘escape’ (not the world, but representation, 
conscious thought, the plane of organization) through one’s own escape was also Julian 
Beck’s idea of the contagious way in which nonrepresentative theatre might work – 
perceptually and politically. For instance, in The Life of the Theatre he writes:  
 
I am a slave who dreams of escape after escape, I dream only of 
escaping... of a thousand possible ways to make a hole in the wall, 
of melting the bars, escape escape, of burning down the whole 
prison if necessary.  
 
And then again, he argues that: ‘Great art means that you get swept, as if by wind 
(unseen forces) out of the solitary cells of the jails of suffering. Great art as the key for 
jailbreak... as key to creation’ (Beck 1972: n.p.). The artist’s escape has the purpose of 
unlocking creativity for others. In turn, despite the company’s more didactic moments, 
Innes suggests that they did also think in terms of a politics of perception. For instance, 
he notes  
 
their assumption... that spiritual change is the pre-condition for 
meaningful exterior political change; and that dealing with a social 
issue on its own terms will only perpetuate the established cycle of 
violence and oppression, of which it is a symptom (Innes 1981: 
189).  
 
Likewise, for Deleuze and Guattari, ‘Everything is political’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1988: 213); not only how we vote but ‘modes of perception, kinds of actions, ways of 
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moving, life-styles, semiotic regimes’ (ibid., 227). Every kind of power has a 
‘microtexture’ to which their ‘micropolitical’ philosophy attends. 
 
We will say more about the micropolitics of the Living Theatre in the fourth 
section. For now, let us return to the implications for theatre of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
critique of the psychoanalytic interpretation of the unconscious. On the one hand, it 
suggests that we might conceive the theatre as a “desiring-machine”: as something that 
means nothing (or is not a representation of meaning) but works in and produces the 
real. In the Living Theatre’s earliest works, we might suggest that they explored this 
nonrepresentative power of theatre through a poetic rather than communicational use of 
language, in their attempts to ‘revive or recreate poetic drama for the contemporary 
world’ (Aronson 2000: 51). Performing works by Gertrude Stein and Beat poets 
Kenneth Rexroth and John Ashberry, the company developed a poetic diction more 
concerned, as the Beats themselves were, with sound and rhythm than significance: 
“How can you enlarge the limits of consciousness if language atrophies?” Beck asked 
(Beck in Aronson 2000: 55). For Beck and Malina, it was only this poetic rather than 
everyday usage of language that could reconnect listeners with the unconscious. This 
concern with the asignifying aspects of language arguably re-emerges in the exile 
period, for instance with the performance of “Street Songs” in Mysteries: ‘an 
incantatory poem by Jackson MacLow based on the chants of the anti-war and civil 
rights movements (“Stop the war,” “Freedom Now,” “Free the blacks,” etc.)’ (Aronson 
2000: 71). Dismissed as ‘fiercely adolescent and rhetorical insurrection’ by critic 
Richard Gilman (in Solomon in Harding and Rosenthal 2006: 65), the company’s use of 
simple slogans as performance text tends to be construed as failing to recognise the 
complexity of political conditions. But surely we could equally suggest that, given the 
company’s prior concerns with the poetic, the point is that even these most apparently 
communicational or informational language units – slogans – are performative qua 
incantation, rather than representation.  
 
However, we must be clear here that this concern with the asignifying or 
affective usage of language is not an indication that the Living Theatre were making a 
theatre for the irrational body, as distinct from, or as opposed to the rational mind (as 
some German audiences apparently concluded on watching Mysteries).31 On the 
                                                 
31 In The Life of the Theatre, Beck reports: ‘When we played the Mysteries in Berlin in 1965, the German 
audience cried out: “You are using the same techniques that the Nazis used! the same mass hypnosis! the 
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contrary, we know that they thought in terms of the body as doing its own kind of 
thinking. In turn, although the Living Theatre devoted a great deal of time to discussion 
in the preparation of Paradise Now, it is important not to over-emphasise the role of 
‘talk’ in the company’s methodology. Equally important are physical exercises, 
improvisations and experiments that allow the body to introduce new ideas during the 
rehearsal process. Correlatively, though the company are known for their ‘willful 
disregard for actor training’ and particularly for their rejection of the acting conventions 
associated with the then dominant “Method” school (Aronson 2000: 60), it would be a 
mistake to think they were uninterested in the knowledge and indeed the ‘unknowing’ 
of the actor’s performing body. Echoing the Spinozist mantra oft-repeated by Deleuze – 
“we do not yet know what a body can do” – Beck argues that the theatre can help 
people ‘to find out what it is to have a body, and to begin to use and make joy with it’ 
(Beck 1972: n.p.). Indeed for Deleuze, following Spinoza, the affect of ‘joy’ involves 
the increase of the body’s lived power or power to act; joy is the intensification of life 
as creativity.  
 
 The important point here is that the Living Theatre saw the body as a site of 
creation, in Deleuze’s sense; that is, as the locus of the new or unthought, not because it 
is made meaningful by a transcendent subject but because the body itself has powers of 
differentiation, the power to differ from itself that Deleuze conceives in terms of 
‘virtuality’. It is this virtual dimension of actual things which lies at the heart of 
Deleuze’s critique of hylomorphism – ‘the doctrine that production is the result of an … 
imposition of a transcendent form on a chaotic and/or passive matter’ (Protevi 2001: 8). 
In contrast, Deleuze’s thought ‘emphasizes the self-organizing properties of ‘matter-
energy’’ (Marks 2006: 4). This self-organizing, creative aspect of matter, including the 
matter of the performing body, is conceived by Deleuze as the difference or line of 
variation running through all things. Such a perspective is also echoed in remarks made 
by Beck about the Living Theatre’s rehearsal processes; for instance, his comment that: 
‘…Whenever we work physically we find things that we could never find if we did 
nothing but think’. Or again: ‘Exercise should not be used to train the body to express 
the banal. We want things not yet known to the controlled consciousness which is 
                                                 
same appeal to emotional response and that’s dangerous! You have to be rational! When Julian Beck sits 
in the middle of a stage, lit by a spotlight directly over his head and hypnotizes us with magnetic voice 
and you enchain us by repeating slogans until we echo them… you rob us of our rational ability to see the 
world, to assess it and act accordingly. You make us into brainless animals. We don’t want to feel, we 
want to think’ (Beck 1972: n.p.). 
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ruining us’ (Beck 1972: n.p.). A further, more specific example comes from the Rite of 
Rung VII in Paradise Now, in which the actors are described as reaching  
 
as far as they can toward the creation of new sounds and new sound 
relationships. They listen closely to one another; they experiment in 
the use of their vocal chords and voice boxes in creating sounds and 
sound relationships which are, so far as they are consciously aware, 
not in their usual range of sounds (Beck and Malina 1971: 122). 
 
The creation of new sound was also an element of Mysteries and Smaller Pieces, during 
a section of which ‘The actors began to play an organ that was in the theatre and to 
create sounds with every element and part of the theatre they could’ (Aronson 2000: 
72). The actors experiment in order to find out what the body of the theatre building can 
do – in becoming-musical-instrument rather than being a house of representation.  
 
 The idea of generating a theatre of creation rather than reproduction was 
something that the Living Theatre had been experimenting with for some time. For 
example, in The Marrying Maiden (1960), they had explored the potential of chance 
techniques. As Biner explains, 
 
The Marrying Maiden turned out to be almost entirely different from 
one performance to the next. The author [Jackson MacLow], 
drawing on the rules of chance of the hexagrams in the I Ching, 
constructed six dialogue-and-character scenes. He provided a series 
of directions for the actors consisting of five degrees of vocal 
volume and five degrees of tempo in delivery. And, he specified, by 
means of a hundred adverbs and adverbial phrases, the tone in which 
certain words or groups of words were to be spoken – with gaiety, 
sorrow, and other emotions following each other solely by chance 
(Biner 1972: 55).  
 
Malina then built on MacLow’s explorations of chance, adding a dice thrower into the 
structure, whose throws determined the sequence of the performance and interjections 
of a recording created by John Cage. As Biner reports, each time the dice thrower threw 
a five, ‘the tape recorder was activated – Cage’s “music” actually consisted of a taped 
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reading of the play, with certain parts electronically distorted by Cage but most of the 
text remaining audible’ (ibid.). In this collaboration with Cage, we can see that the 
company’s evaluation of experiment and commitment to creation as the production of 
the new operates not just in individual performances but in their attitude to theatre in 
general. Like Allan Kaprow, who we will discuss in Chapter Three, and Deleuze and 
Guattari, the Living Theatre were always committed to experimentation as the aesthetic 
value par excellence. When the Living Theatre began, Malina envisaged it as a theatre 
that would operate at ‘the highest level of artistic adventure, the highest level of 
experiment’ in order to bring the existing field of theatre (which she described as ‘a 
little retarded’) up to the level of the aesthetic risk-taking that she perceived to be going 
on in dance, music, painting and poetry (Malina in Bottoms 2006: 24-25). By working 
with artists like Cage and MacLow, the Living Theatre produced theatre as a new 
assemblage transformed by its connection to other disciplines.  
 
 The Living Theatre also sought to instantiate creation through improvisation. In 
contrast, Innes’ insistence upon a fundamental ‘incompatibility of improvisation and 
art’ reinstates the dualist, two-worlds view that Deleuze rejects (Innes 1981: 198). ‘Art’, 
Innes seems to suggest, is a kingdom within a kingdom: a separate sphere of conscious, 
mindful creation that operates independently of the accidental, chaotic process of 
improvisation.  But as Holland suggests, improvisation need not be conceived as the 
embrace of chaos over order, but as a process that allows self-organised order to 
emerge, rather than being imposed from without. This constitutes a new attitude to the 
event of performance, understood not as a representation of a prior creativity but as an 
act of creation in a manner that establishes connections with the Living Theatre’s aim to 
break with performance as enactment of an existing script. Malina has suggested that 
the Living Theatre’s real commitment to improvisation emerged with their production 
of The Brig, which the company first performed in May 1963. ‘A great deal of The Brig 
is improvisatory,’ she states. ‘Every time an actor playing a prisoner steps on a line 
there is an improvisation, every time an actor playing a prisoner has an open button 
there is an improvisation’ (Malina et al 1964: 212). And after The Brig then, Beck 
argues, ‘It would never again be possible for us not to improvise. We would have to 
construct plays with forms loose enough so that we could continue to find out how to 
create life rather than merely repeat it’ (Beck 1972: n.p.).  
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 As David Wiles has discussed, commercial theatre tends to treat the “work” or 
show as an ‘ontological constant’, as a commodity that stays the same as itself night 
after night, and no matter where, when or in relation to whom it is performed (Wiles 
2003: 1). In contrast, it was in relation to Paradise Now that the Living Theatre most 
clearly articulated their aim to create a theatre of production or creation, rather than 
reproduction: 
 
We said in preparing Paradise Now… that we would not reproduce 
something but we would try to create an event in which we would 
always ourselves be experiencing it… not reproducing and bringing 
to life the same thing again and again and again but always it would 
be a new experience for us and it would be different from what we 
call acting’ (Beck in Schechner et al 1969: 25).  
 
As Beck suggests here, this notion of the work as becoming rather than being 
constitutes a different kind of relation between performer and “work”, in which acting is 
reconceived as a process of living rather than representing. In contrast to the theatre of 
reproduction, in which the actor presumes to have the controlling power to repeat the 
known or to reanimate a self-present past, in the theatre of production the actor 
encounters the performance as an unknown, self-creating process the future life of 
which is always uncertain. 
 
In the same interview with Schechner, however, the company speak of this non-
representative theatre in terms of a shift from ‘enactment’ to ‘the act itself’ in a manner 
that falls back on a binary between self-present reality and alienating representation, or 
real life and illusory fiction, which we will never find in Deleuze (ibid.). Equally 
problematic are productions like The Connection (1959), in which The Living Theatre 
seemingly sought to access reality through the most obvious means: in this case, by 
putting ‘real’ drug users on stage (albeit within a meta-theatrical structure that made it 
extremely difficult for the audience to say with any certainty which aspects of the 
performance were ‘real’ and which were ‘fictional’). As Bottoms reports, ‘production 
anecdotes suggest that some members of Freddie Redd’s quartet – the jazz ensemble 
who played live onstage during the performance – were indeed drug users, and that, on 
occasion, one or other of them would pass out, for real, during the performance’ 
(Bottoms 2006: 29). But as John Mullarkey has discussed, it would be a mistake to 
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think that the ‘direct exploitation (manipulation) of the Real’ in this way is ‘the way to 
[create] reality’ in performance, given the view that reality is differential rather self-
identical presence. Fiction employs ‘all the resources of the unreal (performance)’ in a 
manner that ‘succeeds all the more in the mimicry of reality’s own perpetual movement. 
Reality is not like itself either, but is what always mimics or coincides with itself only 
in part’ (Mullarkey 2009: 203-204). In other words, from a Deleuzian point of view, we 
err if we attack representation on the basis that it distorts the truth of the otherwise self-
identical presence of reality (as here and now). Attack representation, but only in order 
to liberate a self-differing reality from being petrified in immobile images or static 
concepts, since Deleuze’s brand of anti-representationalism does not construe presence 
in terms of the unmediated or as access to truth; nor, correlatively, does he equate 
‘fiction’ or ‘mediation’ with representation.   
 
 With this argument in mind, we might suggest that Paradise Now was less a 
self-present act (‘the act itself’), and more what we might call a ‘real fiction’ or a 
‘fictional reality’ – beyond the real/fictional duality of representationalism32. For 
instance, consider the closing sequence of the performance when the company 
announce that “The theatre is in the street”, lead the audience out of the theatre, and 
encourage them to break open the doors of local prisons. As we have already noted, 
‘Beck and Malina asserted that they did not literally expect that the rush of spectators 
would, in fact, open the jails’ (Solomon in Harding and Rosenthal 2006: 65); rather, we 
might conceive this gesture as an invocation of an anarchistic community that was 
missing or still to come. For Deleuze, the political function of art is not to raise the 
consciousness of an existing people or claim to produce theatre that represents a 
particular self-present class or nation – operating on what he calls the ‘macropolitical’ 
level. Rather art’s political task is to contribute to the invention of a people to come, of 
a community that is ‘missing’ to the extent that they ‘exist in the condition of a 
minority’ (Smith in Deleuze 1998: xlii). We will say more about this in the final section, 
which will consider differential presence in terms of notions of community.  
                                                 
32 There is a resonance here between my concept of ‘real fiction’ and Jill Dolan’s writing on the notion of 
‘utopian performatives’ in her book Utopia in Performance: Finding Hope at the Theater (2005). Here 
Dolan argues that performance does not produce representations of utopias, but makes ‘palpable an 
affective vision of how the world might be better’ (Dolan 2005: 6 – emphasis added). She then goes on to 
suggest that ‘The politics [of performance] lie in the desire to feel the potential of elsewhere. The politics 
lie in our willingness to attend to or to create performance at all, to come together in real places… to 
explore in imaginary spaces the potential of the “not yet” and the “not here”’ (ibid., 20). In response, I 
would want to emphasise the immanence of this ‘elsewhere’ to actuality (and indeed, this will be 
emphasised in Chapter Four). The palpability of the visions to which Dolan refers suggests their 
differential presence, albeit a presence that resists recognition or identification.  
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5. Differential community: in search of an audience to come 
 
 Etymologically, the very term ‘community’ suggests an aspiration to identity 
rather than difference, unity rather than multiplicity, harmony rather than disjunction or 
rupture, and is associated with known conventions and rituals rather than improvised or 
experimental processes of relation33. And indeed, we will now suggest that there is a 
tension in the Living Theatre between their double ambition to constitute the audience 
as immanent, creative participants in performance and to establish the relation they call 
‘absolute communion’. If creativity is the production of difference, then absolute 
communion seems to repress creativity rather than encourage it. At the same time, if 
differential presence involves the perception and encounter with difference then it might 
at first seem more aligned with the disruption of community rather than with its 
creation.  
 
However, in this fifth and final section, we shall propose that one can work 
towards a concept of ‘differential community’ as that which might name a collective 
experience of differential presence, or the nature of the community that differential 
presence invokes.  To arrive at such a concept we need to draw together the notions of 
community that emerge from the Living Theatre and from Deleuze and Guattari, 
looking particularly at the idea of a people that are ‘missing’ and the concept of 
‘becoming-minor’. Finally we will return to the recurring issue of the incompatibility 
between the Living Theatre’s overt political goals for their work and the necessarily 
unpredictable and unquantifiable nature of the theatre of participation, immanence and 
production which they were also involved in making.  
 
In interviews with Biner, Beck suggests that ‘community is in some way the 
most important aspect of our work’ (Beck in Biner 1972: 163). As we have already 
seen, the structuring of Paradise Now as a series of participatory “Rites” evidences the 
Living Theatre’s interest in ritual as a performative form. However, this work can also 
be seen as a creative reinvention, both of the concept of ‘ritual’ and that of 
                                                 
33 See Sue-Im Lee’s work on community in contemporary fiction, for example: ‘Befitting a concept 
central to the etymology of community, “communion” describes a spiritual union or meeting of souls, and 
this meaning continues to inflect the prevailing understanding of community as a condition of 
intersubjective continuity and transparency’ (Lee 2009: 24). 
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‘community’, of ritual as a performance with the power to bring forth a ‘people to 
come’ rather than as a ceremony that entrenches the values of an existing community. 
Re-reading the Living Theatre’s experiments retrospectively, perhaps we might now 
conclude that the people were ‘missing’, that they lacked the right audience for the work 
they were making, at the time when they were making it. Like Nietzsche or Artaud’s 
work, we could say that theirs was a theatre of the future that sought to create the 
community or people appropriate to it, rather than finding a ready-made audience 
already open to experiencing the processes that the work sets in motion. This constitutes 
a new idea of ritual contra the dominant anthropological view that defines ritual as the 
affirmation of the values of an existing community. And indeed, Solomon’s essay on 
the company’s more recent works suggests that the people are still missing.  Discussing 
the Living Theatre’s Utopia (1995-6), a work which sought ‘to overcome the spectator’s 
disbelief in her own desires’ (Malina in Solomon in Harding and Rosenthal 2006: 59), 
Solomon proposes that its ‘failure to find – and reach – an audience in New York’ had 
less to do with the arguable ‘failures’ of the production itself34, and ‘more to do with the 
ideological climate and artistic expectations an audience brings to a performance’ 
(Solomon in Harding and Rosenthal 2006: 60). What was missing in New York, she 
suggests, was a people with a common belief in, or openness to, an alternative to 
consumerism. What was there was cynicism, resignation and jadedness (ibid., 62)35.    
 
 The notion of ‘a people’ and community was clearly important to the Living 
Theatre; ‘The Relation of the Artist to the Struggle of the People’ is, after all, the 
subtitle to Beck’s first notebooks, which were published in the same year as Anti-
Oedipus. And while Beck’s language here echoes traditional Marxism, the Living 
Theatre’s own way of life and attitude to their audiences constitutes a more 
unconventional contribution to notions of community or social formation. Ultimately, 
Beck has stated, they wanted the community of the company ‘to function truly like an 
anarchist society… a society where the group is not sacrificed to the individual any 
more than the individual is to the group… a society without authority’ (Beck in Biner 
1972: 163). The goal was not to represent such a community on stage, but to live as 
such a community – an idea that Aronson suggests came primarily from Beck and 
                                                 
34 ‘True,’ Solomon admits ‘the production was not uniformly well acted, the text was not always easy to 
hear, and much of the imagery is bald and downright hokey’ (Solomon in Harding and Rosenthal 2006: 
60); but these superficial ‘failures’ cover over a more fundamental ‘failure’ that is the absence of an 
audience suitable to hear and feel what the Living are saying and doing.  
35 Here, Solomon is specifically discussing the presentation of Utopia in February 1996 ‘at a second 
space owned by the Vineyard Theater’ in New York (Solomon in Harding and Rosenthal 2006: 60). 
 109 
Malina’s early mentor, Paul Goodman (Aronson 2000: 53). And just as Beck and 
Malina made an effort to relinquish a directorial role in relation to the Living Theatre’s 
productions, it seems that there may well also have been a hierarchy they needed to 
dismantle in the company’s communal life: ‘Judith and I make a real effort to disappear 
into the community, to blend into it. We wither away little by little, as we want the state 
to do’ (Beck in Biner 1972: 164). At the very least, they surely achieved the 
organization of an anti-oedipal, or non-nuclear family that resisted the conventional 
triangulation of ‘mommy-daddy-me’ – the triangle of relations which psychoanalysis 
positions as the origin of desire. 
 
 The theme of community, a ‘people’, or ‘the masses’ and particularly the notion 
of a community for art as absent or ‘missing’ is also important for Deleuze and Guattari, 
most notably in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature but also in A Thousand Plateaus and 
Deleuze’s ‘One Less Manifesto’. The phrase itself: ‘The people are missing’ comes 
from the painter Paul Klee, and relates to his concern to create a work of art that escapes 
from the strata and territories of the earth to the ‘deterritorialized, or rather 
deterritorializing, Cosmos’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 337). In order to do this, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue, Klee needs, but lacks, ‘the forces of a people’ (ibid.). 
Writing in 1972, Deleuze and Guattari argued that 
 
…The relation of artists to the people has changed significantly: the 
artist has ceased to be the One-Alone withdrawn into him- or herself, 
but has also ceased to address the people, to invoke the people as a 
constituted force. Never has the artist been more in need of a people, 
while stating more firmly that the people is lacking… (ibid., 346).  
 
This talk of a people has nothing to do with ‘popular or populist artists’ – who address 
their work to those who operate as the ‘majority’ in society (ibid.). Popular theatre, 
Deleuze likewise argues in ‘One Less Manifesto’, ‘summons majority rule’, which does 
not mean the power of the many over the few (otherwise flies would rule the world), but 
the constitution as ‘minorities’ of all those who deviate from the standard measure of 
the system of representation: ‘Man – white, Christian, average-male-adult-inhabitant of 
contemporary American or European cities’ (Deleuze 1997: 253).  
 
 The theme of community is also addressed via their concept of ‘becoming-minor’. 
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According to Deleuze and Guattari, madness operates between a reactionary and 
revolutionary pole, where the former veers towards a fascism in which the 
schizophrenic declares “I am a superior race”, and the latter towards a becoming-minor 
in which she states “I am an inferior race” (ibid., 235). Subsequently, in ‘One Less 
Manifesto’, Deleuze wrote of the power of Bene’s theatre to create a “minority 
consciousness” in its audiences, in a manner that resonates with this revolutionary pole 
of schizophrenia. In turn, we might note that this idea of becoming-minor is clearly 
stated in a more recent piece of street theatre by the Living Theatre, Not in My Name 
(1994) which closes with the cast singing text ‘based on lines from Eugene Debs: 
“While there is a lower class, I am in it… While there is a criminal element, I am of 
it…”’ (in Solomon 2006: 66). Here, the performers, like the schizophrenic, declare a 
solidarity with groups that deviate from the standard measure and are overruled by the 
‘majority’. But for Deleuze, everyone has the potential to exceed or escape imposed 
identities in favour of enlisting in becoming or perpetual variation. And it is here, 
Deleuze says, that theatre can ‘surge forward with a specific, political function’ – not to 
represent a community but to create ‘a minority consciousness as a universal becoming’ 
(Deleuze 1997: 253-255). In this way, Deleuze suggests the possibility of a universal 
community created through performance, though one that is premised upon differential 
presence as a power to vary that we all have in common, rather than as differences that 
keep us apart. ‘The more we attain this form of minority consciousness,’ he argues ‘the 
less isolated we feel’ (ibid., 256).  
 
  Perhaps the Living Theatre’s greatest ‘failure’ emerges in the tension between 
their interest in opening performance to its (non-external) outside or the unknown 
through participation, improvisation and so forth, and the specific political goal they 
wanted to assign to performance as a revolutionary activity; the tension between the 
production of the new, that is by definition unpredictable and the desire to take control 
of creative processes in order to enact a particular outcome. This is no more apparent 
than in their documented responses to occasions when the audience ‘mis-behave’: for 
instance, at a performance at Berkeley on February 20th 1969. Following a day of 
clashes between student protesters and riot police, the audience for Paradise Now only 
wanted to dance, rather than to participate on the terms laid out by the company. Malina 
says ‘They were all doing their thing on stage, in the aisles, in the balcony. One by one 
exhausted actors staggered into the dressing rooms panting… “We can’t get through to 
them”. “They don’t hear us”’. The company’s statements of prohibitions are ‘crowded 
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out by the big party’ and the play ‘ends at the Fifth Rung’ (Beck and Malina in 
Mantegna et al 1970: 72).  
 
Discussing the work of the exile period, Beck and Malina describe their desired 
relationship to the audience as follows: 
 
…We raise questions and we expect from the audience that together 
maybe we can find the answers. The answers are found together. 
That is, if we perform a ceremony, the solution of which can only be 
found in communication with each other, then what we want from 
the audience and ourselves is to reach that point at which the 
solution is found. We know it can only happen with absolute 
communion (Beck and Malina in Mantegna et al 1970: 24). 
 
As Innes has remarked, such statements bare the traces of the Living Theatre’s 
engagement with Grotowski, who argued that the ‘relationship of perceptual, direct, 
‘live’ communion between actor and spectator’ was the essential condition of theatre 
(Grotowski 1968: 32). However, Beck and Malina also seem to equate this communion 
with the discovery of a single answer to a political question, or with the arrival at an 
ultimate solution understood as the product of an absolute unity between performers and 
audience. For Deleuze, in contrast, problems always have multiple solutions, which are 
the effects of difference rather than identity. Indeed, he theorised all kinds of human and 
inhuman bodies as ‘responses to the complicating or “problematising” force of life’ 
(Colebrook 2002: 1). For example, Deleuze suggests that ‘an organism is nothing if not 
the solution to a problem, as are each of its differenciated organs, such as the eye which 
solves a light “problem”’ (Deleuze 1994: 211). But a photosynthesising plant or a 
camera are also solutions to the problem of light; as Colebrook summarises ‘For 
Deleuze a “problem” is not a simple question that needs to find an answer; a problem is 
something that disrupts life and thinking, producing movements and responses’ 
(Colebrook 2002b: xxxiv). 
 
 According to this definition, May ’68 was certainly a ‘problem’ which disrupted 
the Living Theatre’s thinking via the ‘Parisian revolutionary kids’ or enragés who 
connected with the company at the Avignon Festival that year. This was certainly a 
meeting of multiple solutions to the political problems of the time. For instance, Beck 
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reports that there were many among them who argued with the company ‘about 
Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, anarchism, various revolutionary viewpoints and… the 
whole question of violence-non-violence was a very rough one’ (Beck in Schechner et 
al 1969: 33). And yet, despite this disagreement, this absence of communion, Malina 
notes some kind of success at another level when she says that the enragés ‘can play 
Paradise Now like no other audience’. Although Beck argues that this was because they 
‘understood the thing… and went with it’, we could also suggest that it is precisely 
because the Parisian ‘kids’ did not accept the message of the performance, that the 
conditions for a genuinely creative encounter were established. As the Becks 
themselves acknowledge in the same interview,  
 
influence and influencing are such a mysterious mystique of a 
process… You do your work, and you try to make it as effective 
and affecting as possible; but there is something wrong about 
measuring the effect… Ultimately, effectiveness for us is potential 
effectiveness (Beck and Malina in Mantegna et al 1970: 72).  
 
Affirming this mystery of relation, Deleuze and Guattari encourage us to shoot arrows, 
but not to assign them ‘a target or “aim”’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 378). This is not 
to say that performances cannot fail, or that in declining to assign a ‘target’ to their 
action, they are somehow without function or purpose; rather, for Deleuze, the real 
event is always a missed encounter rather than a moment of coincidence. As John 
Mullarkey argues: ‘We keep missing the event. Or rather, the event is in this constant 
missing, about to happen or having happened, but never happening’ (Mullarkey 2009: 
144). The differential presence of the Deleuzian event is not ‘absolute communion’ but 
perpetual non-coincidence, where people fail to meet one another and yet are 
perpetually altered by one another.  
 
 As Irving Goh has discussed, the implicit idea of community in Deleuze and 
Guattari does not take the form of a ‘rigid or closed structure’ (Goh 2007: 221), but a 
grouping of heterogeneous elements that contains within it what Goh calls a force of 
‘anti-community’ such that community is reconceived as groups that ‘affirm and 
exercise the freedom to come together or break away’ (ibid., 223). The community is 
not self-present but differentially present, perpetually deviating from, rather than 
reproducing, itself. As Goh puts it, it is ‘always already a question of... a community-to-
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come that renders any representation of it as a cutting off of itself from the flow or 
passage’ of an other, future community (ibid., 226); or as Deleuze and Guattari put it, 
‘an ambulant people of relayers... rather than a model society’ (Deleuze and Guattari in 
Goh 2007: 226). And it is this kind of community, we could argue, that the Living 
Theatre invoke in performance and continue to pursue in their self-deviation as a 
company. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have sought to rehabilitate aspects of the practice of the 
Living Theatre from a dominant narrative of ‘failure’, reframing them as pioneers of 
methods such as audience participation and collective creation, and arguing that their 
ambition in relation to these methods is irreducible to some simple pursuit of 
undifferentiated presence (as authenticity or communion). Aided by the Deleuzian 
concepts of ontological participation, immanence, production/creation and ‘the people 
to come’, we have demonstrated that the concepts of presence created by the Living 
Theatre are more complex than existing literature has suggested.  And more broadly, we 
have begun to introduce the arguments in favour of conceiving presence as differential, 
but also, specifically, as a non-representational relation.  
 
In the course of this opening chapter, we have emphasized the company’s 
underlying concern to foster the creative participation of differential parts in the 
production of a whole – both in terms of an audience who are allowed to change the 
nature of a performance, and in terms of a company who collectively author a self-
differing performance without the imposition of an overarching, transcendent vision. 
Rather than reiterating the persistent criticism of the company’s artistic, metaphysical 
and political naivety, the chapter has positioned the Living Theatre as exemplary 
experimenters in relation to the problem of how to make oneself a theatre of immanence 
and production rather than representation and enactment, and as a company who create 
‘real fictions’ or ‘fictional realities’ rather than either representations or self-present 
acts. 
 
Finally, we drew from Deleuze and Guattari’s writing around the relationship 
between art and ‘the people’ in order to align the Living Theatre with the concept of 
‘differential community’ defined as a collective experience of differential presence, or 
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as a name for the nature of the community invoked by differential presence. The point 
here was to propose that the role of the theatre of differential presence is not to 
represent an existing community, but to summon forth a minor community that has 
difference rather than identity in common. Since the Living Theatre themselves have 
not provided us with ample examples of how this differential community might be 
produced in performance, we will return to this topic, particularly towards the end of 
Chapter Four.  
 
For now though, we will move forward conceptually (although backwards 
chronologically) in order to address differential presence in the work of Antonin Artaud. 
Although perhaps even more in need of recuperation from the limits of deconstructive 
perspectives, Artaud’s work will allow the opportunity to extend and deepen our 
analysis of the implications of differential presence for our conception of the relations 
between mind and body, thought and language, difference and authorship.  
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Chapter Two 
 
How Do You Make Yourself A Theatre Without Organs? 
Differential presence in Artaud 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The second chapter of this thesis will begin to flesh out the concept of differential 
presence that has been outlined so far, by way of a conjunction of Deleuze’s work with 
that of the French actor, playwright, poet and theorist Antonin Artaud (1896-1948). 
Given the sheer scope of the Living Theatre’s practical experiments, the opening chapter 
allowed us to generate a broad map of the variety of ways in which differential presence 
might be manifested in performance. Despite the acknowledged flaws in aspects of the 
company’s thinking and the specific ‘contents’ of individual works, the Living Theatre 
were shown to have engaged with four key processes – discussed under the headings of 
participation, immanence, production and community – each of which contributed a 
distinct facet of understanding to the concept of differential presence rather than self-
presence. With this wide-ranging exploration in place, we are now in a position to go into 
more detail and complexity regarding the nature of differential presence. 
 
Artaud is, of course, best known for The Theatre and Its Double (1938), the book 
that collects a number of important texts outlining his conception of theatre, including the 
first and second manifestos for ‘The Theatre of Cruelty’. Although this chapter will draw 
from these better-known texts, it will largely focus on the radio play To have done with 
the judgment of god, as well as discussing Artaud’s ‘translation’ of Lewis Carroll’s 
‘Jabberwocky’, which he worked on during the summer of 1943 (Sontag 1976: 447). To 
have done with the judgment of god was recorded in 1947, a year after Artaud finally 
returned to Paris having been in psychiatric institutions for the past nine years, but was 
never publically broadcast before his death in 1948 (at least not in the way that Artaud 
had hoped) (Schumacher 1989: 188). Although it has become commonplace to argue that 
Artaud failed to achieve in practice what he set out to do in theory – or, to make manifest 
his manifestos – this chapter will argue that To have done with the judgment of god 
exemplifies differential presence in performance, or what I shall also call ‘the theatre 
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without organs’. This hybrid concept uses the concept of ‘the body without organs’ as a 
tool to come at the theorisation of differential presence in theatre from a new direction. 
As is well known, the phrase itself comes from the final section of To have done with the 
judgment of god, in which Artaud declares that  
 
When you have made him a body without organs, then you will have 
delivered him from all his automatisms and restored him to his true 
liberty. Then you will teach him how to dance wrong side out... and 
this wrong side out will be his real place (Artaud in Sontag 1976: 570-
71). 
 
This image was then taken up and significantly developed by Deleuze and Guattari, in 
ways we shall discuss in depth in what follows.  
 
Beyond this concept, Deleuze frequently refers to Artaud, both in his sole-
authored works and the collaborations with Guattari. However, in contrast to the general 
tendency within Artaud Studies, the emphasis is not on Artaud’s theatre writing. In fact, 
Deleuze engages in very little detailed discussion of Artaud’s theatre, bar the odd 
paragraph interspersed with more in-depth treatments of Artaud’s conception of 
thought, use of language, and his schizophrenic symptoms. In this way, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s engagement with Artaud could be perceived to reflect the fact that Artaud’s 
writing on theatre ‘constitutes only a fraction of his total output,’ which comprises 
poetry, letters, novels, essays, notebooks and scripts (Scheer 2004: 3). In contrast, 
Adrian Morfee claims that Artaud’s ‘ideas on theatre have been the centre of enquiry 
for nine out of every ten scholarly publications on his writings over the past thirty 
years’ – an emphasis which he argues is ‘totally out of proportion’ with the amount of 
attention paid to theatre by Artaud himself (Morfee 2005: 5). However, this chapter will 
demonstrate that, even if they are not explicitly concerned with theatre, all of Artaud’s 
writings have implications for how we understand the theatre. And in the same way, it 
departs from the premise that Deleuze’s writings on Artaud, whilst not foregrounding 
theatre, can still inform our understanding of Artaud’s theatre, particularly with regard 
to presence. 
 
 Like the previous one, this chapter is made up of five main sections. The first 
section will explore two different ‘schools’ of thought in the secondary literature on 
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Artaud, contextualising this chapter in relation to both the dominant deconstructive 
critique of his work and to the more affirmative, existing work on Artaud from a 
Deleuzian perspective. Next, we will provide some theoretical context for the concept 
of the ‘theatre without organs’ that will be developed here, by addressing the notion of 
the body without organs from which it derives. Here, we will argue that the body 
without organs constitutes an aspiration towards differential presence, rather than an 
appeal to simple, or metaphysical presence without difference, as Derrida has 
suggested. From this theoretical basis, the short third section will give a brief outline of 
how one might make oneself a theatre without organs, before going on in the longer 
fourth section to address Artaud’s work as a specific case study for the use of language 
and voice within such a theatre. Here, we will see how Artaud uses a ‘destratified voice’ 
to performatively construct differential presence in relation to other bodies rather than 
passively suffering the wounding power of words or submitting the voice to the 
stratifying power of phonemes and signification. Finally, the fifth section will develop a 
response to the question of Artaud’s relation to his audience through language, 
presenting an alternative account to Jon Erickson’s argument that Artaud’s use of 
language appeals to ‘the immediacy of a purely physical response’ that hopes to 
establish and maintain self-presence between audience and speaker by bypassing 
thought (Erickson 1985: 285). In contrast, we will emphasise Artaud’s break with any 
mind/body duality, his desire to address the mind in the flesh and to force his audience 
to truly think (rather than having their existing worldview confirmed), in a manner that 
resonates with Deleuze’s notion of ‘the encounter’. Here we will examine both Artaud 
and Deleuze’s concepts of thought in order to generate a further definition of 
differential presence, not as an instance of ‘immediate (re)cognition’ between self-
present bodies (Erickson 1985: 285), but as an event of genuine thought, which both 
Deleuze and Artaud define as a creation rather than a representation. 
 
  
1. Contexts: Artaud with Deleuze, not Derrida 
 
So, let us begin with the question of context. In choosing to address Artaud now, 
and specifically in choosing to address him in relation to the concept of ‘presence’ in 
performance now, we are first confronted with what seems to have become the 
dominant understanding of his work: namely, Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of 
Artaud’s position as one in which presence and representation are opposed. To 
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summarise, the theoretical gesture of deconstruction is characterised by the location of a 
(often unacknowledged) binary opposition in a given text – for example, the opposition 
of presence/absence, or presence/representation. The critique then claims to expose how 
one half of the dualism is ‘always already’ penetrated by the other. There can be no 
absolute purity beyond these differences, deconstruction argues.  
 
In ‘The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation’ (1978), Derrida’s 
deconstruction on Artaud’s concept of the theatre of cruelty, invites us to conclude that 
fidelity to Artaud is impossible, because he aspires to create contradictions in the form 
of self-identical and immediate theatrical representations (Derrida 1997: 56). The 
theatre of cruelty, Derrida argues, constitutes the  
 
inaccessible limit of a representation which is not repetition, of a re-
presentation which is full presence, which does not carry its double 
within itself as its death, of a present which does not repeat itself, that is, 
of a present outside time, a nonpresent. The present offers itself as such, 
appears, presents itself, opens the stage of time or the time of the stage 
only by harbouring its own intestine difference, and only in the interior 
fold of its original repetition, in representation (ibid., 57). 
 
In this way, Derrida equates the ‘intestine difference’ of the present with representation. 
‘Pure presence as pure difference’, Derrida argues, is not presence at all. Presence 
requires representation in order to appear, or as Derrida puts it: ‘Presence, in order to be 
presence and self-presence, has already begun to represent itself, has always already 
been penetrated’ (ibid., 58). One example of Artaud’s pursuit of self-presence for 
Derrida emerges in his aim to replace actors enslaved to the reproduction and repetition 
of an author’s text, with the presentation of the living actor. As such, while Derrida 
inititally admires Artaud’s critique of the binary oppositions undermining 
representational theatre, he ultimately argues that Artaud wants to escape from 
differences into the absence of difference.  
 
In his critique of the metaphysical tradition, Derrida argues that Western 
philosophy is only able to make truth-claims on behalf of its representations by positing 
an originary or grounding self-presence.  As Jeffrey Bell has discussed, one example of 
‘such a presupposed, unquestioned presence’ is  
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the self-presence of our thought within the sounds which express these 
thoughts. It is the plenitude of this sound, the physicality and self-
presence of hearing ourselves speak, which is the unquestioned self-
presence one presupposes in understanding truth as the self-identity 
and coincidence of the world and our thoughts regarding the world 
(Bell 2006: 262n.).  
 
The notion of truth, that is, depends in part upon the assumption that we can say what 
we think.  
 
Echoing this perspective, theatre theorist Jon Erickson (1985) has since defined 
Artaud’s poetic works as concerned to discover a language of self-presence, a voice that 
speaks the speaker and the world as they are and communicates those self-present 
meanings directly to an audience. In his essay, Erickson discusses the phenomenon of 
“sound poetry”: a category of poetic practice that he associates with practitioners from 
Dadaist Hugo Ball to contemporary poet Steve McCaffrey, and contrasts with what he 
calls “sound-text poetry,” which he links to figures such as Gertrude Stein. It is clear 
that Erickson wants to demonstrate the greater value and conceptual sophistication of 
the latter over the former. “Sound-text poetry”, he says, dramatizes the arbitrariness of 
signification (Erickson 1985: 281), whereas sound poetry, ‘operates through a denial of 
signification toward an ideal of the unification of expression and indication’ (ibid., 
279). Quoting McCaffrey’s call for words to be liberated from a substitutive role, 
Erickson insists that sound poetry pursues a ‘language of presence, as opposed to a 
language of signification’ in which words are the thing rather than its mere stand-in 
(ibid., 280)36. He also identifies ‘Artaud’s cries’ in works such as To have done with the 
judgment of god with sound poetry and argues that both want to reduce the potential for 
difference between language and meaning, or words and things by re-establishing a 
natural rather than cultural relation between them. As culturally determined 
signification, language is understood to keep us apart from the world. In this regard, 
Erickson implies a direct connection between Artaud’s relation to language and the 
Dadaist reaction against the so-called “prison house of language”. As Erickson explains, 
                                                 
36 Erickson quotes the following remark from McCaffrey: “Sound the event not the servant of semantics 
becomes a possible antidote to the paradox of sign. That a thing need not be a this standing for that but 
immediately a that and so free of the implications of the metaphysics of linguistic absence” (McCaffrey in 
Erickson 1985: 280).  
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Dada understands language as a wall that separates people from one another, ‘words 
from things, consciousness from presence’ and as such language must be torn down and 
destroyed (ibid., 284).  
 
 Against this divisive language, Erickson argues, Artaud is pressing for an 
originary, adamic language or ursprache ‘that names an object or being in its essence, 
which means the signifier is one with the signified and their relationship is not 
arbitrarily fixed’ (ibid., 280). That is, the concept of an adamic language assumes a 
thing or being has a self-identical essence that words can name, and in so doing allow us 
to be at one with the truth of the world. In pursuit of this natural connection between 
words and things, Erickson argues, this language of presence issues from an undivided 
body, bypassing the mind, and as such is claimed to be ‘more true for the human 
condition’ than signification (ibid. – emphasis added). Signifying language is 
understood to falsify the experiences of the body, which are, in turn, taken to be ‘more 
true’ than those of a body ‘distracted by any cognitive split’ (ibid.). Erickson argues that 
Artaud is against signifying language as that which separates consciousness from 
presence – understood as ‘the simultaneity between consciousness and an object of 
attention’ (Power 2008: 3). For Artaud, Erickson argues that this language of presence 
originates purely in the body rather than in the mind since Artaud conceives the 
signifying language of the mind as that which breaks the natural presence of the body to 
itself and its objects.  
 
 The remaining sections of this chapter will attempt to examine Deleuze’s 
account of Artaud in order to offer an alternative perspective on his work, and 
specifically his work with and on language, from these two, interrelated positions. As 
the general introduction to this thesis has already proposed, Deleuze’s broad, 
poststructuralist project to construct a philosophy that thinks differential presence or 
difference ‘in itself’ (rather than as the mere difference between two presences) is 
compatible with Derrida’s. However, although presence does always differ from itself 
for Deleuze as well as Derrida, it is not only mediated by linguistic difference for 
Deleuze. The emergence of difference need not be understood as the return of a 
repressed and feared writing that ‘erases the presence of the self-same within speech’ 
(Derrida 1976: 270). Rather, there are different ways of thinking difference: not just as 
the ‘death’ that full presence must necessarily harbour within itself, but as ‘a free and 
present variation’ that registers itself with audiences as affect, operating beneath the 
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threshold of representation (Deleuze 1997: 253). In this sense, this chapter will suggest 
that Artaud’s non-representational theatre seeks to affirm a new kind of presence as 
difference, rather than aiming to transcend difference in order to reach the self-identical 
presence of Western metaphysics. The desire to break free from ‘conflictual, official 
and institutionalized representation’ (ibid.), we will argue, need not immediately be 
equated with a ‘transcendentalist agenda’ (Vanden Heuvel 1991: 44). The reality that 
performance makes available to the spectator in this event of ‘differential presence’ is 
not an other-worldly, transcendent realm that is self-identical insofar as it occupies a 
space and time outside of representation. Rather, the differential presence constructed 
by what this chapter will call the ‘theatre without organs’ gives us access to the real as 
difference in itself, as an immanent, ‘perpetual variation’ from which representational 
differences are merely derived.  
 
There is nothing new, at least within Artaud Studies if not within Performance 
Studies at large, in setting up a connection between Artaud and Deleuze. Catherine 
Dale, Ed Scheer and Jeffrey Bell amongst others have already explored the Deleuzian 
elements of Artaud’s oeuvre37. Indeed, Artaud Studies has – if you like – been through 
this conduit and come out the other side, with theorists like Jane Goodall and Umberto 
Artioli both arguing that Deleuze’s project is distinct from Artaud’s in a number of 
crucial ways. Goodall, for example, accepts that Deleuze and Guattari are close to 
Artaud ‘in their quest for a return to some kind of chora of subjectivity, “the Body 
without Organs”, and in their fascination with becoming, metamorphosis and contagion 
as processes which rupture paradigmatic understanding’. However, she ultimately 
insists that  
 
they hardly qualify as gnostic revolutionaries. Their campaign 
against stratification is not the same as the aim of Artaudian theatre: 
‘…to make manifest and to plant in us ineradicably the idea of a 
perpetual conflict and of a seizure in which life is rent at every 
                                                 
37 There are a number of Deleuze Studies scholars who have already explored the relationship between 
Deleuze and Artaud, including Catherine Dale (2001a; 2001b; 2002), Ronald Bogue (2003) and Jeffrey 
A. Bell (2006). Within Artaud Studies, Deleuze is discussed by Scheer in Cull (2009), Butler in Scheer 
(2000), and by Artioli, Scheer and briefly by Goodall in Scheer (2004). However, the Deleuze-Artaud 
conjunction has not been addressed at length in Performance Studies, that is, with a particular emphasis 
on its implications for theatre and performance. Milton Loayza (2000) does invoke Deleuze and 
Guattari’s distinction between Chronos and Aion in his essay on Artaud’s theatre, however I hope that 
this chapter adds something new to this existing body of work by providing an in-depth discussion of 
Deleuze’s work specifically on Artaud, and what it means for our understanding of Artaud’s theatrical 
work, particularly with regard to the debates around presence.   
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moment, in which the whole of creation rises up and sets itself 
against our condition as constituted beings’ (Goodall in Scheer 
2004: 75). 
 
Likewise, whilst Artioli describes Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1972) as 
‘unthinkable without Artaud’s oeuvre’, he also frames the book as dissolving the 
‘persistent dualism’ of Artaud’s thinking with its positive notion of desire (Artioli in 
Scheer 2004: 145). Further, Artioli questions Deleuze’s description of Artaud as having 
achieved a “wonderful breakthrough” which ‘knocked down the wall [of the 
signifier]’(Deleuze 2004: 240). Instead, Artioli suggests: ‘If you put the two projects 
together, Artaud’s revolt, far from attaining the miracle of the breakthrough, resonates 
with the devastating cry of setback’ (Artioli in Scheer 2004: 147). 
 
 And no doubt some of these concerns – particularly regarding Deleuze and 
Guattari’s arguable romanticisation of Artaud’s suffering – are valid. After all, Deleuze 
is well known for his description of his particular approach to the history of philosophy 
as ‘a sort of buggery or… immaculate conception,’ producing a child that would be the 
author’s ‘offspring, yet monstrous’ (Deleuze 1995: 6). This chapter will not take quite 
such a violent approach, so much as emphasise the Deleuzian aspects of Artaud’s 
thought and the Artaudian aspects of Deleuze’s, in order to develop the notion of 
differential presence in performance. In turn, it seems important to note that Gnosticism 
is only one influence, amongst others, on Artaud’s thinking and that its overemphasis 
can lead to troubling conclusions such as Serge Hutin’s claim that ‘For Artaud as for the 
Gnostics, true liberation meant nothing less than an escape from the tyranny of the 
sensible world’ (Hutin in Goodall 1994: 3). But as a number of the following sections of 
this chapter point out, Artaud specifically rejects such a mind/matter binary in other 
aspects of his thought. It is the transcendent judgment of the sensible that is tyrannical 
and must be escaped, not the sensible itself. 
 
In what follows, it will be argued that a theatre without organs would not 
involve the pursuit of an adamic language through which actors might immediately and 
truthfully express themselves and the world, so much as the attempt to ‘speak 
difference’ with what we will term ‘a destratified voice’. This concept translates 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the disorganization necessary to reach the body 
without organs to the specific body of the voice as a means to rethink the relationship 
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between language and the appearance of difference. The destratified voice allows 
difference to make its presence felt in what Deleuze calls a ‘fundamental encounter’ that 
forces new, embodied thoughts upon us. Adding to the definitions generated in the first 
chapter, differential presence now names an encounter with difference or perpetual 
variation as that which exceeds the representational consciousness of a subject, forcing 
thought through rupture rather than communicating meanings through sameness. In this 
way, the destratified voice of the theatre without organs becomes the correlative 
language practice to the philosophy of difference, a way of speaking in the theatre that 
produces bodies rather than representing them. 
 
 
2. What is the body without organs? 
 
 In order to introduce the concept of the theatre without organs as a site of the 
production of differential presence, we first need to look at the Deleuzian notion of the 
body without organs from which it derives. Since, if it is the body as conceived by the 
mind/body binary which is at the origin of the language of presence according to 
Erickson’s perspective, then the language of differential presence emerges from the 
body without organs understood as both an embodied experience and an ontological 
principle. First, we will look at how Deleuze defines the body without organs, and its 
relation to other key concepts such as ‘the strata’ or ‘stratification’, ‘judgment’ and 
‘becoming’, before going on to emphasise the distinction between Derrida and 
Deleuze’s interpretations of the relationship between the body without organs, presence 
and difference.  
 
The concept of the body without organs first appears in Deleuze’s work in The 
Logic of Sense (1969), in which he proposes that it corresponds to Artaud’s triumphant 
composition of a novel usage of language. As a ‘new dimension of the schizophrenic 
body’, Deleuze argues that the body without organs does not achieve self-identical 
expression with its cries, but rather feels the ‘problem’ of language through its 
suffering; ‘namely, the schizophrenic problem of suffering, of death, and of life’ 
(Deleuze 2004: 30-32). Deleuze suggests that the specifically schizophrenic experience 
of an absence of distinction between ‘things’ and ‘propositions’ draws attention to an 
ontological capacity of language to act on bodies rather than merely represent them 
(ibid., 31). Language is not a separate kind or level of being that transcends bodies, the 
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schizophrenic senses; but how then might language be used as a response to this 
‘problem’? In his discovery of the body without organs as, in part, a relation to 
language, Artaud breaks free from passively suffering the wounds that ‘words without 
sense’ inflict upon the schizophrenic body. Having made himself a body without 
organs, he is not sheltered from language but actively uses it as ‘words without 
articulation’, as words that become ‘illegible and even unpronounceable, as it 
transforms them into so many active howls in one continuous breath’ (ibid., 33). In 
other words, the solution at first seems to be about simply redirecting the force of 
language; shifting from occupying the position of one to whom things are done with 
words, to the one who uses language to act.  
 
 Moreover, by the time we reach the two volumes of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia – Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus – the body without organs 
(now called the BwO for short) has become a central concept for Deleuze and Guattari’s 
ontology. Here they distinguish between different types of BwOs, that we can find once 
we have ‘sufficiently dismantled our self’, and what they call ‘the totality of all BwOs’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 151, 157). Like the distinction between specific becomings 
and the fundamental becoming they affirm, the totality of BwOs has less to do with ‘the 
body’ as such, or the schizophrenic body in particular, and more to do with ontology. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, once the self is taken apart, what we reach is 
‘nonstratified, unformed, intense matter’ or ‘energy’. The BwO is this primary ‘glacial 
reality’ on which organisms and subjects form – nothing but these flows of energy, of 
difference in itself (ibid., 153). This energy is elusive: ‘It’s not so much that it pre-exists 
or comes ready-made,’ Deleuze and Guattari argue,  
 
although in certain respects it is pre-existent. At any rate, you make 
one, you can’t desire without making one. And it awaits you; it is an 
inevitable exercise or experimentation, already accomplished the 
moment you undertake it, unaccomplished as long as you don’t’ 
(ibid., 149).  
 
As such, the BwO can be defined multiply. According to their commentators, it is what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to elsewhere as a plane of consistency, ‘a static plane of 
immanent creation which Deleuze and Guattari pit against God’s transcendentalism’ 
(Dale 2001b: 136n), and it is what Colebrook defines as ‘the totality or plane of … 
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prehuman, prelinguistic and profound differences’ which Western thought has tended to 
consider as deviations or distractions from existing categories of representation 
(Colebrook 2002: 16).  
 
 To make yourself a BwO (that is, in turn, to position oneself on the totality of all 
BwOs and to experience this prelinguistic difference) involves a process of 
disorganization or ‘destratification’ – the destruction of stratification as ‘a phenomenon 
of…sedimentation that, in order to extract useful labour from the BwO, imposes upon it 
forms…and hierarchized organizations’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 159). Such 
instances of stratification block our way to the BwO and, as such, must be removed or 
undone in order for the BwO to be made. In Plateau Six, Deleuze and Guattari focus on 
what they call ‘the three great strata…that most directly bind us’: the organism, 
signifiance and subjectification; although the indication is that there are many, many 
more besides (ibid.). Each strata attaches to a different aspect of life: the organism to the 
body, signifiance to the ‘soul’ (or unconscious) and subjectification to the conscious 
(ibid., 160). The strata then come to mediate our relationship to life, operating like a 
utilitarian logic or a transcendental point of view that passes moral judgment on 
differences from their respective representational categories: 
 
You will be organized, you will be an organism, you will articulate 
your body – otherwise you’re just depraved. You will be signifier and 
signified, interpreter and interpreted – otherwise you’re just a deviant. 
You will be a subject, nailed down as one… otherwise you’re just a 
tramp (ibid., 159). 
 
In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that as much as we need to liberate the 
creativity of the body from the limits of the organism as form, we also need to ‘tear the 
conscious away from the subject in order to make it a means of exploration’ and to tear 
the unconscious ‘away from signifiance and interpretation to make it a veritable 
production’ (ibid., 160).  
 
In the same Plateau, Deleuze and Guattari also associate the organism as a 
stratum on the BwO with ‘the judgment of God’ – again, borrowing a phrase from 
Artaud. The judgment of God, they argue,  
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is precisely the operation of He who makes…an organization of the 
organs called the organism, because He cannot bear the BwO…The 
organism is already that, the judgment of God, from which medical 
doctors benefit and on which they base their power (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988: 159).  
 
Indeed, the judgment of God is equated with the stratification of the BwO. The 
judgment of God is all the strata, or phenomena of sedimentation, that operate on the 
intense matter of the BwO put together: ‘For many a strata, and not only an organism, is 
necessary to make the judgment of God’ (ibid., 159). In the later essay ‘To Have Done 
with Judgment’, Deleuze elaborates upon this idea of judgment as an oppressive and 
stultifying force operating ‘at the level of the body’ (Deleuze 1998: 130): 
 
…Judgement implies a veritable organization of the bodies through 
which it acts: organs are both judges and judged, and the judgement of 
God is nothing other than the power to organize to infinity…The way 
to escape judgement is to make yourself a body without organs, to find 
your body without organs (ibid., 131). 
 
In contrast to the organism, God cannot exercise his judgment on the BwO: a body 
traversed by the ‘imperceptible forces’ of ‘combat’, or what Deleuze calls ‘nonorganic 
vitality’ (ibid., 131). Combat, Deleuze states, is not to be confused with war; rather, it 
‘is a powerful, nonorganic vitality that supplements force with force, and enriches 
whatever it takes hold of’ (ibid., 133). This living power, which ‘happens’ or passes 
over the BwO, places forces in relation to one another with positive effects. Something 
new is made. 
 
In this sense, the dismantling of the strata is only one part of a two-stage 
process, of which the second phase is an event of becoming: a circulation of intensities, 
a transmission of forces, and a transformation of bodies by one another that can only 
happen once notions of ‘the subject’ and representational relations have been done away 
with. At this point, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between different types of BwOs: 
such as the BwO of the masochist, who constructs himself as a body without organs in 
order to participate in a becoming-horse. At this point, we might begin to perceive 
connections between the BwOs as they appear in A Thousand Plateaus and the 
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schizophrenic body as it appears in The Logic of Sense. We have already discussed 
Deleuze’s argument that Artaud’s language issues from a schizophrenic experience of 
the body, as that which is perpetually penetrated by other bodies, since it has no frontier 
of sense to distinguish between ‘self’ and ‘other’. What is new in A Thousand Plateaus 
is the articulation of the ontological realm with which the body without organs is 
associated. The BwO is not associated with the depths of nonsense threatening to 
disrupt the surface of sense, but with ‘the field of immanence of desire, the plane of 
consistency specific to desire (with desire here defined as a process of production 
without reference to any exterior agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a 
pleasure that fills it)’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 154 – emphasis original). In turn, 
whereas The Logic of Sense emphasises the suffering involved in the schizophrenic 
experience of the body, A Thousand Plateaus allies the schizophrenic experience with 
the attempted becomings of artistic, sexual, and drug-related experiments, to which 
Deleuze and Guattari assign creative potential. Having broken down the ‘incorporeal 
frontier’ of sense or what Deleuze and Guattari reconceive as the strata inhabiting the 
BwO, we no longer experience ourselves as a signifying subject (man) in relation to a 
signified object (horse). Through becomings, there is a presence of difference to 
difference, the perception or affection of one body by another, without the need to pass 
through processes of imitation or representation. 
 
 Pre-empting the logic of his deconstruction of the theatre of cruelty, in ‘La 
Parole Soufflée’ (1965) Derrida argues that Artaud’s concept of the body without 
organs constitutes an appeal to simple, or metaphysical presence without difference. For 
Artaud, Derrida says, it is the division of the body into organs which introduces 
difference into the body and ‘opens the lack through which the body becomes absent 
from itself’ (Derrida in Bell 2006:157). In turn, given their appropriation of the concept 
of the body without organs, Bell has recently questioned whether Deleuze and Guattari, 
along with Artaud 
 
long for a lost homeland, a deeply buried purity and freedom which has 
since been covered over by layers of impurities (in this case, organs) 
which only serve to hinder the freedom necessary for thought and 
creativity. If this is how Artaud is to be read, it is evident, then, that his 
longing is a metaphysical longing, a striving to regain a lost presence 
(Bell 2006: 156).  
 128 
 
If this is how Deleuze and Guattari are to be read, then they too would fall foul of 
deconstructive critique. 
 
 But as Bell goes on to emphasise, the enemy of the BwO is not the organs for 
Deleuze and Guattari (as what divides and differentiates an otherwise unified body), but 
the organism as the ‘organic organization of the organs’ (ibid., 158 – emphasis added). 
The organism inserts itself into the BwO in order to prescribe to bodies a distinct and 
restricted function, molar identity, or specific, fixed strata. For Deleuze and Guattari,  
 
The BwO is not undifferentiated, but has its own inner 
differentiation, its composed and positioned “true organs”, and it is 
in this manner, then, that Deleuze and Guattari can read Artaud’s 
call for a BwO as not being a call for a One in opposition to the 
multiple’ (ibid., 159)  
 
– or for presence as opposed to difference, monism as opposed to dualism. In this sense, 
the concept of the BwO plays a central role in Deleuze’s effort to re-think the process of 
creation (whether as thought, art or nature) without the need to posit a transcendent, 
organizing Law, or what Artaud called ‘the judgment of God,’ which controls the 
creative process from a position outside of it. Conjoining Artaud with Spinoza, the 
BwO constitutes a refusal of any distinction between worldly products and a 
transcendent producer, between organizing mind and organized matter, in favour of a 
univocal notion of being as a processuality ‘immanent in whatever manifests it’ 
(Deleuze 1990: 16). To make yourself a body without organs is both to find and to 
construct that immanent processuality as it is manifested in the processes of writing, 
performing, thinking, living. 
  
 
3. The theatre without organs & Artaud’s To have done with the judgment of god  
 
 Given this conception of the BwO, what is a theatre without organs (or TwO) 
and how does it operate in the world? What are the specifically theatrical ‘strata’ that 
we need to dismantle in order to construct such a theatre and what kinds of new 
connections between bodies might such a destratified theatre allow? It is at this point, 
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before we move on to address Artaud’s To have done with the judgment of god as a 
specific case study of the TwO, that Deleuze’s essay ‘One Less Manifesto’ is of 
particular help: to bridge the gap between philosophy and performance, or ontology and 
theatrical practice. In this essay, as we saw in the thesis’ Introduction, Deleuze develops 
a concept of a theatre of ‘perpetual variation’, a theatre that subtracts the organizing 
elements of theatrical representation – such as plot, character and dialogue – in order to 
‘release a new potentiality of theatre, an always unbalanced, nonrepresentative force’ 
(Deleuze 1997: 242). Immediately, this proposed theatre presents itself as in alliance 
with the body without organs, which is involved in a similarly subtractive process when 
it dismantles the strata as the ‘phenomenon of sedimentation’ that impose organization 
and stasis on an otherwise mobile, material energy (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 159). In 
both cases, it is a question of taking away that which attempts to fix the moving and 
homogenise the differing; a matter of undoing the effects of an organizing force that 
forms speed and subjectifies affect.  
 
 ‘Only affects and no subject, only speeds and not form’ (Deleuze 1997: 249) – 
this describes the TwO, as much as the BwO. If the BwO is a plane or surface which, 
once we have leapt onto it, allows us to perceive ourselves and the world, not as discrete 
subjects and objects, but as mutually transformative processes of becoming, then the 
TwO is equally an already-existing, and yet also waiting-to-be-constructed plane, 
produced by performance-makers and their ‘audiences’. In the TwO, all elements of 
theatricality become the ‘material for variation’ (ibid., 246): the variation of costume 
‘that falls off and is put back on’ (ibid., 248); the variation of gesture in which no 
gesture is repeated ‘without obtaining different characteristics of time’ (ibid., 249); and 
the variation of language – which will be the focus of our case study. In the TwO, the 
‘phonological, syntactical, semantical and even stylistical’ (ibid., 244) elements of 
language are all intensified through ‘methods of stammering, whispering’ and 
mumbling (ibid., 247).  
 
 And yet, of course, if the TwO forms an alliance with Deleuze’s theatre of 
perpetual variation, then it is also connected to Artaud’s infamous ‘Theatre of cruelty’ 
(Artaud in Sontag 1976: 577). Artaud wrote the first manifesto for such a theatre in 
1932, in which he argues that theatre’s essence lies in its power to overwhelm the false 
distinction between truth and illusion, presence and representation, in a manner that 
resonates with Deleuze. Theatre is not about ‘make-believe’ for Artaud, but the ‘truly 
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illusive’ (Artaud in Schumacher 1989: 101); it is not a ‘hollow gesture’ that copies an 
originary reality, but a real image that takes hold of its spectators (ibid., 104). Artaud 
reiterates this univocal perspective in the essay ‘Theatre and Cruelty’ when he states 
that ‘the audience will believe in the illusion of theatre on condition they really take it 
for a dream, not for a servile imitation of reality’ (ibid., 109 – emphasis original). As 
we noted in the first chapter of this thesis, one way that Artaud suggests we might 
release the real power of theatre’s images to affect audiences – or, theatre’s ‘cruelty’ – 
is by undoing the spatial ‘stratification’ of the auditorium38. And like the becoming that 
takes place on the BwO, Artaud conceives of the cruelty unleashed by the destratified 
space as a force that ‘connects things together’ in ‘a wholly magic act’ of ‘constant 
creation’ rather than reproduction (ibid., 107). 
 
 Our case study for the development of the concept of the TwO and its relation to 
differential presence will focus on the role of language in Artaud’s radio play and in his 
‘translation’ of the poem ‘Jabberwocky’ by Lewis Carroll. In contrast to the elaborate 
scenic and theatrical effects required by his first dramatic text, The Spurt of Blood 
(1925)39, To have done with the judgment of god eliminates every aspect of theatre 
except the voice. Likewise, we might note that it is the variation of language that 
receives the greatest amount of attention in Deleuze’s ‘One Less Manifesto’. In both 
cases, it is important to emphasise the attention paid to language as a means to counter-
balance the tendency to conceive the pursuit of non-representational theatre (whether as 
the theatre without organs, a subtractive theatre of perpetual variation, or the theatre of 
cruelty) as one that reinstates a dichotomy between language and body (or thought and 
affect), and falls down heavily in favour of the presence of the latter over the alienating 
power of the former. All three theatres may well be anti-textual, as Martin Puchner 
(2002) implies, but only if by ‘text’ we mean a self-identical script the truth of which 
must be faithfully reproduced in performance, or a homogenising force that serves to fix 
                                                 
38 In the first manifesto for the Theatre of cruelty, Artaud proclaims: ‘We intend to do away with stage 
and auditorium, replacing them by a kind of single, undivided locale without any partitions of any kind 
and this will become the very scene of the action. Direct contact will be established between the audience 
and the show, between actors and audience, from the very fact that the audience is seated in the centre of 
the action, is encircled and furrowed by it’ (Artaud in Schumacher 1989: 104). 
39 At one point, the stage directions of The Spurt of Blood call for: ‘Silence. Noise like a huge wheel 
spinning, blowing out wind. A hurricane comes between them. At that moment two stars collide, and a 
succession of limbs of flesh fall. Then feet, hands, scalps, masks, colonnades, porticoes, temples and 
alembics, falling slower and slower as if through space, then three scorpions one after the other and 
finally a frog, and a scarab which lands with heart-breaking nauseating slowness’ (Artaud in 
Schumacher 1989: 18). And later demand that ‘At a given moment a huge hand seizes the WHORE’s hair 
which catches fire’ (19). From such examples it is not difficult to imagine why the play remained 
unperformed in Artaud’s lifetime (see Cohn 1979). 
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the creativity and variability that Deleuze argues is immanent to language. But they are 
by no means anti-literary or uninterested in speech as a theatrical element; on the 
contrary, ‘One Less Manifesto’ argues that ‘A public reading of poems by Ghérasim 
Luca is a complete and marvellous theatrical event’ (Deleuze 1997: 247)40. 
Correlatively, Artaud describes the purely vocal theatre of To have done with the 
judgment of god as ‘providing a small-scale model for what I want to do in the Theatre 
of cruelty’ (Artaud in Sontag 1976: 577). In this way, although Artaud’s polemics 
sometimes suggest otherwise, it is important to acknowledge that the theatre of cruelty 
is not conceived in terms of the exclusion of words. ‘There is no question of abolishing 
speech in theatre,’ Artaud states; rather, Deleuze and Artaud share the notion that 
language ought to be handled as the ‘concrete’ entity that it is (ibid., 123). It is not 
language itself that is rejected, so much as the codified ways in which it is used. 
 
 Since the story of Artaud’s censored broadcast, To have done with the judgment 
of god is well known we will not rehearse it here, suffice to say that the occasion of the 
ban acts as a good example of Deleuze’s argument that the strata are perpetually 
recasting themselves in the BwO.41 In other words, for Deleuze and Guattari, To have 
done with the judgment of god constitutes an experiment towards making oneself a body 
without organs that is perceived as a threat to those State bodies that exert political and 
aesthetic control in order to protect the strata. The starting point for the radio play was a 
series of short texts, written by Artaud, and then performed by Roger Blin, Maria 
Casarès, Paule Thévenin and Artaud; interrupted by rhythmic passages played on 
xylophones and drums, ‘beating and exchanges’ between Blin and Artaud, and the 
latter’s ‘cry in the stairwell’.  
 
It is with this performance of language, we will now go on to suggest, that we 
see a genuine instance of Artaud’s TwO performing its philosophy of differential 
presence. In the next section we will introduce the concept of the destratified voice as 
                                                 
40 Ghérasim Luca (1913-1994) was a Romanian poet, however he wrote the majority of his poetry in 
French. Deleuze refers to his work on a number of occasions: not only in ‘One Less Manifesto’, but also 
in A Thousand Plateaus and in the essay ‘He Stuttered’ in Essays Critical and Clinical.  
41 As Schumacher (2002) reports, the radio programme was recorded between 22-29 November 1947 by 
Artaud and his collaborators. Originally commissioned by Fernand Pouey, the programme was censored 
by Wladimir Porché, the director-general of the radio station on the day before it was scheduled for 
broadcast: 2 February 1948. As Marc Dachy (1995) tells us in a short, introductory essay in the cover 
notes of the recording, the broadcast had two private hearings for Artaud’s friends and colleagues. The 
first was held on 5 February 1948, in the hope of changing Porché’s mind about the ban. Those who 
attended – including Jean-Louis Barrault and Roger Vitrac – passed a favourable verdict on the recording, 
but the ban was maintained, resulting in Pouey’s resignation. The second private hearing was held on 23 
February 1948 ‘in a disused cinema’ (Dachy 1995).  
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one element of the TwO, or the performing body without organs. In the first instance, 
we will look at some examples of this voice at work in Artaud’s radio play, before 
going into more detail regarding Deleuze’s discussions of Artaud’s use of language and 
voice in The Logic of Sense and then, in A Thousand Plateaus. Finally, we will note the 
connections between Artaud and Deleuze’s arguments as to how language ought to be 
used in order to allow difference to be heard. 
 
 
4. The TwO cries out in a destratified voice: 
Language and differential presence  
 
 As a theatre without organs, To have done with the judgment of god performs its 
philosophical work in its construction of a ‘destratified voice’. In the case of the voice, 
destratification involves putting elements like intonation, diction, pitch, and meaning 
into variation. For example, in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the BwO 
resists the ‘torture’ of organization partly by way of a particular relation to the 
phonological aspect of language: ‘In order to resist using words composed of articulated 
phonetic units, it utters only gasps and cries that are sheer unarticulated blocks of 
sound’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 9). In this respect, the phoneme is like an ‘organ’ of 
language that the destratified voice would rather be without.  
 
 In To have done with the judgment of god, this phonological variation can be 
most obviously heard in the passages of glossolalia that erupt from the text, and in 
Artaud’s distant, resonating cries from the stairwell. Whereas the stratified voice speaks 
‘perfectly and soberly’ (Deleuze 1997: 247), Artaud’s destratified voice speaks too high 
and too fast to act as the servant of communication. In turn, having torn the voice away 
from the task of signification, Artaud can then use his voice to enter into a series of 
becomings. There is a becoming-woman of the voice, for instance, when it becomes 
impossible to identify the sex of the speaker according to the traditional representational 
categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ – the distinction that Deleuze and Guattari call one of 
‘the great binary aggregates’. There is a becoming-animal of the voice, insofar as we are 
alerted to uses of the human voice that can be comprehended directly by a listener 
(whether that listener is also the speaker, or another body) without the mediation of a 
linguistic system of differences. Likewise in the passages where he performs a dialogue 
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with himself, Artaud uses his voice to enact the ‘inclusive disjunctions’ that Deleuze 
associates with the schizophrenic: he is mad and sane, patient and analyst.  
 
Alternatively, moving beyond the radio play, we might look to the example of 
Artaud’s little-known ‘translation’ of Carroll’s ‘Jabberwocky’, which Deleuze discusses 
in The Logic of Sense. Deleuze says:  
 
…Beginning with the last word of the second line, from the third 
line onward, a sliding is produced, and even a creative, central 
collapse, causing us to be in another world and in an entirely 
different language. With horror, we recognize it easily: it is the 
language of schizophrenia’ (Deleuze 2004a: 29).  
 
He argues that, in his ‘Jabberwocky’, Artaud’s use of language is symptomatic of his 
specifically schizophrenic experience of language and its relation to bodies, which is 
qualitatively different from Carroll’s. Carroll’s language, Deleuze argues, is organized 
on the surface in the form of what he calls two ‘series’: the signifying series and the 
signified series. What separates these ‘physical bodies’ [signified series] and ‘sonorous 
words’ [signifying series] is what Deleuze calls an ‘incorporeal frontier’ or, simply, 
‘sense’ (ibid., 34). In Artaud’s schizophrenic language, Deleuze argues, ‘there are no 
longer any series at all; the two series have disappeared’ (ibid.). In other words, there is 
no organization that creates a frontier between signifier and signified. In the absence of 
surface and series in Artaud’s text, Deleuze says, nonsense ‘absorbs and engulfs all 
sense’ (ibid.). In his version of ‘Jabberwocky’, Deleuze argues that Artaud is confined 
to the depths of nonsense (or non-meaning) on account of his schizophrenic relation to 
language, while Carroll can move between the surface of sense (or meaning) and the 
depths of nonsense, which comes prior to sense and always threatens to engulf it. 
Surface and depths are distinct, but not opposed, Deleuze argues; rather, the former 
comes in as the ‘secondary organization’ of the latter – making sense of nonsense (a 
realm in which there is no distinction between signifier and signified) through the 
construction of series. As such, Deleuze states, ‘Even at the surface, we can always find 
schizoid fragments, since its function is precisely to organize and display elements 
which have risen from the depth’ (ibid., 34). The surface of sense makes the world 
denote, manifest and signify. ‘In this collapse of surface,’ – that is, the experience of the 
schizophrenic as Deleuze defines it – ‘the entire world loses its meaning. It maintains 
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perhaps a certain amount of denotation, but this is experienced as empty. It maintains a 
certain power of manifestation, but this is experienced as indifferent. And it maintains a 
certain signification, experienced as ‘false’’ (ibid., 31). 
 
 Just as the language of schizophrenia lacks the distinction of signifying and 
signified series, Deleuze states that the schizophrenic body does not experience a 
distinction between ‘things’ and ‘propositions’ (ibid.). As such, Deleuze argues, ‘body-
sieve’, ‘fragmented body’, and ‘dissociated body’ are ‘the three primary dimensions of 
the schizophrenic body’ (ibid.). For Deleuze, it seems, bodily experience is directly 
connected to language usage. Artaud has a qualitatively different experience of the 
relation between language and the body from Carroll and hence uses language 
differently. Carroll’s language is ‘emitted at the surface’, at which the incorporeal 
frontier of sense ‘shelters sonorous language from any confusion with the physical 
body’ (ibid., 34). Artaud’s language, in contrast, is ‘carved into the depth of bodies’ 
(ibid., 29) – not all bodies but the schizophrenic bodies of his world, which Deleuze 
describes as ‘no longer anything but depth’ (ibid., 31). The body is no longer sheltered 
from confusion with language, nor with other bodies. We’ve seen how in his 1985 
article, Erickson argues that Artaud aspires to a language of presence that issues from a 
pure, undivided body. In contrast, Deleuze says that Artaud’s language issues from a 
body that, as ‘depth’, has no surface to maintain a distinction between ‘itself’ and other 
bodies. As Deleuze says: ‘A tree, a column, a flower, or a cane grow inside the body; 
other bodies always penetrate our body and coexist with its parts’ (ibid., 31). 
 
 Without the distinction between language and body, Deleuze proposes, ‘the only 
duality left’ for the schizophrenic ‘is that between the actions and the passions of the 
body’ (ibid., 34). In turn, he associates the actions and passions of the body with two 
different relations to language available to the schizophrenic. On the one hand, the 
schizophrenic can experience language in the form of what Deleuze calls ‘words 
without sense’. In this scenario, ‘The word no longer expresses an attribute of the state 
of affairs; its fragments merge with unbearable sonorous qualities, invade the body 
where they form a mixture and a new state of affairs, as if they themselves were a noisy, 
poisonous food and canned excrement’ (ibid., 32). Through this invasion, Deleuze 
claims, words without sense have the capacity to wound the schizophrenic body. 
Alternatively, he suggests, the schizophrenic can actively use language in the form of 
what he calls ‘words without articulation’. In this case,  
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It is a question of transforming the word into an action by rendering it 
without articulation… One could say the vowel, once reduced to the 
soft sign, renders the consonants indissociable from one another, by 
palatising them. It leaves them illegible and even unpronounceable, as 
it transforms them into so many active howls in one continuous 
breath’ (ibid., 33).  
 
Rather than passively suffering wounding words, the schizophrenic actively transforms 
words into actions by subtracting the difference between the phonetic elements. For 
Deleuze, Artaud exemplifies this latter active relation to language with his 
transformation of words into ‘a fusion of consonants’ (ibid., 33).  
 
Deleuze calls these words breath-words (mots-souffles) and howl-words (mots-
cris) and describes them as a ‘triumph’ for the schizophrenic (ibid., 32). They are not 
triumphant because they are meaningful, for Deleuze, since he insists that ‘words 
without articulation’ are ‘no less beneath sense and far from the surface’ (ibid., 33). 
Rather, they are triumphant because they signal a break with the schizophrenic’s 
suffering from words as wounding, and a move toward the schizophrenic’s use of 
language to act. Deleuze proposes that this language of breath-words and howl-words 
corresponds to Artaud’s concept of the body without organs, which he refers to as a 
‘new dimension of the schizophrenic body’ (ibid., 32), in contrast to the dimensions of 
the ‘body-sieve’, ‘fragmented body’, and ‘dissociated body’. Deleuze concludes this 
series of The Logic of Sense with the claim that he ‘would not give a page of Artaud for 
all of Carroll’ and argues that ‘Artaud is alone in having been an absolute depth in 
literature, and in having discovered the vital body and the prodigious language of this 
body’ (ibid., 35). This ‘vital body’ is the body without organs, and its language is that of 
breath-words and howl-words. Deleuze concurs with Artaud’s own observation that he 
discovered this new dimension of the schizophrenic body and its language ‘through 
suffering’ (ibid.,). Carroll, in contrast, never ‘felt the real problem of language in depth 
– namely, the schizophrenic problem of suffering, of death, and of life’ (ibid., 30).  
 
‘Contrary to popular belief,’ Deleuzian commentator Catherine Dale insists, 
there is ‘nothing sloppy’ or vague about these cries of the destratified voice. Rather, she 
says, ‘The unlanguage of howls and syncopated rhythms requires utter diligence and 
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determination’ (Dale 2002: 92). Such a position is reinforced by the 1994 film about 
Artaud directed by Gérard Mordillat and Jérôme Prieur, which draws from accounts by 
Artaud’s friends, including Thevenin, to attest to the picture of Artaud as the obsessive 
director who relentlessly rehearsed his readers to make sure they were getting the 
pronunciation of his words ‘right’. But this ‘rightness’ has nothing to do with the 
pursuit of a language of presence to truthfully present the self, since, as Dale notes, 
Artaud ‘disapproves of thinking of oneself as a being, as an innate being who is then 
able to represent/reproduce oneself’ (ibid., 89). Rather, perhaps, getting it ‘right’ 
concerns the struggle to construct a destratified voice in the first place, to break with the 
habitual use of the voice as an organ of communication, and to reconfigure the 
relationships between lips, tongue, palate, breath and vocal chords in order to produce 
as yet unheard sounds. 
 
The concept of the destratified voice can also be contextualised with reference to 
the theory of language that Deleuze and Guattari later articulate in A Thousand 
Plateaus, in which they argue – contra linguistics - that language’s variability comes 
from within itself rather than, merely, from external circumstances. Language is not a 
homogeneous system that acts as theme to the variations performed in instances in 
speech; rather, they argue, ‘it is the variation itself that is systematic’ in language 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 93). And it is this immanent difference of language that 
Artaud’s destratified voice allows us to apprehend – for instance, in the fluctuations of 
pitch in his particular brand of Sprechgesang, as one procedure ‘in which several voices 
seem to issue from the same mouth’ (ibid., 97). In this way, the voice is neither the 
phenomenological medium that allows the presence of self-consciousness to itself, nor 
is it the mere ‘simulation’ of presence as Derrida contends in Speech and Phenomena – 
the response to the threat of the difference that language is said to introduce into self-
presence (Derrida 1973: 15). Rather, the destratified voice embraces the potential ‘to be 
a foreigner, but in one’s own tongue’, or to perform the difference in one’s own voice, 
in a gesture that, for Deleuze and Guattari, expresses a solidarity with those minorities 
who ‘work over’ a foreign language from within (Deleuze 1997: 247). Indeed, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, placing the voice in variation is revolutionary, insofar as it both 
goes against the political enterprise to impose a homogeneous system of language on 
speakers that they claim is coupled with the study of linguistics (Deleuze and Guattari 
1988: 101), and has the capacity to bring forth perpetual variation as the ‘the essential 
element of the real beneath the everyday’ (ibid., 110).  
 137 
 
Although Artaud’s polemics sometimes suggest otherwise, it is important to 
acknowledge that the theatre of cruelty is not conceived in terms of the exclusion of 
dialogue. For both Deleuze and Artaud, ‘There is no question of abolishing speech in 
theatre’; rather, language ought to be handled as the ‘concrete’ entity that it is (Artaud 
in Sontag 1976: 123). It is not language itself that is the problem, so much as the 
conventional way in which it is used. In The Theatre and Its Double for example, 
Artaud praises the capacity of altered intonation or pronunciation to access the ‘music’ 
underlying the conventional meanings of words. There is much to be said, he declares, 
 
about the power of words to create their own music according to the way 
they are pronounced, distinct from their actual meaning and even running 
counter to that meaning – to create an undercurrent of impressions, 
connections and affinities beneath language (Artaud in Schumacher 
1989: 93). 
 
What seems worth noting here is the way in which Artaud alludes to a duality of the 
present as surface and undercurrent in a manner that seems to resonate with Deleuze’s 
distinction between the realms of sense and nonsense, or between the ‘everyday’ and 
the ‘real’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 110). By varying pronunciation, theatrical speech 
can expose the difference within words that Artaud conceives in terms of an immanent, 
autonomous musicality. 
 
 Of course, To have done with the judgment of god is not solely composed of 
howls and cries, but nor is it that the more articulated words are more or less truthful 
representations of a prior presence. Rather, as Adrian Morfee has proposed, the final 
phase of Artaud’s working life might be characterised as a search for a non-
representational and ‘non-alienating form of writing’ in which a perpetually differing 
self might be created. Morfee argues that, in his late texts, ‘what Artaud desires is not 
observational consciousness that treats his life as something distinct from what he is, 
but to feel life itself, to be aware of himself existing’ (Morfee 2005: 177). From 
Morfee’s perspective, this will always be a fated ambition insofar as awareness, or any 
kind of presence with life is understood to necessarily involve mediation, distanciation 
or the introduction of difference as representation. Artaud is setting himself an 
impossible task, Morfee argues, when he aspires to engage in writing as a ceaseless 
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process of undetermined self-creation, rather than as an act that binds the self to a fixed 
representation that betrays or alienates that creativity. In contrast, a Deleuzian 
perspective allows us to suggest that the ‘life itself’ to which Artaud desires to become 
present is already self-differing rather than self-identical, and that this differential 
presence is not somehow beyond our experience altogether – only beyond the limits of 
representational consciousness. 
 
 
5. The TwO creates differential presence: Artaud and the audience 
 
For Deleuze, as we have seen, difference is that which presents itself to affect 
and sensation alone. In the fifth section of this chapter, we will now explore how the 
theatre without organs might be understood to put us in the presence of difference in a 
manner that brings together the projects of theatre and philosophy, by examining 
Deleuze’s idea of difference as that which ‘forces thought’. However, before we 
articulate differential presence in this way, we will analyse the way in which Erickson 
invites us to conceive of Artaud’s relationship to his audience in terms of thought and 
‘meaning’.  
 
Erickson’s critique frames Artaud’s concept of presence as not only self-
identical expression, but as necessarily ‘immediate (re)cognition’ (Erickson 1985: 285 – 
emphasis added). Immediacy implies spatio-temporal relations of sameness insofar as it 
is associated with the instantaneous on the one hand, and with the unmediated or direct 
on the other. Artaud, Erickson claims, hopes to create a language of instantaneousness, 
through bypassing the mind in favour of establishing contact between bodies. Thought, 
and by extension the mind, is associated with delay; intellectualization introduces 
unnecessary pauses in the reception process.  
 
Sound poetry or Artaud’s cries attempt to overcome this temporal gap by 
denigrating the value of symbolic meaning, the cognition of which takes 
place in consciousness, and by appealing to the immediacy of a purely 
physical response (an action of the unconscious). This is an attempt at 
maintaining presence, which resides in immediacy, and of avoiding 
slippages of presence that result in individual self-consciousness and 
alienation from the scene. No one should stop to think (ibid.). 
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Erickson is making a number of points here. In the first instance, he seems to equate 
thinking with consciousness and suggests that, for Artaud, what is valuable in the 
performance of language is not meaning, but an unthinking, simple presence of the body 
to the word. But Artaud is not just concerned to banish temporal difference, Erickson 
argues, he also wants to achieve an unmediated or direct language which speaks to its 
audience without the mediation of concepts. Bypassing consciousness, it seems, kills 
two birds with one stone. As such, Erickson suggests that Artaud’s concept of presence 
involves an immediate, unconscious, bodily response to language as sound rather than 
symbol. This is opposed to ‘thinking’, understood as that which imposes breaks in 
presence and distortions of meaning. In contrast, Erickson’s own position naturalises a 
temporal gap between expression and comprehension as a condition of consciousness. 
In this way, he points out the contradiction inherent in the notion of “immediate 
(re)cognition”, arguing that ‘meaning’ can never be unmediated or instantaneous:  
 
Consciousness of language is a belated consciousness. Meaning is never 
comprehended instantaneously, but always a fraction of a moment later… 
In a symbolic system “immediate (re)cognition” is self-contradictory 
(Erickson 1985: 285). 
 
Meaning is always delayed and therefore differentiated. And as such, if there is an 
immediacy or ‘presence’ between speaker and audience, it cannot be ‘meaningful’. Or, 
vice versa, if the performance of language is ‘meaningful’ for the audience, it is because 
there has been a break in presence. 
 
Erickson goes on to propose that, in seeking both self-identical expression and 
immediate recognition, intonational language takes two key risks. First, the language of 
presence aspires to a ‘universal, emotive language’ that can only be unambiguous in the 
expression of strong emotion, and, as such, lacks the capacity to express ‘nuance’ – 
understood as a specific, but minor or subtle inflection of meaning. It wants to be 
definite and particular, but intonational language, Erickson argues, can only achieve the 
self-identity of expression to which it aspires by limiting the range of meanings of its 
expressions. Erickson claims:  
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…The language of presence can only operate on the level of strong 
emotion if it is to be discerned or experienced unambiguously. Can there 
be any hope of finding nuance here, below the level of thought (which is 
essentially linguistic)? (ibid., 282) 
 
In this way, Erickson suggests that subtlety of meaning is specific to the realm of 
consciousness. Since the language of presence directs itself toward the unthinking body 
it has to shout loudly and clearly to be understood. In turn, Erickson contends that the 
language of presence ‘is not devoid of signification, it is just widening and making less 
definite what is being signified’ (ibid., 288). Intonational language aspires to the 
elimination of the ambiguity it associates with the process of signification. In its failure, 
it signifies only the extremes of the general, rather than the nuance of the particular.  
 
Secondly, the language of presence, as Erickson defines it, risks hermeticism. 
From one perspective, he argues, this is because the language of presence is more 
concerned with the performer’s experience than that of the audience (ibid.). From 
another, it is because the language of presence seeks to break away from the 
conventional relations between signifier and signified that form the basis of social 
communication. In doing so it risks constructing its own ‘prison-house’, not of language 
but of nonsense. Drawing from the example of Artaud’s contemporary Hugo Ball, 
Erickson argues 
 
This solitary fortress in which one seeks an inner presence, this 
incomprehensible sphere can be a prison as well, though its purpose may 
be to free one from the constraints of language in society. This struggle, 
this tension, finally led Ball into a state of monastic silence (ibid., 285). 
 
Incomprehensibility separates us from one another, Erickson implies, as much as the 
representational language sound poetry seeks to escape.  
 
 In the main, Erickson’s essay seems to associate Artaud with an opposition of 
thinking and presence; thought is that which interrupts presence as an immediacy of 
expression and meaning. At one point, however, Erickson discusses Artaud’s notion of 
presence, not in relation to the performance of language, but in the context of thought 
itself. For Artaud, Erickson argues, consciousness is that which intervenes to separate 
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him from his own thought; and yet, without consciousness he risks losing his thoughts. 
This leaves Artaud in a double-bind: ‘Artaud wishes to be totally conscious, by not 
being so he suspects that someone is stealing his thoughts, but any attempt to be fully 
self-conscious while thinking arrests the thought process, so that in a sense he steals it 
from himself’ (ibid., 286). For Artaud, Erickson suggests, ‘The thought process’ is both 
unconscious and in motion. Consciousness, in contrast, involves the arrest of motion - 
as a process of capture in relation to the thought process, attempting to prevent its 
escape.  
 
 But surely then, presence cannot be opposed to thought per se if presence is a 
problem for thought. Rather, it becomes clear that we need to distinguish between 
conscious and unconscious as two levels at which thought might be understood to take 
place. In turn, we might suggest that what Artaud wants is to conceive presence not as 
opposed to thinking, but presence as the unconscious movement of thought, and that we 
can draw from Deleuze to shed further light on this idea. Artaud does not want to make 
a mindless theatre in which no one stops to think, but he does want to reconsider our 
notion of the ‘mind’ and of thinking. Again, it is a question of destratification. As Dale 
notes, ‘Artaud does not reject the mind, he denounces it as an organ of the organized 
body and as an interpreter of meaning’ (Dale 2002: 91). Deleuze provides such an 
alternate account of thought: not as the recognition of existing meanings but as an 
embodied, creative process borne of the encounter. Armed with these Deleuzian ideas 
we can not only address Artaud’s linguistic aspirations in his radio work, To have done 
with the judgment of god, but his broader ambition to create a theatre – of gestures as 
well as words – that makes us think and in so doing affirms the ontological force of 
difference in itself, which cannot be ‘understood’ but can be sensed.  
 
Thus, to construct oneself a theatre without organs is to learn to think, as well as 
to speak, differently. In To have done with the judgment of god, Artaud suggests that 
man thinks as he is made. As Dale argues, Artaud ‘throws both mind and body into 
consternation accusing man of thinking along the organized lines of the organism, that 
is, of thinking in the same way as he is constructed and vice versa’ (Dale 2002: 87). 
Likewise, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze argues that he and Artaud agree on the 
idea that to think – genuinely – is to create; to make something new in contact with the 
world rather than to approach it with preconceived ideas. And it is this creative nature 
of thought that makes it difficult, for all of us, to really think. However, it also this 
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difficult thought – that Deleuze calls ‘thought without image’ – that is privileged as the 
only thought that can approach difference in itself. 
 
Deleuze addresses the nature of thought throughout his oeuvre, but both in 
Difference and Repetition and A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze proposes an affinity 
between his and Artaud’s understanding of that nature. In both cases, the key Artaud 
text for Deleuze seems to be the Correspondence avec Jacques Riviere (1923-24) in 
which he and Guattari definitively take ‘Artaud’s side’ against Riviere – the ‘man of the 
State’ who attempts to re-bind Artaud’s errant thought to targets and aims (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988: 378). In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze argues that Riviere 
misunderstood Artaud; indeed, he declares, ‘Rarely has there been such 
misunderstanding’ (Deleuze 1994: 147). And whereas Riviere takes thinking for 
granted, Deleuze argues, as an innate function that already exists and must merely be 
put to work, Artaud  
 
knows that thinking is not innate, but must be engendered in thought. 
He knows that the problem is not to direct or methodically apply a 
thought which pre-exists in principle and in nature, but to bring into 
being that which does not yet exist (there is no other work, all the rest is 
arbitrary, mere decoration) (ibid.). 
 
For Deleuze ‘To think is to create – there is no other creation – but to create is first of 
all to engender “thinking” in thought’ (ibid.). Artaud, he argues, shares this definition of 
thought, but he also has direct experience of the difficulties of engendering thought as 
creation. In the Correspondence, as Deleuze narrates,  
 
Artaud said that the problem (for him) was not to orientate his 
thought, or to perfect the expression of what he thought, or to acquire 
application and method or to perfect his poems, but simply to manage 
to think something (ibid.).  
 
This problem is not unique to Artaud, Deleuze suggests; rather, Artaud’s particular 
experience shows up ‘difficulties in principle, concerning and affecting the essence of 
what it means to think’ (ibid.). The nature of thought as creation means that it is 
difficult, for all of us, to genuinely think.  
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 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze goes on to argue that Artaud’s 
interrogation of his experience of the inability to think provides us with a ‘revelation of 
a thought without image’ which he contrasts with what he calls ‘the dogmatic image of 
thought’ (ibid.). With Artaud, Deleuze argues, thought is forced to think its own 
‘natural ‘powerlessness’, but he adds that this ‘fracture’ or ‘collapse’ essential to 
thought is indistinguishable from its ‘greatest power’ (ibid.). In other words, Artaud’s 
experience of thought’s inability to hold itself together as itself, although the cause of 
suffering for Artaud, actually demonstrates the power of thought as the ceaseless 
production of itself as difference. After Artaud, Deleuze proposes, the dogmatic image 
of thought can no longer stand. Deleuze and Guattari return to this idea in A Thousand 
Plateaus, suggesting that Artaud’s letters to Riviere reveal thought’s essence as its ‘own 
incapacity to take on form’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 378). It is not a question, 
Deleuze says, of ‘opposing to the dogmatic image of thought another image borrowed, 
for example, from schizophrenia, but rather of remembering that schizophrenia is not 
only a human fact but also a possibility for thought’ (Deleuze 1994: 148). We need not 
approach Artaud’s schizophrenia as an example of errant or deviant thought, rather it 
shows us the creative power of all genuine thought.  
 
 In stark contrast to Erickson, for whom, as we’ve seen, thought is ‘essentially 
linguistic’ (Erickson 1985: 282), Deleuze argues that language does not define or 
condition the process of thought. Thought does not begin with the categories of 
language but with ‘something in the world’ that presents itself to sensation: difference. 
Thought is not the product of language but of what Deleuze calls a ‘fundamental 
encounter’ (Deleuze 1994: 139). Here, he makes a clear distinction between what he 
calls ‘objects of recognition’ and those of encounter. Objects of recognition, Deleuze 
argues, ‘do not disturb thought’ insofar as they provide thought with ‘an image of 
itself’; they reaffirm for thought, in other words, what it already thinks it knows. For 
Deleuze, instances of recognition do not involve genuine thought. We only ‘truly think’ 
when we have difficulty in recognizing something (ibid., 138). Such things produce 
encounters as the forcing of thought, or as Deleuze puts it:  
 
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object 
not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered 
may be Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of 
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affective tones: wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its 
primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In this sense it is 
opposed to recognition (ibid., 139 – first emphasis original, second 
emphasis added). 
 
The object of encounter, then, presents itself to affect or sensation alone, rather than to 
conscious thought or recognition. Indeed, the encounter ‘defies consciousness, 
recognition and representation’ (Bogue 1989: 78). Conceived in terms of its power to be 
affected, Deleuze also argues that the body can think in ways from which consciousness 
would do well to learn. Deleuze is not arguing that sensation is able to recognize 
nuance, as constituted by small degrees of difference between meanings. Rather, he 
argues that difference in itself is that which ‘can only be sensed’, since consciousness 
works with identities.   
 
At times, Artaud’s account of theatrical meaning might seem to promote the 
‘dogmatic image of thought’ rather than a ‘thought without image’. For instance, in a 
discussion of what he calls ‘undebased mime plays’ in “‘Mise en scène’ and 
Metaphysics”, Artaud seems to assign the elements of theatre a substitutive role. Artaud 
explains: ‘…I mean straightforward mime where gestures, instead of standing for words 
or sentences as in European mime…stand for ideas, attitudes of mind, aspects of nature 
in a tangible, potent way…’ (Artaud in Schumacher 1989: 94 – emphasis added). So 
long as theatre operates as a substitute for something else – be it words or ideas, the 
break between the absent represented (ideas) and the present representative (gesture) 
remains. In the same fashion, there is in Artaud’s writings a lingering desire to be 
understood and to dictate audience response, that could be seen to stand in tension with 
a Deleuzian reading of Artaud’s theatre as an encounter which forces (definitively 
creative) thought. For instance, in a 1947 letter to Fernand Pouey, Artaud explicitly 
rejects an understanding of To have done with the judgment of god as ‘a work that is 
chaotic and disconnected… in which the wandering sensibility of the listener must also 
take at random what suits him’ (Artaud in Sontag 1976: 576). In turn, Artaud describes 
the broadcast as: ‘a search for a language which the humblest road-mender or coal seller 
would have understood, a language which conveyed by means of bodily transmission 
the highest metaphysical truths’ (ibid., 583).  
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Such appeals to understanding and ‘truth’ here might well be taken to imply a 
desire to banish difference along the lines of Erickson’s reading of Artaud. However, 
Deleuze encourages us to notice Artaud’s divergence from such a reading in three 
different ways. Firstly, he allows us to conceive Artaud as aspiring to create a theatre as 
an object of encounter rather than recognition, as forcing thought rather than 
communicating meanings. With regard to the issue of theatre as substitute, it is 
important to note Artaud’s account of the nature of these ideas for which theatre stands 
in. These ideas, Artaud suggests, do not pre-exist their expression, and as such theatre 
creates rather than represents them, in much the same way as does the Deleuzian 
encounter. From these examples we can see that it is not that he wants to divorce theatre 
from ‘meaning’ per se, so much as create new meanings beyond those that already exist 
and can be represented. For instance, in “Theatre and Poetry” Artaud declares his 
commitment to freeing objects from their conventional associations or what he refers to 
as their ‘immediate meaning’. Artaud proposes that objects in the theatre  
 
…are cut off from their immediate meaning, and endeavour, indeed, to 
create a true language based on the sign, rather than based on the word. 
That is where the notion of symbolism based on the changing of 
meanings comes in. Things will be stripped of their immediate meaning 
and will be given a new one (Artaud in Schumacher 1989: 119).  
 
Rather than thinking of the symbol as that which represents existing meanings, Artaud 
conceives symbolism as the creation of new meaning. This is a function Artaud 
associates with poetry: theatre becomes poetic, Artaud argues, when it seizes its 
capacity to shake our understandings of the relations between things. Similarly, in the 
first manifesto of the Theatre of Cruelty, Artaud argues that ‘Through poetry, theatre 
contrasts pictures of the unformulated with the crude visualization of what exists’ (ibid., 
105 – original emphasis) – a process he associates with cinema. Contemporary society, 
he complains, ‘has made us forget the slightest idea of serious theatre which upsets all 
our preconceptions’ (ibid., 108). Once distilled to its essence, we must not ask whether 
theatricality can define thought, Artaud argues, ‘…but whether it makes us think’ 
(ibid.,122 – original emphasis).  
 
Secondly, Deleuze’s concept of the encounter with that which can only be 
sensed also allows us to return with fresh eyes to Artaud’s references to ‘bodily 
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transmission’ and his concept of ‘the Flesh’. Indeed, Deleuze himself creates a concept 
of ‘the flesh’ in The Logic of Sense, where he talks about the inscription of difference or 
of ‘the depths’ in the flesh (Deleuze 1990: 161). Likewise, in ‘Theatre and Cruelty’ 
(1933), Artaud argues: ‘One cannot separate body and mind, nor the senses from the 
intellect, particularly in a field where the unending repeated jading of our organs calls 
for sudden shocks to revive our understanding’ (Artaud in Schumacher 1989: 109). 
Here, the body, or what Artaud also names ‘Flesh’, is located at the very source of 
genuine thought, as distinct from the kind of habitual thinking involved in the 
interpretation of the psychological theatre that Artaud rejects. Specifically, he argues 
that society has become unaccustomed to a theatre of presence as the forcing of thought, 
largely on account of ‘the damage wrought by psychological theatre, derived from 
Racine’ (ibid., 108). Likewise, in ‘Situation of the Flesh’ (1925), Artaud assigns a 
particular definition to the notion of flesh beyond a common-sense understanding:  
 
For me the word Flesh means above all apprehension, hair standing on 
end, flesh laid bare with all the intellectual profundity of this spectacle of 
pure flesh and all its consequences for the senses, that is for the 
sentiments. And sentiment means presentiment, that is, direct 
understanding, communication turned inside out and illumined from 
within. There is a mind in the flesh, but a mind as quick as lightning. 
And yet the excitement of the flesh partakes of the high substance of the 
mind. And yet whosoever says flesh also says sensibility. Sensibility, 
that is, assimilation, but the ultimate, secret, profound, absolute 
assimilation of my own pain, and consequently the solitary and unique 
knowledge of that pain (Artaud in Sontag 1976: 111). 
 
For Deleuze too, the presence of difference or perpetual variation has an electric 
quality: ‘It is like lightning coming from somewhere else and announcing something 
else – a sudden emergence of creative, unexpected and subrepresentative variation’ 
(Deleuze 1997: 252). Using the destratified voice, differential presence is characterised 
by the ‘sudden shock when thought realises itself in the body’ (Dale 2002: 91); it is a 
moment of performance that addresses an acephalic ‘mind in the flesh’.  
 
Thirdly, we can also suggest that Deleuze’s conception of ‘the language of 
schizophrenia’ in The Logic of Sense might be productively read alongside Artaud’s 
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concepts of language as operating as incantation and vibration in relation to its 
audience. Conventionally, ‘incantation’ is associated with the idea of the spell, chant or 
mantra: a set of words which, when recited in a ritual context, have some kind of 
magical effect. In the context of sound poetry, Erickson suggests, incantation refers to 
an ideal of language as  
 
…summoning forth the power of presence within every fiber and organ, 
and nerve of the human being, uniting the spiritual with the physical, 
tapping into the dormant and primal creative energies, and emanating 
outward toward the listener; it is a sounding of one’s human space and the 
establishing of a resonating field, creating a harmonious sub- or pre-
linguistic communication between poet and auditor (Erickson 1985: 280 – 
emphasis added).  
 
However, this notion of incantation is not the only way to understand Artaud’s aims 
with respect to the performance of language. Particularly problematic, perhaps, is the 
implication that Artaud aspired to a ‘harmonious’ relation to his audience. On the 
contrary, we might suggest, incantation for Artaud involves a rupture, which in turn 
indicates the meeting of difference (as itself, with itself) rather than identities. For 
example, we might note the violent terms in which Artaud articulates the impact of 
incantation in the following quotation from ‘“Mise en scène” and Metaphysics’:  
 
To make metaphysics out of spoken language is to make language 
convey what it does not normally convey. That is to use it in a new, 
exceptional and unusual way, to give it its full, physical shock potential, 
to split it up and distribute it actively in space, to treat inflections in a 
completely tangible manner and restore their shattering power and really 
to manifest something; to turn against language and its basely utilitarian, 
one might almost say alimentary, sources, against its origins as a hunted 
beast, and finally to consider language in the form of Incantation (Artaud 
in Schumacher 1989: 97 – first and second emphasis added, third italics 
original). 
 
Here, Artaud emphasizes the way in which a particular usage of language might provide 
access to the ontological, or what he refers to as the ‘metaphysical’. Incantation, Artaud 
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argues, constitutes a break with the tradition of employing language as merely the tool 
for representing an already existing reality, in favour of exposing the power of language 
to act upon, and create the real. This experience is both ‘shocking’ and ‘shattering’, 
rather than ‘harmonious’ for the audience because they are forced to physically 
encounter the novelty of that which has been incanted. Incantation acts upon the bodies 
of its audience, we might propose, in a comparable fashion to the way in which words 
act upon the body of the schizophrenic as Deleuze figures it. With Deleuze, making 
metaphysics out of language, means the affirmation of difference in itself through 
Incantation.  
 
   And yet, it would be a mistake to over-emphasise the importance of ‘shock’ to 
Artaud as a mode of relation to his audience. Or rather, perhaps we need to distinguish 
between the ‘shattering power’ of an encounter with difference as ontological force and 
shock as a conscious reaction to a different opinion to one’s own. As is well known, 
Artaud’s broadcast To have done with the judgment of god was banned precisely for 
fear that it would shock the French public. Indeed, Morfee notes that it is typical to find 
in Artaud’s late writing ‘the infantile delight in naming lower bodily fluids and 
processes’ (Morfee 2005: 126) which, Morfee argues, tends to undermine rather than 
aid Artaud’s thought. However, for all the talk of ‘caca’, farts and sperm in the radio 
play, one might argue that Artaud places a greater value on the concept of ‘vibration’, a 
more subtle mode of audience response which in fact needs to be protected from being 
overwhelmed by the shocking or scandalous in order to function. The concept of 
vibration appears several times in Artaud’s oeuvre. In a 1948 letter to Wladimir Porché, 
the director of the radio station that banned Artaud’s radio work, he writes:  
 
I wanted a fresh work, one that would make contact with certain  
organic points of life,  
a work in which one’s whole nervous system  
illuminated as if by a miner’s cap-lamp  
with vibrations,  
consonances  
which invite 
   man 
   TO EMERGE 
   WITH 
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   his body 
to follow in the sky this new, unusual, and radiant Epiphany. 
But the glory of the body is possible 
   only if 
   nothing 
in the spoken text 
happens to shock 
happens to damage 
this sort of desire for glory (Artaud in Sontag 1976: 579). 
 
Here Artaud expresses his ambition to create a work that causes the audience’s nervous 
systems to vibrate, leading to a renewed understanding of their bodies. However, he 
also makes clear that any conscious, ‘shocked’ response to the text will get in the way 
of this more intuitive reaction. Equally, although Artaud is often accused of positing a 
mind/body distinction, the concept of vibration seems more concerned to contrast 
habitual responses (‘shock’) with the emergence of the new (‘Epiphany’).  
 
 Twenty years prior to these letters, Artaud had employed the concept of 
vibration in a short theoretical text concerned with his film project, The Shell and the 
clergyman (1928). Here, during a short-lived period of preference for the cinema over 
the theatre, Artaud argues that cinematic images are uniquely endowed with a magical 
rather than representational quality with ‘the characteristics of the very vibration, the 
profound, unconscious source of thought’ (Artaud in Schumacher 1989: 53). Cinematic 
images vibrate, Artaud suggests, and as such they are connected to thought as that 
which is produced by vibration. In turn, we might read these remarks back into Artaud’s 
letter to Porché: if vibration is the unconscious source of thought, then Artaud wanted 
To have done with the judgment of god to make us think, to vibrate us in order that we 
might conceive our bodies anew. For Artaud, this impact of vibration lies outwith the 
powers of explanation and knowing. In The Theatre and Its Double, Artaud argues that 
there is no point, ‘trying to give exact reasons…why the nervous system after a certain 
time is in tune with the vibrations of the subtlest music and is eventually somehow 
lastingly modified by it’ (ibid., 115). Unknowable perhaps – and yet, combining 
Artaud’s sense of the impact of vibration with Deleuze’s theorisation of thought as 
creative encounter does provide some kind of explanation. Like Deleuze, Artaud’s 
concept of vibration traverses the mind/body distinction in order to think the nature of 
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the presence between thinking bodies: not as pure presence, but as the differential 
presence that forces thought. As Dyson suggests,  
 
Between presence and representation is the interval between matter 
itself and our conscious perception of matter, and in that interval all the 
artificial divisions that go into constructing and representing matter as a 
series of independent objects cast in an infinitely divisible space and 
existing in a perpetuity of instants are set in place (Dyson in Scheer 
2000: 87).  
 
Differential presence involves an embodied encounter with destratified matter, or matter 
in itself, which makes us think through an unconscious or intuitive vibration.  
 
 A further matter that arises here is the question of Artaud’s relation to the 
categories of intention and necessity, of artistic practice and the practice of mental 
health patients. With intonation, incantation and vibration, Artaud seems to be actively 
pursuing a new usage of language in performance, contrary, perhaps, to Deleuze’s 
emphasis on the schizophrenic origins of his approach. Indeed, The Logic of Sense 
caused something of a controversy when it was published, insofar as Deleuze was seen 
by some to be annexing ‘Artaud’s writing to the realm of the schizophrenic’ (Morfee 
2005, 108) and thus denying him artistic control or credit for his work. For example, 
Paule Thévenin – Artaud’s friend and collaborator – railed against Deleuze’s reading of 
Artaud in an article called ‘Entendre/Voir/Lire’42. Here, as Jeffrey Attebury (2000) 
reports, Thévenin objects to Deleuze’s use of existing clinical terminology to categorise 
Artaud’s work, which she suggests makes him complicit with the violence done to 
Artaud by the medical profession. ‘Straight away,’ Thévenin argues, ‘Deleuze falls into 
the major trap of identifying Artaud as a schizophrenic’ (Thévenin in Attebury 2000, 
716)43. As Attebury notes,  
 
Whether or not Deleuze here uses the term schizophrenia in a manner that 
                                                 
42 Thévenin republished her essay in 1993 as part of a collection of writings on Artaud entitled Antonin 
Artaud, ce désespéré  qui vous parle (Paris: Editions du Seuil).  As Jeffrey Attebury (2000) reports, the 
collection’s introduction includes an apology of sorts to Deleuze from Thevenin, which Attebury reads as 
an acknowledgement of the inherent difficulty of reading Artaud. Here, Thévenin refers to her early 
critique of Deleuze as “a little bit exaggerated” (Thévenin in Scheer 2004a, 27). 
43 This is my own rough translation of a quotation that Attebury gives in the original French: "D'emblee, 
Gilles Deleuze, tombant dans le piege majeur, identifie Antonin Artaud a la schizophrenie" (Thévenin 
1993: 200). 
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is in strict accordance with clinical practice, he clearly has recourse to the 
language of psychoanalysis as a means of explicating Artaud’s texts, a 
strategy that would appear to make Artaud’s writing into a case study 
(ibid.). 
 
In contrast, Thévenin argues ‘that Artaud’s work must be understood on its own terms, 
that his language presents a consistent challenge to any analysis of it according to a 
codified system, especially that of psychoanalysis’ (Attebury 2000: 716). This chapter 
cannot hope to do justice to this issue here, but for now it seems important simply to 
register Artaud’s careful consideration of how one might consciously effect an 
unconscious vibration, or create an encounter, in one’s audience or oneself. Contra 
Erickson’s argument that Artaud’s use of language, like sound poetry, is more 
concerned with the experience of the performer than that of the audience, Artaud’s 
response to Porché’s ban evidences his primary concern with what language can do – as 
intonation, incantation and vibration – to and for those who hear it. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this second chapter, we have provided an exposition of three key concepts 
emerging in the encounter between Artaud and Deleuze: the body without organs, the 
theatre without organs, and the destratified voice, as well as furthering our 
understanding of what the experience of differential presence might involve. The 
chapter proposed that To have done with the judgment of god constitutes an instance of 
a theatre without organs that uses the destratified voice in a pursuit of differential 
presence – as a nonrepresentative encounter with difference that forces new thoughts 
upon us. Drawing from various works by Deleuze including Difference and Repetition, 
The Logic of Sense, A Thousand Plateaus and ‘One Less Manifesto’, we have 
conceived differential presence as an encounter with difference or perpetual variation as 
that which exceeds the representational consciousness of a subject, forcing thought 
through rupture rather than communicating meanings through sameness. Contra the 
dismissal of Artaud’s project as paradoxical or impossible, the chapter has suggested 
that his non-representational theatre seeks to affirm a new kind of presence as 
difference, rather than aiming to transcend difference in order to reach the self-identical 
presence of Western metaphysics. 
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 And yet, this very idea of creating an encounter with difference is perhaps 
problematic if the encounter is something that happens ‘to’ us, or that forces thought 
‘upon’ us, in an apparently accidental and unpredictable fashion. How can anyone be 
said to ‘create’ an encounter if the encounter is, by definition, a force of creation 
without need for the transcendent control of a creator? What is needed is a different 
attitude to the role of the artist, as one who does not claim to create the encounter so 
much as to create the conditions for the encounter, as one who makes space and time for 
creation by erasing himself as artist. We will now suggest that one can find such an 
attitude in the work of Allan Kaprow, particularly in his ‘Activities’, which will be the 
focus of our next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Differential presence as ‘affect’ & ‘becoming-imperceptible’ in Allan Kaprow’s 
Activities  
 
 
Introduction 
  
 At the end of the last chapter, we noted the potential paradox of the concept of 
‘creating an encounter’, given that its inherently unpredictable and unknowable nature 
can be seen to present a challenge to notions of authorship and intentionality. Likewise, 
in the first chapter, we pointed to the tension that arises on account of the Living 
Theatre’s attempts to attach participation to an explicit macropolitical agenda or goal. 
Following on from such ideas, this chapter will re-approach these questions from a new 
angle via the work of the American artist and theorist Allan Kaprow (1927-2006), best 
known for his coinage of the term ‘Happening,’ understood as ‘a new art form that 
couldn’t be confused with paintings, poetry, architecture, music, dance, or plays’ 
(Kaprow 2003: xxvii). However, rather than focus on such canonical works as 18 
Happenings in 6 Parts, we will draw attention to the works Kaprow referred to as 
‘Activities’ rather than ‘Happenings’, and specifically on the Activities and writings 
related to them that he created in the early to mid 1970s44. This choice of focus is a 
response to the radical indeterminacy of the Activities and their Deleuzian project to go 
beyond undoing the categories of genre or art-form in favour of creating fleeting 
moments of ‘nonart’ as that which operates beneath the art/life distinction. In what 
follows, we will be examining Kaprow’s Activities in terms of Deleuze’s concept of 
‘affect’ rather than signification, and ultimately as experiments in the ‘becoming-
                                                 
44 There is conflicting evidence as to exactly when Kaprow began to use the term ‘Activity’ and when the 
first Activity might be said to have taken place, but it seems to have been around 1968-69. That is, there 
is terminological confusion over whether certain events such as Runner (1968) and Charity (1969) should 
be called ‘Activities’ or ‘Happenings’. Kaprow’s own essay, “The Education of the Un-Artist, Part II” 
(1972) provides a score for both works which categorises them as Activities (Kaprow 2003: 115, 122). 
However, in the recent and very comprehensive catalogue Allan Kaprow: Art as Life, which draws 
heavily on the Kaprow papers in the Getty Archive, both Runner and Charity are listed as Happenings 
(Meyer-Hermann 2008: 197 & 207). This source also suggests that several of Kaprow’s early Activities 
remained unrealized, and that the first actually presented Activity was an event entitled Moon Sounds, 
realized in December 1969 at the wedding of Heidi and Richard Blau – son of the eminent performance 
theorist, Herbert Blau (ibid., 210 – NB. Heidi Blau is incorrectly named ‘Helga’ in this book). In 
correspondence with the author, Herbert Blau has said of Moon Sounds: ‘It was a marvellous affair that 
started at our house in Silver Lake, went out onto the desert landscape between Cal Arts & the 
Livermore atomic energy research headquarters, and ended with a dinner back at the house’.  
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imperceptible’ of the work of art, of the artist, and of the participant – in which 
becoming-imperceptible will be associated with differential presence, rather than with 
absence. Through Deleuze’s theorisations of affect and becoming-imperceptible, and 
Kaprow’s account of the Activities, differential presence can now be understood as the 
direct, embodied and transformative experience of participating in the real as a 
constantly changing ‘whole’.  
 
Between the late sixties and 2001, Kaprow scored and enacted more than a 
hundred Activities45. However, he continued to make new ‘Happenings’ until around 
1970, and indeed continued to reinvent past ‘Environments’ and Happenings alongside 
creating new Activities for the rest of his career. As such, it is not the case that there is a 
discrete ‘Activities phase’ that necessarily constitutes a development from the 
Happenings. Indeed, the first essay in which Kaprow uses the term ‘Activity’ – 
“Pinpointing Happenings” from 1967 – confirms not only a practical, but a conceptual 
overlap between the Activities and Happenings. Here, Kaprow attempts to describe and 
define what he calls an ‘Activity Happening’ or ‘Activity type Happening’ as a 
subcategory of Happenings. An ‘Activity Happening,’ he says, is   
 
directly involved in the everyday world, ignores theatres and 
audiences, is more active than meditative, and is close in spirit to 
physical sports…fairs…and political demonstrations. It also partakes 
of the unconscious daily rituals of the supermarket… The Activity 
Happening selects and combines situations to be participated in, 
rather than watched or just thought about’ (ibid., 87 – emphasis 
added). 
 
Of course, since Kaprow made this remark, ‘sports… fairs… and political 
demonstrations’ (and to a lesser extent supermarket rituals) have become staple 
examples of what constitutes ‘performance,’ at least for US Performance Studies as 
influenced by Richard Schechner’s ‘broad spectrum’ definition. Nevertheless, this 
remark helpfully highlights three aspects of the Activity process that remain central to 
how Kaprow approached its creation: the selection of situations (or actions), the 
combination of those actions into a new configuration, and the invitation to an audience 
                                                 
45 According to the timelines published in Allan Kaprow: Art as Life, the last, new Activity Kaprow 
created before his death was entitled Postal Regulations and was realized in June-July 2001 (Leddy and 
Meyer-Hermann 2008: 330).  
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to actively participate in those actions rather than contemplate them. But we must wait 
until the trio of essays entitled ‘The Education of the Un-Artist’ to understand more 
about the specifics of Kaprow’s aims in relation to the participants in the Activities. 
Even then, though, unlike the term ‘Happening,’ which Kaprow seemed to be 
perpetually defining in various manifesto-like articles, we will never get a 
corresponding definition of the Activity. Instead, Kaprow inserts examples of his 
Activity scores into essays that introduce a plethora of new terms and values such as 
‘nonart’, ‘lifelike art’, ‘play’, ‘experiment’, ‘participation performance’ and so forth46.  
 
And yet, despite this practical and conceptual overlap, there is some sense in 
which the Activities could be seen to address some of the problems that Kaprow came 
to associate with the Happenings of the 1960s. That is, although he had initially been 
pleased with the way in which the Happenings could not be recognised according to 
art’s existing, formal categories, Kaprow sensed that, as their popularity grew, both his 
own Happenings and those of others were becoming increasingly determined by the 
same set of ‘unquestioned beliefs’ about the identity of art that restricted the 
experimentalism of the conventional arts: ‘belief in objects that can be possessed; belief 
in eternity; belief in control and skill; belief in creativity; belief in publicity and fame; 
belief in marketability’ (ibid., xxviii). But rather than reject the form altogether, Kaprow 
tried to eliminate these beliefs from his later Happenings ‘…By doing events only once, 
by not sending out announcements, by shifting event sites from artists’ lofts and 
underground galleries to remote landscapes’ (ibid.). In a bid to protect his experiments 
from their own ‘success’, Kaprow took his Happenings away from the art-world as site 
and away from its demands for publicity and reproduction. 
 
But even this was not enough for Kaprow. The Happenings’ ‘biggest problem’, 
Kaprow retrospectively argued, ‘was the presence of audiences,’ this being the major 
cause of his subsequent critique of them as ‘just another version of vanguard theatre’ 
(ibid). And it is this desire to eliminate a ‘conventional’ audience that is at the heart of 
the distinction between the Happening and the Activity. However, many of the 
                                                 
46 It is perhaps worth noting that Kaprow, although very active practically, does not seem to have 
published any writing in 1969 – the year in which, according to Leddy’s chronology, Kaprow makes the 
transition to calling his works ‘Activities’ rather than ‘Happenings’ (Leddy and Meyer-Hermann 2008: 
210). Correlatively, we might speculate that this missing definition constitutes a recognition of a 
distinction between the theoretical and the practical – that Kaprow wanted to maintain a separation 
between nonart as an idea, and the Activity as an event. As we’ll go on to suggest, the concept of nonart 
could be seen as a limit to which the Activities aspired, but perhaps rarely achieved.   
 156 
Activities still involve acts of observation – of one participant by another, or by 
participants of themselves. Thus, Kaprow’s hostility to the idea of a conventional 
audience cannot simply be reduced to a hostility toward the traditional primacy 
accorded to vision in our relation to works of art and performance. What Kaprow has in 
mind, when he refers to the problem of the audience, is that a conventional audience at 
that time tended to have little or no impact on how the nature of the work unfolded in 
time, that is, on the individuality of the work of art as a complex and self-different 
event. There is a different kind of looking – or ‘attention’ – that takes place, Kaprow 
suggests, when the audience is in the midst of doing and when they are responsible for 
what is done. Clearly, this is not a matter of “all or nothing”, but of a continuum of 
participation of which Kaprow wanted to explore the outer limits – when the role of the 
artist in constituting the nature of the work has been reduced to a minimum, and the role 
of the participants has been increased as much as possible.     
 
In the transition from one to the other, Kaprow began to make what he called 
‘performer-only’ Happenings, such as Calling (1965) and Self-Service (1967). 
However, this label was arguably aspirational rather than descriptive. For instance, we 
might note the large, if impromtu audience that gathered to watch the aspects of Calling 
that took place in New York’s Grand Central Station47. In contrast, Self-Service bears a 
much closer relation to the Activities, on account of the subtlety, or we might say the 
‘becoming-imperceptible’ of some of the actions offered to the participants. For 
Kaprow, Self-Service marked something of a break with his earlier Happenings which 
he describes as having had ‘far more dramatic and deliberate imagery’ in contrast to the 
‘cohesion and casualness, an in-and-out-of-your-daily-lifeness’ of Self-Service (Kaprow 
1968: 153). Some actions remain spectacular; for instance, it would be hard not to 
notice the enactment of the instruction: ‘People tie tarpaper around many cars in 
supermarket lot’. Others however, although also enacted in public, would be easier to 
miss, such as the following instruction: ‘Many shoppers begin to whistle in aisles of [a] 
supermarket. After a few minutes they go back to their shopping’ (Kaprow in Kelley 
2004: 109). At this point Kaprow is raising a number of questions: What is the relation 
between everyday activities and aesthetic experience? How can art become more 
democratic without becoming banal or conventional? How can genuine participation 
                                                 
47 There is an attention-seeking, spectacular quality - completely absent from the Activities - to Kaprow’s 
decision to have the cloth-wrapped bodies of participants dropped off at Grand Central and propped up 
against its information booth. Looking like dead bodies or packages awaiting collection, the mummified 
participants call out to other volunteers, before unwrapping themselves and leaving the station.   
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occur, and what then is the relationship between the artists’ aims and the interests or 
experiences of the participants? These are the questions that become increasingly 
important for Kaprow in his development of the concept of ‘nonart’ and of the practice 
of the Activity – both of which, we will argue, constitute forms of thinking differential 
presence as the becoming-imperceptible of the work of art, artist and “audience” 
through the notion of participation.  
 
 In order to provide a general picture of what the Activities were like, we might 
follow Jeff Kelley in distinguishing between those events that took place in an 
educational context (which were mostly the US Activities enacted by small groups of 
students), and those that were commissioned by galleries or art festivals (which were 
mostly the European Activities, enacted by invited and volunteer participants from the 
host cities) (Kelley 2004: 161). Alternatively, the Activities might be understood to 
operate between two poles, at one of which inhuman materials take centre stage while 
people function as attentive workmen (such as Level from 1970 and Durations from 
1976). At the other pole, the specific conventions of human behaviour are of primary 
concern (such as Take Off from 1974, or Maneuvers and Satisfaction, from 1976). At 
the former pole, and in this sense they are reminiscent of some of the Happenings, the 
actions Kaprow proposes often involve processes of building, physically demanding 
labour and the materials of construction; for example, in Tracts, Sweet Wall (both 1970) 
and Scales (1971). At the latter pole, participants are often grouped into mixed-sex 
couples who enact various forms of exchange and contact with one another – sometimes 
just using their bodies, and at other times supplementing the relationship with 
technologies such as telephones, microphones, cameras and tape recorders (ibid., 190). 
In between these two poles, there are the bodily-experiment works like Meters (1972), 
Highs, Basic Thermal Units (both 1973), Affect (1974) and Air Condition (1975). These 
involve inhuman materials like light, ice and water, but no construction or manual 
labour. Likewise, although they invite participants to enact forms of contact and 
exchange, there is no real concern with behavioural conventions or body language.  
 
 What these Activities have in common, however – in addition to their ‘intimate 
scale’ (ibid., 180), the absence of non-participant viewers, and the fact that that they all 
begin with a plan written by Kaprow – is their focus on relationality; hence their 
pertinence to a discussion of differential presence as a fundamentally relational concept. 
The concept of differential presence asserts the primacy of relationality, refusing any 
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essential being or fixed nature to the ‘things’ that appear from it. Likewise, the 
Activities invite us to attend to relationality, whether the foregrounded relation is one 
between human bodies and inhuman matter, of a human body to itself or to other 
humans, or to the inhuman force of change to which, as we’ll see, both Kaprow and 
Deleuze accord ontological priority. In this way, the Activities further the 
experimentation with participation that we located in the Living Theatre by generating 
works which not only involve participatory elements in the midst of an otherwise 
observed theatre, but are defined throughout by the nature of participants’ responses to a 
score, or set of instructions, provided by the artist. At the same time, Kaprow’s work 
allows us to reconceive the way in which differential presence can be understood to 
involve contact with the real, beyond the representations of a subject. This contact or 
presence will be theorised by Kaprow as a blurring of the boundaries between art and 
life, and finally as the ambition to make participatory art which provides participants 
with ‘a sense of the whole’. Participatory art, in other words, facilitates an awareness 
and experience of ontological participation beyond any subject/object distinction.  
 
Crucially, as this chapter’s focal Deleuzian concepts of ‘affect’ and ‘becoming-
imperceptible’ will make clear, this is an experience that involves change and 
transformation for both the human and inhuman bodies that take part. This is why it 
constitutes an experience of differential presence, or what Kaprow will variously 
conceive as ‘lifelike art’, ‘experienced insight’, or ‘becoming “the whole”’, rather than 
self-presence. Further, we will emphasise that such presence does not involve a 
dissolution of the material self in order to become the adequate vessel for the passage of 
a dematerialised thought – as Peter Hallward (2006) has suggested in his discussion of 
the notion of ‘becoming-imperceptible’. Rather, differential presence involves a 
heightened awareness of our capacity to affect and be affected by other material bodies, 
and an experience of ‘growing in the midst of things’ rather than being irrevocably 
separated from them (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 280).  
 
 Where Kaprow takes us in a new direction from the previous two chapters is in 
his radical rethinking of what ‘art’ is, or, what constitutes an aesthetic experience – a 
direction that was particularly influenced by his encounter with Art as Experience 
(1934) by John Dewey, who defined the aesthetic in terms of the complete participation 
of organism and environment (Zepke in Cull 2009: 117). For critics like Christopher 
Innes this also happens with the Living Theatre with regard to their use of improvisation 
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(which, as we’ve noted, Innes sees as antithetical to art), just as there are those who see 
works such as Artaud’s ‘Jabberwocky’ as a schizophrenic symptom avoiding the 
intentionality or sense of purpose associated with the production of art. Nevertheless, it 
will be proposed that – as part of his experimentation with differential presence – 
Kaprow goes the furthest to explore the relationship between art and life in a manner 
that presents a challenge to the more restricted, even institutionalised, notion of art that 
Deleuze (and Guattari) sometimes put forward. Hence, this further question must also 
be tackled: Does ‘art’ itself (or what Kaprow will call ‘Art art’ or ‘artlike art’) present a 
blockage to the artist’s or participants’ experience of differential presence? And, if so, 
under what new conditions might affect and becoming-imperceptible occur? It is here, 
potentially, that we might find a democratisation of differential presence – not as the 
basis for ‘revolution’ or wholesale social change, but as a micropolitical strategy that 
draws the “audience’s” attention to its capacity to change and be changed by worldly 
processes.  
 
This chapter is composed of three main parts. The first part addresses the 
question of what Deleuze’s concept of ‘affect’ might contribute to our understanding of 
differential presence in the Activities. Here, we begin by contextualising a Deleuzian 
theorisation of the Activities by way of a critique of interpretations of Kaprow’s work 
as signification and metaphor by Annette Leddy (2008) and Richard Schechner (1968). 
In the second part, we move on from the concept of ‘affect’ to the notion of ‘becoming-
imperceptible’, which will be defined as a kind of limit-experience of differential 
presence, or as what we will also discuss as an ‘ontological participation’ made 
available by Kaprow’s participatory (non)art. Here, the theoretical context for the 
discussion is primarily Stephen Zepke’s article, ‘Becoming a Citizen of the World: 
Deleuze between Allan Kaprow and Adrian Piper’ (2009), which not only deals 
thoroughly with the relation between Deleuze and Kaprow, but also raises important 
questions regarding the nature of differential presence as ‘becoming-imperceptible’. At 
this point, we will also expose the connections between Zepke’s critique of Kaprow and 
Hallward’s 2006 critique of Deleuze, before developing an alternative reading of both. 
In the case of both parts, the existing context provides a foil for the arguments of this 
chapter: in the first instance, with the contrast between reading the work of art as a 
signifying or metaphorical object, and conceiving it as affective process or 
metamorphosis; in the second, with regard to the relative emphasis on the conceptual 
and the material in Kaprow and Deleuze, and in the distinction between a dialectical 
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thinking in terms of presence/absence and the Deleuzian notion of becoming as a 
different kind of presence. In the third and final part of the chapter, we shall to address 
some of the problems raised by Kaprow’s Activities for the notion of differential 
presence, particularly questioning the extent to which becoming-imperceptible and 
nonart might be understood to be ‘ideal’ and looking at the reasons why Kaprow could 
be seen to have failed to achieve such experiences in his actual practice.  
 
 
1. Contra the Activity as metaphor: differential presence as ‘affect’ and 
‘experienced insight’ 
 
 placing a block of ice and bale of straw 
 near each other somewhere 
 ice melting slowly 
 reducing bale, straw by straw 
 (keeping pace with the ice) 
 until nothing remains. (Kaprow 2008: 46) 
 
This is Kaprow’s score for Level (1970), an Activity dedicated to his wife, 
Vaughan Rachel, which art historian, Annette Leddy interprets biographically, 
transforming it into a symbol of Kaprow and Rachel’s relationship.  
 
Because of the dedication and the pairing of the objects, it is tempting to 
see Level as a portrait of Kaprow’s marriage, then in its fourteenth year. 
If so, it is a grim one, worthy of Robert Frost, in which marriage is a 
levelling process that reduces both people “until nothing remains” 
(Leddy and Meyer-Hermann 2008: 46).  
 
Ice is not just ice here, Leddy proposes, nor straw simply straw. Rather, the block and 
the bale are metaphorical stand-ins for Kaprow and his wife. Equally, Leddy suggests 
that in works like Warm-Ups and Basic Thermal Units ‘melting ice is a metaphor for 
overcoming emotional distance’ (ibid., 45) and that Affect was created ‘as a piece about 
a disharmonious relationship’ (ibid., 49).  
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 There is a similar emphasis on representation over direct, material presence in 
Richard Schechner’s 1968 interview with Kaprow, which focuses on Fluids (1967) – an 
earlier Happening also involving ice. Kaprow describes Fluids, matter-of-factly, as  
 
a single event done in many places over a three-day period. It consists 
simply in building huge, blank, rectangular ice structures 30 feet long, 
10 feet wide, and eight feet high. The structures are built by people who 
decide to meet a truck carrying 650 ice blocks per structure. They set 
this thing up using rock salt as a binder – which hastens melting and 
fuses the blocks together (Kaprow in Schechner 1968: 154).  
 
Schechner, however, insists that Kaprow cannot be unaware of the parodic nature of 
Fluids in relation to America, ‘a terribly property-conscious country with people who 
want to own everything’ (Schechner 1968: 154). Preempting Leddy’s interpretations, 
Schechner reads Kaprow’s Fluids as a gesture that runs ‘against the American grain’ 
and as ‘a suggestive metaphor for all kinds of monumental things which really do 
disintegrate slowly the moment we’ve created them’ (ibid.). While Kaprow does not 
attempt to reject these connotations of Fluids, he responds to Schechner’s reading by 
emphasising both multiplicity – there are many other allusions in the work beyond 
parody – and the asignifying blankness of the ice structures. Kaprow suggests:  
 
If you were crossing the city you might suddenly be confronted by 
these mute and meaningless blank structures which have been left to 
melt. Obviously what’s taking place is a mystery of sorts; using 
common material (at considerable expense) to make quasi-architectual 
structures which seem out of place amid a semi-tropical city setting. 
The structures indicate no significance. In fact, their very blankness 
and their rapid deterioration proclaims the opposite of significance 
(Kaprow in Schechner 1968: 154). 
 
The melting structures do not stay the same as themselves for long enough, Kaprow 
suggests, to function as signification; the structures are not symbolic objects but 
combinations of material processes that change in response to other processes: the 
process of ice responding to that of rock salt, ice to sun, skin to ice, binding to melting, 
and so on.  
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In turn, the melting of the structures is not a metaphor for the processual nature 
of all monuments so much as an engagement with ice and salt as materials that make the 
perpetual metamorphosis of architecture visible to human perception, in contrast to the 
slower pace of change performed by stone or marble, which tends to obscure such 
changes. As Kaprow himself puts it, with the use of ephemeral materials,  
 
Change, governing both reality and art, has extended…from the 
expression of an idea arrested in a painting, to a work in which the 
usually slow mutations wrought by nature are quickened and literally 
made part of the experience of it; they manifest the very processes of 
creation-decay-creation almost as one watches (Kaprow 1966: 169).  
 
As ephemera, art then offers us the chance to see reality at a different speed; the 
imperceptible changes of nature’s ‘slow mutations’ are rendered perceptible. That is, 
even at this early point in his career, Kaprow affirms his philosophical position as one 
that conceives reality as ‘constant metamorphosis’, and argues that it is this conception 
that lies ‘at the root’ of his work (ibid.). Like Deleuze, Kaprow conceives the real in 
terms of an ontology of change. While the emphasis here is still on witnessing change 
as something ‘one watches’, it still plants the seed for Kaprow’s later conception of the 
Activities as an opportunity to affectively participate in change, as the fundamental 
basis of both art and life. Change and the fleeting need not be represented as the 
Impressionists did (whilst still making lasting works of art), or as metaphor as 
Schechner suggests. Rather, Kaprow argues, ‘If change is to be lived and felt deeply, 
then the art work must be free to articulate this on levels beyond the conceptual’ (ibid.); 
in other words, as affect. Alternatively we might also wish to note that, in their 
discussions of Franz Kafka and Francis Bacon, Deleuze and Guattari argue that 
metaphors do not function as mere representations, but as genuine expressions of 
transformation, becoming or metamorphosis48. 
 
At the same time, these metaphorical readings of Kaprow’s late Happenings and 
early Activities erase the potential impact of the work from a participatory rather than 
                                                 
48 In Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari call upon us to ‘Kill metaphor’ since the conventional understanding of 
the metaphor posits an ontological distinction between the self-present world and the images of it 
produced by artists (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 70). In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that when 
artists create images they are producing actuality through metamorphosis.  
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spectatorial perspective. Indeed, this ‘tyranny of the signifier’ (as Deleuze and Guattari 
call it) could be argued to encapsulate why participation, and the removal of 
spectatorship, becomes so important for Kaprow. The Happening Fluids, insofar as it is 
staged in the city, can still be encountered as an image; it more readily lends itself to 
symbolic readings. The Activity Level, on the other hand, exists primarily as something 
to be done and experienced immanently, rather than to be seen from the outside; and it 
is this participatory aspect of the work that Leddy seems to ignore in choosing to focus 
on the Activity as poetic text or symbolic image. What matters is what happens to us as 
we reduce the bale straw by straw, trying to match our own rhythm of action with that 
of the ice as it perceives the heat of the sun. 
 
Works of art can always be retrospectively understood to signify certain ideas. 
For instance, initially, there is an emphasis on signification similar to Schechner and 
Leddy’s in Kelley’s account of the Activity – Sweet Wall (1970), which was enacted 
‘within sight of the Berlin wall’ and involved building a wall out of cinder blocks with 
bread and jam as the mortar. Kelley states that ‘The political symbolism of constructing 
and knocking over a mock wall so close to the Cold War’s most concrete expression of 
the Iron Curtain was, of course, evident to all’. However, he also acknowledges that 
although Kaprow ‘was fully aware of the political implications’ of Sweet Wall, he was 
in fact ‘more interested in the actual process of laying out, layering up, mortaring 
together, sighting, pushing over, and then cleaning up the concrete blocks, which, by 
then, were smeared with sticky jam and wadded with dirty, wet bread’ (Kelley 2004: 
163). Representational implications are not denied, but it is important to note that 
Kaprow himself explicitly argues against any simple distinction between form and 
content in order to avoid producing works of art that will ‘remain only an illustration of 
a thought’ rather than providing participants with what he calls an ‘experienced insight’ 
(Kaprow 1992: 25), an experience akin to what Deleuze theorises as ‘affect’ (as we’ll 
see).  
 
That is, Kaprow’s interest in the asignifying powers of art can be productively 
read alongside Deleuze’s notion of affect and that this conjunction adds a new 
dimension to the concept of differential presence. Critically, although the Deleuzian 
emphasis on art as affect counters the refusal of self-presence that characterises 
metaphorical interpretation, it does not constitute a return to some kind of literalism, in 
which presence involves a self-same object that ‘is what it is’ for a subject, neither more 
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nor less. Rather Deleuzian affect is an aspect of differential presence that involves the 
metamorphosis of bodies in contact with one another.  
 
 As Felicity Coleman has discussed, ‘Deleuze’s conception of affect develops 
through his entire oeuvre’, from his earliest work on Hume – Empiricism and 
Subjectivity (1953) – through to last collaboration with Guattari, What is Philosophy? 
(1991) (Coleman in Parr 2005: 12). This conception is highly influenced by Spinoza, to 
whom Deleuze dedicated two complete books and whom he frequently hails as one of 
the most important figures in the history of philosophy – ‘the Christ of philosophers… 
the infinite becoming-philosopher’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 60)49. As Massumi 
notes, affect ‘is most often used loosely as a synonym for emotion’ or personal feeling 
(Massumi 2002b: 28); but here, affect is defined as the perpetual variation of what 
Spinoza calls our ‘force of existing’ or ‘power of acting’, in the form of an ‘increase-
diminution-increase-diminution’ of power between the two poles of sadness and joy. 
Deleuze makes clear that affect is not a ‘thing’, so much as a lived passage or transition: 
‘I would not say that the affects signal the decreases or increases of power, I would say 
that the affects are the decreases [sadnesses] and increases [joys] of lived power’ 
(Deleuze 1978: n.p. – emphasis added).  
 
 So affect is our changing force of existing – but what does this mean? For 
Spinoza, it means what a body can do, what it is capable of, what is in its power. And, 
in turn, Spinoza defines the project of thinking affect as ‘Ethics’, going against the 
conventional understanding of ethics as ‘systematizing, defending, and recommending 
concepts of right and wrong behaviour’ (Fieser 2006: n.p.). Neither Spinoza nor 
Deleuze is concerned with such prescriptions of right and wrong in general and for all, 
so much as with what is good or bad for a particular body, as what increases or 
decreases its power respectively. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari state: 
 
Spinoza asks: What can a body do?...We know nothing about a body 
until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how 
they can or cannot enter into compositions with other affects, with the 
affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed 
by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it 
                                                 
49 Deleuze’s two books on Spinoza are Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (1968) and the more 
accessible, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (1970).  
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in composing a more powerful body’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1989: 
256-7). 
 
In this sense, ethics differs both from morality and physiology, since the former is 
concerned with questions of ‘duty,’ while the latter defines bodies in terms of putatively 
valueless organs, functions and general characteristics. In turn, the concept of affect 
defines an ethico-aesthetic practice – as Bogue suggests: ‘A human’s affective 
powers…are so numerous that it is only through an extended experimentation that we 
can come to know what a human body is capable of’ (Bogue 1989: 133). 
  
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari develop their theory of affect in 
order to create a new concept of self: a mode of ‘non-personal individuation’, or what 
they also call a ‘haecceity’. In the first instance, this is a new way of thinking what an 
individual or individuality might be, beyond the concept of ‘a person’ and towards the 
notion of the unique process or singular event. ‘Individuation doesn’t have to be 
personal,’ Deleuze argues (Deleuze 1995: 141); it might be conceived relationally. In 
turn, a hacceity is defined by its affects and by the optimal and ‘pessimal’ limits of its 
power to act (a horse at the summit of its power, in contrast to a horse being whipped 
because it has fallen in the street). Affect or becoming,  
 
far from simply making the subject pass from one individuality to 
another, involves it in another type of individuation altogether, at once 
singular and impersonal, from which persons derive when the existent 
is separated from what it can do (Zourabichvilli in Patton 1996: 206).  
 
With this concept, Deleuze points to the duality of affect as that which both ‘carries 
away’ or undoes the subject, at the same time as it produces a new form of 
individuality. The affect ‘is not a personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the 
effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1989: 240). Or as Deleuze puts it in Negotiations, ‘Affects aren’t 
feelings, they’re becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through them (thereby 
becoming someone else)’ (Deleuze 1995: 137). Affective force does not belong to, nor 
is it exerted by, a pre-existing subject; rather, every individuality presupposes, refers to, 
and is animated by  ‘singular relations of forces’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1989: 207). The 
variable power to affect and be affected is the very life of things.  
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Affect is relevant to discussions of presence since it provides new ways of 
conceiving individuation. It allows us to conceive of the presence of individuality 
beyond the traditional notions of subject and object which impose false separations 
between intersecting and reciprocally-determining forces, and fail to comprehend the 
possibility of an individuality or presence of a specific composition of relations.   In this 
way, the Deleuzian shift from the subject/object distinction to non-individuated (or 
processual) affect encourages an immanent analysis, which insists that we cannot 
understand such artistic creations by observing them from the outside, only by allowing 
them to work upon us as they worked upon and for those who made them. This shift is 
also pertinent to Kaprow because it does not just concern how critics write about art, but 
how audiences experience and participate in it. In the first instance then, differential 
presence as affect might be understood to involve this event of ‘composition’ – when 
one body’s changing force of existing enters into composition with the affects of 
another body. And indeed, some of Kaprow’s Activities – like the aptly titled Affect 
(1974) – could be conceived as performing just the kind of ‘extended experimentation’ 
Bogue describes: testing what transformations might happen when a particular human 
body enters into composition with the nonhuman body of ice, or a lightbulb in a hot 
water-skin-electric fan-unfamiliar territory assemblage. But while Deleuze has little 
interest in subjective feelings, in this Activity Kaprow foregrounds the relation between 
sensation and emotion: asking participants to tape record their ‘feelings’ about each 
other whilst undertaking the bodily experiments. Indeed, Kaprow described his own 
concerns in Affect as being to do with 
 
what relations, if any, our physical sensations of coldness, dryness etc. 
may have with the corresponding emotional states we call “cold” or 
“dry”. It is also about the complexes of these qualities in any human 
situation (Kaprow 1975a: n.p.). 
 
This complexity, beyond the conventional opposition of objective sensation and 
subjective feeling, is what Deleuze calls affect. A sense of ‘coldness’, for instance, is 
neither a quality belonging to the object, nor a feeling belonging to a subject, but a 
‘supraindividual’ force that emerges in the event of contact between bodies and passes 
through them.   
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But the affective dimension of differential presence is also theorised by Kaprow 
as what he calls the ‘experienced insight’: an event of embodied thinking by the 
participant in the act of doing, which is not the same as the recognition of some 
underlying metaphorical meaning of the Activity determined in advance by the artist. 
Experience, Kaprow believes, ‘is physical, not intellectual. An experience is thought 
which has been “incorporated”, on a muscular, neural, even cellular level, into the body’ 
(Kaprow 1992: 26). Having long since dispensed with the accommodation of a 
traditional audience, what matters for Kaprow in the Activities, is the ‘direct, physical 
involvement’ of those who choose to do it: ‘Meaning is experienced in the body, and 
the mind is set into play by the body’s sensations’ (Kaprow 1986: n.p.). This is not to 
say that the Activities do not involve observation or watching, on the contrary, many of 
them invite participants to act as an audience to one another’s actions. But Kaprow 
insists that  
 
…watching and listening in the midst of doing is very distinct from the 
specialized observations of a physically passive audience (only the mind 
is awake for a traditional audience, at best; and it has no responsibility 
for the actual work. It can only judge) (ibid.).  
 
For Kaprow, such active presence in and attention to one’s embodied relation to 
a work, (rather than the ‘detached observation’ of a work) has an explicitly political 
value. Indeed, in a text from 1994, Kaprow calls participation ‘the most…democratic 
contribution of the late avant-garde’ (Kaprow 1994: 52). This is not simply because of 
physical presence, but because this presence allows the participants to genuinely 
collaborate in and contribute to the nature of the event that takes place. Such works do 
not illustrate a preconceived set of concepts, an approach to art making that Kaprow 
dismisses as ‘not a worthwhile activity’ (Kaprow 1968: 156). That is, although, as 
Kaprow notes, the form of his works is always ‘simple and clear’, the actual experience 
of the event ‘is uncertain and unforeseeable, which is why I do it, and its point is never 
clear to me, even after I’ve done it’. Kaprow describes his strategy as being to provide 
‘as much open uncertainty in an experience as possible’(Kaprow 1991: n.p.).  
 
 Kaprow uses the concept of the feedback loop to differentiate between the 
modes of communication that defined what he calls ‘Art art’, and nonart (or lifelike art) 
respectively: 
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For each kind of art, the conveyance itself is the message… Artlike art 
sends its message on a one-way street: from the artist to us. Lifelike art’s 
message is sent on a feedback loop: from the artist to us (including 
machines, animals, nature) and around again to the artist. You can’t “talk 
back” to, and thus change, an artlike artwork; but “conversation” is the 
very means of lifelike art, which is always changing’ (Kaprow 2003: 204 
– emphasis added).   
 
The experiential ‘message’ of the Activity, ‘conveyed by a process of events that has no 
definite outline’, is repeated back to the artist but with a difference, like Chinese 
whispers (ibid.). That is, while Kaprow dislikes the changes in meaning that an 
institutional context imposes upon lifelike art, he embraces those that come from the 
nature of the event itself through its open method of conveyance. In this sense, the 
genuinely participatory nature of the Activity constitutes another strategy for avoiding 
convention and encouraging the emergence of the new. Genuine participation, for 
Kaprow, is not just giving members of an otherwise conventional audience small tasks 
to do within a performance or environment – the nature of which is already determined. 
Indeed Kaprow criticises his own earlier Happenings on this account, arguing that 
 
Tasks on the order of sweeping or reading words remain relatively 
mindless as long as their context is a loose theatrical event prepared in 
advance for an uninformed audience (ibid., 185).  
 
Rather, genuine participation is this conversational process through which an audience 
is actively ‘collaborating in the art making and meaning making process’ (Kaprow 
1994: 52). 
 
But the Activities are also democratic in the sense that they can be done by 
untrained or non-specialist bodies. To some extent, the actions the participant is invited 
to perform for the Activity are familiar: blowing one’s nose, opening a door, or taking a 
pulse. However, the actions’ everydayness is also something that Kaprow has to 
counter-act in order to allow ‘experienced insight’ rather than mere routine to occur. 
That is, he develops a range of practical strategies in order to prevent the participants, 
including Kaprow himself, from slipping into routine behaviour, and experiencing the 
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Activity as life, rather than art-life or life-art. Again, Kaprow employs the concept of 
‘feedback’; this time, in relation to what he calls ‘feedback devices’ which play an 
important part in altering how participants attend to the actions they are performing. For 
instance, in a ‘sketch for a possible breathing piece’ (1979), Kaprow refers to a 
loudspeaker, a mirror, and a tape recorder used in the sketch as ‘feedback devices’ 
which produce ‘displacements of ordinary emphasis’ (Kaprow 2003: 198). The Activity 
repeats everyday actions, like looking at ourselves in a mirror, but employs feedback 
devices as a means to draw attention to the ordinarily unattended (‘fleeting mist on 
glass’), and away from the obvious (the recognition of our selves in terms of the 
reflected image). 
 
 Alterations of speed are another method that Kaprow used for preventing the 
Activities from slipping into conventional behaviour. For instance, in Rates of 
Exchange (1975), Kaprow approached the handshake as an example of a routine that 
could be forced to break down. As Kelley suggests, ‘If you slow down the motion of a 
handshake enough it becomes impossible to shake hands; some other exchange takes 
place’ (Kelley 2004: 195). What this experiment exposes is that the identity of the 
action ‘to shake hands’ only functions at a particular relation between speed and 
slowness; at another relation, the action becomes imperceptible as shaking hands, and 
becomes something else which, in turn, can be experienced by the participants as some 
other kind of contact. Kaprow had been interested in speed as a factor relating to 
thresholds of perception as far back as 18 Happenings – in which, at one point, ‘(light 
fades imperceptibly over a long period of time…)’, and at another, there are sounds 
‘barely remaining long enough to be heard clearly’ (Kaprow in Kirby 1965: 58). The 
Activities take this interest further by involving the entire body in attempts to slow 
down ‘walking’ – to give another example from Rates – until it reaches a point of 
transformation.  
 
 
2. The Activity as ‘Zen Conceptualism’: Zepke’s critique of Kaprow  
 
Although there is considerably less secondary literature linking Deleuze and 
Kaprow than Deleuze and Artaud, it is important to mention that this is still not the first 
discussion to connect the two: Andre Lepecki, for instance, makes the briefest of 
allusions to Deleuze in his publication following his ‘redoing’ of 18 Happenings in 6 
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Parts50. However, part two of this chapter will focus on Stephen Zepke’s much more 
sustained engagement with Kaprow, which begins by celebrating what he perceives to 
be the Deleuzian nature of Kaprow’s Happenings and early Activities as self-
determining composition, before he ultimately breaks with Kaprow in favour of the 
more explicitly political work of Adrian Piper. This second part of the chapter will be 
broken down into a series of subsections, the first of which will provide an exposition of 
Zepke’s essay. The second section will indicate the connections between Zepke’s 
objections to the late Kaprow and Peter Hallward’s recent critique of Deleuze in his 
book, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (2006). Finally, the 
third section consists of a series of critical responses to Zepke, alongside the 
development of a definition of becoming-imperceptible as differential presence rather 
than as self-annihilation or destruction. In particular, we will to expose the resonance 
between Deleuze’s notion of becoming-imperceptible as an undoing of the 
subject/object relation which enables us to experience ourselves as ‘in the midst of 
things’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 280), and Kaprow’s aspiration for the Activities to 
function as a training in undoing subjective discreteness in favour of an immanent 
participation in the real as a changing ‘whole’.  
 
Zepke’s complex essay opens with the argument that between his early 
Happenings and late Happenings, Kaprow makes a shift akin to Deleuze’s move from 
‘expressionism’ to ‘constructivism’ between The Logic of Sense and Anti-Oedipus. Just 
as Deleuze can be seen to have a changing understanding of the relationship between 
the realms he calls the ‘actual’ and the ‘virtual’, Kaprow experiments with new relations 
between ‘the virtual (score) and the actual (performance)’ or Happening (Zepke in Cull 
2009: 114). Deleuze uses the term ‘virtual’ in a way that differs from its usage in 
notions of ‘virtual reality’ in performance theory. Borrowing his terms from Bergson’s 
Matter and Memory (1896), Deleuze’s ontological use of the virtual is proposed as an 
alternative to the possible/real distinction. The possible, Deleuze argues, prevents us 
from understanding life’s creation of differences because it is retrospectively 
constructed from the real ‘like a sterile double’ (Deleuze 1988: 98). Whereas the real is 
understood to be limited to reproducing the image of the possible that it realizes, the 
                                                 
50 In relation to his redoing of 18 Happenings in 6 Parts, Lepecki writes: ‘…All instructions and scores, 
all choreographic details so carefully annotated by Kaprow, were to be approached (precisely) as being 
“rigorous yet anexact” instructions. That this apparently paradoxical formula is also the one used by 
Gilles Deleuze to describe the dynamics of organic life, I took as being more than mere coincidence’ 
(Lepecki 2007: 48).  
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virtual is actualized in processes of divergence and creativity. The virtual is conceived 
as a kind of reservoir or source of pure difference that can be called upon to explain the 
emergence of novelty in actuality. In short, Deleuze says, ‘The characteristic of 
virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualized by being differentiated’ (ibid., 
74); the virtual is dependent on the actual to exert its creative force, just as the actual is 
dependent on the virtual in order for the material world to involve the production of the 
new, rather than the reproduction of the same. 
 
However, Zepke argues that if Deleuze’s earlier work still gives the impression 
that the actual and the virtual are somehow two distinct dimensions that need to be 
reconciled or to communicate, then by Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari are insisting 
upon the immanence of the creative production of difference, or ‘desire’, in the social 
(Deleuze 1995: 144). As Zepke explains, quoting Deleuze’s remarks on this shift in 
Negotiations,  
 
This is a move from an ‘expressionism’ by which the ‘actor’ actualizes, 
or ‘dramatizes’ the virtual realm, to a ‘constructivism’ of the virtual in 
the ‘act’. This was, Deleuze says, a shift from the ‘theatre’ to the 
‘factory’, a shift from the dramatization of becoming by the social, to the 
production of becoming in the social (Zepke in Cull 2009: 109 – original 
emphasis). 
 
Rather than merely pointing to a more fundamental source of change or creativity 
elsewhere (a distinct virtual realm), social actions are seen to produce their own 
transformative encounters.  
 
Likewise, Zepke contends, whereas in Kaprow’s early Happenings the ‘virtual 
score’ was dramatized or expressed by the event, in the later Happenings, the ‘score’ 
was produced or constructed in the event in a manner that can be seen to be adopting, 
but also extending the compositional strategies that Kaprow learnt from John Cage51. 
Kaprow develops from allowing a distinct score to operate in a transcendent relation to 
its actualization as performance (as that which organizes matter from a position outside 
of it), to the production of works in which the score is immanent to and inseparable 
                                                 
51 As Zepke notes, ‘Kaprow attended Cage’s “Experimental Composition” class at the New School for 
Social Research in New York that ran from 1957 to 1958’ (Zepke in Cull 2009: 115).  
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from its actualization52. It is not just the virtual score that contains the power of 
creation, which a performance merely expresses; rather, in a move towards what Zepke 
calls a ‘self-determining’ compositional process (ibid., 117), the actual Happening is 
itself creative insofar as it scored in a manner that allows it to unfold in unpredictable 
and novel ways, with each response to an instruction changing the conditions for the 
next response and so on. For Zepke, this shift concerns the changing relation of 
Kaprow’s works to life. As Kaprow’s work develops, he argues,  
 
it tries to find more effective mechanisms by which the score of 
‘events’ can not only be actualized in life, but could directly construct 
new ways of living. In this way both Kaprow and Deleuze move 
towards encompassing the virtual and the actual within a single 
plan(e) of composition, a plan(e) that overcomes the subjective form 
of experience in favour of a process that constructs a living plane of 
immanence (ibid. – emphasis added). 
 
With the later Happenings, it is not just about actualising a score ‘in’ life, or transferring 
it from the realm of the virtual to the actual, but about the production of a new reality or 
‘life’ in the event of performance. The later Happenings and early Activities, Zepke 
argues, do not simply use life as their setting but actively intervene in its virtual 
conditions, working to transform subjectivity as ‘the foundational structure of 
experience’ (ibid., 110). These artworks are not objects for a subject, but transformative 
events that change life by undoing the very notion of the subject. This is arguably where 
the politics of Kaprow’s practice lies for Zepke, insofar as these events  
 
not only sought to introduce something new into life, but were aimed 
against the normalized subjectivity of human being itself… The event 
                                                 
52 Here, Zepke establishes a connection between Kaprow’s notion of ‘score’ and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
use of the term ‘plane’, in such expressions as the ‘plane of immanence’ or ‘plane of organization’. In this 
sense, Zepke is not using the term ‘score’ entirely literally, since Kaprow continued, throughout his 
career, to write down programs of instructions for his works prior to actually doing the Happening or 
Activity. What changes is the extent to which the actual events differ from what is written and the nature 
of what is written in the score/program. The score for 18 Happenings in 6 Parts, for instance, is 
notoriously detailed: with stickmen drawings by Kaprow of the poses that the performers should adopt at 
various points. As we have already footnoted, following Lepecki, Kaprow was interested in the apparent 
paradox that even supremely detailed instructions could produce indeterminate results. Perhaps what 
Zepke is indicating is that as Kaprow’s work develops, he becomes increasingly willing to allow ‘what 
happens’ to be determined by the event itself, rather than by the score – at first through his openness to 
chance interruptions, and then through his pursuit of genuine participation.  
 173 
transforms the conditions of experience and in so doing constructs a new 
form of subjectivity, and a new kind of art’ (ibid. – emphasis original).  
 
 But there seems to be a tension here for Zepke, and he ultimately rejects 
Kaprow, for three main, interrelated reasons: firstly, on account of a perceived 
‘conceptualism’ or focus on meditation rather than action in Kaprow’s late Activities; 
secondly, because of what Zepke calls Kaprow’s wish to place the experience of the 
Activities ‘against art of any sort’ (ibid: 118 – emphasis original); and finally, because 
he sees the first two developments as constitutive of Kaprow’s divergence from Deleuze 
and Guattari (which can only be a bad thing from Zepke’s point of view). Zepke praises 
the Activities: Meters and Entr-acte (both 1972) because of their openness to ‘aleatory 
events’ and 7 Kinds of Sympathy (1976), because of its constructive rather than 
expressive mode of composition53. But he then rejects the Activities: Scales (1971) and 
Time Pieces (1973) because they ‘take on the character of “work”’ in ways that he 
argues ‘can no longer be called “art” or “aesthetics”’(Zepke in Cull 2009: 119). ‘In both 
cases,’ Zepke claims, ‘the “work” is a means of attaining a meditational awareness that 
emerges from, but at the same time transforms, the most banal forms of life’ (ibid.). 
What Zepke seems to object to in this, is what he sees as the increasing emphasis by 
Kaprow (indicated by these two earlier Activities, but particularly problematic in 
Kaprow’s work from around 1978) on a conceptual, rather than actual transformation of 
life. In his conception of the later Activities as ‘Performing Life’, Zepke argues, 
‘Kaprow offers a process of self-reflective meditation on everyday actions and 
experiences that does not construct new counter-actualisations, but simply promises a 
mystical transcendence of life’. In other words, no real rebirth occurs for these 
Activities’ participants; banal life or ‘the subjective form of experience’ may be 
conceptually evacuated or superficially coloured through a transcendent experience, but 
ultimately it is left untouched (ibid.,121).  
 
 In part, Zepke’s reading here is based on the knowledge that Kaprow had begun 
to practice Zen Buddhism in 1978, and he supportively quotes Kelley’s suggestion that, 
                                                 
53 In 7 Kinds of Sympathy, Zepke argues ‘The virtual events determined by the score (A/B watches, 
copies, scratches, etc.) are open to an infinite number of potential actualisations, while each actualisation 
determines the plane of composition on which the virtual sections will be actualised… This 
compositional process is aleatory and self-determining; the score and its actualisation are necessarily 
inseparable and reciprocally determining’ (Zepke in Cull 2009: 117).  
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after this time, Kaprow’s work offers ‘secular, operational analogues to the koan’ 
(Kelley 2004: 204). According to Zepke, the koan 
 
was a study form developed mainly within the Rinzai school of Zen… 
and aimed at intuitive flashes of insight or ‘satori’: ‘cosmic triggers’ 
in which the perspective of the individual ego was overcome and the 
interconnectedness of the world appeared in its living vitality (Zepke 
in Cull 2009: 120).  
 
Zepke then goes on to argue that this constitutes a break with Deleuze:  
 
This mystical style of knowledge as self-overcoming, achieved 
through performance is, Kaprow claims, ‘an introduction to right 
living’ (2003, 225). But it is increasingly uncertain that this still bears 
any resemblance to what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘counter-
actualization’, let alone what they call art (ibid.). 
 
Some readers of Deleuze (like Hallward) would beg to differ. Deleuze, for them, is a 
mystic. Yet for now we can note that Zepke’s reading is also partly based on his 
understanding of Kaprow’s relation to Duchamp and the gesture of the Ready-made. It 
is Kaprow’s ‘absolute fear of recuperation’ by the art market or its institutions, Zepke 
claims, which leads him to position the experiences of the Activities against or outside 
of art (ibid., 119). The critique of everyday life is overwhelmed by Kaprow’s obsession 
with fully collapsing art into that mode of life. He argues that from the early 70s, 
Kaprow reconceives his work, not as art, but as ‘Performing Life’ which ‘is not an 
aesthetic process, and nor does it produce art; instead, it is an entirely conceptual 
decision that turns an everyday action such as shaking hands or speaking on the 
telephone into a performance’ (ibid.). In this way, Kaprow is taking advantage of the 
impact of Duchamp’s readymade in a move that relies upon the participant’s ability to 
apply ‘the art-bracket’ to any aspect of life whatever. Here, Zepke argues, Kaprow gives 
‘an interesting Zen twist to Conceptual Art’s emphasis on intellectual processes as the 
essence of art [but] nevertheless dematerialises the art-life dialectic by dissolving the 
first in the second through turning it into a state of mind’ (ibid., 120). Art is merely a 
state of mind conditioned by a conceptual framing device, divorced altogether from the 
creation of affects. 
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3. Transcendence, escape and apoliticism: connecting Zepke’s critique of 
Kaprow and Hallward’s critique of ‘becoming-imperceptible’ 
 
 This chapter will counter some of these arguments. But first, this second 
subsection begins from the observation that the transcendence, escape and apoliticism 
that Zepke attaches to the late Kaprow, are the very things of which Deleuze stands 
accused in Peter Hallward’s critique, Out of this World (2006). That is, Zepke’s image 
of Kaprow as concerned with a ‘mystical’ process of ‘self-overcoming’ resonates 
strongly with Hallward’s argument in general, but particularly with his claim that the 
concept of becoming-imperceptible demonstrates that Deleuze’s key concern is the 
question of how we can ‘rid ourselves of ourselves’ (Deleuze in Hallward 2006: 4). For 
Zepke, the late Activities constitute a withdrawal of art from the social, and from the 
task of changing it, in favour of a ‘search for a private and meditative awareness 
transcending the conditions of ordinary perception’ (ibid., 122). Likewise, for Hallward, 
Deleuze’s thought encourages us to abandon all hope of political agency in favour of 
becoming an imperceptible subject who passively waits for the creative force of the 
virtual to pass through her, correlatively inviting philosophy to become as abstract and 
unworldly as possible. The primary problem of all this for Hallward, as for Zepke, is 
political. 
 
More than a hundred and fifty years after Marx urged us to change 
rather than contemplate the world, Deleuze, like so many of his 
philosophical contemporaries, effectively recommends instead that we 
settle for the alternative choice (Hallward 2006: 7). 
 
Essentially, Zepke suggests that Kaprow’s Activities do the same. We should note here, 
then, that this is a challenge to Deleuze and Kaprow being a resource for political art (as 
the Living Theatre hoped, but failed to be).  
 
To expand on Hallward’s argument for a moment, the opening contention is that 
Deleuze ‘assumes that the most creative medium of our being is a form of abstract, 
immediate or dematerialised thought’ (ibid., 2). Dematerialised, Hallward says, because 
Deleuze invokes a separation between thinking and the world. Genuine thinking as 
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creation can only be ‘out of this world’, since any connection to reality constitutes a 
distortion of its pure form. 
 
...To claim that purely creative thought becomes abstract or 
immaterial is not to say that such thought is then simply empty or 
‘non-extended’, so much as liberated from any constituent relation to 
anything external to itself… A thinking that proceeds independently 
of any reference to or mediation through a world or reality external to 
itself will prove to be our most adequate means of expressing an 
absolutely creative being or force (Hallward 2006: 2 – original 
emphasis). 
 
For Hallward, Deleuze creates a hierarchy between the virtual and actual, where the 
former is conceived as the source of creativity and difference, and the latter is often 
conceived – almost Platonically – as an inadequate manifestation of this greater vitality 
elsewhere. As Hallward puts it, creativity is valued over creation: 
 
Creativity is what there is and it creates all that there can be... Every 
biological or social configuration is a creation, and so is every 
sensation, statement or concept... The merely relative differences that 
may exist or arise between created things stem from a deeper, more 
fundamental power of creative differing (ibid.,1 – original emphasis). 
 
Art is a favoured activity in Deleuze because it is understood as creation, as that which 
creates in the form of affects and percepts. But nevertheless, even art – as it is discussed 
in What is Philosophy? – is dependent on Life as creative differing. Life does not need 
art in the same way. Likewise, the credit for actualisation as the production of 
differences goes to the virtual, whilst all too often the process itself is understood to 
involve compromise or limitation in contrast to the purity and autonomy of the virtual 
realm. For example, Hallward argues that according to Deleuze’s thought we must 
assume that the power or creativity of a created thing ‘is limited by its material 
organisation, its situation, its actual capacities and relations with other creatures’ (ibid., 
2). As such, Hallward goes on to contend, 
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the main task facing any such creature is to loosen and then dissolve 
these limitations in order to become a more adequate or immaterial 
vehicle for that virtual creating which alone individuates it.  In other 
words, the main task facing a creature capable of thought is to learn 
how to think… What matters is… the redemptive re-orientation of any 
particular creature towards its own dissolution (ibid., 2-3). 
 
Hallward describes his position as one that deviates from the ‘conventional take’ on 
Deleuze as a materialist philosopher, arguing instead ‘that Deleuze’s philosophy is best 
described as an exercise in creative indiscernment, an effort to subtract the dynamics of 
creation from the mediation of the created’ (ibid., 3). Creativity has an identity or true 
presence that is distorted in actuality: a distortion or differentiation which Deleuze’s 
philosophy attempts to repair by issuing calls to subtraction or distillation. And this is 
how Hallward sees ‘becoming-imperceptible’: as a call to dissolution.  
 
The concept of becoming-imperceptible features primarily in A Thousand 
Plateaus, in which Deleuze and Guattari frame it as the final and most valuable form of 
becoming, after ‘becoming-woman’ (which is said to ‘come first’) and ‘becoming 
animal’: 
 
If becoming-woman is the first quantum, or molecular segment, with 
the becomings-animal that link up with it coming next, what are they 
all rushing toward? Without a doubt, toward becoming-imperceptible. 
The imperceptible is the immanent end of becoming, its cosmic 
formula’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 279). 
 
There are different kinds of becomings then, or what May calls different ‘species of the 
genus becoming’; however, they have in common the affirmation of, or return to 
difference in itself. But whereas May seems to suggest that becomings begin with 
becoming-woman because our ‘sexual roles’ are ‘perhaps our most fixed stable identity’ 
(May 2003: 151), we could argue the opposite: that we have to work up to the radicality 
of becoming-imperceptible because it challenges us to decompose, and to perpetually 
decompose, all kinds of categorical distinctions – whatever separates us from 
everything else (not just gender or species distinctions). In this respect, becoming-
imperceptible involves a ‘becoming everybody/everything’ in which ‘one makes a 
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world…in which it is the world that becomes’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 279). It is to 
‘world with’ our surroundings; a mode of participation that extends the logic of 
becoming to the whole world.  
 
But Hallward latches onto this concept as evidence of Deleuze’s prioritisation of 
virtual creativity over actual creation.  
 
Any particular creature can re-orient itself in line with the virtual 
creating that it expresses through a series of transformations or 
‘becomings’ directed towards what Deleuze presents as their 
exclusive telos: their becoming imperceptible. The value of any 
particular becoming (woman, animal, molecule...) varies with the 
degree to which it carries us beyond the limits of perception, meaning 
and form… Only by becoming imperceptible can an actual individual 
become fully adequate to the  virtual creating to which its very being 
attests... To use a metaphor adapted from Deleuze’s reading of 
Beckett, the imperceptible subject of such a life comes to float like a 
cork, helpless but serene, upon a tempestuous ocean of pure 
movement (Hallward 2006: 3). 
 
If we follow this summary, Deleuze seems to be saying that in order to become our 
selves (‘to become what one is’) – or by implication, to achieve what we have been 
calling differential presence – we need to absent ourselves altogether. We only achieve 
our full power of existing when we disappear into the virtual creating which is the 
condition for our subjectivity. Hallward accepts that the advocation of becoming-
imperceptible as the telos of life is not exactly the same as the advocation of 
‘annihilation pure and simple’, but he still insists that the pivotal question for Deleuze, 
he says, is ‘can we rid ourselves of ourselves?’ (Deleuze in Hallward 2006: 4). 
Likewise, he says, for Deleuze’s take on the artist. Deleuze likes Beckett, Hallward 
argues, because ‘Beckett knows that in order “to create [...] one has to lose one’s 
identity, one has to disappear, to become unknown”’ (Hallward 2006: 3).  
 
And there is a cold, anti-humanism in Deleuze that will not pander to the ego’s 
impulse to self-preservation. Deleuze and Guattari do suggest that this becoming 
involves a process of subtraction, elimination, reduction, or even suppression, 
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repeatedly invoking the idea of reducing oneself to ‘an abstract line’ or a ‘trait’ as a 
prerequisite for locating ‘one’s zone of indiscernibility with other traits’, including what 
Deleuze calls the ‘impersonality of the creator’, or what we might also call the worldly, 
yet inhuman power of change. 
 
One is then like grass: one has made the world, everybody/everything, 
into a becoming, because one has made a necessarily communicating 
world, because one has suppressed in oneself everything that prevents 
us from slipping in between things and growing in the midst of things 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 280). 
 
But this break with subjectivity need not be evoked as such a lonely, absenting process; 
becoming-imperceptible might equally be interpreted as a question of participation – as 
adding to yourself, rather than subtracting from yourself, or as the subtraction of that 
which prevents us from becoming other. Whereas Hallward arguably still thinks in 
terms of a dialectic between being (presence) and the void (absence) – Deleuze allows 
us to think in terms of presence as becoming, as affect, and ultimately, as becoming-
imperceptible. Such a process is not about annihilation or becoming-invisible, nor is it 
apolitical for Deleuze.  
 
 
4. Contra Zepke: nonart, ‘becoming “the whole”’, attention and the 
democratisation of art   
 
So, how might one respond further to these critiques explicitly of Kaprow and 
Deleuze, and implicitly of the notion of differential presence? In this final subsection, 
we will draw from both Deleuze and Kaprow to demonstrate why Zepke misconstrues 
the Activities, as well as drawing from Kaprow’s theorisation of them as training 
towards ‘becoming “the whole”’ (Kaprow 2003: 217) to enrich our alternative 
interpretation of becoming-imperceptible contra Hallward’s dematerialist argument. 
The critique of Zepke is based on four main points. Firstly, we will to argue against the 
idea that Kaprow ultimately wants to place the Activity against ‘art of any sort’ (Zepke 
in Cull 2009: 118 – emphasis added). Secondly, we shall follow Kelley in suggesting 
that Kaprow is interested in Zen as a route to immanence rather than transcendence (or, 
in Soto, rather than Rinzai Zen). Thirdly, it will be proposed that Kaprow’s concept of 
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‘Performing Life’ to which Zepke refers is a research process towards the creation of 
Activities rather than an Activity itself, a distinction which allows us to re-emphasise 
the becoming-imperceptible of art and life as an ‘experienced insight’ rather than the 
result of a conceptual decision. And finally, we will revisit Zepke’s concern that it 
becomes ‘increasingly uncertain’ the extent to which Kaprow’s later Activities bear 
‘any resemblance to what Deleuze and Guattari… call art’ (ibid., 120). First this section 
shall point to the variation within what Deleuze and Guattari call art, and secondly to 
argue that the way in which Kaprow deviates from the arguably restrictive and romantic 
definition of art given in their later work is a largely positive move. In each case, we 
revisit Zepke’s critique not just for the sake of argument, but because Kaprow and 
Deleuze are political, rather than mystical, for us. 
 
So first, as we have seen, Zepke argues that Kaprow’s Zen Conceptualism is 
partly the product of his ‘absolute fear of recuperation’ by the art world and his desire to 
position the Activities ‘against art of any sort’ (ibid.). And certainly, Kaprow was 
deeply suspicious of ‘Art’ as a market and a set of powerful institutions. However, he 
writes with rigour and balance, not about the evils of gallerists, but about the covert 
pressure to conform exerted on artists as that which makes persistent experimentation so 
difficult. To begin with, Kaprow argues, there are conventions that come from the artist 
herself, which can only be overcome through a process he calls ‘un-arting’. ‘Artists of 
the world, drop out!’ Kaprow demands echoing the Communist manifesto, ‘You have 
nothing to lose but your professions!’ (Kaprow 2003: 109) In part, Kaprow suggests, 
the restrictions of identity are imposed upon the artist through language, indeed he 
argues that ‘static words, particularly names’ do more than ‘customs’ to slow down or 
otherwise restrict the social change effected by ‘nonverbal forces’ (ibid., 125). Kaprow 
argues that the very application of the name ‘artist’ to someone weighs them down with 
the ‘profession’s accumulated attributes and meanings…An artist obeys certain 
inherited limits on perception, which govern how reality is acted on and construed’54. 
But just as ‘adjustment to the new state of affairs is slowed down by keeping an old 
name’, Kaprow suggests that ‘new names may assist social change’; as such, Kaprow 
suggests, we might replace the name artist with ‘player’ as a way of ‘altering a fixed 
                                                 
54 Kaprow makes the same argument regarding performance when he differentiates between the 
‘performer’ who acts out a written script and the person who performs everyday routines. Being a 
‘performer’, Kaprow argues, ‘involves responsibility for what the word performer may mean and what 
being a performer may entail’ (Kaprow 2003: 187). 
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identity’, freeing up the person to move elsewhere according to what he calls a 
‘principle of mobility’ (ibid.,126).  
 
By shifting operations ‘away from where the arts customarily 
congregate,’ the un-artist, in becoming ‘an account executive, an 
ecologist, a stunt rider,’ could adopt ‘an attitude of deliberate 
playfulness toward all professionalizing activities well beyond art’. 
Thus, the un-artist is one who changes jobs. (Kelley 2004: 158) 
 
As Kelley states, in contrast to the ‘programmed behaviour’ imposed upon people by 
their professions, Kaprow conceived of the becoming-imperceptible of the un-artist as 
‘slipping between and among various professional categories’ in a process he called 
‘signal scrambling’ (ibid.). 
 
But the primary issue is that the Activities have a far more complex relation to 
art than Zepke implies, such that we must move beyond a simple vocabulary of ‘art’ and 
‘life’, in favour of using Kaprow’s own rich terminology. Although it was a matter of 
concern for him throughout his career, it is in the Activities period that Kaprow most 
directly takes on the question of art’s identity. What is art and what is not art cannot be 
easily established he suggests, particularly in the three-part essay ‘The Education of the 
Un-Artist’ (1971-74); rather, there are a whole gamut of objects and practices that are 
not what they appear to be. There is not only ‘art’ and what Kaprow calls ‘nonart’ (or 
‘lifelike art’, or ‘un-art’), but also ‘Art art’ (or ‘artlike art’) and ‘Art art in the guise of 
nonart’ or ‘quasi nonart’ (Kaprow 2003: 101)55. To further complicate this process of 
identification we are also told that nonart ‘exists only fleetingly’ and can at any moment 
become ‘a type of art’ (ibid., 98). As such, Kaprow’s response to the question: “What is 
art?” will be constituted not only by an awareness of complex formations beyond the 
simple distinction between ‘art’ and its other (‘life’), but also by the ontology of change 
that, as we have seen, he shares with Deleuze – a worldview in which establishing fixed 
definitions and identifying stable beings are merely attempts to paper over the cracks of 
a constantly shifting, self-transforming reality.  
 
                                                 
55 Although Kaprow’s vocabulary changes as his writing progresses, he does seem to use the terms 
nonart, un-art and lifelike art almost interchangeably, as we will also do. While in “The Real Experiment” 
(1983) Kaprow refers to the distinction between artlike and lifelike art exclusively, in the earlier three 
part essay, “The Education of the Un-Artist” he argues that un-artist must produce lifelike nonart.  
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As far back as his Environments and early Happenings, Kaprow had sought to 
make works of art with ‘a maximum ambiguity of identity (what is it?)’ (Kaprow 1992: 
24). And, as we mentioned at the start, what he initially liked about the Happenings was 
their non-recognisability according to the existing formal categories conventionally 
applied to art: 
 
Coming into the Happenings of the late fifties, I was certain the goal was 
to “do” an art that was distinct from any known genre (or any 
combination of genres). It seemed important to develop something that 
was not another type of painting, literature, music, dance, theatre, opera’ 
(Kaprow 2003: 195).   
 
Kaprow conceives artistic conventions as a set of traits that allow us to recognise an 
event (as theatre, as dance) and trigger a conventional mode of relation to that event. In 
contrast, he sought to create unknown forms of event to which we must invent new 
ways of relating. And, of course, artistic conventions had also been a concern for the 
formalist modernism of Clement Greenberg that had been dominant in the American 
art-world since the fifties. As Kelley reports 
 
…Formalism advocated the systematic elimination of any and all 
artistic conventions not essential to the viability of a given medium 
(mostly painting). Storytelling, for example, or political subject matter 
would be peeled away from the surfaces of modern art, revealing the 
deeper existential tensions to the object itself (Kelley in Kaprow 2003: 
xv). 
 
But whereas modernism was concerned with removing inessential conventions relative 
to each medium, Kaprow set out to ‘systematically eliminate precisely those 
conventions that were essential to the professional identity of art’ per se (ibid., xvii); 
namely, ‘Art art’. Kaprow is not against any kind of art. Rather, he is questioning and 
critical of convention both in life and in art, because it is convention that actively blocks 
the mode of presence as affect and becoming-imperceptible that Kaprow sought to 
establish in the Activities. When we enter into routine behaviour – whether in an art 
context or a social context – we are not attending to our embodied participation in the 
world as change. As nonart or lifelike art, the Activities aim to interrupt routine 
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responses by occupying a threshold that is the becoming-life of art and the becoming-art 
of life.  
 
Artistic habits and everyday routines both pose problems for the Activity as 
Kaprow foresees it in “Pinpointing Happenings”: Kaprow describes the Activity type 
Happenings as ‘risky’ – because it is easy for them to fall into either art or life, rather 
than residing in the ‘paradoxical position of being art-life or life-art’. Activities fall into 
the category of art when habit leads the Happeners ‘to depend on certain favoured 
situations and to perfect them in the manner of conventional artists’ (Kaprow 2003: 87). 
Activities fall into the category of life when Happeners choices ‘become so 
indistinguishable from daily events that participation degenerates into routine and 
indifference’ (ibid., 88). Elsewhere, Kaprow states that 
 
Unless the identity… of what the artist does oscillates between 
ordinary, recognizable activity and the “resonance” of that activity in 
the larger human context, the activity itself reduces to conventional 
behaviour. Or if it is framed as art by a gallery, it reduces to 
conventional art. Thus toothbrushing, as we normally do it, offers no 
roads back to the real world either (Kaprow 1986: 222 – emphasis 
added). 
 
We will say more on this when we reassess Zepke’s characterisation of 
“Performing Life”, but for now let us move on to the second response to Zepke 
regarding Kaprow’s relationship to Zen. Here we need to we follow Kelley, who 
differentiates the worldliness of what he calls the ‘American Zen’, disseminated to 
Kaprow by Cage, from the transcendentalism of other forms of Zen56. ‘Cage wanted to 
be in the world as a witness;’ Kelley argues, ‘he was not an enthusiast for 
transcendence’ (Kelley 2004: 200). Likewise, Kelley proposes that Kaprow was more 
interested in the notion of ‘heightened awareness’ associated with the Soto school of 
Zen, rather than the ‘sudden enlightenment of the Rinzai’ (ibid.). And while Zepke 
notes Kaprow’s interest in the koan developed by the Rinzai school, Kelley nuances this 
position by arguing that 
 
                                                 
56 Zepke himself quotes Kelley a number of times in his essay, recognising his expertise on Kaprow’s 
relationship to Zen. However, he still seems to associate Zen in general with mysticism and 
transcendence rather than immanence and the political.  
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To Kaprow, their key feature was that any answers were worked out 
in experience, not just in the head, and were thus different for each 
devotee. In this sense, koans were very like his works…’ (ibid., 204 – 
emphasis added)57.  
 
As such, the Activities are only akin to the koan insofar as they were both concerned, 
not with escaping the world, but with participating in it and attending to it more fully as 
bodies with unique or individual powers to affect and be affected.  
 
 Contra Zepke’s argument, Kaprow is very clear that the goal of the Activities (as 
nonart or lifelike art) is immanent rather than transcendent.  
 
The purpose of lifelike art was therapeutic: to reintegrate the piecemeal 
reality we take for granted. Not just intellectually, but directly, as 
experience – in this moment, in this house, at this kitchen sink’ (Kaprow 
2003: 206 – emphasis added).  
 
It does not hold out a ‘promise of perfection in some other realm’, he insists, but 
demonstrates ‘a way of living meaningfully in this one’ (ibid., 218). Living 
meaningfully, for Kaprow, means rediscovering a ‘sense of the whole’; indeed, it 
ultimately involves becoming the whole by letting go of the self as discrete subject, just 
like Deleuze’s notion of becoming-imperceptible. For Kaprow, the aim of the Activities 
is a form of ‘self-knowledge’, not as a strengthening of self-present identity, but as ‘the 
passage of the separate self to the egoless self. Lifelike art in which nothing is separate 
is a training in letting go of the separate self’ (ibid., 217). But at the same time, while 
Kaprow states that this embodied self-knowledge ‘is where you start on the way to 
becoming “the whole”’, he is careful to add that this process might equally take ‘the 
form of social action or personal transformation’ (ibid.). Immanent participation in the 
whole does not necessarily involve an escape from the public into the private, or the 
social into the personal, as Zepke suggests. Indeed, given the ontology of change and 
                                                 
57 The koan is a Zen form of study that involves the student being given a ‘problem with no logical 
solution’ such as a paradoxical statement or question. Kaprow wasn’t interested in the koan because of 
the Rinzai school belief in it as a means to produce ‘instant enlightenment’. Rather, Kelley suggests, 
Kaprow appreciated Zen for its emphasis on practice, on ‘paying attention to what we are doing’ rather 
than trying, purely intellectually, to make sense of what we do from a transcendent point of view (Kelley 
2004: 204).  
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becoming that Kaprow shares with Deleuze, surely such rigid distinctions between 
realms cannot apply.  
 
Passing now to the third response, we must question Zepke’s implication that 
Kaprow’s later Activities are equivalent to the notion of “Performing Life”, and, in turn, 
his argument that “Performing Life” is ‘an entirely conceptual decision’ rather than an 
aesthetic, affective process (Zepke in Cull 2009: 119). On the contrary, Kaprow is less 
interested in the conceptual decision to see life as art, or the idea that anything can be 
made into art, than he is in what we might call the becoming-Life of art as nonart. Or 
rather, he appreciates the need to move on in the thinking of the relation between art and 
life, beyond the linguistic gesture of a subject through which ‘nonart can be art after the 
appropriate ceremonial announcement’ (Kaprow 2003: 128). There is nothing radical 
for Kaprow in the idea that art is whatever an artist, or art-conscious person, says it is, 
or whatever is placed into a gallery58. Rather than being a conceptual decision, 
‘Performing Life’ is an aspect of the process of what Kaprow calls ‘un-arting’: a new 
mode of research and development in the preparation of works, distinct from the 
conventional idea of the artist at work in her studio – especially if the studio is a place 
detached from daily routines of eating and sleeping and so forth. Kaprow’s concept of 
‘performing everyday life’ names a research process that the un-artist engages in before 
creating an Activity. Such performance involves a particular kind of attention or 
framing which transforms that to which is attended - the routine or everyday. Attention 
exposes the artificiality of what appears natural, Kaprow argues, or increases the 
perceptibility of those aspects of life that have become ‘almost too familiar to grasp’ 
(ibid., 188, 190). Imperceptibility, Kaprow suggests, can be the product of perceptual 
habits. For example, Kaprow discusses brushing his teeth as an act that ‘had become 
routinized, nonconscious behaviour in comparison to his ‘first efforts to do it as a child’. 
Kaprow reports:  
 
I began to suspect that 99 percent of my daily life was just as routinized 
and unnoticed: that my mind was always somewhere else; and that the 
                                                 
58 Part of the problem, or limitation with Duchamp’s gesture for Kaprow, is that by insisting on using the 
gallery it excludes ‘most of life’ on account of size if nothing else. One might be able to put a urinal on 
show, but one cannot exhibit the LA freeway at rush hour, Kaprow complains (Kaprow 2003: 207). 
Kaprow sees Duchamp as taking nonart and setting it in a ‘conventional art context’ or what he also calls 
‘an art-identifying frame’ which ‘confers “art value” or “art discourse” upon the nonart object, idea, or 
event’. Despite the forceful effect of Duchamp’s initial gesture, Kaprow argues the Readymade strategy 
later became ‘trivialised, as more and more nonart was put on exhibit by other artists’ (ibid., 219). 
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thousand signals my body was sending me each minute were ignored’ 
(ibid., 221 – emphasis added). 
 
Here, Kaprow alludes to the human capacity to experience thought as disembodied and 
to fail to perceive the thinking presence of the body. As Kaprow indicates when he 
refers to ‘the thousand signals’ sent by the body, the artist’s affective presence to the 
‘here and now’ rather than ‘somewhere else’ does not involve an overcoming of 
difference per se, although it does reject the artificial distinction between mind and 
body. Rather, through attention, we gain a heightened awareness of the complexity or 
self-difference of our body’s perpetual variation in relation to its surroundings. The 
becoming-perceptible of the imperceptible (the ‘unnoticed’ and ‘ignored’) need not 
involve drugs or other extreme forms of experimentation, as Deleuze and Guattari 
sometimes imply. The transformation of perception, that Deleuze and Guattari theorise 
in terms of jumping from the ‘plane of organisation’ to one of immanence, might 
equally happen through attending to rather than evacuating the body as affect, as ‘the 
variation that occurs when bodies collide or come into contact’ (Colman in Parr 2005: 
11): tongue-teeth-water-paste-brush-arm.   
 
But is not a question of conceiving toothbrushing, for instance, as art – Kaprow 
is more interested in the act of brushing your teeth in itself, than in how we define it. 
Nor does Kaprow simply stop here: ‘performing everyday life’ is a research process, 
which is not the same as an Activity. In this sense, Zepke’s reading seems to confuse 
two distinct aspects of Kaprow’s practice in this period: his pre-Activity research 
process (that he describes as ‘performing life’), and the Activities themselves. As the 
essay “Participation Performance” (1977) makes clear, Kaprow does not conceive of 
performing everyday life through attention as an end in itself. Or rather, although 
performing everyday life will have its own pleasures and insights, Kaprow goes on to 
suggest that a ‘prescribed set of moves’ (or what Kaprow also calls lifelike performance 
or an Activity) might be ‘drawn from’ such everyday routines as ‘the ways people use 
the telephone’ (Kaprow 2003: 188). The normal, familiar routine is experienced as 
unknown and strange through observation as part of a preceding period of research or 
study, but then this action must be treated in a particular way in order to become an 
Activity, that is neither too much like ‘Art art’ (rather than nonart or lifelike art) or too 
much like routine life (rather than Life, or lived change). 
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Finally, in this fourth part of our response to Zepke, let us consider his 
uncertainty regarding the resemblance of Kaprow’s Activities to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of art. According to Kaprow, the framing effect of the museum can dampen the 
effects of avant-garde lifelike art, but left in its proper ‘real life circumstances’ the value 
of lifelike art, Kaprow says, is that it refers us ‘again and again’, not to its origins in art 
history, but to its sources in ‘the real world’ (Kaprow 2003: 205). This, presumably, is 
the aspect of Deleuze and Guattari’s and Kaprow’s respective theories of art of which 
Zepke is thinking when he posits a clear break between them. But in numerous works, 
such as A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari clearly pursue a radical notion of 
the relation between art and life. Indeed, Zepke himself acknowledges that in parts of 
their work Deleuze and Guattari avoid the separation of the realms of actuality and 
creativity, or art and Life, by ‘turning art into a natural “living” process’ (Zepke 2009: 
114), as likely to be performed by nonhuman animals – like the Australian rainforest 
bird, the Scenopoetes dentirostris or Stagemaker bird – as by human artists. Here, they 
call the Stagemaker ‘a complete artist’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 184), approaching 
human art as but one part of the much wider phenomenon of ‘organic creativity’ in 
which all living beings might be said to ‘have art’ (Bogue 2003c: 65-9). 
Conventionally, animal creativity is differentiated from aesthetic activity - for example, 
birdsong from music – with recourse to an opposition ‘of the functional and the 
aesthetic, of activities that are purposive means and those that are self-sufficient ends’ 
(ibid., 70). Instead Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective realigns this relation between the 
functional and the aesthetic, suggesting that a work of art, such as birdsong, can both 
serve a purpose and have a life of its own.  
 
In relation to this naturalization of art, does Kaprow’s position really constitute a 
divergence from Deleuze’s thought? Perhaps not – whilst at the same time, it could be 
argued that when Kaprow does deviate from aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s later 
aesthetics, it is all to the good. For example, in contrast to Kaprow’s lifelong 
commitment to participation, Deleuze and Guattari often seem to construct an 
experiential hierarchy between the artist and the viewer. For instance, What is 
Philosophy? positions the artist as a romantic hero – ‘a seer, a becomer’ who ‘goes 
beyond the perceptual states and affective transitions of the lived’, and then must find a 
way to preserve his experience through the materiality of art (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 171). Artists, they say (echoing Artaud),  
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are athletes – not athletes who train their bodies and cultivate the lived 
(...) but bizarre athletes of the “fasting artist” type, or the “great 
Swimmer” who does not know how to swim. It is not an organic or 
muscular athleticism but its inorganic double, “an affective 
Athleticism”, an athleticism of becoming that reveals only forces that 
are not its own (ibid.,172). 
 
What the artist sees, Deleuze and Guattari call ‘Life in the living or the Living in the 
lived’: an encounter with ‘something in life that is too much for anyone’, but is also ‘the 
source or breath that supports them through the illnesses of the lived’ (ibid., 172-73). 
This inhuman excess of Life, it seems, has the potential to have both a destructive and 
therapeutic effect. Artists are the ‘presenters of affects’ who not only create them in 
their work, but also ‘give them to us and make us become with them, they draw us into 
the compound’ (ibid., 175).  
 
 Nonetheless, we perhaps have to question whether Deleuze and Guattari 
sometimes privilege the artist’s experience at the expense of the experiences of 
‘ordinary’ people, which were so important to Kaprow in the Activities. Certainly, it 
seems that Deleuze is a more aristocratic, rather than democratic thinker, insofar as he 
wishes to preserve an elite class of artists who are charged with the role of allowing 
everybody else to perceive the imperceptible affects and becomings underlying all 
things. Kaprow, in this sense, may well break with Deleuze as Zepke suggests, but only 
insofar as he goes further than Deleuze through his egalitarian commitment to 
participation. In this model, the artist is conceived less as a hero, and more as a 
‘necessary evil’ who merely serves as the catalyst for the more important matter of how 
the Activity takes off.   
 
 In this sense, the concept of becoming-imperceptible not only relates to the 
participants’ experience of the Activities as lived change, but to Kaprow’s own attempts 
to challenge the separation of ‘the artist’ as subject from everybody else and thus also 
the audience as passive consumer. In “The Real Experiment”, for instance, Kaprow 
insists on the importance of what he calls ‘artistic submergence’ (Kaprow 2003: 211). It 
is in the nature of lifelike art, he says: 
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to reduce and eliminate the fame associated with rock stars, socialites, 
and short-term politicians. If you view the world as a unity, with all 
things connected, including yourself and your work, then being 
celebrated with the exaggerated attention and flattery that go with 
stardom almost invariably leads to self-importance, separation, and, 
in time, isolation’ (ibid., 212 – emphasis added).  
 
 The becoming-imperceptible of the artist does not just involve a withdrawal 
from fame, but from conventional notions of authorship. Admittedly Kaprow’s degree 
of involvement in, or direction of, the enactment of the Activities varies (as we will 
discuss in the third and final part of this chapter). However, in Easy (1972) for example, 
a work devised for CalArts students where Kaprow did plan the actions to be done, the 
work can hardly be said to ‘belong’ to him as author. As Kelley describes, Kaprow  
 
supplied only the text and suggested a tract of land upon which to 
carry out the plan, letting his students choose their stones, how to wet 
them, where to drop them, where upstream and downstream were 
located and so forth… Almost all the decisions were left to others. He 
simply offered an idea of something to do…’ (Kelley 2004: 168).  
 
In turn, the eighteen Activity booklets that Kaprow produced between 1973 and 1979 
might also be understood as attempts by the artist to become-imperceptible. The hope 
was that by creating illustrated manuals of a set of actions, anyone anywhere could have 
access to, and enact an Activity without the need for Kaprow’s physical presence. He 
insisted that the booklets were not documents of the Activity but a set of visual 
instructions in which the photographs are carefully staged to be clear, while also being 
sufficiently open or un-nuanced. They are designed to show you what to do but not how 
to do it – nor in turn, how to feel about what you are doing. But, disappointingly for 
Kaprow, the booklets ‘tended to function as stylistic templates that corrupted the 
enactments of the works’ and by the end of the 70s ‘he had come to regard their 
production as a misguided strategy’ (Kelley 2004: 189).  
 
So, despite his democratising ambitions, Kaprow remains the director of the 
Activities: he scores them, introduces them and leads the reflective discussion about 
them after the event. And from one perspective we might say that these relations of 
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democratisation and guidance are not opposed; the former requires the latter. That is, 
Kaprow recognised early on that the Activities’ participants needed guidance in their 
new task; the democratic nature of the Activity was unfamiliar such that it could not be 
taken up without some degree of supported preparation and reflection. However, in the 
final part of this chapter we will look at a number problems that arose in the actual 
performance of some of the Activities during the seventies, and also at the reality of 
Kaprow’s relationship to ‘Art art’ and the art-world, beyond the rhetoric of nonart and 
becoming-imperceptible.  
 
 
5. ‘Success’ and ‘failure’ in the Activities  
 
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari cite John Cage’s definition of the 
experimental: “not as descriptive of an act to be later judged in terms of success or 
failure, but simply as an act the outcome of which is unknown” (Cage in Deleuze and 
Guattari 1984: 371n.). If, by definition, experimental art has no predetermined outcome, 
Cage suggests, there is no standard in relation to which the actual resulting event or 
process can be judged to have succeeded or failed. But, nevertheless, perhaps we can 
judge the extent to which such art is genuinely experimental or undetermined, and, in 
Kaprow’s case, the extent to which participants’ ‘experienced insights’ can still be 
valued if they divert from Kaprow’s own ontology. Is there a tension between Kaprow’s 
avowed commitment to a democratic relation to participants and his own specific aims 
for lifelike art such that it would lead participants to differential presence as ‘a sense of 
the whole’ or lived change? Are there limits to the extent to which a participant’s 
response can differ from the artist’s aims, beyond which point a work might be said to 
have ‘failed’ or to have ‘gone wrong’? Further, let us now explore the extent to which 
one ought to understand the concept of nonart as an ideal to which the Activities 
aspired, rather than as a condition Kaprow’s art might actually be said to have achieved.  
 
One potential ‘failure’ comes in the form of rebellion among the participants. 
For instance, in Take Off (1974), an Activity undertaken by nine people in Genova, 
Italy, only one group of three (which included Kaprow) actually carried out the written 
plan to its completion with the other two groups rebelling against Kaprow’s instructions 
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in one way or another59 (Piltzer et al. 1975: 90). James T. Hindman (1979) suggests that 
this is something Kaprow attempts to control through the careful supervision of each 
stage of the process of realizing an Activity. Kaprow is omnipresent in his work, 
Hindman argues,  
 
to make sure that the events are actually performed with some degree 
of honesty and involvement, rather than destructively or indifferently. 
Although each scenario can be developed with full freedom and 
flexibility, Kaprow foresees an “optimum” performance as one that 
occurs with thoroughness and commitment, in a genuine spirit of 
inquiry, within the structure he has proposed (Hindman 1979: 102).  
 
Another way that things can ‘go wrong’, is on account of a tension or discrepancy 
between Kaprow’s aims and the felt impact of his interventions – however 
‘imperceptible’ he hoped they might have been. For example, Ester Carla de Miro’s 
participant account of Take Off, reports that on reading the program of actions, it was 
clear to her that ‘there was an inherent ambiguity in his plan because, although it 
offered four possibilities’ (to make a bed, to unmake a bed, to dress and to undress) 
 
 in reality there were only two: One is unable to make a bed without 
having first taken the bedding off and one cannot dress without 
having first undressed. The plan with its apparent neutrality 
indirectly forces the actions (and consequently the relationships that 
would result from them) toward a kind of intimate communication… 
Kaprow designed the piece with the hope that it would create an 
openness between the  participants, and the apparent neutrality was a 
screen behind which he had hidden his intentions (de Miro in Piltzer 
et al 1975: 91). 60 
 
                                                 
59 According to the article, two women put together in the first group met each other the day before the 
Activity and became friends. They objected to the invitation to deceive one another built into Kaprow’s 
instructions and ‘decided it was an authoritative imposition that sought to destroy their relationship’. The 
man who was the third in the group wanted to continue to follow the rules of the Activity, so during a 
group lunch the women ‘symbolically killed him with a pistol and photographed the action’ (Piltzer et al 
1975: 90). 
60 Ester Carla de Miro was the Italian translator of the plan for Take Off as well as one of the Activities' 
participants. Her extended account of Take Off is massively valuable as a readily accessible document of 
participant experience.  
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Kaprow confirms such a perception, stating:  
 
At the bottom of this plan was a desire on my part for some kind of 
contact. For me the value of this piece would be the contact or 
communication which is not described in the plan (Kaprow in Piltzer 
et al 1975: 94).  
 
As de Miro notes, the language of Kaprow’s plans could not have been much further 
from the representation of intimacy; on the contrary he deliberately adopts a pseudo-
scientific objectivity in his scores, labelling participants ‘A and B’ as if they were trial 
subjects. In this sense, Kaprow seems to acknowledge that intimacy is not something 
that he can make happen, in that he deliberately erases any trace of his own ambition 
that the Activities might allow ‘the most direct possible relationships’ (ibid., 91). 
However, while other Activity programs might have been experienced as more 
genuinely ‘open’, Take Off was clearly interpreted by some as indirectly manipulative.  
 
 As we have already briefly noted, another strategy that Kaprow employs in a bid 
to make the Activities ‘successful’ is the preparation of participants. This raises 
interesting questions with regard to the way in which text and language function in 
relation to the Activities. For instance, in his account of a 1979 Activity, 7 Kinds of 
Sympathy, Kaprow justifies here the need for explanatory notes, which were given to 
the participants along with the score for the Activity:  
 
The notes accompanying the program intentionally pointed out 
guidelines to interpretation. It is worthwhile mentioning this aspect of the 
preparation for participating. An unfamiliar genre like this one does not 
speak for itself. Explaining, reading, thinking, doing, feeling, reviewing, 
and thinking again are commingled’ (Kaprow 2003: 167 – emphasis 
added). 
 
What does this say about participants’ capacity (or Kaprow’s faith in the participants’ 
capacity) to relate to the unknown? On the one hand, we might argue that the need for a 
textual supplement undermines any belief in the affective power of the Activities 
themselves, as Hindman notes: Kaprow’s decision to provide participants with an 
‘interpretive introduction’ carries ‘the danger of establishing expectations for 
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participants’, but nevertheless ‘Kaprow feels that something concrete on the possible 
nature of the experience is necessary, since normal social “contracts” for interaction are 
suspended’ (Hindman 1979: 98). Nevertheless Hindman concludes that ‘The work must 
speak for itself, anyway, despite Kaprow’s intrusion, because of the unique experience 
facing each participant’ (ibid.).  
 
For Kaprow, an Activity’s accompanying notes served the purpose of sensitizing 
participants to the experiences involved in the Activity, but not to prescribe in advance 
the kinds of experiences they were to have (Kaprow 2003: 168). Indeed, in his essay 
“Participation Performance” (1977) Kaprow implicitly describes his “ideal” participant 
through a contrast with those who participate in ‘communal performances like July 4th 
parades’. Whereas the former all know how to participate in the event on the basis of 
learned social conventions, Kaprow’s ideal participants have in common ‘a shared 
openness to novelty, to being sensitized, to flexibility of stance rather than to possessing 
a body of hard information and well-rehearsed moves’ (ibid., 183). There is a different 
kind of ‘readiness’ here. However, we could question the validity of Kaprow’s 
opposition, which is arguably based on a somewhat caricatured description of the 
parade. The implication is that we cannot have an experienced insight into a 4th July 
parade, and indeed, if we behave in the same way in an Activity as we might in a 
parade, then we will be getting participation ‘wrong’. If Kaprow does indeed have an 
ontology of change, it must be that all forms of life participate in it; nothing is excluded. 
As such, why does (and indeed how can) Kaprow still hold that a participant is more 
likely to have an experienced insight during one of his Activities, rather than in a 
parade?  
 
 There are also reasons to believe that Kaprow found it difficult to leave Art art, 
the pressures of ‘the art world’, its institutions and conventions altogether – his stated 
ambition. As such, we might also argue that Zepke too easily assumes that one actually 
can escape art altogether, given that Kaprow’s writing and making document both the 
conceptual and practical difficulties of the flight from the constraints and conventions of 
artistic identity. For example, in “The Education of the Un-Artist, Part I” (1971), 
Kaprow rather oddly argues that nonart depends on the art world for its sense of 
purpose:  
 
 194 
Nonart’s advocates, according to this description, are those who 
consistently, or at one time or other, have chosen to operate outside the 
pale of art establishments – that is, in their heads or in the daily or natural 
domain. At all times, however, they have informed the art establishment 
of their activities, to set in motion the uncertainties without which their 
acts would have no meaning’ (Kaprow 2003: 98).  
 
The meaning of nonart, he suggests here, is the uncertainty it provokes in the art world 
establishment, who are forced to reconsider what art is in the light of these new actions. 
The concept of nonart, it seems, depends on pre-existing concept of art to position itself 
against. This goes against other writings elsewhere, in which it is the experiences of an 
Activity’s participants that are valued – and require no art-world verification. Although, 
later, Kaprow also bemoans the practical dimension to this residual attachment to art: 
‘…In trying to escape from the art context, I find that 99% of the time, I am on the 
inside…’ (Kaprow 1998: 99).  
 
 On the one hand, this failure is put down to the elusive nature of the nonart 
event as Kaprow conceives it. Nonart, Kaprow says, ‘is whatever has not yet been 
accepted as art but has caught the artist’s attention with that possibility in mind’. In 
other words, it is, for Kaprow, that to which an artist attends but cannot be recognised as 
art on the basis of their existing concepts; it ‘exists only fleetingly… Indeed, the 
moment any such example is offered publicly, it automatically becomes a type of art’ 
(Kaprow 2003: 98). As such, Kaprow declares nonart ‘almost impossible’ (Kaprow 
1971: 100) and to be something that ‘will probably obtain only once in each artist’s life’ 
(Kaprow 2003: 75). But on the other, we might question whether Kaprow tried hard 
enough, in practical terms, to remove himself and his work from the art-world context, 
which he saw as a restrictive influence on his pursuit of affective presence. Although 
Kaprow went much further than most to ‘leave art’, one might argue that by continuing 
to allow galleries to frame the Activities, it was Kaprow himself who restricted the 
becomings that could take place within in them. After all, most of the European 
Activities were commissioned by galleries, and in the case of Take Off, the program was 
exhibited in the sponsoring gallery to which the public were also invited to meet 
Kaprow and the participants following the event (Kaprow in Piltzer et al 1975: 89). 
Indeed some of Kaprow’s colleagues at CalArts are said to have challenged him on his 
professed goal to drop out of art,  
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especially since it was patently obvious that he remained gainfully 
employed, both as a professor and as a commissioned artist… Some 
felt that if Kaprow really wanted to drop out of the art world, he 
should stop accepting commissions from its galleries and institutions 
(Kelley 2004: 180). 
 
A further risk of this lingering contextualisation of the Activity as art is that the 
participants find themselves struggling to break with conventions of relation. Arguably 
this is what one participant of Take Off - Gerald Piltzer - experienced, as documented in 
his tape recording made as part of the Activity: 
 
I usually don't have any feelings while making a bed. I don't think 
about it but now I have to think because Allan told me to… This bed 
isn't a bed anymore. It's just a process in a Happening… (Piltzer 1975: 
90) 
 
The certainty with which Piltzer identifies the process of making the bed as art and his 
reinforcement of ‘Allan’ as the ‘author’ of the work indicates the difficulty of actually 
experiencing a dissolution of the distinction between the usual situations of life and 
unusual situations of art. And no doubt, in “The Education of the Un-Artist, Part II” 
(1972), Kaprow does conceive of the context in which he is working as a post-
Duchampian universe, in which the ‘art-conscious’ have the capacity to identify life as 
art. The ‘art-conscious’ carry the art bracket ready-made in their heads for instant 
application anywhere’ (Kaprow 2003: 110) in such a way that ‘All snow shovels in 
hardware stores imitate Duchamp’s in a museum’ (ibid., 111). After the Readymade, 
‘sophisticates’ are willing to identify almost anything as art, even without the gallery as 
ground. In this sense, it seems that life’s imitation of art has less to do with something 
that the objects or actions do, and more to do with ways of seeing; a ‘seeing as’ (art-
like) by an art historically informed audience.  
 
How, then, can nonart be possible? How can Kaprow make something that 
cannot be identified as art, when even the most mundane of objects installed in 
everyday places can be seen, at least by an elite, as art? The answer is because nonart is 
not a definitional gesture, for Kaprow, but a fleeting moment of affective experience. 
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The becoming-art of brushing one’s teeth, for instance, does not occur by making a 
decision to identify the action as art, but by attending to it differently. It is because 
nonart is not just negatively defined as anything that cannot be recognised as art – 
indeed, post-Duchamp, there is arguably nothing that cannot be seen as art – that it 
becomes real (albeit very difficult) rather than ideal. Although it remains conceptually 
‘unclear’, Kaprow gives nonart a precise, physical and durational definition as a 
particular kind of presence – understood by Kaprow as experienced insight or 
‘becoming “the whole”’, or via Deleuze as affect or becoming-imperceptible – that can 
happen, momentarily, when one physically occupies the threshold between art and life. 
This is not to say that the event cannot be recognised as art – it can. Kaprow can only do 
a certain amount to attempt to prevent this from happening – for instance, by becoming-
imperceptible as the artist-creator. The rest is up to the participants – as the audience 
becoming non-audience – who must take as much responsibility as Kaprow for the 
nature of the events that occur.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have added further conceptual facets to the theory of 
differential presence, re-defining this new notion of presence in terms of Deleuze’s 
concepts of affect and becoming-imperceptible and Kaprow’s concepts of ‘experienced 
insight’, nonart, ‘becoming “the whole”’, and attention. In each case, the chapter has 
resisted existing critiques of both Deleuze and Kaprow that would class this new type of 
presence as a kind of absence, transcendence or escape – a classification that goes hand 
in hand with an accusation of mysticism or a lack of political commitment to changing 
the actual world. On the contrary, the chapter has argued, Kaprow and Deleuze share a 
concern to theorize the practice of participating in actuality beyond the subject/object, 
or self/other distinction, in a manner that promotes an ethico-political sense of taking 
part in “the whole”, in which participants are seen to change actually and be changed by 
their contact with other processes in the world. However, we have also suggested that 
Kaprow’s Activities, or at least his ambitions for them, go further than some parts of 
Deleuze’s thought in terms of extending this politics of participation to the realm of art, 
towards what the chapter referred to as the ‘democratisation of differential presence’. It 
is not just artists who can become-imperceptible; it is not just the work of art that can 
offer the experience of differential presence.   
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But as we move onto the fourth and final chapter of this thesis, there is still a 
key aspect to differential presence that we have not yet addressed, at least not in full. 
That aspect is time: there is a specific temporality of differential presence that we can 
understand, it will be suggested, through the Deleuzo-Bergsonian concept of ‘duration’ 
and the practice of the American company, Goat Island, as one that has consistently 
examined the durational aspects of presence in performance. We touched on this aspect 
earlier in this chapter in the discussion of the Happening Fluids and the Activity Level, 
in which it was indicated that ice and stone have differing speeds of change and that 
human bodies might explore altering their own rhythms of action in an encounter with 
those of inhuman bodies. In what follows, we employ concepts from Deleuze’s 
engagement with Henri Bergson to give greater theoretical weight to these observations, 
but we will also see how – for Goat Island – we do not need to move outside of the 
space of art altogether in order to access differential presence.  
 
Whereas the Living Theatre suggested that we need to leave the theatre for the 
street, and Kaprow calls upon us to escape the gallery (and the parade), Goat Island 
propose that the space, time and bodies of ‘black-box’ contemporary performance (as 
well as those of ‘the ordinary’) are already multiple if we use them and attend to them 
appropriately. From this perspective, the participatory project might be seen as founded 
on a false problem in which the theatre is viewed as a self-same space of representation 
and transcendent control (and only that), rather than as that which – seen differently – 
can also be experienced as a differential site of creation and affect. With their emphasis 
on the multiple nature of the present, Goat Island also remind us of the extent to which 
the critique of self-presence, or the theorization of differential presence, has always 
been a political as well as a metaphysical project; or, correlatively, the extent to which 
the homogenisation or exclusion of difference has ethical as well as philosophical 
implications.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The temporality and ethics of differential presence in Goat Island 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Founded in 1987, Goat Island is a collaborative, Chicago-based performance 
group, directed by Lin Hixson and formed of the core members: Matthew Goulish, 
Bryan Saner, Karen Christopher, Mark Jeffrey and Litó Walkey. During their twenty 
years of creating work, the company earned both respect and fascination in the field of 
performance for their commitment to the affective potential of intricate choreographies 
performed by non-expert bodies, and the capacity of a slow, genuinely collaborative 
research and creation process, that starts from a state of not knowing, to generate new 
thoughts and unexpected sensations. In 2006, Goat Island announced that their ninth 
performance, The Lastmaker (2007), would be the last work that they would create as a 
company, before individual members went on to pursue new projects and collaborations 
– such as Goulish and Hixson’s new initiative: Every house has a door. 
 
 The connection between Goat Island and Deleuze has already been explored in 
the writings of founding member, Matthew Goulish, as well as in the work of 
performance scholars such as the company's UK archivist Stephen J. Bottoms, and 
David Williams. All three have exposed some of the Deleuzian aspects of Goat Island in 
a range of important observations61. For instance, in writing about the process of 
creating the company’s eighth performance – When will the September roses bloom? 
Last night was only a comedy (2004) – Goulish evokes notions of ‘stuttering’ in 
performance and a ‘zone of indiscernibility’ between human and animal that clearly 
evidence an engagement with Deleuze’s thought. Likewise his earlier monograph, 39 
microlectures: in proximity of performance (2000), draws on the concepts of 
                                                 
61 See Bottoms, Stephen J. (1998) “The Tangled Flora of Goat Island: Rhizome, Repetition, Reality”, 
Theatre Journal Vol. 50, No. 4 (December 1998), pp.421-446, and Williams, David (2005) “L’ombre de 
ton chien: on dogs and goats and meanwhile”, available at Art Surgery, 
http://www.artsurgery.org/contributors.html, accessed 19/7/08. See also an early text I wrote in 
collaboration with Matthew Goulish: Cull, Laura and Goulish, Matthew (2007) “A Dialogue on 
Becoming”, in Theatres of Thought: Theatre, Performance and Philosophy, edited by Daniel Watt and 
Daniel Meyer-Dinkgrafe (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing).  
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‘deterritorialization’, the machinic, and differential repetition62. As, Bottoms has noted, 
it is not that Goat Island have ‘consciously sought to translate Deleuze and Guattari’s 
ideas into the performance context’ (Bottoms 1998: 434) but nevertheless their 
approach to the creation of performance – as collaboration, as becoming – registers their 
affinity to the values of Deleuze's ontology. 
 
 There can be no doubt, then, that Goat Island as a company have been 
influenced by Deleuze, but more recently (and of much interest, as we will see, for our 
thesis) they have also been influenced by the thought of Henri Bergson who, perhaps 
above all, shaped Deleuze’s philosophy of time63. Specifically, this chapter will suggest 
that we can not only find evidence for a long-standing engagement by Goat Island with 
Deleuze’s thought in general, but for a particular engagement with the Deleuzo-
Bergsonian notion of time as duration, becoming and a multiplicity of presents that 
would throw a final light (that is both philosophical and political) on presence as 
differential. Again, this is particularly evident in Goulish’s writing. For instance, the 
Deleuzo-Bergsonian concept of duration as difference in kind takes centre stage in 
Goulish’s recent paper ‘The time of the ordinary’ (2008), just as the idea of time as 
ceaseless change or becoming (rather than a container of such change) is foregrounded 
in Goulish’s contribution to the collaborative essay, ‘A Dialogue on Becoming’ (2007). 
In the latter, Goulish writes: 
 
Memory exists in each perception, because each moment, however 
small, has duration. A change transpires in each moment. Memory in 
a sense coheres a moment as a moment, as we might remember its 
start a certain way at its end, in order to make it one thing, a 
moment. We perceive duration through change; we  perceive change 
through movement. A moment, then, is moving. Because it is 
moving, it is always becoming. It will never become what it is 
becoming (Goulish in Watt and Meyer-Dinkgräfe 2007: 61). 
 
                                                 
62 There are countless other examples of Deleuzianism in Goulish that we could have drawn upon here. 
For instance, we could suggest that it is no coincidence that the company draw on Matheson’s The 
Incredible Shrinking Man for their performance, The Sea & Poison; a resource central to Deleuze’s 
exposition of the concept of becoming-imperceptible.  
63 There are a number of Deleuze scholars who assert this view, such as Elizabeth Grosz and Todd May, 
who notes that ‘Deleuze’s treatment of time borrows heavily from the work of Henri Bergson’ (May 
2003: 145). 
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Finally, we might also note that the most recent text published by company 
director, Lin Hixson, who not only foregrounds Bergson’s time-philosophy, but also 
points to the implications of these ideas for re-thinking presence in performance. Of The 
Lastmaker, Hixson writes: 
 
You sit on one side of the performance. I sit on the other. When I 
look across the room and see you watching the performers sing 
songs around the dining room table, I know your heart beats at a 
different rate than mine. This tells me we will die at different times. 
Knowing this I wave good-bye to you… My duration encompasses 
and discloses yours. Your duration encompasses and discloses mine 
(Hixson 2008: 52). 
 
This text by Hixson perhaps constitutes the most direct acknowledgement of the 
company’s interest in the Deleuzo-Bergsonian idea of the present as constituted by the 
co-existence of multiple durations; that is, in the idea that there is no single ‘here and 
now’, but several different and self-differing actualities. However, the purpose of this 
chapter is not simply to point out that Goat Island are interested in Deleuze and in 
Bergson. Rather, in this chapter, we will be focussing on Goat Island’s work in order to 
examine the specifically temporal aspect of ‘differential presence’. If the metaphysics of 
presence, and its critique, equate presence with the “now” and with “liveness” or 
immediacy, then how is time conceived within the theorisation of differential presence 
and how might it appear in practice? 
 
 This shift in focus to the relation between differential presence and time, in 
contrast to the rethinking of language, thought and ‘the self’ in previous chapters, is by 
no means arbitrary. As this thesis has remarked elsewhere, differential presence does 
not present itself to consciousness and recognition. Or as May puts it:  
 
Difference in itself is founding for identity but does not appear as 
such (as difference in itself) within those identities. It is not 
phenomenologically  accessible. Thus, a search for difference in 
itself must abandon the project of investigating directly the givens of 
experience and turn toward a more hidden realm. Deleuze discovers 
that realm in the nature of time (May 2003: 145).  
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Although we will be problematising any notion of time as a realm beyond experience as 
such (as May alludes to here), his account does helpfully summarise the move that 
Deleuze makes from difference to time. Time is a central concern for Deleuze’s thought 
and receives in-depth treatments in many of his works, including: Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, Bergsonism, Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense and the Cinema 
books64. In each case, Deleuze turns toward time in order to articulate pure difference or 
difference in itself. 
 
 Thus, the search for differential presence has also led us to time – a realm which, 
of course, has also long been of concern to Performance Studies, given that its object is 
a time-based art, a durational art involving the encounter between living, moving 
bodies. Indeed, the value of ‘performance’ as a distinct category from ‘theatre’ has often 
been asserted – directly or indirectly – with reference to its ‘presentness’ or occupation 
of the very ‘here and now’ that ‘theatre’ is perceived to ignore in favour of representing 
fictional time. As Adrian Heathfield writes,  
 
From its beginnings… performance has consistently replaced or 
qualified the material object with a temporal act. Performance’s birth 
within and against theatrical form is equally rooted in an 
engagement with the time of enactment and its disruptive potential 
in relation to fictive or narrative time’ (Heathfield 2004: 8).  
 
Such remarks as this point back to the origins of the distinction between the categories 
of ‘theatre’ and ‘performance’ and to the temporalities of what were perceived, by 
some, to be their contrasting modes of operation: of representation and presence 
respectively. For example, it points back to Josette Féral’s notion of performance as that 
which ‘escapes all illusion and representation’ insofar as it ‘tells of nothing and imitates 
no one’; and consequently, of performance as that which has ‘neither past nor future’ 
but simply ‘takes place’ (Féral in Murray 1997: 296). For Féral, performance occupies 
                                                 
64 It is partly for this reason that we have devoted a chapter to the temporal aspect of differential 
presence, while there is no such chapter devoted to its spatiality. However, the chapter will question the 
dichotomy between the time’s creativity and inert space that one can find in aspects of Bergson’s early 
work.  
 202 
‘a continuous present – that of the immediacy of things, of an action taking place’ (ibid., 
292)65.  
  
 However, partly because of the interdisciplinary nature of their approach, Goat 
Island force us to go beyond the binary opposition between the immediacy of 
‘performance’ and the illusion of presentness in ‘theatre’. They have more to say about 
performance than, simply, it being an art of the present. For example, recent literature 
on the company has repeatedly emphasised their ‘slow-time aesthetic’: they are well 
known for taking at least two years to create a performance work, and for creating 
performances the pace of which appears considerably decelerated in relation to other 
forms of contemporary culture66. For Heathfield, for instance, Goat Island’s slowness is 
part of a broader contemporary tendency in performance to want to ‘slow things down, 
to examine gesture, relation, [and] meaning production not only as a process, but at a 
significantly slower speed’ in relation to ‘the demands so prevalent in contemporary 
culture for instantaneous relationships between art and meaning, intention and 
realisation, desire and fulfilment’ (Heathfield 2004: 10 – original emphasis). Likewise, 
in his account of the company’s penultimate performance, Philip Stanier proposes that 
 
The time invested in the performance by the company, is matched by 
the demands of time and contemplation made by the piece upon its 
audience. This demand of consideration, for the conceptual repair of 
the performance, is paid back by the discovery of time and 
inspiration within the piece. The contemplation of September roses 
leads to an expansion of the experience of its duration, and a 
spiralling production of possible meanings (Stanier 2004: n.p.) 
 
 However, while these and other commentators on Goat Island’s work have 
suggested that their performance involves a direct presentation of time, that it invokes a 
heightened attention to time or constitutes a giving of time, there are arguably few who 
provide a clear account of what the nature of that time is, beyond the indication that it is 
                                                 
65 In fact, the concept of presence in Féral’s important 1982 article is more complex than I have suggested 
in these brief remarks, or as others have summarized (see Power). For instance, she talks about the 
performance of gestures in Vito Acconci’s practice as rendering Derrida’s différance perceptible in a 
manner that suggests that hers is by no means a binary logic (292).  
66 For some general commentaries on Goat Island and ‘slowness’, see Stanier, Phillip (2004) ‘Process, 
Repair and the Obligations of Performance’, Bailes, Sara-Jane (2007) ‘Some Slow-Going’, or 
Christopher, Karen (2006) ‘Waiting, Wondering, Wavering and Wanting: The Performance of Silence’.   
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somehow different from ‘clock-time’, ‘real time’, ‘narrative time’ and so forth. For 
example, Hans-Thies Lehmann has argued that one defining aspect of ‘postdramatic 
theatre’ (a category of contemporary theatre in which he includes Goat Island) is a 
durational aesthetic characterized by ‘the intention of utilizing the specificity of theatre 
as a mode of presentation to turn time as such into an object of the aesthetic experience’ 
(Lehmann 2006: 156). Contemporary theatre prolongs time, he suggests, by extending 
the length of a ‘work’ and putting performers in slow motion. But I want to propose that 
part of the productivity of this intersection of Goat Island’s work with the Deleuzo-
Bergsonian philosophy of time is that it allows us to say more about the nature of this 
‘time as such’ that performance might be claimed to present to experience. In what 
follows, I will suggest that Goat Island use slowness and repetition to reveal time as 
difference, to construct differential presence as an affective encounter with time’s 
multiplicity. I will argue that they show us that there is no such thing as ‘the’ present 
but a ‘multiplicity of presents, each with a correlatively different past and future’ 
(Mullarkey 1999: 54). 
 
 Finally, this chapter makes good on the promise to return to the political by 
taking the discussion of the temporality of differential presence beyond the realm of 
metaphysics, and into the realm of ethics and politics – a realm which is undoubtedly of 
concern to Goat Island, even if they do not frame their work in relation to a specific 
socio-political agenda in the same way as the Living Theatre (or precisely because they 
do not). By employing the strategies of slowness and waiting, repetition and imitation in 
relation to their sources – strategies that we will explore in full in what follows – Goat 
Island do not “raid the archive” in irresponsible acts of appropriation that are only 
justifiable if we conceive the past as dead and gone, as unreal. Rather, we will suggest, 
they engage in a process of mutual interference in which the speeds of other presents 
are invited to interfere with the actuality of the performance as much as the performance 
interferes with the actualities of their sources.  
 
 In this way, we will argue that an analysis of differential presence in Goat Island’s 
work contributes a new voice to the “Actualist” side of recent debates in Deleuze 
Studies and, as such, deviates from Hallward’s unsympathetic interpretation of Deleuze, 
which we partially examined in the last chapter. Rather than ‘virtualise’ other actualities 
in a manner that segregates them to an other-worldly realm beyond politics, Goat Island 
perform the multiplicity of presence – as the durations of human and inhuman others 
 204 
and ‘the past’ – in a way that makes demands upon us: for attention, patience and 
respect. This chapter will argue that differential presence in Goat Island is an instance of 
felt time in which time’s own differential presence as change or novelty is rendered 
perceptible (despite May). Goat Island’s particular strategies of slowness and waiting, 
repetition and imitation give us access to this differential presence of time, but only to 
the extent that our perception changes in the encounter with the performance as much as 
the performance changes in its encounter with our perception. Or as Goulish puts it in 
‘The time of the ordinary’: ‘attention to matter constitutes action upon matter, to engage 
another Bergsonian formulation… “we are really present in everything we 
perceive”’(Goulish 2008: n.p.)67. The very title of Goulish’s paper indicates his concern 
to firmly locate duration (and as such, differential presence) in the realm of the 
accessible: classing duration not as the virtual condition ‘beyond the state of 
experience’ (Deleuze 1988: 27) but as ‘overlooked’ or unnoticed, and performance as 
the very enactment of duration’s ‘multiplicity’. Or again, as Goulish himself writes: ‘I 
simply, but hopefully not simplistically, propose that performance figures in our 
dialogue as a set of practices that enact, or reenact, or articulate duration’s multiplicity 
as live or as lived’ (Goulish in Cull 2009: 132)68. In this way, for Goat Island (contra 
Kaprow) both spectatorship and theatrical space can be redeemed, since they were 
always already differential or multiple in the first place, if attended to properly.  
 
 But before we go on to address the specific ways in which differential presence 
as felt time appears in Goat Island, we need to develop a more thorough outline of 
Deleuze’s philosophy of time. In the first instance, we will rehearse the more common 
account of this philosophy, which focusses on Deleuze’s deconstruction of presence/the 
present according to the virtual/actual distinction. However, we will then go on to 
explore a critique and alterative to this account emerging out of recent Deleuze Studies, 
which replaces a simple dualism of virtual and actual with the concept of multiple, co-
existing presents or actualities. The motivation for examining this debate is partly a 
                                                 
67 Here, Goulish is quoting Bergson, H. (1977) The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 259 
68 Throughout his work, and particularly in Bergsonism, Deleuze uses the term ‘multiplicity’ in a 
particular way that differs from the standard philosophical distinction between the One and the Multiple. 
In Bergsonism, for example, Deleuze distinguishes between two types of multiplicity - quantitative (or 
discrete) and qualitative (or continuous) - of which the former is spatial and homogeneous (eg. a flock of 
sheep or clock-time) and the latter is temporal and heterogeneous (eg. a “complex feeling” or dissolving 
sugar). What matters for us here is that for Bergson, Deleuze argues, ‘duration was not simply the 
indivisible, nor was it the nonmeasurable. Rather, it was that which divided only by changing in kind’ 
(Deleuze 1988: 40). In other words, duration can be divided into individual moments, but this is a form of 
abstraction that alters the nature of the qualitative multiplicity as a continuous unfolding of difference. 
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sense that Goat Island’s own approach to time and presence is closer to this latter 
position. That is, ironically, although Goat Island are explicitly engaged with Deleuze’s 
philosophy (in a way that the other practitioners discussed in this thesis are not), they 
might also be seen to exemplify a break with, or divergence from (one orthodox reading 
of) Deleuze – particularly in the case of Goulish’s recent writings. In this way, the 
motivation also concerns this project as a whole – and the relationship between the 
concept of differential presence we have tried to develop, and Deleuze’s philosophy. 
This recent account could be interpreted in two ways: either as a critique of Deleuze 
himself (or at least aspects of Deleuze) and/or as a critique of a particular interpretation 
of Deleuze (that emphasises those aspects over others)69. Particularly if we follow the 
former interpretation, it is important to explore this debate as a means to question the 
extent to which the theorisation of differential presence must go beyond Deleuze, must 
look to other theoretical frameworks, especially in relation to both the problem of ethics 
and the question of how performance can do philosophy on its own terms.  
 
 The chapter is divided into six main sections. As we’ve just indicated, the first 
section introduces the key ideas of Deleuze’s philosophy of time as it is most commonly 
understood. The second section then critically reapproaches these ideas – particularly 
the concept of difference’s ‘virtuality’ – and suggests an alliance of attitude between 
Goulish’s writing on ‘the ordinary’ and contemporary philosopher John Mullarkey’s 
notion of ‘Actualism’. The following four sections then each address a different aspect 
                                                 
69 We have noted here that this critique of Deleuze could be interpreted in a number of ways: as a critique 
of Deleuze’s oeuvre as a whole; as a critique of aspects of Deleuze’s oeuvre; or, as a critique of the 
aspects of Deleuzianism or Deleuzian commentary that place the greatest emphasis on the notion of the 
actual as mere by-product of a virtual realm of difference. As such, it is worth maintaining an awareness 
of the alternately nuanced ways in which Deleuze frames notions like the virtual across the various works 
in which they appear. That is, the concept of the virtual is a multifaceted one, that Deleuze deals with 
differently in a number of works: in the early texts Bergsonism (1966) and Difference and Repetition 
(1968), and in the later texts ‘One Less Manifesto’ (1979) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980). In the earlier 
works, virtuality is a name given to a mode of existence that is unrepresentable and real, despite being 
neither ‘actual’ nor ‘possible’. But it also concerns a specific conception of time and the relations 
between past, present and future. In particular though, the emphasis of the early works is on what might 
be said to condition movement, multiplicity or variation, rather than on those processes as complete in 
themselves; the emphasis is on the virtual as that which conditions effects such as becomings. In 
Difference and Repetition for example, Deleuze makes a distinction between ‘differenciation’ and 
‘differentiation’, where the former refers to the actualization of the virtual, and the latter to the power of 
the virtual to differ from itself, a power upon which actualization or differenciation is said to depend 
(Deleuze 1994: 207). And, in an arguably Platonic fashion, it is the latter process that receives the most 
attention, and is accorded more profundity. In contrast, in Kafka, ‘One Less Manifesto’ and A Thousand 
Plateaus, there is considerably more concern with the material process of differenciation whether Deleuze 
is discussing Bene’s stammerings and whisperings as actualizations of the virtual within language, or the 
‘the performances of Lolito, an eater of bottles, earthenware, porcelains, iron, and even bicycles’ who 
‘makes his jaw enter into composition with the iron in such a way that he himself becomes the jaw of a 
molecular dog’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 247). 
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of how this revised conception of the temporality of differential presence might be 
understood to be explored in Goat Island’s work. In section three, we will address their 
use of slowness and waiting as a means to offer an experience of felt time. In section 
four, we consider the politics of the company’s use of differential repetition and 
imitation as ways to explore the actual durations of others. Related to this previous 
section, the fifth part of the chapter goes further into the way in which Goat Island 
reconceive the notion of ‘character’ in performance and the modes of relation that are 
set up between the performers and the primarily historical figures that belong to their 
archival, source materials. Finally, the sixth section is concerned with how these various 
strategies and processes come to bear on Goat Island’s approach to structuring a final, 
‘finished’ performance, and is followed by some concluding remarks on the ethics of 
duration’s multiplicity which will lead us into the conclusion of the thesis as a whole. 
 
 
1. The deconstruction of presence in Deleuzo-Bergsonian philosophies of time:  
The virtual/actual distinction 
 
 As we have already seen in the previous chapters, single or simple presence qua 
Being is undone in Deleuze’s thought. And his philosophy of time plays a crucial part in 
this undoing – not only of presence as Being, but presence as the self-same present or 
“here and now” to which performance theories of presence so often refer70. When we 
think about time, we tend to start by thinking in terms of ‘things’ or ‘selves’ that then go 
through time, to put being before becoming. But for Deleuze, becoming (time) comes 
before any being (‘thing’ or ‘self’). For example, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze 
follows the early Greek thinker Heraclitus in arguing that present reality does not have 
‘being’, that ‘there is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity; neither 
multiplicity nor becoming are appearances or illusions’ (Deleuze 1983: 23-4). Whereas 
for Heraclitus’ rival Parmenides it is only what is unchanging that is truly real, only that 
which does not become different from itself that can be genuinely said to exist 
(Turetsky 1998: 11), for Heraclitus and Deleuze what there is is becoming: ceaseless 
change, perpetual variation or difference. For Parmenides, change is appearance, not 
                                                 
70 Cormac Power’s book, Presence in Play: A Critique of Theories of Presence in the Theatre (2008) 
helpfully collects and recounts many of these celebrations of theatre and performance’s ‘Nowness’. For 
instance, he cites Thornton Wilder’s 1941 claim that “On the stage it is always now” (Wilder in Power 
2008: 4) and Andy Lavender’s more recent argument that “Theatre has always traded in nowness, and at 
various points in its history has developed new ways in which to heighten the spectator’s awareness of the 
present moment” (Lavender in Power 2008: 4).  
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reality, and time itself is unreal; for Deleuze, as we shall see, time is no mere ‘receptacle 
of being’ (Boundas in Patton 1996: 93) – it is the real itself, the power that constitutes 
life as becoming.  
 
 Likewise, Goat Island have long thought of performer presence in terms of 
becoming, and of performance as a process in which the performer experiences him/her 
‘self’ as a series of transitions rather than as a discrete ‘self’ engaged in the act of 
presenting that ‘self’, or representing ‘the other’. Beyond the presence/representation 
binary, Matthew Goulish suggests that in performance  
 
a performer is not a single entity. Instead of a unit, a performer is an 
identity in motion in a particular direction. A performer is a 
becoming… Myself BECOMING an illustration in a figure skating 
manual / Myself BECOMING The Creature from the Black Lagoon 
/ (...) Myself BECOMING a microphone stand’ (Goulish 2000: 79).  
 
As we will go onto explore in more depth in due course, Deleuze’s concept of becoming 
is not concerned with the unfolding of being (the becoming of some thing) or the 
development of an already determined identity. Rather, becomings involve the 
unpredictable transformation of one’s own becoming in encounters with others, and 
specifically of one’s time in encounters with others’ durations. For Deleuze, ‘things’ 
(like performances or performers or spectators) emerge as an effect of the flow of time 
(Colebrook 2002: 41). And we will see this encounter between divergent becomings not 
only in the event of Goat Island’s performances – when the audience encounter a 
work’s multiple durations – but also in the company’s slow and careful, research and 
rehearsal processes, during which Goat Island as individualities (or as individual 
compositions of relations) allow their becomings to be transformed by their sources and 
by each other71.  
 
 However, although Deleuze’s philosophy of time is influenced by Heraclitus 
and also by Nietzsche, it is particularly shaped by his encounter with the thought of 
Henri Bergson – and it is this influence and relationship that we will be focussing on 
                                                 
71 We are using the term ‘individualities’ here to make a distinction between Deleuze’s relational notion 
of individuality (as discussed in Chapter Three) and the concept of the discrete individual with a self-
present identity. As Paul Patton has discussed, through notions such as affect and multiplicity Deleuze’s 
thought provides us with ‘a concept of individuality which does not conform to the logic of identity’ 
(Patton 2000: 10).  
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here. Going against the hostility to Bergson and vitalism that characterised the 
intellectual climate of his times, Deleuze framed Bergson’s philosophy as making ‘the 
greatest contribution to a philosophy of difference’ (Deleuze 1999: 42), the modernity 
of which lies in its emphasis on ‘the durational character of life’ (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 
21). We must, Bergson insisted, think in terms of duration. Crucially though, Deleuze 
also takes from Bergson the idea that time ‘is invention or it is nothing at all’ (Bergson 
1911: 361); the idea that time is always qualitatively differing from itself; or finally, 
that time can be equated with change and creativity and placed in opposition to the 
‘essentially inert and uncreative’ nature of space72. For Bergson, Deleuze argues 
 
Duration is always the location and the environment of differences 
in kind; it is even their totality and multiplicity. There are no 
differences in kind except in  duration – while space is nothing other 
than the location, the environment, the totality of differences in 
degree (Deleuze 1988: 32). 
 
In this scenario, ‘every moment brings with it something “radically new”’ (Mullarkey 
1999: 9-10). And in this regard, we can make an immediate connection to Goat Island in 
terms of their open rather than controlling approach to the creative process which, 
although by no means entirely unique to them as a company, still goes further than most 
in its embrace of time as inventive, undetermined change. ‘We have discovered a 
performance by making it’, the company’s website announces73.  
 
 And it is this distinction (between space and time, matter and memory, the 
inorganic and the living) that leads Deleuze to his deconstruction of presence/the 
present according to the conceptual pairing of the virtual/actual. As was discussed 
earlier, Deleuze characterizes the virtual, in contrast to ‘the possible’, as a realm of 
difference that conditions the production of the new in the actual world. However, 
Deleuze also defines the virtual in terms of time: as pure (rather than personal) memory 
                                                 
72 As John Mullarkey has pointed out, Bergson’s account of the nature of spatiality and its relation to 
time changes across his oeuvre beyond this straightforwardly negative depiction of space as pure 
homogeneity which is primarily put forward by Bergson in Time and Free Will (Mullarkey 1999: 12-13). 
However, it is outwith the scope of the thesis to explore the nuances of Bergson’s thinking, suffice to note 
that Deleuze presents a particular and partial account of Bergsonism that should not be taken as identical 
with Bergson’s philosophy per se (as Deleuzians often tend to do). 
73 Of course, one could also argue that even this idea of discovering a performance by making it marks a 
degree of effort to determine the future in contrast to the moment of the company’s inauguration. At this 
point it was not certain that it would be a ‘performance’ that would emerge from their collaborative 
process. 
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or as the persistence of the past as that which conditions the production of the present 
and makes it pass. And this concept of virtuality has a great many implications for 
common sense notions of time. For instance, it dismantles the binary between the 
presence of the present and the absence of the past, inviting us to think instead of the 
becoming of the present and the virtual presence of the past. Likewise, as Constantin 
Boundas suggests, the Deleuzo-Bergsonian theory of time insists that  
 
the present can no longer be thought of as becoming past after a new 
present has come to replace it, nor can the past be thought of as 
being constituted after it has ceased to be present…We are indeed 
asked to think that the entire past preserves itself and, therefore co-
exists with every present (Boundas in Patton 1996: 93-4).  
 
In this counter-intuitive theory that invites us to abandon almost all of our current 
associations with the term ‘past’ as a tense, Deleuze and Bergson propose that it is not 
that the past has been present and then passes, but rather that ‘the present is constituted 
as past at the same time that it is constituted as present’ in a kind of simultaneous 
doubling of reality as both virtual and actual (ibid.). The presence of the present, then, is 
differential rather than self-identical.  
 
 
2. The multiplication of presence in ‘Actualism’: a critique of the virtual  
 
 Perhaps one of the most lively areas of debate in recent Deleuze Studies 
concerns the nature of the relation between virtual and actual in Deleuze’s thought. 
Does Deleuze place a greater value on the virtual over the actual, or on ‘creation’ rather 
than ‘creature’ (to translate the question into Hallward’s terms)? While Keith Ansell-
Pearson is comfortable to call Deleuze’s thought ‘a materialism of the immaterial’ or, ‘a 
materialism of the virtual’ (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 413), Hallward – as we have seen in 
the last chapter – accuses Deleuze of producing an ascetic philosophy of unworldly, 
pure creativity with no genuine connection to the actual world of material creatures. To 
recount, Hallward argues that Deleuze ‘assumes that the most creative medium of our 
being is a form of abstract, immediate or dematerialised thought’ (Hallward 2006: 2) 
and, as such, that Deleuze encourages us to escape as far as possible from ourselves and 
active engagement in the material world in order to merely contemplate presence as 
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creative differing. And, certainly, Deleuze does develop the methodological concept of 
‘transcendental empiricism’ as a method that attempts to go beyond the experience of 
actual ‘things and states of things’ to the unrepresentable, virtual tendencies of which 
they are understood to be products. Whereas actual things differ from each other in 
degree, tendencies differ in kind. Transcendental empiricism undoes the ‘mixtures’ 
given to experience, revealing the pure tendencies of space and duration. 
 
 In turn, this notion of the virtual as that which conditions the actual has been 
taken up and foregrounded by a number of Deleuzian commentators, including Brian 
Massumi, Manuel de Landa and Keith Ansell Pearson. However, another contemporary 
philosopher – John Mullarkey – has argued that Massumi et al represent a larger 
‘Virtualist’ tendency within Deleuze Studies to denigrate the actual in favour of the 
virtual, creating a hierarchy between the two concepts on the basis of the idea that 
actual forms are ‘ontologically dependent upon a ground that is not their own’ 
(Mullarkey 2004: 470)74. In these readings, he suggests, ‘the actual is normally 
aligned…with the merely possible, the molar, the spatial, the phenomenological, and the 
psychological, while the virtual alone has privileged access to reality, that is, to 
ontology’ (ibid.). Whereas Deleuze and Bergson’s original struggle was to convince 
skeptical empiricists of the reality of a virtual realm of difference, duration and affect, 
Mullarkey seems to suggest that the balance has now swung too far the other way – 
such that only the virtual is considered real and fundamental, while actual forms are 
treated as mere by-products that must be forgotten or relinquished in order to access the 
processes understood to bring them about.  
 
 In contrast, Mullarkey argues that it is the notion of a realm of virtuality that is 
the psychological by-product derived from the reality of actuality (not the other way 
round)75. And in turn, he proposes what he calls ‘Actualism’, based on other aspects of 
Bergson’s work in which the virtual is understood, not as grounding, but as itself 
                                                 
74 Amongst the works of Deleuzian Virtualism, Mullarkey cites Manuel de Landa’s  Intensive Science 
and Virtual Philosophy (2002) and Keith Ansell Pearson’s Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual 
(2001) (Mullarkey 2004: 488).  
75 However, it would be a mistake to think that Mullarkey is simply reversing the virtual/actual hierarchy 
here – dismissing the virtual as a ‘merely’ psychological phenomenon rather than an ontological reality. 
Although it is beyond the remit of this project to discuss such a position in full, Mullarkey’s view is 
essentially that the virtual is ‘a function of the actual’ but one that has ‘real effects on the actual rather 
than being merely epiphenomenal’ or illusory; both psychology and actuality are ontological. The actual 
is not a self-identical presence that needs a hidden power of virtual difference to render it creative and, as 
such, real. The actual was always already real as differential presence without the need for the concept of 
the virtual as ‘the pure difference ontologically subtending our actual world’ (Mullarkey 2004: 471).  
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grounded by ‘a play of actualities’ (ibid., 471). He argues that ‘the actual is always 
already actualised somewhere, to some point of view’; whereas the virtual is but ‘a 
perspectival image seen from… an interacting set of actual positions’ (ibid., 469). What 
may appear ‘virtual’ from one perspective is actual from another; what is ‘beyond 
experience’ clearly depends on the notion of actual experience we begin with. In what 
we might call “the virtualist Deleuze” the virtual is conceived as some kind of hidden 
potential or force that explains the phenomenon of actualization. Mullarkey, however, 
wants to relativise the perspective from which this perception of an ‘ontological 
hinterworld’ derives (ibid., 471). It is not, he argues,  
 
that there is one type of actual perception with the virtual existing 
beyond and around it (as a reservoir of difference) but rather that 
there are numerous different forms of actualities that virtualize their 
mutual differences such that a lowest common denominator is 
abstracted or spatialized – termed disparagingly ‘the actual’ or ‘the 
perception of the present’ or simply ‘presence’ – whilst those 
differences are consigned to a halo surrounding that single actuality 
and called ‘the virtual’ or the ‘memory of the past’ (ibid., 474-5 – 
emphasis original). 
 
And here is where the concept of Actualism becomes central not only to the concerns of 
this chapter but to an objective of this thesis as a whole: to deconstruct simple presence 
(and a single present) but with recourse to difference as multiplication rather than 
representation. In this way, Actualism suggests that there is not just ‘one type of 
presence everywhere’ in relation to which everything else is either past or future, but 
multiple presents that can be perceived through an ‘enlarged’ perception that Deleuze, 
following Bergson, associates with the artist as well as the mystic (ibid., 487).  
 
 One such artist who approaches performance in terms of this enlarged 
perception is Goulish himself. Significantly he does this at the same time as trying to 
bring the virtual back down to earth: 
 
If I might analyze what I am attempting, I could call it a modest 
Americanization of Deleuze; in a sense, trying to align his thinking 
with a  writing approach one might recognize more in the tradition 
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of American than European philosophy, by which I mean one that 
springs from the lived, the everyday, the ordinary (as found in 
Thoreau, Whitehead and Cavell) (Goulish 2007b – emphasis added). 
 
Similarly, Mullarkey positions his own essay as an attempt to ‘stem any exaggeration’ 
not only of the conceptual importance of the virtual for Deleuzo-Bergsonian thought, 
but also of its ethical or moral value. In the first instance, as Mullarkey notes, there has 
been a tendency in recent Deleuze Studies to set up a Manichean distinction between 
the ‘good’ virtual (molecular, rhizome etc.) versus the ‘bad’ actual (molar, tree etc.). 
But if the actual is ‘bad’ (at worst) or merely less worthy of attention than the virtual, 
then this clearly has implications for how we act in actuality, for our ethics and 
politics76. In contrast, Goulish’s writing provides a valuable correlate in Performance 
Studies to Mullarkey’s Actualist philosophy, most explicitly perhaps in his series of 
three lectures on the topic of the ordinary – which we might also call ‘the actual’77. In 
“The strain of the ordinary” (2007a), for example, Goulish associates the ordinary with 
‘that which can be overlooked’ and with a school of American writing (exemplified by 
Gertrude Stein amongst others) that refuses to overlook this ordinary. Following an 
exploration of this writing, Goulish suggests a shift in perception through which ‘what 
we call the ordinary’ can be seen ‘as the object invested with attention that multiplies 
it’. Here, Goulish is clear that he does not want ‘to value the ordinary over the 
extraordinary’ so much as attend to the extraordinary within the ordinary; to develop a 
mode of attention, of careful and concentrated sensing, that allows us to encounter the 
ordinary in all its complexity (akin to Kaprow’s process of “Performing Life”) (Goulish 
2007a: n.p.). Likewise, in “The time of the ordinary”, Goulish undoes the strict 
opposition between Bergson’s examples of the ticking clock and the dissolving sugar as 
demonstrations of two kinds of time, proposing that actual experience is always more 
                                                 
76 As Mullarkey acknowledges, his Actualist critique of the ethical and political implications of the 
prioritization of the virtual over the actual to some extent reflect the feminist critiques of Deleuze put 
forward by theorists like Luce Irigaray and Alice Jardine. As he puts it, ‘we could point initially to the 
feminist critique of Deleuze’s key notion of ‘becoming woman’ as one attempt to rehabilitate the actual, 
by pointing out the need to regard fully the molar being of individual women, as political agents or as 
biological mothers, beyond any indifferent flow of pure ‘atoms of womanhood’ heading towards 
imperceptibility’. For an essay connecting this feminist critique to aspects of Goat Island, see my own 
article – co-authored with Matthew Goulish – “A dialogue on becoming”. 
77 There are three works making up Goulish’s series of talks on the theme of the ordinary: 1) “The 
Disappearance of Latitudinarianism” which was originally presented as a paper at the Openport 
Symposium The Disappearance of Latitude – Live Presence & Realtime in Contemporary Practice 
hosted by Link’s Hall, and The School of the Art Institute of Chicago, on February 23, 2007; 2) “The 
strain of the ordinary”, which was presented at the Performing Literatures conference at University of 
Leeds, July 1, 2007; and, 3) the final work, entitled “The time of the ordinary” which was presented at 
Performance Studies International #14 conference in Copenhagen in August 2008. 
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complex than the example, which Goulish describes as a heuristic device existing in a 
sort of ‘virtual Kansas’ (Goulish 2008: n.p.).  
 
 Secondly though, and perhaps more crucially, the Actualist project is 
underpinned by an ethical demand to acknowledge the reality of multiple actualities 
(not just a single ‘actual’), rather than ‘virtualizing’ these actualities as the differential 
ground to a single, dominant actuality or presence. It may be that Virtualism seemingly 
celebrates this virtual as the creative engine behind the actual, but nevertheless, 
Mullarkey suggests, this celebration masks a form of oppression or a denial of the 
reality of otherness or differential presence78. As such, beyond merely deconstructing 
presence according to the virtual/actual distinction, we need to acknowledge the 
presence of multiple actualities, even when those actualities are invisible or 
imperceptible to ‘us’. That is, regardless of the limits of our specific perspective, these 
multiple actualities ‘are always actual in and for themselves’ (Mullarkey 2003: 481). 
Presence is a plurality of presents, or a multiplicity of inhuman as well as human ways 
of being in time. Therefore, the approach to the temporality of presence that Actualism 
promotes is one that is less anthropocentric than either the metaphysics of presence (as 
deconstructed by Bergson, Derrida and Deleuze) or Virtualism, but also less ‘past-ist’ 
than the latter, given its support for the development of an enlarged perception to 
encounter the thickness of the present (as presents, plural)79. And it is our contention 
that there are few better contemporary examples of this approach at work in 
performance, or of a response to this call to enlarge perception (and with that, our 
understand of what is involved in ‘spectatorship’ or what goes on in theatrical space), 
than Goat Island. In what follows, we will attempt to explain why.  
 
                                                 
78 It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves here that this ‘otherness’ can equally be what we 
conventionally consider to be a part of ‘ourselves’, not just the otherness of another person or 
individuality. For instance, Mullarkey discusses the example of the tendency to ‘virtualize’ parts of one’s 
self – such as the unconscious, the body or memory – from the perspective of consciousness. Rather than 
appropriate the difference of these parts as ‘mine’ or label their reality as ‘virtual’, Actualism encourages 
us to conceive of each part as its own actual world, with its own actuality, which may or may not be 
visible to other parts such as conscious thought, but can be felt or intuited (Mullarkey 2003: 479).  
79 Mullarkey suggests that ‘One way to capture the two dominant approaches to time in contemporary 
Continental philosophy is by depicting them as either futurist or pastist. Where (the early) Heidegger 
demotes the present in favour of the future, Deleuze attacks it from its flank of the past. In both cases, 
though, any depth that might be thought to belong to other broader presents, to thick presents, is stolen for 
the future or past’ (Mullarkey 2003: 487). In this sense, this final chapter is pointing to a consideration of 
differential presence beyond Deleuze, and partly developed by Matthew Goulish whose perspective – 
particularly in recent writing – is arguably closer to Bergson and Mullarkey than Deleuze, to the extent 
that we are willing to label the current orthodoxy on Deleuze as more ‘Virtualist’ than ‘Actualist’.  
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3. Slowness and waiting: Differential presence as felt time 
 
 The first strategy or distinctive characteristic of Goat Island’s work that we will 
address is their use of slowness and waiting. As we noted in the chapter introduction, 
Goat Island are well known for performances which insist upon slowing down 
audiences; performances which alter the speed of the audience through the temporality 
of the performance’s unfolding, forcing the audience to wait for something to happen 
and, indeed, to feel slow actions and small gestures as ‘somethings’ rather than 
‘nothings’. Of course, this chapter is by no means alone in suggesting that Goat Island’s 
performances impose a recalibration of time upon their audiences. However, we hope to 
draw from the Deleuzo-Bergsonian notion of the present’s multiplicity in order to offer 
something new to this observation with an emphasis on why – philosophically, 
aesthetically, ethically, politically – such a recalibration might matter.  
 
 As company member Karen Christopher explains,  
 
Slowness is part of our process and is a reaction against speed. 
Collaboration is a slow process and devising is a slow process for us. 
On top of this, we are  manipulating the viewers’ sense of time by going 
at other than usual paces and  using improbable time signatures. A 
quick understanding of circumstances or ideas often misses depth and 
complication, so slowness is also away of allowing  complexity into the 
work (Christopher in Stanier 2004: n.p.). 
 
In part, this embrace of slowness in performance can be attributed to Hixson’s earlier 
experiences of the work of Pina Bausch and Tadeusz Kantor, ‘which she read as 
actively resisting (albeit in very different ways) the contemporary cultural pressure to 
communicate or entertain quickly’ (Bottoms 1998: 442). Correlatively, a Goat Island 
dance sequence will often allow a single minute gesture to take up an unexpectedly 
extended period of time. For example, in the company’s fifth performance How Dear to 
Me The Hour When Daylight Dies (1996),  
 
Matthew Goulish spends upwards of 10 minutes standing and rubbing 
the back of one hand with the fingers of his other hand… leaving the 
 215 
audience with time to  watch seemingly very little for – in 
theatrical/performance terms – a long time (Mitchell in Goat Island 
1999a: n.p.).  
 
In this sense, the company are willing to risk boredom, but from the position of 
conceiving boredom as an affect that can immediately precede an optimum audience 
state of what we might call a kind of passive alertness; when we have stopped trying so 
hard to understand why what is happening is happening or to make sense of what is 
being done, and concentrate on attending to what is happening – in itself (which is 
always not ‘itself’ or one at the same time) and on ourselves in the process of perceiving 
the performance. Rather than allowing us to see the gesture as a representation of an 
existing idea, the slowness of the ‘hand-dance’ both forces us to look more closely and 
to listen to our own duration as it is figured by our impatience – an experience which, 
for Deleuze and Bergson, creates new concepts.  
 
 Goat Island are particularly interested in the notion of waiting, in the 
performers’ waiting and making the audience wait in a manner that, for Sara Jane 
Bailes, ‘enfolds the performer and spectator into the same condition of (unfulfilled) 
expectancy’ (Bailes 2007: 39). However, one might also address the process of waiting 
in Goat Island through Bergson’s well-known example of waiting for sugar to dissolve 
in water, which Deleuze takes up both in the essay, “Bergson” (1956) and the book, 
Bergsonism. In Creative Evolution, Bergson writes,  
 
If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, willy-nilly, wait 
until the sugar melts. This little fact is big with meaning. For here 
the time I have to wait is not that mathematical time which would 
apply equally well to the entire history of the material world, even if 
that history were spread out instantaneously in space. It coincides 
with my impatience, that is to say, with a certain portion of my own 
duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer 
something thought, it is something lived. It is no longer a relation, it 
is an absolute (Bergson 1911: 10).  
 
The one who waits does not merely contemplate, but lives the difference between 
his/her own rhythm and that of the sugar – which is taking too long (in the waiter’s 
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actuality) to dissolve into the water. From this experience, Deleuze emphasizes, we can 
see that the sugar need not only be approached in terms of its spatial organization, or its 
difference in location from other things: the glass, another lump of sugar and so forth. 
Considered in terms of space the sugar differs from other things in degree, but as 
Deleuze stresses 
 
it also has a duration, a rhythm of duration, a way of being in time 
that is at least  partially revealed in the process of its dissolving and 
that shows how this sugar differs in kind not only from other things, 
but first and foremost from itself (Deleuze 1988: 32).  
 
As we’ve mentioned, Goulish also takes up this example of the dissolving sugar and 
Bergson’s contrasting example of the ticking clock in ‘The time of the ordinary’. As 
Goulish describes, for Bergson, the clock leads us to misunderstand time by describing 
it in spatial terms, since 
 
the clock attempts to measure changes in duration according to 
differences of degree (two minutes is sixty seconds more than one 
minute) rather than kind (what was a recognizable cube-shaped lump 
of sugar after one minute has become after two minutes a globular 
form one-quarter the original size, as three-quarters of it is now in 
liquid suspension in the hot tea, transforming the contents from “tea” 
to “tea with sugar,” this difference in kind being of course the point) 
(Goulish 2008: n.p.)80. 
 
 But the example of the melting sugar is not just about the sugar, but about the 
one who waits, and it is in this sense that it relates to performance and particularly to the 
question of audience reception. As Deleuze argues  
 
Bergson’s famous formulation, “I must wait until the sugar  dissolves” 
has a still broader meaning than is given to it by its context. It signifies 
that my own duration, such as I live it in the impatience of waiting, for 
                                                 
80 Bergson’s original example was about sugar dissolving in water, since sugared water was a popular 
drink in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Goulish’s (mis)quotation of the example – in 
which water becomes tea – is not so much a mistake as a translation of Bergson’s observations into a 
more ordinary, contemporary example. 
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example, serves to reveal other durations that beat to other rhythms, 
that differ in kind from mine (...)’ (Deleuze 1988: 32).  
 
The affect of becoming-impatient is what alerts us not only to our own duration, but to 
its difference in kind from the many other durations pulsing within the real. There is an 
inherently performative dimension to all this, insofar as Bergson and Deleuze focus on 
the act of witnessing as that which triggers the exposure of both my own and other 
durations. However, as Ansell-Pearson notes, the relationship between the philosopher 
and the sugar dissolving is not that of spectator to spectacle, but rather ‘a special kind of 
complicity’ – a coexistence of multiple durations in the event of attending to life’s way 
of being in time (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 29). In this way, while we have moved on from 
the literally participatory performance of Kaprow, Goat Island are still concerned with 
ontological participation reconceived as taking part in the plurality of rhythms making 
up the actual. 
 
 The very first of Goat Island’s works, Soldier, Child, Tortured Man (1987) asks 
after the difference of the performer in a comparable fashion. We do not have to wait 
for the performer to melt of course, but we do have to wait for her/him to become 
exhausted, to reach the point when s/he is physically unable to perform a further 
repetition of a choreographic sequence. In early interviews Hixson explains this use of 
physical exertion in performance as derived from the company’s fascination with ‘that 
which was not illusionary, like the body getting tired or the involuntary breathing of a 
performer after running’ (Hixson 1990: 18). However, this use of exhaustion can be 
alternatively read, through Deleuze, as allowing the performer’s way of being in time to 
define the temporal structure of the performance. It is not about the self-presence of a 
real body versus the representational illusion of acting, but about the difference of the 
body from itself as revealed in the process of becoming-exhausted. For instance, in an 
interview with Irene Tsatsos, Goulish recalls how the structure of Soldier was altered in 
response to the performers’ levels of physical fitness: 
 
The physical training for Soldier was constructed around five 
permutations of movement that were stated and then repeated with 
variations… Lin [Hixson] tried to construct it so that by the end we 
were so tired that we couldn’t do a sixth repetition. As we got in 
better shape, we didn’t tire so easily. Lin made the piece more 
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difficult. She put the hardest stuff at the end. So we really are 
exhausted by the end (Goulish in Tsatsos 1991: 67).  
 
This interest in the difference of the performer as exhaustion is also evident in the later 
work, It’s Shifting Hank (1993); although, in this piece, the emphasis in not just on the 
specificity of human duration in general, but on the performers’ individual ways of 
being in time. It is important that they are allowed to tire ‘one by one’ rather than all at 
the same time.  
 
 Likewise, Goat Island approaches the notion of multiple co-existing durations 
with typical lightness and humour in their sixth performance, The Sea & Poison (1998), 
in which Goulish uses the top of his head as a stage, and as a place to attempt to grow a 
bean in a performance of becoming-earth. Here, Goulish shows the bean plant as a 
process of perception (in relation to heat, light, water, nutrients, music) rather than as an 
object – using his head as the site of the encounter between his human and the bean’s 
inhuman duration. Reflecting on the act in a subsequent essay, Goulish asks: 
 
For example, what is earth? A terrain, not a territory. A place where a 
bean might grow. Therefore if I become a place where a bean might 
grow, might I not become the earth? What do I need? Soil, water, light, 
music, and a bean. He places these ingredients atop his head and waits. 
A man sits near him and composes a letter. Instead of becoming the 
earth, he has become a houseplant. An exhausted couple begins dancing 
to his music, which has generated a dancelike environment. He wants a 
drink and yells for one. He has forgotten his quest to become the earth. 
He has discovered the difference between the earth and the human: 
distractability. The earth remembers; the human forgets. If I did the 
performance perfectly, would the bean grow? (Goulish in Goat Island 
1999b: n.p.) 
 
If the act is a deliberate failure on one level (the bean does not grow); then it is a 
success on another – alerting the audience to the commitment necessary to attend to the 
duration of the earth. We might also say that the act exposes the way in which the 
power to be distracted, like the power to become exhausted, is part of the human’s way 
of being in time – distraction affects the character, performer and audience. Even the 
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slowest performance experiments have found it necessary to move faster than the 
growing bean in order to ‘keep’ their audience, or sometimes, when performance is 
allowed to unfold well beyond conventional temporal limits the audience is invited to 
come and go according to their own capacity to tolerate its duration81. It is all a question 
of balance: how long is too long (to wait)? How long is long enough for something to 
happen while seemingly nothing is happening?  
 
 In certain sequences in a Goat Island performance, differential presence as felt 
time or the lived experience of differential rhythms comes to the fore as the audience 
experiences the ‘painful affects’ not only of impatience or boredom, but also of 
confusion. In their early work, for example,  the company could be seen to force a set of 
questions on the audience through their performances of strenuous, untrained effort or 
what Tsatsos calls ‘rigorous athletics’82. For instance, It’s Shifting, Hank, involved a 
sequence in which  
 
all four performers crawled backwards on their forearms and toes and 
they did this until they collapsed in puddles of sweat on the floor. One 
by one they failed to continue and ended up being dragged out of the 
way by the survivors who then carried on crawling. The crawling went 
on for a long period of time and the strain it caused on the performers’ 
bodies was both visible and audible. The rubbing of the bony part of the 
forearm on the floor caused the skin to peel back and the elbows were 
bloody by the end of this sequence (Christopher in Goat Island 1999a: 
n.p.).  
 
In this sense, it is partly the duration of the action that renders it inexplicable, leading 
the audience to wonder: ‘How long is this going to go on? Why do they keep on doing 
this even though it hurts them?’ The thoughts that this sequences forces, registers the 
recalibration of time for the audience by the performance. It reveals a relationship 
between time and logic – an expectation that things will only last for a ‘reasonable’ 
length of time.   
                                                 
81 Here, I am thinking of works like Robert Wilson’s KA Mountain and of durational performances by 
Forced Entertainment. 
82 In 1991, interviewer Irene Tsatsos asked Goat Island if ‘rigorous athletics’ were the company’s 
‘trademark’. Matthew Goulish replied: ‘I’m not so sure physicality is a trademark. I think it’s a kind of 
response to dance where you can see the effort but not the pain. But when an audience sees an untrained 
effort, it’s more affecting that seeing a trained or hidden effort’ (Tsatsos 1991: 67).  
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 In the earlier chapter on Artaud, we explored the idea of differential presence as 
a fundamental encounter that forces thought. Now, we can develop this idea by noting 
that, for Bergson, thinking must be about time, about accelerating or decelerating, and 
as such sympathizing with or participating in the movement and ‘the very life of things’ 
(Bergson 2007: 43). In other words, we might suggest that differential presence, in Goat 
Island, constitutes a feeling of time that forces thought; an affect or becoming-other that 
reveals the nature of time as multiplicity and the production of novelty. As time unfolds, 
change occurs; even when, seemingly, “nothing” is happening. Indeed, it is perhaps 
precisely when nothing or very little seems to be happening – as in the uses of slowness 
and waiting in Goat Island – that time’s production of difference or novelty becomes 
most apparent to us. 
 
 While Goat Island’s later performances abandon the connections to the tradition 
of heroic, endurance performance established by some earlier works, waiting remains 
important. Indeed, it was perhaps of greatest concern to them during their penultimate 
performance When will the September roses bloom? Last night was only a comedy… 
Here, it is clear that Goat Island are not only concerned with the waiting of the 
audience, but with the performers’ waiting; and equally, as Christopher explains, they 
are not interested in representing waiting, as much as in occupying a particular mode of 
embodied attention:  
 
The tiny hairs on my face are ecstatic. They straighten out from my 
face and waver in the air around my head. I’m listening. I’m trying not 
to project a sense of something. My gaze is not direct and my body not 
in a loud posture that states: I am waiting, I am wanting, I am 
showing...’ (Christopher in Goat Island 2006: n.p.). 
 
Such uses of waiting or apparent stillness have the effect of attracting the audience’s 
attention to movement going on on another level from that of conventional 
choreography. Similarly, for example, when performer Lito Walkey stands on one leg 
for a specific duration, accompanied by James Taylor’s “Sweet Baby James”, what 
appears is not the body as a solid and static thing, but the body as part of a world in 
perpetual motion. In attempting to be still, what becomes perceptible are the rhythmic 
shudders and vibrations of muscle tension; something is happening after all. The 
 221 
performance’s duration has made something happen to us that allows us to perceive 
happenings where we saw nothing (but stillness) before. In Deleuzian terms, this change 
to the spectator involves jumping from one ‘threshold of perception’ to another, since 
‘there is always a perception finer than yours, a perception of your imperceptible’; 
‘there is always a threshold capable of grasping what eludes another: the eagle’s eye…’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 287, 281).  
 
Alternatively, we might follow the view of fellow performer, Bryan Saner, who 
equates these frequent moments of stillness and silence in September Roses, not with 
absence or the void, but with a kind of waiting that establishes a connection between 
that which has been separated or broken apart: ‘We have always considered our 
standing still and silence as repair. It is not nothing. It is a careful, patient listening 
before action. The stillness is related to the concept of serving people; of waiting’ 
(Saner in Goat Island 2006: n.p.). Hixson also alludes to this association of waiting and 
repairing damage, arguing that in contemporary culture:  
 
you have to be moving in order that your worth as a person is 
appreciated. You have to be in motion, you have to prove your 
productivity as a person, and that’s very scary for those that are not in 
motion. For someone who is ill, or doesn’t have money, or is not in 
motion in this capitalistic way: those people are cut off the chart now, 
in terms of being even considered a part of our culture... Repair has to 
do with stillness... People have to stop for a moment... and wait (Hixson 
in Goat Island 2006: n.p.). 
 
In these writings, Hixson also intuits a relation between becoming and waiting:  
 
Becoming someone else feels to me like an active state, but I know that 
there’s something about that that involves waiting as well. And I think 
it has to do with being able to see the other – by being able to be 
attentive, and hold the other with yourself, or in yourself... These are 
the things that are circling around in my mind (ibid.).  
 
Movement at a speed determined by the needs of capitalism is not the only movement. 
As the sugar example suggests: seeming immobility is not the absence of movement, 
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but rather movement at a different speed. For Deleuze and Bergson, every thing is 
moving, and clearly what Hixson is critiquing is not movement itself but the capitalist 
attempt to establish one, homogeneous rhythm and speed as universal, to segregate the 
(valuable) moving and the (useless) still from one’s own perspective. The ethical 
dimension of this Deleuzo-Bergsonian theory of time is that it impresses upon us the 
need to develop the patience and the modes of attention necessary to affirm the reality 
of durations other than our own.   
 
 With both of these temporal strategies – slowness and waiting – Goat Island 
encourage what we might call a kind of ‘participatory spectatorship’. Though for some, 
it’s ‘stretching common sense’ to say that watching a performance (or looking at a 
painting) counts as a kind of participation (Kelley in Kaprow 2003: xviii); for others, 
like Goat Island, the rhetoric of those who insist on literal, audience participation is 
based on a false distinction between passive spectatorship and active participation83. 
Spectatorship has never been passive in the first place, Goat Island suggest; rather, the 
act of paying attention to the multiple durations of performance is, in itself, a way of 
taking part in those different ways of being in time.  
 
 
4. Repetition and imitation as becoming: 
Respecting the actualities of others (when philosophy meets politics) 
  
 Now, I want to move on to explore the role of what might (commonsensically) 
be called repetition and imitation in Goat Island’s work: two themes that initially seem 
“non-Deleuzian” in their emphasis on the reproduction of sameness. However, Deleuze 
not only wants to rethink time or becoming as the ‘groundless ground’ of all identity; he 
wants to rethink repetition and apparent mimesis as a ‘species of becoming’ (Mullarkey 
1999: 137). For Deleuze, what repetition repeats is difference not identity, not least 
because there could be no identical repetitions except outside of time. In a similar vein, 
                                                 
83 This is akin to the view put forward by Jacques Ranciere in his book, The Emancipated Spectator 
(2009). Here, Ranciere argues against the association of spectatorship with passivity, and with the idea of 
being seduced by an appearance without perceiving its real conditions or the mechanisms of its 
production. The spectator does not need ‘emancipating’, Ranciere suggests; since spectatorship is already 
a process of active storytelling, interpretation and translation. Spectatorship, for us, is also an active 
process, but less in terms of narrative or story and more in terms of the becomings induced by the 
encounter with multiple, differing durations.  
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Goat Island do not just repeat the archive but allow its different actualities to enliven the 
company’s own becoming.  
 
 For many, Goat Island’s choreographies are notable for their use of repetition as 
much for their uses of slowness and waiting: the recurring development of intricate and 
precise ‘dances’ based on repeated gestures, jumps, phrases, lifts and so forth. In 39 
microlectures, Goulish’s reporting of an anecdote reveals his Deleuzian sympathies: 
 
A few years ago, a producer whose name was Rollo made a special 
trip to see a performance of Goat Island’s piece It’s Shifting, Hank. 
Afterwards he wanted to give us his reaction, and I was elected to 
talk to him. I can summarize the conversation now as follows: Rollo 
said: What is the reason for all this repetition? And I said: What 
repetition? (Goulish 2000: 33) 
 
For Goulish, what Deleuze would call ‘bare, material or unproductive repetition’ is all a 
matter of perception; for instance, of the difference of perception between what he calls 
the ‘informed’ or ‘ecstatic’ viewer. ‘As John Cage said in his “Lecture on Nothing”,’ 
Goulish notes ‘“Repetition is only repetition if we feel that we own it”’ (ibid.). This is 
the relation to dance of the informed viewer who feels able to recognize when a dancer 
repeats a step, on the basis of a sense of ownership of choreographic language. 
Goulish’s ecstatic viewer, in contrast, ‘is ignorant of dance and claims no ownership of 
its language’ and, as such, observes only the differences of steps that the informed 
viewer subsumes within the recognition of the same.  
 
 Goulish goes on to suggest that this distinction extends to performer as well as 
audience, where the ecstatic performer is one for whom ‘no difference between two 
moments is insignificant’ (ibid., 34), or better (perhaps) every moment is different – 
since Deleuze wants to take us beyond the perception of difference as not-sameness; 
beyond, for instance, the not-sameness of two dance steps. Likewise, Lehmann 
explicitly acknowledges Deleuze’s influence when he argues that ‘even in the theatre, 
there is no such thing as true repetition. The very position in time of the repeated is 
different from that of the original. We always see something different in what we have 
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seen before’ (Lehmann 2006: 157)84. The production of difference, rather than the 
reproduction of the same, has always been at work in the theatre, for Lehmann and Goat 
Island, even in its most classical formations. In turn, Lehmann suggests – and this 
seems highly pertinent to Goat Island’s repetitive choreographies – repetition, like 
stillness, can draw our attention to ‘the little differences’ (ibid.). Again, Lehmann is 
drawing from Deleuze here who wrote of the power of repetition to foreground 
difference in relation to the work of Andy Warhol – specifically his screen-print 
paintings and the “Death and Disaster” series (Zepke 2005: 32). As Goat Island dance, 
this attention to the difference of repetition does not just occur as an entire sequence is 
repeated, but in the repetition of a gesture by different company members, in which the 
‘same’ movement is transformed in the context of a different body. 
 
 Although less apparent than the use of (differential) repetition, Goat Island’s 
choreographies are also characterized by a use of imitation or what Goulish has called 
‘choreographic appropriation’85. Again, however, their specific approach to and 
understanding of imitation is closer to what Deleuze calls becoming rather than 
copying, insofar as it is an imitation that transforms the imitator as s/he encounters a 
different duration. For Deleuze and Guattari, all imitations involve what they call 
‘becomings’ – whether we are talking about a painter’s “representation” of a bird or the 
so-called “mimicry” of the wasp by the orchid in nature. ‘Imitation self-destructs,’ they 
argue ‘since the imitator unknowingly enters into a becoming that conjugates with the 
unknowing becoming of that which he or she imitates. One imitates only if one fails, 
when one fails’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 305). Deleuze and Guattari also argue that 
‘We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you are’ (ibid., 238), 
and in this sense, they propose that imitation or representation are not the (only) way we 
encounter the difference of ‘the other’. 
 
 A key example of this comes in the company’s seventh performance, It’s an 
Earthquake in My Heart (2001) in which Goulish performs an imitation of Dominique 
Mercy – ‘a French dancer in Pina Bausch’s company’ (Goulish 2000b: 7). Goulish’s 
account of the process of developing this imitation is interesting because it suggests the 
                                                 
84 Lehmann cites Difference and Repetition in a footnote to this statement. See pp. 197n.  
85 In fact, in his essay “Memory is this”, Goulish tells us that Hixson ‘appropriated the idea of 
choreographic appropriation’ having watched The Last Performance by Jerome Bel and company in 
which the performers all imitate the same solo by the German choreographer and dancer, Susanne Linke 
(Goulish 2000: 6). 
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way in which one type of repetition can undo another – how imitation might undo habit 
and make way for becoming. For instance, Goulish’s attempt to imitate Mercy – by 
repeatedly watching a video of him dancing and attempting to copy it – shows how 
imitation might constitute a way to unlearn (or forget, or escape from) one way of 
moving, and to learn (or remember) another. Through imitation, Goulish opens himself 
up to a feeling of the ‘foreignness’ or ‘wrongness’ of moving when one attempts to take 
on the speed, rhythm or way of being in time of another body. Conventionally, the term 
‘appropriation’ connotes an element of absorption, possession or incorporation, in 
which the difference of the thing appropriated is subsumed within the identity of that 
which appropriates. However, Goulish notes that in his case, appropriation is about 
leaving the difference of the source intact: it is precisely when he can perform a 
movement that feels wrong that he is ‘getting it right’ – when he is entering into 
composition with Mercy, becoming-Mercy (ibid., 8). To appropriate Deleuze and 
Guattari’s words, it could be said that Goulish imitates Mercy, reproducing his image in 
a signifying fashion86. But it is the speed and rhythm of Mercy’s gestures that Goulish 
tries to cultivate in his own body, following the logic that if the body is an outcome of 
its movements, and the self an effect of its becoming in and as time, then by taking on 
the movement of an other (as closely as possible) we might transform our own style of 
living.   
 
 
5. Beyond ‘mere’ imitation: manifestation, hybridization and the affective body 
 
This use of imitation or becoming extends beyond the process of developing 
choreographies, and features as a central strategy in Goat Island’s creative process as a 
whole. Indeed, Goulish says that ‘about 80%’ of what they do in a Goat Island 
performance ‘is about imitating something or someone’, in a manner that he suggests is 
‘a lot like… what children do. They see a movie that they really like then they go home 
and re-enact parts of it’ (Goulish in Sayre 1997: n.p.). Goat Island, in turn, imitate 
historical figures: the female pilot Amelia Earhart, Mike Walker – the Vietnam War 
veteran who was once America’s fattest man, the philosopher and writer Simone Weil, 
and the comedians Larry Grayson and Lenny Bruce. But they also imitate characters 
from films: Mr Memory from The 39 Steps, Scott Carey from The Incredible Shrinking 
                                                 
86 See A Thousand Plateaus, the original sentence reads: ‘it could be said that the orchid imitates the 
wasp, reproducing its image in a signifying fashion’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 10).  
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Man. In each case, Goat Island move away, not only from the dominant understanding 
of theatrical ‘character’ as determined by ‘notions of roundness, depth and interiority’ 
(Wallis and Shepard 2004: 179), but also any stereotypically postmodern approach in 
which imitation or appropriation are used to point to the necessarily fictional or 
representational status of the performance. Rather, we might suggest that to play a 
character in Goat Island is to enter into a becoming with one’s sources, to perceive and 
respect the different ‘world’ of another person, but also to attempt to explore and 
cultivate a different duration in an encounter with that ‘world’. We will now propose 
that this approach to character operates on three levels that we might nominate 
‘manifestation’, ‘hybridization’, and ‘the affective body’. Each term indicates a slightly 
different approach to the affirmation of time as becoming as that which precedes the 
discrete identities of self and other, or performer and character. 
 
 What we will term ‘manifestation’ is a surface effect of the company’s 
commitment to preserving the difference of their sources rather than forming them 
through interpretation. By manifestation we mean to suggest a sense of difference 
between speaker and voice, loosely akin to that of the possessed spiritualist. As 
Christopher describes, ‘Each of the voices we incorporate needs to be heard on its own 
terms and not written over by some attitude of our own’ (Christopher in Bottoms and 
Goulish 2007: 83). Likewise, as Bottoms reports, ‘Hixson speaks of the need to 
“embrace the sources sincerely,” looking to learn from and so move with them, rather 
than interpreting them from a fixed point (Bottoms 1998: 436). The Many are protected 
from an over-determination by the One; difference from an assimilation into identity. 
That is, manifestation works through the resistance to nuance or expressive intonation 
added to the source from the outside. Diderot famously conceived the actor as one who 
accurately imitates the exterior signs of emotion so perfectly that the audience cannot 
tell that he is not actually feeling them (Shepard and Wallis 2004: 225). With Goat 
Island, as Deleuze says of Bene, ‘the actor ceases to be an actor’ in order to become a 
surface over which a series of gestures and words pass. This is not to say that the 
performer is not doing anything, on the contrary she is attending to subtracting her ‘self’ 
– as outside observer – in order to allow the audience to encounter the source in all its 
difference from itself. Manifestation is not about Karen Christopher becoming an empty 
vessel that allows the real Mike Walker to appear; it is about affirming and protecting 
the difference immanent to Mike Walker’s words from any secondary organization as 
representation. 
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 Next comes ‘hybridization’. In “The Incredible Shrinking Man Essay and Board 
Game: A Collaborative Publication Project” (1999), Saner introduces the notion of 
hybridity, which he defines as the splicing of one’s existing ideas with a new way of 
thinking that comes from an ‘other’. Hybridization, he suggests, is what happens when 
audiences confront Goat Island’s performances, but it is also what occurs  
 
within the company as members collaborate together on a daily basis 
in rehearsals. The ideas that we work with are almost always hybrids. 
We combine our thinking with the thoughts of others, creating a 
hybrid vigour that is in a sense more resistant and hardy (Saner in 
Goat Island 1999b: 19). 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, hybridization is thought in terms of becomings, be it 
becoming-animal, molecular or imperceptible. They cite the example of Vladimir 
Slepian, who writes a story about a man who enters into a becoming-dog by wearing 
shoes on his hands. In turn, the mouth must be used to tie the laces on the second hand. 
Do not become a barking, molar dog, they say – “real” animals are trapped in and 
defined by their forms as much as human subjects. But do bark; since, by barking, ‘if it 
is done with enough feeling, with enough necessity and composition, you emit a 
molecular dog’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 275). In a becoming-dog, the dog must 
become something else as much as I. In turn we might say that putting character into 
variation involves the character becoming the actor as much as the actor becoming the 
character; Mike Walker becoming Karen Christopher as much as the other way round. 
For example, during her repetition of a character’s speaking and moving, Christopher 
says that she never attempts to  
 
cause the audience to cease to see me in front of them. Yet it is not 
enough to say that we are “simply playing ourselves”… It is a specific 
thing I do when I complicate myself with more than one voice. Like a 
series of transparencies sliding over each other, we are trying to enact a 
kind of simultaneity of being (Christopher in Bottoms and Goulish 
2007: 84). 
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A further hybridizing device used by the company is the notion of performance 
within the performance, which is used in September Roses: Simone Weil as Paul Celan. 
Simone Weil as Lillian Gish; and in The Lastmaker: Larry Grayson as St Francis. As 
Hixson explains, the ‘as’ constructs a diagonal connection between sources; hybrids are 
created which suggest relationships between the apparently unrelated, of difference to 
difference but not by way of resemblance. A diagonal structure need not be spoken – in 
Daylight Dies, Christopher speaks Mike Walker’s words while wearing Amelia 
Earhart’s white cotton flying helmet, such that ‘As Amelia disappears, Mike Walker 
appears and appears and appears’ (ibid., 85). Secondly, this specifically differential 
nature of Goat Island’s imitiations is perhaps most evident in the hybrid or “double-
figures” that emerge in the company’s most recent shows, such as the Larry Grayson-St 
Francis of Assisi figure performed by Mark Jeffrey in The Lastmaker (2007) or indeed 
Goulish’s rendering of Mr Memory – which is, in fact, an assemblage of multiple 
imitations, combining the character from Hitchcock’s The 39 Steps with the former 
Wooster Group actor Ron Vawter as Roy Cohn. As Bottoms recounts, Goulish 
performs the assemblage by ‘delivering some of Memory’s lines from the film using the 
speed-talking technique Vawter had used in the Wooster Group’s L.S.D.’ (Bottoms 
1998: 438).  
 
 Finally, it is important to note exactly what aspects of their source-figures Goat 
Island choose to imitate; a choice that implies a particular understanding of 
individuality – who or what ‘Amelia Earhart’ is, ‘Mike Walker’ is and so forth. And 
here is where we turn to the third level: the focus on affect or ‘the affective body’ of the 
source rather than on psychology. Christopher, for instance, describes her process as 
follows: 
 
When I play a character I play a series of gestures and sounds. I repeat 
certain positions and cadences and rhythms. I am not trying to repeat 
the person, only their motion and their sound (Christopher in Bottoms 
and Goulish 2007: 84). 
 
In contrast to notions of acting as emotional identification, this is a task-based approach 
to performance that locates a value in the diligent repetition of the visible and audible 
qualities of something or someone else. There are a number of things we might note 
here. First, that Goat Island tend to create characters by watching and repeating other 
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performances rather than interpreting a script. Second, that this approach emphasises the 
affective aspect of language as sound rather than representation. Christopher does not 
conceive her ‘self’ as a tool for representing the truth or essence of an ‘other’, such as in 
the conventional approach to character which assumes and imposes stasis on both 
performer and person performed. Rather, through repetition, she affirms the difference 
underlying this distinction by entering into a becoming with a body that speaks and 
moves differently from her own.  
 
 Speaking of Daylight Dies – the performance in which these imitations of Earhart, 
Walker and Mr Memory appear – Goulish states: ‘I think that a big part of this 
performance is about the presence of people who are no longer alive’ and one might 
add, the presence or actuality of ‘the past’. This concern is particularly developed in the 
figure of Mr Memory from The 39 Steps, re-enacted by Goulish during the performance, 
and whom he describes as ‘a kind of personification or emblem of the past in the 
present in a human form’ (Goulish in Sayre 1997: n.p.). But what do we mean by the 
actuality of the past, or the co-existence of multiple presents? Are we suggesting that 
‘the past’ is a present going on at a different speed? Are we really arguing that Amelia 
Earhart, for example, is not dead after all? Of course not. ‘Amelia Earhart’ – at least 
according to one understanding of what ‘Amelia Earhart’ means – died in 1939 (or to be 
precise, went missing July 2, 1937, and was declared dead January 5, 1939). And yet, 
much depends on who or what we think ‘Amelia Earhart’ is, on who or what we think 
any ‘one’ is. In the conventional account, Earhart is a self-present individual who was 
born and died, who had a life that began and ended at clearly demarcated points in time. 
This is Amelia Earhart defined as what Deleuze would call a ‘molar’ entity. In contrast, 
as chapter three introduced, Deleuze presents us with a rethinking of individuality or 
uniqueness as what he calls a ‘haecceity’, a ‘bloc of becomings’, or a ‘rhizome’, and 
which we might paraphrase as a set of relations: ways of being in time, ways of using a 
body, a voice. Likewise, Deleuze contrast the molar form of some thing, with its 
‘micrological’ traits or details, such as the form of a face in contrast to a facial tic 
(Lawlor 2008: n.p.). It is these relations or traits that the Goat Island performer 
differentially repeats in the process of imitation. The traits of Amelia Earhart are 
extracted from her form and then used in a ‘different milieu,’ or ‘deterritorialized’ as 
Deleuze and Guattari would say, in order to produce new, alternative outcomes (ibid.). 
In this way, whereas molar forms can die or end, molecular becomings can live on by 
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inhabiting different molarities (such as a Goat Island performer). A tone of voice, a turn 
of phrase, a posture: all of them present, differently.  
 
 
6. Goat Island becoming Goat Island 
 
 In this sixth section we shall add some brief remarks on how the company 
approach the final, or finished performance such that it preserves the self-different 
nature that all the preceding strategies discussed have sought to nurture. “What is it to 
play a character in a Goat Island piece?” Christopher asks in Small Acts of Repair 
(2007), noting that writing around Goat Island’s work tends to elide questions of 
‘performance style’ in favour of discussions of ‘content and structure’. Perhaps the 
reason for this neglect is that the company don’t seem to have a ‘performance style’; 
that is, they make a point of avoiding virtuoso, or charismatic performance. As Goulish 
says, the work is performer-centred, but not necessarily presence-centred – where 
‘presence’ is associated with a quality (some people having it, some not) that seduces 
audiences, and with the demonstration of actorly skill, or magnetism. Maybe – better, it 
is because they don’t seem to have one performance style but several, or, in other 
words, their performance style is one of multiplicity rather than homogeneity. 
Individual performers don’t have their ‘own’ style that they bring to character, nor is 
there a ‘house style’ that serves to unify the performers as belonging to the same, 
coherent theatrical universe. As such, Goat Island’s ‘performance style’ is not a coating 
added to the performance so much as a surface effect of a process that is the company’s 
relationship to their sources.  
 
 Goat Island can be seen to take their concern with repetition, imitation and 
copying to a ‘meta-level’ in September Roses, exploring the idea of performance as its 
own double. Here the ‘finished’ performance appears as that which might have been 
(and could still be) otherwise. As Bailes describes, September Roses was ‘performed in 
two parts/versions over two nights, using the same blocks of material, presented in a 
different sequence each night, with the addition of a section that is unique to each 
version’ (Bailes 2007: 38). The second night is not the ‘bad copy’ of the first; both 
nights are and are not the ‘final’ show, insofar as the very decision to structure the 
performance material in two different forms opens up the idea that the material could 
equally be structured in more than two, perhaps an infinite number of ways. The shift 
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from process to performance, in other words, is akin to what Deleuze (after Simondon) 
calls individuation: difference differentiating itself (Bogue 1989: 63). The arrival at a 
‘finished’ performance puts a (temporary) stop to the generation of self-organizing 
forms by the creative process as ‘metastable substance’. Listening to Goat Island talk 
about their working method confirms this anti-hylomorphic perspective (when the artist 
forms matter with an Idea): they speak of the performance as a living thing, as 
something that grows, as something that changes in unpredictable ways, becoming 
larger than them and extending beyond the limits of their ability to know, conceptualise 
or interpret it. ‘We’re very interested in getting to places we haven’t been to before,’ 
Hixson says, ‘and if you had a theme you were starting with, it would always dominate, 
you wouldn’t go on that journey. You’d just pick something out and put it with your 
theme...’ (Hixson in Bottoms 1998: 433). Rather than organise material according to its 
perceived relevance or irrelevance to a transcendent theme, the company encourages the 
performance as metastable substance to do its own thing – that is, to differ from itself – 
for up to two years of rehearsal and development. 
 
 But it would be a mistake to think that the performance suddenly becomes the 
same as itself the minute that it is declared ‘finished’. On the contrary, Goat Island work 
hard to keep the difference or multiplicity in the work in a manner that allows the 
audience to make something new with it in the event of performance. Speaking of their 
collaborative process, the company have often noted that it works better when one 
brings something ‘incomplete’ to rehearsal, when one brings the outline of an idea for 
an action or image, leaving space for its transformation by new perspectives. Likewise 
in performance, it becomes important to make a show with holes in it. Writing of 
September Roses, Karen Jürs-Munby proposes: 
 
Like some of the fragile materials used – one-legged stools, 
cardboard tables and crutches in pieces – the structure of the 
performance text itself self-consciously announces that it, too, could 
be seen as in need of repair. It does not add up to an Aristotelian 
dramatic fictional whole but instead is full of holes. The onus is on 
the spectator/witness to help repair – perhaps by piecing together 
information seen over the two nights – or to help bear the trauma of 
living in a damaged world’ (Jürs-Munby in Lehmann 2006: 12).  
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For Jürs-Munby, to say: ‘there’s a hole in this performance’ or that its beginning is 
missing could be experienced, on the one hand, as a kind of photographic gesture that 
‘establishes a dialectic between presence and absence, between the presence of our 
experience of it and the absence of that to which it refers’ (Sayre 1989: 244). The 
gesture both alerts us to the present act of viewing (you are watching the performance) 
and implies an absence within that present (you are only watching an incomplete 
version of a full performance that happened elsewhere, in another time). But whereas 
Jürs-Munby’s reading of Goat Island is largely informed by a Lacanian position in 
which the difference of the performance from itself is conceived as lack or absence, 
September Roses’ missing beginning and ending might equally be seen to constitute a 
nod to process philosophy. That is, we might also approach these qualities of September 
Roses non-dialectically, noting that ‘beginnings’, ‘endings’ and the ‘finished’ make 
little sense within an ontology that asserts the primacy of becoming. The notion of 
becoming not only unsettles the distinction between subject and object, or self and 
other, but – by definition – the distinction between one discrete moment and another, 
between being (this) and not being (this) – when one ‘thing’ supposedly stops and 
another ‘thing’ starts. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Through slowness, waiting, repetition and imitation, Goat Island’s performance 
work acknowledges and responds to ‘the need to open ourselves affectively to the 
actuality of others’ (Mullarkey 2003: 488). So why is it important to feel time in this 
way; why does this temporal aspect of differential presence matter? In the first instance, 
the response to these questions can be metaphysical: that it matters that we perceive 
time in itself – as qualitative change, as a multiplicity of presents, rather than distorting 
it through the dominant philosophy of the same, and misleading concepts of repetition, 
imitation and a simple ‘here and now’. But there is another response that locates an 
ethical content within this metaphysics of time: an ethics of others, and specifically of 
other ways of being in time87. As Colebrook notes,  
 
                                                 
87 Contra Deleuze’s emphasis on Bergson’s specifically metaphysical contributions to the philosophy of 
difference, Mullarkey suggests that ‘Bergsonism may best be read as an ethics of alterity fleshed out in 
empirical concerns’ (Mullarkey 1999: 107). 
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Because we perceive the world from our own interested viewpoint we 
usually locate all other durations within our own… We perceive other 
persons as bodies, like ours and within our world; we don’t perceive 
the different ‘world’ of the other, their own duration (Colebrook 2002: 
47). 
 
And this act of reducing the different, the novel, or other to the same can be construed 
as an act of repression. Likewise, in Creative Evolution Bergson suggests that an 
‘attention to life’ – or an ‘openness’ to other durations – is what creates a hierarchy of 
species in nature. For Bergson, the lower form of life acts as if ‘the general movement 
of life stopped at it instead of passing through it. It thinks only of itself, it lives only for 
itself’ (Bergson 1911: 268).  
 
 In contrast to the self-absorption Bergson critiques, Goat Island’s work neither 
relegates the different to a separate (virtual) sphere for which we have no responsibility, 
nor seeks to assimilate that difference into a self-present company, character or show. In 
a recent correspondence, Goulish stated: ‘what I think was always most important about 
the copying was the idea of making oneself anew from the outside, through an 
encounter with another’. He also emphasised the way in which the internet as a research 
tool made the ethics of preserving the difference of the past and their sources all the 
more important:  
 
Toward the end of the making of The Lastmaker Mark [Jeffrey] 
brought in the idea of copying the [Larry] Grayson monologue, and I 
think that was the first time we used YouTube as a research resource. 
That internet technology seemed to bring the past, or the distant, so 
much closer. If the sources of our copying had anything in common 
before, it was that they required a certain degree of pilgrimage, of 
travel and labor to bring them closer – to see the performance or find 
the video. I don't mean to glorify that effort, although it certainly 
focused the attention. The new nearness of the past and its easy 
repetition makes a different  kind of study possible. I suppose the 
danger of that lies in the temptation to think everything of the past is 
available, or that what is available is the complete catalogue of the 
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past, or the far away, when that is not at all the case of course’ 
(Goulish 2009: n.p. – emphasis added). 
 
As Goulish’s remarks suggest, such technology as YouTube may render perceptible 
some hitherto unseen movements and speeds of historical figures like Grayson, if 
they are attended to closely in all their micromovements. 
 
 Goat Island describe their own underlying philosophy as a belief that ‘everything 
is connected’ – a belief that allows them to avoid beginning with a ‘theme’ and to 
explore the architectural structure of the Hagia Sophia and the final shows of the 
comedian Lenny Bruce in the same performance. However, the temporal dimension of 
differential presence that we have addressed in this chapter brings to light the full 
significance of this statement: ‘everything is connected’; reminding us that this includes 
a connection between the differing actualities we tend to call ‘past’, ‘present’ and 
‘future’.  
 
 This respect for the differential actuality of the archive provides an alternative 
model of community to that of the Living Theatre. In the World of Art documentary 
about the company, Saner suggests that there is a connection between the use of 
historical source material and the creation of community in the event of performance. It 
is because Goat Island are re-enacting past events in the lives of real people (who are no 
longer alive) that they are ‘developing community with an audience’. In Daylight Dies, 
Saner suggests, this connection is facilitated by his role as a kind of ‘master of 
ceremonies’ who helps to set up a relation between the audience and the other 
performers. As the first chapter of this thesis has shown, this notion of performance as a 
site of community formation could be contextualised with reference to company’s like 
the Living Theatre. However, as was indicated at the start of this chapter, Goat Island 
make very few explicitly political claims for their work. Or rather, as is fitting to their 
embrace of multiplicity, when they do frame their work in this way they also emphasize 
that an explicitly political reading of a given performance is only one interpretation 
amongst others88. We never hear Goat Island speak of ‘the people’, of ‘paradise’ or of 
                                                 
88 For instance, Goat Island have always held work-in-progress showings and post-show discussions 
which give time to these other perspectives – in this case, to the thoughts of their audiences, rather than 
assuming that the company themselves “know best”. In turn, that these thoughts of others frequently then 
turn up in the company’s writing about their work suggests that genuine attention has been paid to the 
capacity of others - the audience - to make something new out of what they have seen or to be 
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‘revolution’ (as distinct, for Deleuze at least, from the ‘revolutionary’) as aspects of a 
‘macro-political’ agenda. We do not hear them make an explicit critique of the present 
as if it were as a single entity, nor celebrate a paradisal, unified utopia elsewhere. 
Rather, Goat Island might be seen to practice a ‘micro-politics’ of performance by 
involving themselves with the multiple presents around them and offering audiences the 
opportunity to follow suit.  
 
 Becoming revolutionary in this case is about enlarging one’s perception and 
focussing one’s attention – another word for which is ‘respect’: not as a subjective 
feeling but as an intuition or a reflective ‘sympathy with reality’ (Bergson 1946: 305 
n.20). As such, the communal presence that Goat Island’s performances might be 
understood to develop is not a matter of simple ‘unification’ of the audience with each 
other, or with the performers. But nor can this community be understood along the lines 
of Brecht’s supposedly ideal audience of ‘thinking and smoking spectator[s]’, as 
individualised and distanced from their fellow spectator as from the show (Lehmann 
2006: 156). That is, the temporality of this community cannot be conceived as a 
homogeneous shared time belonging to every audience member, nor as an entirely 
discontinuous time in which each one discretely occupies his or her own time. Rather, 
Goat Island offer the audience an experience of time as a multiplicity of presents, an 
opportunity to attend to the plurality of ways in which life moves, and so also the 
multiples of even seemingly simple, classical theatre. Beneath the organising power of 
narrative or the proscenium, theatrical space has always been teeming with differential 
presences if only we would notice them.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
transformed by what they have felt. This is not mere lip-service to ‘participation’. It is another form of 
what Bergson calls ‘attention to life’.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
1. The rehabilitation of presence through difference 
 
This thesis has argued, firstly, that presence in performance can be newly 
conceived as an encounter with difference. Consequently, the idea of presence in 
contemporary performance theory need not only be understood, after Derrida, as an 
illusion, as an aspiration to identity, or as a fullness that is forever deferred by the play 
of difference. Secondly, the thesis has not solely been concerned with how concepts 
created by Deleuze contribute to the theorization of presence in performance. Instead, it 
has sought to place Deleuzian ideas alongside parallel concepts devised by artists. The 
resonance between practitioners’ theorizations of presence and Deleuze’s thought was 
particularly pronounced in Chapters Two and Four. Indeed, in the case of the former, 
we have seen how Deleuze’s conception of the nature of thought itself was inspired by 
Artaud’s account of his own difficulty with achieving genuine thought. In turn, this 
particular chapter has established connections between Deleuze’s concept of 
‘fundamental encounter’ and Artaud’s ideas of the ‘mind in the flesh’ in order to define 
differential presence as an event of embodied, creative thinking.  
 
This thesis has also insisted that difference is a kind of presence rather than a 
kind of absence. That is to say, we have seen how Deleuze’s philosophy allows us to 
theorise the variety of ways in which difference might make itself felt in and as 
experience through his concepts of the forcing of thought, affect, becoming, and 
duration. The thesis has, therefore, refuted the view (forwarded by Badiou and 
Hallward) that Deleuze’s idea of participating in the difference of the world necessarily 
involves a process of dematerialisation, or indeed, a distancing of oneself from the 
political project of changing the nature of the actual. Rather, we have argued that the 
pursuit of differential presence is, in itself, a political goal and specifically, a goal that 
must be achieved through ‘micro-’ rather than ‘macro-’ political means.  
 
In the opening chapter, for example, we noted that where the Living Theatre go 
wrong is in superimposing a macropolitical agenda on a performance that was already 
political in its efforts to support the creative and immanent participation of the audience. 
Equally, in Chapter Two, we saw how Artaud’s minor usage of the voice (or the 
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‘destratification’ of the voice) constitutes a revolutionary act for Deleuze, as a mode of 
vocal performance in solidarity with minorities who ‘work over’ a foreign language 
from the inside (Deleuze 1997: 247). In turn, Chapter Three provided the groundwork 
for thinking in terms of what we might now call a ‘politics of becoming’ rather than a 
politics of the subject. Here, that is, we argued that Kaprow’s Activities should not be 
conceived as apolitical meditations on the world, but as invitations to immanently 
participate in the differential nature of the material world, which is itself a political 
gesture. Whereas Badiou and Hallward want us to return to a politics of the (human) 
subject, our Deleuzian reading of Kaprow allows us to see breaking with subjectivity 
(or ‘becoming-imperceptible’) as a form of creative resistance to oppressive, organizing 
concepts – though, importantly, this resistance is not a secondary reaction to 
organization (or ‘stratification’), but a primary non-representative force that can be 
unleashed in performance. Finally, Chapter Four emphasized the ethico-political 
implications of Deleuze’s notion of the relativity of dominant speeds of perception and 
the concept of multiple presents rather than a single ‘Now’ in a manner that prepares the 
way for thinking in terms of a ‘politics of attention’ rather than representation. In their 
emphasis on slowness and waiting, we saw how the politics of Goat Island’s practice 
lies in their challenging of dominant temporal expectations, which places them in 
solidarity with those human and nonhuman animals that have a different way of being 
in time from the speed demanded by late capitalism. 
 
In this respect, a core aspect particularly of the first three chapters of this thesis 
has been to rehabilitate the practices in question from existing interpretations that would 
imply a mis-fit between that practice and Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. In the first 
chapter we saw how Deleuze’s thought enabled us to rehabilitate elements of the 
somewhat discredited practice of The Living Theatre. By taking a broad sweep 
approach and addressing works from the company’s history across almost four decades, 
we emphasized the number and variety of Deleuzian approaches to performance that, in 
some cases, the company might be said to have pioneered, such as: participation, 
collective creation or immanent authorship, and the use of performance to generate a 
differential community, or ‘people to come’. In each case, a Deleuzian interpretation of 
their practice allowed us to distance the Living Theatre from a transcendent, self-
identical notion of presence. This dissociation from transcendence was also of concern 
in Chapter Two in which we sought to distance Artaud from Derrida, and the 
determination of the theatre of cruelty as fundamentally impossible. Likewise, we made 
 238 
use of Deleuze’s own readings to demonstrate that Artaud is not an essentially binaristic 
thinker, but a reflective practitioner who developed concepts beyond the opposition of 
mind and body, or of self-presence and representation.  
 
In the third chapter, we sought to rehabilitate Allan Kaprow’s work both from 
metaphorical readings and from depoliticisation, again by refusing the mind/matter 
dualism and the distinction between thinking (as Zen meditation) and doing (performing 
actual change). Kaprow’s ephemeral, material work does not need an interpreting 
subject standing outside of it in order for it to have ‘meaning’. Rather, the chapter 
suggested that we need to rethink ‘meaning’ in terms of affect and becoming, as a 
transformation of the audience that takes place on the level of the body through 
participation. Finally, in Chapter Four, this project of recuperation was almost reversed 
in the sense that it was Deleuze, rather than Goat Island, who was the subject of a 
recuperative effort. In this case, we drew from both John Mullarkey’s and Matthew 
Goulish’s Actualist thought in order to retrieve Deleuze from the dominant Virtualist 
reading of his work. By emphasising the Bergsonian aspects of Deleuze’s thought, we 
argued that there is not just ‘one type of presence everywhere’ (Mullarkey 2004: 487), 
in relation to which other actualities are categorized as virtual, but multiple, durational 
presents that can be perceived if performance recalibrates its audiences – as Goat Island 
do. 
 
 A further concern of this thesis has been to examine the specific practical 
methodologies developed by its chosen artists in pursuit of encounters with difference. 
On the one hand, then, we might conclude that the thesis provides a toolbox of creative 
strategies for making oneself a theatre without organs, a theatre of production or a 
theatre of differential presence. These methods have included the use of: improvisation, 
collective creation, participation, chance techniques, glossolalia, Sprechgesang, cries 
and howls, incantation, experimentation, ephemeral materials, unexpected speeds, 
nonart, heightened attention, waiting, repetition and imitation. And yet, this toolbox 
does not come with any guarantee of success; such methods cannot be assumed to 
‘work’ everywhere and for all time. In part, this is because strategies always operate in a 
particular context, and the nature of the contexts (or ‘strata’), which organize the 
material flows in the various realms of the social, change over time. To destratify the 
voice, for instance, may come to require an altogether different set of processes in the 
22nd century. Equally, the thesis has shown that there is nothing intrinsically ‘right’ – 
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aesthetically, philosophically or politically – about improvised or participatory 
performance, just as there is nothing intrinsically ‘wrong’ with observed or directed 
theatre. Indeed, classical theatre – as we saw in Chapter Four – can itself be seen as 
multiple and differential.  
 
To some extent, these ideas have been given public expression in Deleuze and 
Performance, the collection of essays I edited for Edinburgh University Press, 
published in June 2009. However, in future work I particularly look forward to 
exploring the implications of this research for performance practice, in practice. Clearly, 
there are a number of pitfalls that one might fall into with such an aim; not least, the 
risk of producing performances that merely serve to illustrate Deleuzian concepts and, 
in doing so, fail to be Deleuzian in a more profound sense. That said, and as I’ve just 
recounted, the thesis has placed particular emphasis on methodology and on affirming 
an experimental approach to practice that values ‘unknowing’ over the illustration of 
existing ideas, as well as creation and production over reproduction and representation. 
As such, I hope to move beyond the parameters and limits of this thesis in future work 
by taking up this practical approach in the hope of encountering new ideas that could 
only be forced through practice. Given Deleuze’s account of difference as that which 
can only be sensed, the sensory practice of devising and actualizing performance works 
seems particularly well suited to the further exploration of how differential presence 
might make itself felt.    
 
 
2. Participation and Authorship 
 
This thesis has also demonstrated the value of the concept of differential 
presence for theorizing participatory performance, rehabilitating the idea of 
‘participation’ from transcendentalist associations with ‘absolute communion’ in the 
case of The Living Theatre, and with ‘Zen Conceptualism’ in the case of Zepke’s 
reading of Kaprow. We have shown that participation, understood as differential 
presence, is not about overcoming differences between people or dissolving art in 
routine life. Differential presence is neither, simply, the result of ‘breaking the touch 
barrier’ (Beck and Malina 1971a: 74), nor, merely, the by-product of ‘a state of mind’ 
(Zepke 2009: 120). Rather, in the conjunction of concepts from Deleuze and from the 
practitioners themselves, the respective chapters on the Living Theatre and on Kaprow 
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have shown how participation can be understood, ontologically, as a process that 
reveals the inadequacy of thinking in terms of any rigid distinction between ‘self’ and 
‘other’, or ‘part’ and whole’89.  
 
Ultimately, the thesis proposes that the only genuinely participatory projects are 
those that facilitate the emergence of relations of differential presence between 
participants and event, in a manner that affirms, rather than seeks to determine or 
control, the creative and unpredictable nature of these encounters. As differential 
presence, participation is understood to generates new ideas and sensations in the 
audience that the artist could never have imagined; but this can only happen when 
participants allow themselves to be caught up in a piece that really does have a life of its 
own, beyond the possibilities that any blueprint might envision. In this context, ‘failure’ 
– in the form of breakdown and collapse – is always a risk. At the same time, we have 
been led to the conclusion that ‘failure’ too is relative and perspectival, rather than 
absolute; one can only judge an experiment to have failed if one measures it in relation 
to a transcendent and predetermined goal.  
 
This is not to say that the performance of differential presence is necessarily 
lawless, or to be entered into carelessly. On the contrary, we have seen how it is often 
the very presence of constraints, rules or instructions that promotes creativity. Faced 
with pure chaos or an infinite number of alternatives, participants may become 
paralysed, or lapse into clichéd ways of thinking and acting. But at the same time, the 
rules or instructions must always leave room for multiple responses and outcomes, as in 
the case of the scores of Kaprow’s Activities. 
 
This theme was of particular concern in Chapters One and Three. In Chapter 
One, for example, the thesis noted that the Living Theatre often felt the need to steer 
audience participation back onto the political course that had been predetermined as the 
goal of works such as Paradise Now. Despite encouraging participation, we noted how 
the company’s score also encouraged actors to intervene if the performance ‘digresses 
from the revolutionary theme’ (The Living Theatre 1971: 45). Rather than seeing 
creative and therefore digressive participation itself as a political act, the thesis has 
noted that the Living Theatre associated the politics of theatre with the communication 
                                                 
89 In this fashion, the thesis has connected theatrical presence to the philosophical notion of immanence 
rather than transcendence, in a way that points to the possibility of future research on the relation between 
presence in performance and other philosophies of immanence, such as that of Spinoza, or Michel Henry. 
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of revolutionary ideas. Likewise, Chapter Three argued that Kaprow’s continuing 
attachment to the art world context (despite his ambitions to the contrary) ran the risk of 
predetermining and conventionalising the relation of the participants to the Activities 
and therefore blocking the emergence of presence as affect and becoming-
imperceptible.  
 
However, the theme of participation was also implicitly addressed in Chapter 
Two insofar as it proposes that Artaud’s lingering desire for authorial control operates 
as a threat to differential presence. This argument then culminated in Chapter Four in a 
manner that now allows us to conclude that, in order for differential presence to flourish 
rather than be suppressed, we need to develop new approaches to authorship and new 
attitudes to the audience, along the lines of Goat Island’s exemplary collaboration and 
openness. With respect to collaboration in the process of making performance, Goat 
Island’s practice provides a more sustainable approach to undoing the transcendent 
author than the Living Theatre’s strategy of collective creation. As the thesis has noted, 
Beck and Malina frequently felt compelled to re-assume directorial control when the 
sheer size of the company seemed to mitigate against arriving at any ‘finished’ work. In 
contrast, the example of Goat Island invites us to conclude that one ought not to 
underestimate the difficulty of immanent creation, particularly when it involves a group 
in which each one is necessarily, already ‘several’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 3).  
 
In this regard, we can surmise that the pursuit of differential presence, and the 
corresponding need to derail the desire to exert authorial control, must inform every 
stage of the process of creating performance for all participants. Differential presence 
occurs when, as audiences, we stop asking ‘what does it mean?’ and concentrate on 
paying attention to what a given performance does to us as affective bodies, and as 
bodies with particular ways of being in time. Differential presence occurs when, as 
practitioners, we approach performance as a way of thinking, rather than as a means to 
illustrate a preconceived set of concepts. Differential presence happens if we make 
room for the audience to genuinely collaborate in and contribute to the nature of the 
event that takes place, whether that collaboration involves literal, physical participation 
– as in the case of the Living Theatre and Kaprow – or what we have called 
‘participatory spectatorship’, such as in the temporal recalibration of audiences 
performed by Goat Island.   
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3. From the non-representational to re-presentation 
 
 In this thesis, we have put forward a series of arguments regarding the theme of 
representation: in particular, we have returned to the debate on the relationship between 
presence and representation, and challenged the persistent orthodoxy that all relations 
we have to the world and to performance are necessarily mediated by representation. On 
the one hand, that is, this thesis has often foregrounded the idea of presence as a non-
representational relation, meaning a process of encounter that does not involve the 
recognition of an object by a discrete subject, or the interpretation of things in terms of 
an underlying meaning. And on the other, we have insisted upon an affective reality of 
relation operating nonrepresentationally, and we have argued that our relation to 
‘others’ or difference can be understood through Deleuze’s concept of becoming, which 
rethinks notions of imitation or mimesis from the point of view of a process ontology. 
As the thesis has repeatedly remarked, for Deleuze, difference comes before identity; 
what there is, is a temporal flow of becoming from which objects and subjects emerge, 
or over which strata are organized. Since these ‘things’ are always changing, the notion 
of mimesis itself must become a mobile concept. From this perspective, the thesis has 
constituted the event of performance as an event of transformation and creation, rather 
than representation and communication, in which both performers and audience can live 
change through their encounters with other bodies.  
 
In Chapter Three on Allan Kaprow, for example, we focused on the way in 
which his Activities invite the audience to experiment with materials as processes, 
rather than interpret them as symbols. Likewise, this investigation has also defended the 
idea of a theatre without representation in its conception of a ‘theatre of production’ and 
a ‘theatre without organs’. But such a defence is perhaps easily misinterpreted – as an 
appeal to chaos, senselessness or meaninglessness; as an invitation to flee from actuality 
and politics; by some, as a call to transcend the mind and thought, and by others, as a 
call to take flight from the material body with all its limitations. Nevertheless, the call to 
undo subjectivity, as a secondary attempt to fix a more primary flux, need not 
necessarily lead to any of these conclusions. These may be the risks of differential 
presence, but they are not its inevitable effects. Rather, as we have noted, differential 
presence can allow both the liberation of thinking from the limitations of fixed and pre-
existing concepts, and the emancipation of the body – including the voice – from habits 
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of usage and conventional modes of organization. Indeed, as we’ve seen, these projects 
are entirely intertwined.  
 
But given these remarks, it might be asked whether this project leaves itself 
vulnerable to Derridean accusations that it merely reinstates a binary between presence 
and representation, rejecting the latter in favour of the former, albeit in the form of 
‘differential’ rather than ‘self-’ presence. Here, much depends on the definition of 
representation in question – a factor that requires us to differentiate between Derrida’s 
own thought (which we have already agreed has much in common with Deleuze’s), a 
more generalized deconstructionist perspective (as put forward by Blau, Auslander and 
Power) and a more extreme brand of representationalism or linguistic idealism. If 
‘representation’ is a synonym for difference (or the process of differing), then there is 
no debate; or rather, the debate shifts to an alternate set of concerns. Clearly, this thesis 
has confirmed the view that presence is itself differential rather than self-identical; and 
that the experience of presence in performance is not opposed to 
representation/difference, but is an encounter with that very process of differing. 
However, the thesis has also demonstrated that one of the central values of Deleuze’s 
philosophy for the theorization of presence in performance lies in his extension of the 
analysis of the process of differing beyond the realm of meaning and chains of 
signifiers. As we have seen in Chapter Two in particular, Deleuze is not dis-interested 
in the process of differing as it appears in spoken and written language, but he is also 
interested in the operations of difference (or ‘representation’ if you will) in the realm of 
matter.  
 
Yet at the same time, the thesis has also been concerned with rethinking 
representation rather than rejecting it, and with reconsidering presence as a mutually 
transformative encounter between the different, rather than as a instance of recognition, 
identification, communication, communion or coincidence between a subject and an 
object.  From its Deleuzian perspective, this thesis has suggested that to represent some 
‘thing’ is neither to imitate it, nor to embark upon a doomed project to be present to 
‘things themselves’ (an enterprise guaranteed to fail on account of the mediation of a 
representing consciousness). Rather, we have drawn from Deleuze to propose that 
performance’s production of images, texts, events and movements involves entering 
into a becoming which changes both the work and the world as re-presentation or 
differential repetition. For example, in Chapter One, we have argued that it is not so 
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much that the Living Theatre were concerned ‘to eliminate the as if’ in performance, as 
Blau suggested, so much as that they wanted to generate ‘real fictions’ or ‘fictional 
realities’. In this way, the chapter has shown how we might rethink representation as 
real creation, rather than as some second-order mode of being, forever detached from 
and inadequate to some ‘thing’ which is represented. The theory of differential presence 
begins from the Deleuzian premise that reality always differs from itself anyway, prior 
to the differential power of representation.  
 
Throughout the thesis, we have also sought to rescue the concept of ‘the real’ 
from its construction as either inaccessible, or as linguistically constructed. In turn, the 
thesis has insisted that theatre’s bodies are not only mediated by the values embedded in 
systems of representation, but were always already differentiated in their own way – as 
what Deleuze variously conceives of as affect, becoming, duration and so forth. At no 
point has this claim been reducible to the idea that performance gives us access to truth, 
the essential identity of things, or a simple Now. Rather, it has been argued that 
performance provides the opportunity for encounters with difference in itself, a 
presence with or participation in difference that is not known so much as sensed.  
 
 
4. The ubiquity of differential presence 
 
For Martin Puchner, as the first chapter noted, it is precisely because theatre 
works with physical bodies that we delude ourselves that performance can show us how 
things really are. However, although they have been the focus here, this project has not 
aimed to situate theatre and performance as privileged forms of creative practice with 
regard to differential presence. The implication of this thesis is not that theatre offers 
encounters with difference, whereas painting or literature or film cannot. Nor have we 
intended to suggest that only specific types of non-representational performance or non-
naturalistic theatre differ from themselves in ways that have the power to effect 
transformations in their audiences. On the contrary, this thesis has argued that to take 
Deleuze’s ontological claims seriously means committing to the idea that differential 
presence is at work in all forms of performance. But this is not to say that all 
performances are ‘the same’, or that theatre is just the same as cinema; rather, what is 
the same is their differences. To take up Deleuze’s ontology, as we have here, is not to 
reduce all forms of performance and art in general to a monotony or bare repetition, 
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because what is being repeated is difference rather than sameness. For us, differential 
presence is ubiquitous in performance, just as there is a univocity of difference in all 
aspects of life for Deleuze.  
 
In turn, although the thesis has deliberately tried to use the most effective 
examples of practice to demonstrate the concept of differential presence, it has also 
emphasised the role of the audience, specifically the willingness of that audience to 
allow their mode of attention to be altered, as a condition for differential presence. 
Ultimately, then, it is the responsibility of both audience and performer to create 
opportunities for differential presence. As this project’s four chapters have shown, we 
need to continue to experiment with strategies that enable us to have encounters with 
difference, rather than suppressing its emergence by perpetuating transcendent models 
of authorship or participation; reinforcing the stratification of the body (including the 
voice); allowing convention to maintain a clear distinction between art and life; or by 
consigning differential ways of being in time to the categories of ‘the inaccessible’, ‘the 
past’ or ‘the worthless’. To experience differential presence, both performers and 
audience must pay attention to the non-representational thought processes of the 
affective body, as that which is always open to transformation through its contact with 
other bodies, both human and non-human. Far from being impossible or immaterial, 
differential presence operates on the level of experience as that which undoes fixed 
subjects and allows us to become, makes us think, and reveals other durations or ways 
of being in time. For this thesis, as for Deleuze, the affirmation of difference or the 
amplification of variation is the over-arching value, whether in relation to theatre, 
philosophy, or politics. Differential presence matters because it outlines alternative 
future experiences of self, language, thought and time. 
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